Com. v. Slaughter, C. ( 2015 )

J-A26041-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL SLAUGHTER,
Appellant No. 432 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 4, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-22-CR-0002736-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 14, 2015
Appellant, Christopher Michael Slaughter, appeals from the judgment
of sentence entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas following
his jury conviction of aggravated assault on a police officer and related
offenses. Appellant led police on a high speed chase in a densely populated
neighborhood, causing an accident which inflicted severe, continuing injuries
to a police officer and an innocent bystander. On apprehension, police found
6.2 grams of cocaine and unused baggies in the vehicle. Appellant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, and claims his sentence was
excessive. We affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A26041-15
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant
facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to
restate them at length here.
For context and the convenience of the reader, we note briefly that
Appellant fled from a traffic stop at high speed, ignoring lights and sirens,
running through a number of stop signs, and narrowly avoiding other
pedestrians in a heavily populated residential neighborhood. A police officer
testified as an expert that in his opinion the quantity of cocaine was
possessed with intention to sell or deliver to another person.
A jury convicted Appellant of aggravated assault on a police officer,1
aggravated assault with malice,2 fleeing or attempting to elude a police
officer,3 recklessly endangering another person,4 and possession with intent
to deliver.5 The court, with the benefit of a Pre-Sentence Investigation
Report (PSI), sentenced Appellant to a term of not less than twenty-nine and
one-half to not more than fifty-nine years’ incarceration. This appeal
followed.
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(2).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).
3
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a).
4
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
5
35 P.S. § 780–113(a)(30).
-2-
J-A26041-15
Appellant raises the following two questions for our review:
I. Whether the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence to sustain Appellant’s conviction for: aggravated
assault where Appellant did not possess the requisite mens rea
of malice; reckless endangerment where there was very little
risk of injury to bystanders, and; [sic] possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver where Appellant did not possess
the controlled substance at issue?
II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s
Post-Sentence Motion where his sentence was excessive and
unreasonable and constitutes too severe a punishment in light of
the alleged gravity of the offense, Appellant’s rehabilitative
needs, and what is needed to protect the public?
(Appellant’s Brief, at 6).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court we conclude
that there is no merit to the issues Appellant has raised on appeal. The trial
court opinion properly disposes of the questions presented. (See Trial Court
Opinion, 9/17/15, at 8-16) (concluding: (1) there was ample evidence to
support the verdict of guilty for each conviction; and (2) the court properly
exercised its discretion in sentencing Appellant, with the benefit of a PSI,
where Appellant, who was on parole at the time of the offenses, did not
accept responsibility for the horrific collision, demonstrated a complete lack
of remorse, and had a previous conviction for aggravated assault).
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
-3-
J-A26041-15
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/14/2015
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COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
: DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v.
: NO. 2736 CR 2013
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CHRISTOPHER SLAUGHTER ; CHARGE(S): AGGRAVATED ASS~ULT~
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: (2); FLEEING OR ATIEMPTING 'PO [8 P.': ...
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: ELUDE POLICE; RECKLESSL~ ~. -...J
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: ENDANGERING ANOTHER PERqQN; (J ;fl~:
: POSSESSION WITH INTENT T(~tS: ~ oo;
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: DELIVER A CONTROLLED SUBSJAN~E
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TRIAL COURT OPINION
This appeal follows the judgment of sentence imposed on November 14,
2015. For the reasons set forth, the judgment should be affirmed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
t:r:, August 13, 2014, a jury found Christopher Slaughter ("Defendant')
guilty of one count of Aggravated Assault-Police Officer, one count of
Aggravated Assault-Malice, one count of Fleeing or Attempt to Elude an Officer,
one count of Recklcsely Endangering Another Person and one count of
Po -.,se~sion with In~ent to Manufa,i:ture Of De'i.iver a Controlled Substance,
Following the verdict, the court ordered a pre-sentence Investigation.
C..1• September 4, 2014, Defendant filed a prose M.)tion for Post Conviction
Collateral which the court denied as premai.ure.
