Com. v. Young, D. ( 2015 )

J-S68020-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
DEMETRIUS YOUNG, :
:
Appellant : No. 460 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 5, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0015003-2012
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DONOHUE and MUNDY, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2015
Demetrius Young (”Young”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered following is convictions of third-degree murder, carrying a firearm
without a license, and possession of instruments of crime.1 For the following
reasons, we affirm.
Young’s convictions stem from an altercation outside of a Philadelphia
night club that resulted in the death of one man, Marcus Smith (“Victim”).
The trial court summarized the facts underlying this appeal as follows:
In 2011, [Victim], Felicia Madison, [Victim’s] fiancée,
and Cortez Pryor were living together. In May of
2011, Pryor was stopped by the police while driving
[Victim’s] car. Pryor ran from the police into Madison
and [Victim’s] house. The police arrested [Victim]
instead of Pryor. After that incident[,] Pryor and
[Victim’s] relationship deteriorated. N.T. 12/2/2014
at 135-39, 146.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 6106(a)(1), 907(a).
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On April 1, 2012, at about 3:45 a.m., Sheila Williams
was outside waiting to enter the Wheels of Soul
nightclub located at 61st and Market Streets in
Philadelphia. A red car pulled up and Williams heard
[Young], who was sitting in the passenger seat,
comment “there go that niggah right there.” Williams
paid attention to the men because she believed there
was going to be a fight. The driver, later identified as
Cortez Pryor, exited the car and met [Victim] at the
back of the car. [Victim] punched Pryor. [Young] got
out of the car and grabbed [Victim]. Pryor retrieved
a firearm from the car and returned to the
altercation. As soon as [Victim] broke free of
[Young’s] hold, Pryor shot [Victim]. [Victim]
immediately fell to the ground and Williams heard
twenty to thirty shots. After the shooting, [Young]
and Pryor drove away in the red car towards 60th
Street. On April 2, 2012, Williams identified co-
defendant Pryor as the shooter from a photo array.
On May 2, 2012, Williams identified [Young] from a
photo array. N.T. 12/2/2014 at 150-60, 168-69,
171, 209.
On the night of the shooting[,] Darryl Seals,
[Victim], and James McGill were at the Wheels of
Soul nightclub at 60th and Market Streets. At
around 3:45 a.m., McGill and [Victim] left the
nightclub. Seals heard gunshots and ran outside and
saw that [Victim] had been shot. Seals got his car
and drove [Victim] to the Hospital of the University
of Pennsylvania. N.T. 12/3/2014 at
141 -42, 144, 146 -48.
At 3:58 a.m., [Victim] was pronounced dead at the
Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania. According
to Dr. Sam Gulino, the Chief Medical Examiner for
the County of Philadelphia, Smith suffered ten
gunshot wounds: four to the leg, three to the chest,
two to the arm, one to the back, and one to the hip.
[Victim] suffered injuries to the lung, heart,
diaphragm, liver, and spine as a result of these
gunshots. N.T. 12/3/2014 at 109, 111-118.
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Trial Court Opinion, 3/20/15, at 2-4 (footnotes omitted).
A jury convicted Young of the offenses listed above. On December 5,
2014, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of nineteen and a half to
thirty-nine years in prison. On December 15, 2014, Young filed timely post-
sentence motions, which the trial court denied the following day. One week
later, on December 23, 2014, Young filed another untimely post-sentence
motion. The trial court denied this untimely motion on December 31, 2014.
Young filed his notice of appeal on January 30, 2015.
On April 2, 2015, this Court issued a rule directing Young to show
cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. Young did not
respond and on May 11, 2015, this Court referred the issue of the timeliness
of this appeal to the panel assigned to decide the merits of this appeal.
It is well established that a defendant must file a notice of appeal
within thirty days of the entry of the judgment of sentence, but that where
the defendant files timely post-sentence motions, this period is tolled until
the entry of an order disposing of the post-sentence motion.
Commonwealth v. Green, 862 A.2d 613, 618 (Pa. Super. 2004); see also
Pa.R.A.P. 903; Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2). It is also well established that an
untimely post-sentence motion does not toll the period of time in which to
file an appeal. Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 750 (Pa.
