Com. v. Gilmore, R. ( 2016 )

J-A18003-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ROBERT STEPHONE GILMORE,
Appellant No. 1060 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 9, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0001212-2014
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 24, 2016
Appellant, Robert Stephone Gilmore, appeals from the judgment of
sentence of an aggregate term of 12½ to 25 years’ imprisonment, imposed
after a jury convicted him of attempted murder,1 aggravated assault -
attempted serious bodily injury,2 aggravated assault - causing bodily injury
with a deadly weapon,3 firearms not to be possessed without a license,4 and
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4).
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).
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recklessly endangering another person.5 Herein, Appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions and alleges the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. He also raises challenges to the
admission of evidence, the application of the merger doctrine, jury
instructions, and the length of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.
The above-stated charges arose from an incident which took place on
February 13, 2014, where Appellant and an unidentified co-conspirator
attempted to kill Stephen Robinson (“Mr. Robinson”) by firing multiple shots
at him in the middle of the afternoon on a public street in downtown Carlisle,
Pennsylvania. Mr. Robinson escaped unharmed. Unfortunately, two
innocent bystanders, Jayonna Pope (“Ms. Pope”) and Ashley Brown (“Ms.
Brown”) were not so lucky. Ms. Pope was struck in the head by a stray
bullet, and Ms. Brown was grazed by another bullet. Appellant and his co-
conspirator fled on foot, laughing, to a waiting car and then drove away.
Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 11/2/15, at 2-3. Based on eye-witness
testimony and the identification of Appellant from a photo array, a warrant
was issued and Appellant was apprehended by the United States Marshall
Service Fugitive Task Force in Brooklyn, New York. Id. at 5.
____________________________________________
5
18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
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Following a jury trial, Appellant was sentenced to the above-stated
term on June 9, 2015.6 Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which
was denied by order of court dated June 16, 2015. Subsequently, Appellant
timely filed a notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal.
Herein, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
I. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
convict Appellant of attempted murder, aggravated assault
(attempted serious injury), aggravated assault (causing
bodily injury with a deadly weapon), recklessly
endangering another person ([Mr.] Robinson), and
recklessly endangering another person ([Ms.] Pope)[?]
II. Whether the jury’s finding of guilt as it relates to the
charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault
(attempted serious injury), aggravated assault (causing
bodily injury with a deadly weapon), recklessly
endangering another person ([Mr.] Robinson), and
____________________________________________
6
Appellant was originally sentenced on March 10, 2015, to an aggregate
term of 17½ to 45 years’ imprisonment, which included a sentence of 15 to
40 years’ imprisonment on count 1 – attempted murder. Appellant filed a
post-sentence motion requesting modification of his sentence based on
allegations that the sentence was unreasonable and excessive. The trial
court admitted that it “erroneously applied an illegally lengthy sentence
which was the result of a calculation error arising from the Commonwealth’s
failure to present the issue of serious bodily injury to the jury as to Count I,
Criminal Attempt – Criminal Homicide.” TCO at 16. The Commonwealth
subsequently filed a memorandum conceding that the maximum sentence
for Appellant’s attempted murder conviction is 20 years’ imprisonment. On
June 9, 2015, a re-sentencing hearing was held and the court re-sentenced
Appellant to an aggregate sentence of 12½ to 25 years’ imprisonment,
which reflected consecutive sentences for attempted murder (10 to 20
years), aggravated assault (1 to 2 years), firearms not to be possessed
without a license (1 to 2 years), and recklessly endangering another person
(6 to 12 months). Id.
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recklessly endangering another person ([Ms.] Pope) was
against the weight of the evidence presented at trial[?]
III. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the admission of
text messages allegedly composed by [Mr.] Robinson[?]
IV. Whether the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on
transferred intent[?]
V. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to merge
aggravated assault (causing bodily injury with a deadly
weapon)([Ms.] Pope) with attempted murder[?]
VI. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and
committed reversible error when it sentenced Appellant to
an aggregate sentence of 12 and one half to 25 years[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 7.
We have reviewed the certified record, the briefs of the parties, and
the applicable law. Additionally, we have reviewed the thorough and well-
crafted opinion of the Honorable Albert H. Masland of the Court of Common
Pleas of Cumberland County. We conclude that Judge Masland’s extensive,
well-reasoned opinion accurately disposes of issues I through IV presented
by Appellant. See TCO at 1-16. Accordingly, with regard to these issues,
we adopt Judge Masland’s opinion as our own and affirm on that basis. We
also affirm the trial court’s decisions with respect to issues V and VI;
however, we add the following discussion regarding these claims.
In issue V, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to
merge the aggravated assault - causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon
charge with the attempted murder charge. It is well-settled that:
A claim that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence by failing
to merge sentences is a question of law. Accordingly, our
standard of review is plenary.
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In Commonwealth v. Gatling, 570 Pa. 34, 807 A.2d 890(2002) (plurality), our Supreme Court clarified the appropriate
analysis for determining when convictions should merge for the
purposes of sentencing:
The preliminary consideration is whether the facts on
which both offenses are charged constitute one solitary
criminal act. If the offenses stem from two different
criminal acts, merger analysis is not required. If, however,
the event constitutes a single criminal act, a court must
then determine whether or not the two convictions should
merge. In order for two convictions to merge: (1) the
crimes must be greater and lesser-included offenses; and
(2) the crimes charged must be based on the same facts.
If the crimes are greater and lesser-included offenses and
are based on the same facts, the court should merge the
convictions for sentencing; if either prong is not met,
however, merger is inappropriate.
Id. at 899.