On November 4, 2014, the court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate
sentence of 29 1/i years to 59 years of incarceration as follows:
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Count 1- Aggravated Assault-Police Officer- Not less than ten nor more
than twenty years in a state correctional institution, a fine of $100 plus
the costs of prosecution.
Count 2- Aggravated Assault-Malice- Not less than 10 nor more than 20
years in a state correctional institution, a fine of $100 plus the costs of
prosecution, to run consecutive to Count 1.
Count 3- Aggravated Assault by Vehicle- nolle pros
Count 4- Aggravated Assault by Vehicle- nolle pros
Count 5-Fleeing or Attempting to Elude an Officer- Not less than 31/2
nor more than 7 years in a state correctional institution, a fine of $100.
plus the costs of prosecution, to run consecutive to previous sentences.
Count 6- Recklessly Endangering Another Person- Not less than 1 nor
more than 2 years in a state correctional institution, a fine of $100, to
run consecutive to the previous charges.
Count 7- Manufacture, Delivery, and Possession with Intent to
Manufacture or Deliver a Controlled Substance (2 grams or more]- Not
less than 5 nor more than 10 years in a state correctional institution,
consecutive to all other charges.
The court imposed restitution in the amount of $1000 and imposed no
additional sentence on summary offenses 9-13.
Count 8- Possession of Drug Paraphernalia- nolle pros
(Transcript of Proceedings, Sentence, November 4, 2014, pp. 17-18(Hereinafter,
"N.T. Sentencing").
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Defendant filed a Post-Sentence Motion on November 13, 2014, and a Brief
In Support Thereof on January 4, 2015. The Commonwealth filed a Brief in
Opposition on February 4, 2015. The court denied Defendant's Post-Sentence
Motion by Order of February 9, 2015.
On March 5, 2015, Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of the Post-
Sentence Motion. Defendant filed a timely Concise Statement of Matters
Complained of on Appeal on May 7, 2015.
FACTUALBACKGROUND
On April 20, 2013, Officer Terry Wealand, a Sergeant with the Harrisburg
City Police, was on duty assigned to the Street Crimes Unit. (Transcript of
Proceedings, Trial August 11, 2014, p. 11 l)(Hereinafter, "N.T. Trial"). In the
preceding 48 hours, Officer Wealand received information regarding a Lincoln
Aviator SUV (hereinafter, "Lincoln") involved in suspected criminal activity.
(N.T. Trial, p. 112). Officer Wealand obtained the plate, registration and
ownership information related to the vehicle. (N.T. Trial, p. 113; p.115). Officer
Wealand began work that day at 4:00 pm. He was in uniform in a two-man
marked police vehicle with his partner, Officer Jon Fustine. (N.T. Trial, p.114).
Sitting in the parked police vehicle at Sixth and Curtin Streets in
Harrisburg, the officers saw the Lincoln drive by, park and let out a passenger.
The officers confirmed the plate number as that of the Lincoln previously
identified to them. (N.T. Trial, p. 116). The vehicle re-entered traffic without
signaling. (N.T. Trial, p. 119). Officer Wealand radioed his intention to initiate a
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traffic stop, followed the Lincoln a few blocks then engaged the red and blue
lights. The Lincoln pulled over. (N.T. Trial, p.120). Officer Fustine exited the
police vehicle on the passenger side and took five or six steps to toward the
Lincoln. (N.T. Trial, p. 122). The Lincoln fled. (Id.). Officer Fustine returned to
the vehicle. Officer Wealand radioed that the vehicle fled from the traffic stop.
(Id.).
As Officer Wealand began to follow the Lincoln, it took off at a high rate of
speed, running a stop sign. The Lincoln passed a playground and baseball field
at a speed such that the back end of the Lincoln lifted into the air. (N.T. Trial,
pp. 123-124; p. 131). Officer Wealand activated his sirens to alert traffic
through an intersection. (N.T. Trial, p. 125). Because it was a warm spring
evening, many people were out on the sidewalks and near their homes. (N.T.