Super. 2005). Thus, the period of time for Young to file a timely appeal
began to run on the date the trial court denied his post-sentence motion,
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December 16, 2014. The filing of the second, untimely post-sentence
motion did not extend the appeal period. Young, therefore, was required to
file his appeal on or before January 15, 2015.
While this Court generally cannot extend the time to file an appeal, we
have allowed exceptions when there has been a “breakdown in the
processes of the court.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498
(Pa. Super. 2007). In Patterson, a panel of this Court found such a
breakdown where the trial court had failed to fulfill the requirements of
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(4), which provides:
An order denying a post-sentence motion … shall
include notice to the defendant of the following:
(a) the right to appeal and the time limits within
which the appeal must be filed;
(b) the right to assistance of counsel in the
preparation of the appeal;
(c) the rights, if the defendant is indigent, to
appeal in forma pauperis and to proceed with
assigned counsel as provided in Rule 122; and
(d) the qualified right to bail under Rule 521(B).
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(4) (emphasis added). The comment to this Rule
explains the reasoning behind the mandatory inclusion of this information:
Paragraph (B)(4) protects the defendant’s right to
appeal by requiring that the judge’s order denying
the motion, the clerk of courts’ order denying the
motion by operation of law, or the order entered
memorializing a defendant’s withdrawal of a post-
sentence motion, contain written notice of the
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defendant’s appeal rights. This requirement ensures
adequate notice to the defendant, which is important
given the potential time lapse between the notice
provided at sentencing and the resolution of the
post-sentence motion. See Rule 704(C)(3). See
also Commonwealth v. Miller, 715 A.2d 1203 (Pa.
Super. 1998), concerning the contents of the order
memorializing the withdrawal of a post-sentence
motion.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720, Comment.
The order entered here by the trial court denying Young’s untimely
post-sentence motion did not contain any of the information required by
Rule 720(B)(4); most crucially, it did not inform Young of the time in which
he had left to file a timely appeal. We addressed the same situation in
Patterson, as the trial court’s order denying an untimely post-sentence
motion did not inform the defendant “that, due to the late filing of his post-
sentence motion, he had to file an appeal within thirty days of the imposition
of sentence.” Patterson, 940 A.2d at 499. We found that the trial court’s
failure to comply with Rule 720(B) constituted a breakdown in the court’s
process that would excuse the untimely filing:
In our view, the trial court’s failure to comply with
Rule 720 constitutes a breakdown that excuses the
untimely filing of Appellant's notice of appeal. While
Appellant did receive proper notification of his post-
sentence and appellate rights at the time of
sentencing, we will not deem partial compliance with
the rules sufficient. Foremost, the use of the word
“shall” in Rule 720(B)(4)(a) evinces the mandatory
nature of the notification. See Commonwealth v.
Pleger, 934 A.2d 715, 720 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(stating “shall” evinces a mandatory obligation).
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Second, the Comment to the Rule clearly states that
Rule 720(B)(4) serves a distinct purpose from Rule
704, namely, to ensure adequate notice to the
defendant given the routine delay between the
sentencing and the disposition of the post-sentence
motion. Finally, in the instant case, the trial court’s
compliance with this rule likely would have obviated
the untimely filing of the appeal as Appellant had
over two weeks remaining in the appeal period after
the trial court entered the order.
In so holding, we do not find that our Court’s
decision in Dreves, supra, compels us to quash the
appeal. In Dreves, [] the trial court properly advised
the appellant of his post-sentence and appellate
rights at sentencing, the appellant filed a post-
sentence motion twenty days after the imposition of
sentence, the trial court denied the motion three
months later, and the appellant filed a notice of
appeal within thirty days of the entry of the order
denying the post-sentence motion. Our Court
concluded that Appellant filed an untimely post-
sentence motion, should have filed his notice of
appeal within thirty days of the imposition of
sentence, and quashed the appeal. Importantly, the
Dreves court did not encounter a situation where
the trial court’s compliance or non-compliance with
Rule 720 would have impacted upon the timeliness
of the appeal. In Dreves, the trial court did not
resolve the untimely post-sentence motion prior to
the expiration of the appeal period. As such, we find
Dreves factually distinguishable. Finding that a
court breakdown occurred, we will entertain the
merits of the instant appeal.
Id. at 499-500.
