Com. v. Brown, G. ( 2016 )

J-A31001-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
GARRETT STEVEN BROWN
Appellant No. 443 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 24, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0005821-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JANUARY 29, 2016
Appellant, Garrett Steven Brown, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered after he was convicted of driving under the influence of
alcohol (“DUI”) and resisting arrest. Brown argues that the arresting officer
violated his right against unreasonable searches. After careful review, we
affirm.
The Commonwealth charged Brown with five counts of DUI, one count
of resisting arrest, and one count of driving a vehicle at an unsafe speed.
Brown filed a pre-trial suppression motion, challenging the basis for the
traffic stop. At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth presented the
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A31001-15
testimony of Officer Michael Jordan, Patrol Officer for the West Manchester
Township Police Department.
Officer Jordan’s testimony can be summarized as follows. In the early
morning of August 18, 2014, Officer Jordan observed a vehicle travelling “a
lot faster than normal.” N.T., Suppression Hearing, 12/17/14, at 5. As he
continued to observe the vehicle, it approached a red stop light aggressively,
and proceeded to spin its tires when making a left turn after the light turned
green. Officer Jordan proceeded to follow the vehicle.
As he was following the vehicle, it sped up and continued to pull away
from him. There were no other vehicles on the street, parked or in motion,
no pedestrians, and no unusual driving conditions. The vehicle proceeded
down the residential street until it made a left turn into a driveway. Officer
Jordan turned on his emergency lighting and pulled into the driveway.
Brown had already exited his vehicle and was heading to the door of his
residence when Officer Jordan detained him.
The trial court found Officer Jordan’s testimony credible, and denied
Brown’s motion to suppress. Thereafter, Brown stipulated to the contents of
the affidavit of probable cause and the transcript of the suppression hearing.
Furthermore, Brown stipulated that Officer Jordan “had cause to file the
resisting arrest charge and that charge is valid.” N.T., Trial, 2/24/15, at 2.
The trial court proceeded to convict Brown of DUI and resisting arrest, and
-2-
J-A31001-15
imposed an aggregate sentence of two years’ probation. This timely appeal
followed.
On appeal, Brown argues that Officer Jordan lacked sufficient probable
cause to stop him. The Commonwealth counters that Officer Jordan had
reasonable suspicion to stop Brown to investigate whether Brown was
intoxicated. We review a challenge to a trial court’s refusal to suppress
evidence pursuant to the following well established standard of review.
[W]e are limited to determining whether the factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct. We may consider the
evidence of the witnesses offered by the prosecution, as verdict
winner, and only so much of the defense evidence that remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole.
Commonwealth v. McAliley, 919 A.2d 272, 275-276 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(citation omitted). “Moreover, if the evidence supports the factual findings
of the suppression court, this Court will reverse only if there is an error in
the legal conclusions drawn from those findings.” Commonwealth v.
Powell, 994 A.2d 1096, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).
The quantum of proof necessary to make a vehicle stop on suspicion of
a violation of the motor vehicle code is governed by 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b),
which states:
(b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police officer is
engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers
or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is
occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request
or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration,
proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or
-3-
J-A31001-15
engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other
information as the officer may reasonably believe to be
necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (emphasis supplied).
Traffic stops based upon suspicion of a violation of the motor vehicle
code under section 6308(b) “must serve a stated investigatory purpose.”
Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the
driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant
to the suspected violation. In such an instance, ‘it is encumbent
[sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by
him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide
probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in
violation of some provision of the Code.’
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
Brown is correct that a vehicular stop based solely upon suspicion of
violating section 3361 requires probable cause:
[A] vehicle stop based solely on offenses not ‘investigatable’
cannot be justified by a mere reasonable suspicion, because the
purposes of a Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)] stop do not exist—maintaining the status
quo while investigating is inapplicable where there is nothing
further to investigate. An officer must have probable cause to
make a constitutional vehicle stop for such offenses.
Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 423 (Pa. Super. 2012) (footnote
and citation omitted). Here, however, the trial court concluded that Officer
Jordan had sufficient reasonable suspicion to investigate whether Brown was
intoxicated.
-4-
J-A31001-15
When this Court evaluates whether an investigative detention is
constitutional, the following principles guide our decision.
A police officer may detain an individual in order to
conduct an investigation if that officer reasonably suspects
that the individual is engaging in criminal conduct. This
standard, less stringent than probable cause, is commonly
known as reasonable suspicion. In order to determine
whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion, the
totality of the circumstances must be considered. In
making this determination, we must give due weight to the
specific reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled
to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Also, the
totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry
to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate
criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent
facts, when taken together, may warrant further
investigation by the police officer.
Commonwealth v. Ranson, 103 A.3d 73, 76 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing
Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en
banc)).
As noted previously, Officer Jordan testified that he witnessed Brown
drive at extreme rates of speed through a residential neighborhood, even
though he was unable to verify the exact speed. See N.T., Suppression
Hearing, 12/17/14, at 9-10. At the speed Brown was travelling, Officer
Jordan feared that Brown would be unable to stop at a stop sign in the
neighborhood. See id., at 10. These circumstances certainly provided
Officer Jordan with sufficient reasonable suspicion to investigate whether
Brown was intoxicated while driving. We therefore conclude that Brown’s
issue on appeal merits no relief and affirm.
-5-
J-A31001-15
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/29/2016
-6-