Trial, p. 125; pp. 268-269). The Lincoln continued accelerating. Officer
Wealand chose to follow the vehicle with lights and sirens rather than engage
in close pursuit. (Id.; pp. 180-181). Officer Wealand attempted to maintain
sight of the Lincoln but realized he could not keep up with it. (N.T. Trial, p.
190; pp. 269-270).
The Lincoln entered a narrow one way street, Jefferson Street, on which
parked cars lined both sides and where the speed limit was 25 miles per hour.
The Lincoln swerved around cars, into empty parking stalls and ran stop signs.
(N.T. Trial, p. 127). Officer Fustine observed the Lincoln nearly strike a woman
pushing a child in a stroller. (N.T. Trial, p. 269). Officer Wealand slowed down
and sped up to clear intersections and stop signs. (N.T. Trial, p. 128). The
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Lincoln picked up speed and ran stop signs. Officer Wealand observed it turn
westbound. (Id.) Officer Wealand received information that a collision occurred
involving a police vehicle. (N.T. Trial, p. 129).
At the same time, Officer Daniel Peiper, also with the Harrisburg Police
Street Crimes Unit, was on street patrol in a police Chevy Tahoe with his K-9
partner, Thor, headed southbound on Sixth Street. (N.T. Trial, pp.78-79).
Officer Peiper recalled that it was a warm spring day with many people out
enjoying the weather. (N.T. Trial, p. 79). At approximately 6:30 pm, Officer
Peiper saw a vehicle fleeing on Jefferson Street. (Id.) He suspected that the
driver would reach the area he was patrolling and jump out of the vehicle. (N.T.
Trial, pp. 79- 80). As his vehicle coasted at a slow speed, Officer Peiper reached
back to open the K-9 cage. (N.T. Trial, p. 90). He took the steering wheel and
without seeing a vehicle coming, felt a large impact. (N.T. Trial pp. 79-80; pp.
90-91). Officer Peiper could not comprehend what had occurred. (Id.) Officer
Peifer heard other officers on the radio and another K-9 officer, taking care of
Thor. (N.T. Trial, p. 81).
Officer Wealand arrived at Sixth and Forrest Streets and observed what he
described as resembling a bomb scene: a marked police Tahoe on its roof and
another vehicle, a green Rav-4, along the sidewalk at an angle to the Tahoe.
(N.T. Trial, p. 132). Officer Fustine described screaming. (N.T. Trial, p. 271). A
man told Officer Wealand that his girlfriend was under the Tahoe. (N.T. Trial, p.
137). Officer Wealand looked under the Tahoe and saw a woman, Selina Martin
entrapped, and the K-9 crouched on the concrete. (N.T. Trial, pp.136-137).
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Officer Wealand then approached the Lincoln. The officer could see that the
airbags had deployed and the driver, later identified as the Defendant, leaning
over and rummaging in the center console. (N.T. Trial, p. 199). Officers
removed Defendant through the passenger window as they could not open
other windows and doors. (N.T. Trial, pp. 140-141). Officer Wealand turned
over custody of Defendant to other officers at the scene. (N.T. Trial, p. 157).
Selina Martin, the woman trapped under the vehicle, had been sweeping
the porch of her home on North Sixth Street that evening as part of a
community cleanup. (Transcript of Proceedings, Jury Trial, p. 62). Ms. Martin
recalled little about the events preceding the incident that day, only that she
heard vehicles, then a bang. She recalled seeing a vehicle flying toward her,
with no opportunity to flee. (Id.).
In order to speak with Ms. Martin, Officer Wealand lay down under the
vehicle. (N.T. Trial, p. 152). Officer Wealand engaged her in conversation
continuously, fearing that she was going to expire. Ms. Martin gained leverage
against Officer Wealand's head to push herself out from under the vehicle. (N.T.
Trial, pp. 158-161).
Officer Peiper and Ms. Martin were transported to Hershey Medical Center.
Officer Peiper's K-9 partner was transported to an emergency veterinary
hospital.