In this case, as in Patterson, the trial court failed to comply with Rule
720(B)(4) and advise Young of the relevant deadlines for appeal purposes
following the disposition of his untimely post-sentence motion. Also as in
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Patterson, Young still had approximately two weeks in which to file a timely
appeal following the denial of his untimely post-sentence motion.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s failure to comply with Rule
720(B)(4) constitutes a breakdown so as to excuse Young’s untimely filing of
his notice of appeal.
Young has raised two issues on appeal. First, he challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions of third-degree murder,
possessing instruments of crime and carrying a firearm without a license.
Young’s Brief at 15-22.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence
admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable
the fact-finder to find every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above
test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note
that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility
of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s
guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a
matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn
from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
believe all, part or none of the evidence.
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Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 947 A.2d 800, 805-06 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Young’s argument with regard to his third-degree murder conviction
does not challenge the presence of evidence that would support his
convictions, but only the credibility of that evidence. See Young’s Brief at
17 (“Thus, the DNA evidence against [] Young … was extremely weak.”), 18
(characterizing the conclusion that Young restrained Victim as
“preposterous”). An argument challenging credibility determinations is an
argument addressed to the weight, rather that the sufficiency, of the
evidence supporting a conviction. Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d
274, 281-82 (Pa. Super. 2009). As such, it is irrelevant to a sufficiency
claim and cannot form the basis for relief.
With regard to the remaining two convictions, possessing an
instrument of crime and firearms not to be carried without a license, Young
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he
possessed the firearm that Pryor used to shoot Victim.2 Young’s Brief at 19-
22. He argues, in sum, that the evidence “established nothing more than
[Young’s] mere presence in a vehicle in which a weapon had been located,
2
Both of these offenses require establishing that the accused possessed a
firearm. 18 Pa.C.S.A. 907(a) (“A person commits a misdemeanor of the first
degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to employ it
criminally.”); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1) (“[A]ny person who carries a
firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a firearm concealed on or
about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business,
without a valid and lawfully issued license under this chapter commits a
felony of the third degree.”).
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and there was no evidence to demonstrate that he even know [sic] of the
weapon before [Pryor] went to the car and retrieved it.” Id. at 22. We
disagree. The Commonwealth presented evidence that Young’s DNA was on
the grip and trigger of the firearm. N.T., 12/3/14, at 221-241. Considering
this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude
that it is sufficient to establish that young possessed the firearm.3
In his second issue, Young argues that his convictions are against the
weight of the evidence. Young’s Brief at 22.
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of
the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying
question of whether the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge
has had the opportunity to hear and see the
evidence presented, an appellate court will give the
gravest consideration to the findings and reasons
advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
court's determination that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable
reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the
lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was
not against the weight of the evidence and that a
new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by
the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a
new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the
evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a
trial court's discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he
term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment,
wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate
conclusion within the framework of the law, and is
3
Tellingly, Young does not mention this evidence in his argument as to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support these offenses. See Young’s Brief at
19-22.
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not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the
will of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the
foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.
Discretion is abused where the course pursued
represents not merely an error of judgment, but
where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or
where the law is not applied or where the record
shows that the action is a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis in the
original) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, we are mindful that as we review Young’s claim, we are
not passing on the underlying question of whether the verdicts were against
the weight of the evidence, but rather we are considering whether the trial
court abused its discretion in denying his motion based upon his claim that
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We are focused,
therefore, on evidence that the trial court’s ruling is “manifestly
unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that
the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id.Young, however, fails to appreciate the scope and standard of our
review. He does not present any argument as to how the trial court abused
its discretion in denying his post-trial motion. He argues only that the
evidence supports his version of events and assails the jury’s credibility
determinations and fact finding. Young’s Brief at 22-25. Thus, his argument
is directed to the underlying question of whether his convictions are against
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the weight of the evidence. As stated above, this is not the question before
us for review. He does not allege how the trial court’s denial of his claim is
“manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the
record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-
will.” Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055.
Young has not provided us with appropriate argument relative to our
standard of review, and this Court will not develop an argument on his
behalf. See Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa. Super.
2006). In addition, however, we note that our independent review of the
record provides us with ample support for the conclusion that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the verdicts in this case were not
against the weight of the evidence. We therefore find no merit to Young’s
claim.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/16/2015
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