Etzler, T. v. Etzler, G. ( 2015 )


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  • J-A09028-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    THOMAS S. ETZLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    DERIVATIVELY ON BEHALF OF                            PENNSYLVANIA
    RECYCLING EQUIPMENT CORPORATION,
    Appellant
    v.
    GUNTHER “BUD” ETZLER, STEPHEN P.
    ETZLER, WILMA D. ETZLER, RECYCLING
    EQUIPMENT CORP., INC.,
    Appellee                  No. 2288 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 9, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Civil Division at No(s): 09-25465 and 09-26544
    BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and STABILE, JJ.
    CONCURRING AND DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:
    FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2015
    I agree with the learned majority that Thomas’s claims at Counts V
    and VI are arbitrable.     I also agree with the majority that Count III,
    appointment of a custodian, is not arbitrable as the arbitration provision in
    the Buy-Sell Agreement was not intended to displace remedies available to
    minority shareholders under the corporation law generally. The appointment
    of a custodian is a remedy available under the Business Corporation Law to a
    shareholder with more than a five percent ownership interest in the
    J-A09028-15
    corporation and to whom the directors “have acted illegally, oppressively, or
    fraudulently.” See 15 Pa.C.S. § 1767(a).
    I depart from my esteemed colleagues, however, in their conclusion
    that Counts I, II, and IV are arbitrable.      “The scope of arbitration is
    determined by the intention of the parties as ascertained in accordance with
    the rules governing contracts generally.” D & H Distrib. Co. v. Nat'l Union
    Fire Ins. Co., 
    817 A.2d 1164
    , 1166 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting Henning v.
    State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 
    795 A.2d 994
    , 996 (Pa.Super.
    2002)). “Arbitration is a matter of contract, and parties to a contract cannot
    be compelled to arbitrate a given issue absent an agreement between them
    to arbitrate that issue.” Setlock v. Pinebrook Pers. Care & Ret. Ctr., 
    56 A.3d 904
    , 909-910 (Pa.Super. 2012).
    Paragraph 18, “Arbitration,” provides:
    Any party to this Agreement shall have the right to demand that
    a controversy or claim arising out of or related to this
    Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by
    arbitration in accordance with the then current rules of the
    American Arbitration Association of Philadelphia, and judgment
    upon the award rendered by the arbitrator or arbitrators may be
    entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. The costs of
    such arbitration shall be borne by the losing party.
    (emphasis supplied).
    I acknowledge that similarly worded arbitration clauses have been
    labeled “unlimited” and our courts have held that any claims implicating the
    contract can be compelled to arbitration, whether they sound in contract or
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    tort.    See Dodds v. Pulte Home Corporation, 
    909 A.2d 348
    , 351
    (Pa.Super. 2006).    However, more recently, this Court has explained that
    “[e]ven though it is now the policy of the law to favor settlement of disputes
    by arbitration and to promote the swift and orderly disposition of claims,
    arbitration agreements are to be strictly construed and such agreements
    should not be extended by implication.”     Elwyn v. DeLuca, 
    48 A.3d 457
    ,
    461 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted). For instance,
    in Setlock, 
    supra,
     we refused to “make the leap” and find claims for
    wrongful death arbitrable pursuant to a residential agreement that merely
    set forth the residents’ financial obligations, finding that the dispute did not
    arise from the matters covered by the agreement. We held that “where a
    contract in no way discusses liability for a cause of action, the arbitration
    clause in the unrelated contract between the parties cannot be read so
    broadly as to encompass any and all disputes that arise between the
    parties.” Setlock, supra at 912 n.7.
    The stated purpose of the Buy-Sell Agreement was to ensure that
    ownership of the closely held corporation remained in the hands of those
    engaged in the conduct of the business. To that end, the Agreement placed
    restrictions on the lifetime transfer of the stock, identified the events that
    trigger a forced sale, and specified the basis for valuation of the shares for
    purposes of a buy-out. The Agreement also established the timeline for the
    acceptance of the offer by the Corporation or the remaining shareholders,
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    the method for determining the purchase price, and the manner of
    transferring the shares.
    I do not believe that Counts I and IV, both of which involve claims of
    wrongful termination, are arbitrable simply because termination is a
    triggering event for the operation of the Buy-Sell Agreement. Count I, which
    seeks a declaration of the validity of actions taken by Gunther and Wilma as
    purported directors of the Recycling Equipment Corporation (“Corporation”),
    including their demotion of Thomas and promotion of Gunther to President,
    involves matters of corporate governance. The Buy-Sell Agreement simply
    does not address matters of corporate management. Count IV is designed
    to effect a tort recovery for the same alleged misconduct that forms the
    basis for the declaratory relief sought at Count I.1 I believe the remedy for
    wrongful termination is wholly distinct from the valuation and transfer of
    Thomas’s shares in the Corporation, which is the subject of the Agreement.
    At Count II, Thomas asserted a derivative claim for the Appellees’
    breach of their fiduciary duties to the Corporation and its shareholders based
    on, inter alia, self-dealing and misappropriation of corporate assets. Thomas
    pled that their misconduct “significantly depleted the value of the Company
    and have set it for a course of self-destruction.” Complaint, Count II ¶61.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Notably, Thomas seeks monetary damages, not reinstatement, for his
    alleged wrongful termination.
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    The majority concedes that Count II states a derivative claim for breach of
    fiduciary duties owed to the Corporation.       Nonetheless, it focuses on
    allegations of financial irregularities, breach of a duty to “maximize
    corporate assets,” and a duty to maintain accurate and complete financial
    records, and concludes that these averments all relate to the determination
    of the book value of the stock, and thus, are arbitrable.           Majority
    Memorandum, at 13.
    I disagree with the majority’s premise that the allegation of financial
    irregularities is ipso facto a challenge to the calculation of book value.
    Furthermore, I believe Count II states a viable shareholder derivative claim
    authorized under the Business Corporation Law.     A shareholder derivative
    action is an “action or proceeding brought to enforce a secondary right on
    the part of one or more shareholders of a business corporation against any
    present or former officer or director of the corporation because the
    corporation refuses to enforce rights that may properly be asserted by it.”
    15 Pa.C.S. § 1782(a); see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1506(a). Financial irregularities,
    waste of corporate assets, alleged ultra vires acts by ostensible directors,
    and self-dealing are well-recognized grounds for seeking relief in a
    shareholder derivative action.   Since the Agreement does not address or
    purport to govern such actions, I do not find the claims asserted in Count II
    arbitrable.
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    Thus, I would reverse and remand for a judicial disposition of Counts I,
    II, and IV, in addition to Count III.
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