As a result of the impact from Defendant's vehicle with the police Tahoe,
Officer Peiper suffered a severe scalp laceration which exposed his skull
causing life-threatening blood loss, a lost a kidney, a broken arm requiring
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surgical reconstruction, a fractured hip, numerous fractured ribs, pelvic
fractures, a punctured lung and nerve damage resulting in permanent
numbness on his right side. (N.T. Trial, pp. 82-84; pp. 105-109). He remained
in a coma for 7-8 weeks and only recalls being awake sometime in June. (N.T.
Trial, pp. 80-81). Officer Peiper remained hospitalized and in rehabilitation
until July 2013. (N.T. p. 84).
Officer Peiper endures relentless pain of such intensity that at one point he
wanted doctors to amputate his foot. (N.T. Trial, p. 86). For an extended period
of time, he required a walker or cane and assistance with basic personal care.
(N.T. pp. 84-85). Officer Peiper has returned to work on a reduced schedule
performing sedentary duties. (N.T. Trial, p. 87).
As a result of the incident, Ms. Martin sustained two collapsed lungs,
broken ribs, a broken shoulder, a fractured spleen, laceration of the liver, a
crushed pelvis, legs, wrists and arms, and cardiac injury which required
numerous surgeries. (N.T. Trial, p. 67; pp. 104-105). Ms. Martin remained in
an induced coma for three months. (N.T. Trial, pp. 63-64). Before the accident,
Ms. Martin enjoyed excellent health, walked and rode a bicycle for fitness.
Since the accident, she suffers constant pain and struggles with ordinary daily
activities such including walking, standing, sitting and reaching. (N.T. pp. 67-
68).
Officer Travis Pidcock, assigned to the Dauphin County Accident
Reconstruction Team, participated in the search of the Lincoln. Officer Pidcock
collected a baggie from the second row of the Lincoln which contained crack
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cocaine. In addition, he collected a bag which contained other baggies. (N.T.
Trial, pp. 207-208.)
Dauphin County Chief Detective John Goshert provided expert testimony
that the amount of cocaine, 6.3 grams, and its street value, $486,000, along
with the possession of empty plastic bags, evidenced drug trafficking. (N.T.
Trial, pp. 257-263.)
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficient evidence supports each verdict of guilty.
Applying the well-settled standard applicable to review of sufficiency of
evidence claims, ample ~vidence supports the verdicts of guilty of 2 counts of
Aggravated Assault, Reckless Endangerment and Possession of a Controlled
Substance.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence,
[a]n appellate court must review the evidence presented and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the
verdict winner and determine whether on the record there is a sufficient
basis to support the challenged conviction. The proper application of the
sufficiency test requires [the Appellate Court] to evaluate the entire
record and all evidence received in the aggregate and not as fragments
isolated from the totality of the evidence. This standard means that [the
Appellate Court] must review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, and drawing all proper
inferences favorable to the Commonwealth, determine if the jury could
reasonably have concluded that all of the elements of the crime were
established beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the jury, as the trier of
fact, is free to believe all, some or none of the evidence presented.
Commonwealth u. Feirst, 423 Pa. Super. 232, 241, 620 A.2d 1196, 1201
( l 993)(internal citations omitted).
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Aggravated Assault
Sufficient evidence supports the verdicts of guilty of Aggravated Assault
under both18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 (a)(l), as against Ms. Martin, and 18 Pa.C.S.§
2702 (a)(2) as against Officer Peiper.
A person is guilty of Aggravated Assault under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 (a)(l), if he
"attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another or causes such injury
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under the circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life." The statute does not require
as Defendant suggests, that the Commonwealth prove a specific intent to cause
serious bodily injury as specific intent can be inferred from the serious bodily
injury. "Where the victim suffers serious bodily injury ... the Commonwealth
need only prove that [the defendant] acted recklessly under the circumstances
manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life." Commonwealth
v. Nichols, 692 A.2d 181, 185 (1997)(Internal citations omitted).
It is beyond dispute that Defendant caused Ms. Martin serious bodily
injury, defined as "injury creating a substantial risk of death or which causes
serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of function
of any bodily member or organ." 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. Ms. Martin described at
length the devastating injuries she sustained, the extended period she
remained in a coma and the permanent impact upon her ability to walk, sit or
to attend to her basic personal care. Having established serious bodily injury,
the Commonwealth bore no further burden of proof of specific intent.
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Ample evidence supported the jury's finding that Defendant acted under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
"[F]or the degree of recklessness contained in the aggravated assault statute to
occur, the offensive act must be performed under circumstances which almost
assure that injury or death will ensue." Nichols, at 185, citing Commonwealth u.
O'Hanlon, 539 Pa. 478,482, 635 A.2d 616, 618 (1985); Commonwealth u.
Hickson, 402 Pa.Super. 53, 586 A.2d 939 ( 1990) alloc. denied, 527 Pa. 663,
593 A.2d 838 (1991).
Based upon facts markedly similar to those in the instant case, the
Superior Court in Commonwealth u. Miller, 955 A.2d 419, 422 (2008), found
that sufficient evidence of mens rea under§ 2702 (a)(l) existed where the
defendant "gunned" his vehicle after a traffic stop, fled, accelerated through an
intersection and ignored stop signs resulting in a crash of significant force
which seriously injured drivers in two other vehicles. Miller at 421. The Miller
Court also considered that "a motorist's conduct is more egregious if he does
not apply his brakes in an attempt to slow down before a collision than if he
attempts to stop. At 423, citing, Commonwealth u. Dellauecchia, 725 A.2d 186,
189 (Pa. Super. 1998).
In this case, the jury heard evidence that Defendant sped in excess of 51
miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone, ran all stop signs, drove through
residential and playground areas, into parking spots, narrowly avoided
pedestrians, hit a full size police Tahoe with such force as to flip it over and fly
into Ms. Martin. Such facts support the jury's finding of recklessness.
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Similarly, sufficient evidence supported the elements of Aggravated Assault
under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(2), as related to Officer Peiper, which provides:
(a) Offense defined.- A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
***
(2) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
causes serious bodily injury to any of the officers, agents,
employees or other persons enumerated in subsection (c) . .
***
(c) Officers, employees, etc., enumerated.- The officers, agents ,
employees and other persons referred to in subsection (a) shall be as
follows:
( 1) Police Officer.
***
Contrary to Defendant's suggestion, the Commonwealth bore no burden to
prove malice as to the charge of Aggravated Assault related to Officer Peiper.
Section 2702(a)(2), applicable to injuries to a police officer, requires no showing
of extreme indifference to the value of human life. Rather, evidence of the
serious bodily injury caused to Officer Peiper, as described at length above,
proved the elements of that crime.
Recklessly Endangering Another Person
The Defendant's conduct in driving through intersections, stop signs, past a
playground and into parking spaces with pedestrians nearby, easily supports
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the verdict of guilty of Recklessly Endangering Another Person under 18 Pa.
C.S. §2705.
Pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S. §2705, "[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the
second degree if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place
another person I danger of death or serious bodily injury." 18 Pa.C.S. §2705.
"To sustain a conviction for recklessly endangering another person, the
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant had an actual present ability to
inflict harm and not merely the apparent ability to do so." Commonwealth u.
Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 915 (Pa. Super. 2000).
The jury heard testimony which supported the elements of Recklessly
Endangering Another Person, namely, Defendant's speeding through populated
neighborhoods and nearly missing pedestrians, including a mother pushing a
stroller.
Possession with Intent to Deliver
Ample evidence demonstrated that Defendant possessed a controlled
substances with the intent to deliver.
The jury could reasonably infer from the fact that Defendant fled from police
after a traffic stop that he possessed an illegal drug. Further, his position near
the console of the Lincoln after the accident supports the conclusion that he
attempted to hide drugs as police approached. No other person occupied the
vehicle to whom Defendant could attribute possession.
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Finally, the jury was free to accept the testimony of Detective John Goshert,
the large amount of drugs, their value and Defendant's possession of baggies
evidenced Defendant's possession with the intent to deliver.
Accordingly, sufficient evidence supported the verdict.
B. The Trial Court properly denied Defendant's Post-Sentence Motion
where ample evidence supports the verdicts as to each charge.
For all of the reasons set forth in the discussion as to the sufficiency of
evidence, the weight of the evidence supports each verdict of guilty, such that
the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denial Defendant's Post-Trial
Motion.
The standard of review of a claim that the verdict was against the weight of
the evidence is a review of the trial court's exercise of discretion in granting or
denying the motion for a new trial. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745,
753.(Pa. 2000). "Discretion is abused when the course pursued represents not
merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly
unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that
the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will." (Id.).
The trial court properly denied Defendant's Post-Sentence Motion which
asserted only that "[Defendant] was never shown to have engaged in acts which
constitute the crimes of which he was convicted." (Defendant's Post-Sentence
Motion para. 7).
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The facts set forth in detail, supra, easily support the jury's findings as to
each statutory element of the crimes. As outlined, the jury properly considered
Defendants speed, his gross disregard of traffic controls in highly populated
areas and the serious injury to Ms. Martin to conclude that Defendant acted
with malice. Contrary to Defendant's suggestion in his Brief in Support of Post-
Sentence Motion, in proving malice, the Commonwealth bore no burden to
prove exactly how fast Defendant sped eluding police. (See, Defendant's Brief in
Support of Post-Sentence Motion). Further, the jury was free to reject any
suggestion that police officers caused the accident.
We also reject Defendant's argument that his conduct created no risk of
injury to others merely because he sped through the streets without striking
anyone. Such argument suggests that a person could be guilty of reckless
conduct only where unless such conduct results in actual injury.
Finally, the trial court properly denied Defendant's Post-Sentence Motion as
to the conviction of Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled
Substance. The jury was free to reject the suggestion that the co- owner of the
vehicle possessed the drugs when Defendant alone occupied the vehicle and
fled when stopped for a traffic violation.
C. The court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing Defendant.
In sentencing Defendant, the court properly considered the gravity of the
offenses, Defendant's rehabilitative needs and the need for protection of the
community.
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Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred in its consideration
of relevant factors. Our Appellate Court have reminded that " .... the sentencing
judge is in the best position to measure factors such as the nature of the crime,
the defendant's character and the defendant's display of remorse or
indifference." Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780 (Pa. Super. 2012) quoting
Commonwealth v. Andrews, 720 A.2d 764, 768 (Pa. Super. 1998).
Here, the sentencing court stated its reliance upon a thorough Pre-Sentence
Report. (N.T. Sentencing, p.15). The court noted in particular its view that,
based upon his parole status at the time of these serious offenses, Defendant
lacked a commitment to rehabilitation. Therefore, the court properly deemed
the sentence necessary for the protection of the public.
Further, the court placed significant weight upon Defendant's lack of
acceptance of responsibility for the horrific collision which inalterably harmed
the lives of Officer Peiper, Ms. Martin and their families. The court noted the
transcript of a prison phone conversation in which Defendant flippantly
acknowledged that he almost struck a mother pushing a child in a stroller.
(N.T. Sentencing, p. 16). The court also noted the prison telephone
conversation submitted into evidence at trial in which Defendant stated that he
dodged pedestrians but that it "wasn't that serious" and "almost killed a cop"
but "did not regret it". (N.T. Sentencing, p.16; .N.T. Trial, pp. 300-303;
Commonwealth Exhibit 39). Such comments demonstrated to the court
Defendant's complete lack of remorse, the only suggestion of which Defendant
offered when facing sentencing.
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Accordingly, the court properly relied upon such facts and gave them the
weight it deemed appropriate in fashioning the sentence.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of sentence should be affirmed.
BYoZURT~
~ ~ , . .
RICHARD A. LEWIS
PRESIDENT illDGE
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