To determine whether offenses are greater and lesser-included
offenses, we compare the elements of the offenses. If the
elements of the lesser offense are all included within the
elements of the greater offense and the greater offense has at
least one additional element, which is different, then the
sentences merge. If both crimes require proof of at least one
element that the other does not, then the sentences do not
merge.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 874 A.2d 66, 70-71 (Pa. 2005) (emphasis
added).
“Attempted murder is defined by reading the attempt statute, 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a), in conjunction with the murder statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2502(a) (murder of the first degree). Accordingly, the elements of
attempted murder are (1) the taking of a substantial step, (2) towards an
intentional killing. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(1), 2502(a).” Johnson, 874
A.2d at 71. “A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he attempts to cause
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or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly
weapon.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4) (emphasis added). It is clear that not all
of the required elements of aggravated assault – causing bodily injury with a
deadly weapon, are included in the statutory elements of attempted murder.
Specifically, Section 2702(a)(4) requires the use of a deadly weapon,
whereas the elements of attempted murder do not. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§
901(a), 2502(a). Thus, the crime of aggravated assault – causing bodily
injury with a deadly weapon, is not a lesser-included offense of attempted
murder, and the trial court was correct in not merging these two charges.
Moreover, we note that it would not be proper to merge the two
charges in the present case, as the charges involved crimes against different
victims. Appellant fired multiple shots at the intended victim, Mr. Robinson,
in the presence of innocent bystanders, thereby exposing multiple people to
the risk of serious bodily injury or death. As the trial court explained in its
Rule 1925(a) opinion, Appellant was convicted of the attempted murder of
Mr. Robinson (not Ms. Pope), and his corresponding aggravated assault
conviction relating to Mr. Robinson was properly merged for sentencing
purposes. TCO at 17. The remaining aggravated assault charge for which
Appellant has been sentenced, and which is at issue here, is related to Ms.
Pope. There was no greater charge into which the conviction for aggravated
assault against Ms. Pope could merge. Thus, we agree with the trial court’s
conclusion that Appellant’s claim of error for failure to merge these two
charges “is simply factually erroneous.” Id.
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Moreover, we add that Appellant may not escape responsibility for the
separate crimes he committed against the intended victim and bystanders.
As stated by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Yates, 562 A.2d 908(Pa. 1989), except for where the legislature unequivocally expresses a
contrary intent: “[I]t remains the law of this Commonwealth that the life
and safety of each citizen is to be protected individually. There is no ‘two for
one discount’ in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, and we will not permit
criminals to imply one through distortion of the common law merger
doctrine.” Id. at 911 (footnote omitted).
Next, we address Appellant’s claim VI regarding the length of his
sentence. As discussed supra, Appellant was re-sentenced on June 9, 2015,
to an aggregate sentence of 12½ to 25 years’ imprisonment. That sentence
reflected consecutive sentences for attempted murder (10 to 20 years),
aggravated assault (1 to 2 years), firearms not to be possessed without a
license (1 to 2 years), and recklessly endangering another person (6 to 12
months). TCO at 16. Appellant contends that his sentence is unreasonable
and outside of the sentencing guidelines. He further alleges that the court
failed to consider the appropriate sentencing factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §
9721(b).
We note that Appellant’s allegations regarding sentencing relate to the
discretionary aspects of his sentence.
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant
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challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must
invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are
generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing
or in a motion to modify the sentence imposed.
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
and internal quotations omitted).
Here, the record clearly reflects that Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal, properly preserved his claim in his post-sentence motion, and
included a separate, concise Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief in
compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. In his Rule
2119(f) statement, Appellant presents a detailed summary of his arguments
in support of his allegations that his sentence is excessive and unreasonable.
Upon review of that statement, we will consider the issues raised by
Appellant to constitute substantial questions to meet the fourth requirement
of the four-part test outlined above.
However, we deem the underlying claims to be meritless.
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. To constitute an abuse of
discretion, the sentence imposed must either exceed the
statutory limits or be manifestly excessive. In this context, an
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abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law,
exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias
or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
***
In determining whether a sentence is manifestly excessive, the
appellate court must give great weight to the sentencing court’s
discretion, as he or she is in the best position to measure factors
such as the nature of the crime, the defendant’s character, and
the defendant’s display of remorse, defiance, or indifference.
Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602-603 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(citations omitted).
We further note that:
When imposing a sentence, a court is required to consider the
particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the
defendant. In particular, the court should refer to the
defendant’s prior criminal record, his age, personal
characteristics and his potential for rehabilitation. Where the
sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence investigation
report (“PSI”), we can assume the sentencing court was aware
of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s character
and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory
factors. Further, where a sentence is within the standard range
of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as
appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Appellant was clearly sentenced within the maximum range of
the guidelines. Additionally, we note that not only did the trial court have
the benefit of a PSI, it expressly stated that it considered all of the
appropriate relevant factors, as explained in the following portion of its Rule
1925(a) opinion:
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[Appellant’s] crime was shocking. He opened fire with a deadly
weapon during daylight hours on a populated downtown street in
an attempt to kill Stephen Robinson. He wounded two innocent
bystanders, one of whom he shot in the head. Per eyewitness
testimony, he laughed as he fled the scene of his crime. His
three victims each deserved to have their rights vindicated by
the imposition of consecutive sentences and nothing less than
the lengthy sentence the court imposed would do justice to the
gravity of [Appellant’s] crimes. The court was in receipt of
letters of support from [Appellant’s] family, but nothing therein
can mitigate the gravity of [Appellant’s] actions. His sentence is
appropriate.
TCO at 16-17.
The trial court also made the following statements regarding
Appellant’s sentence at the re-sentencing hearing:
[T]he nature of this offense, senseless, reckless, horrific all come
to mind as I recall the testimony of the victims in this case, lead
me to believe that a lengthy sentence is necessary not only from
the perspective of public safety or from the perspective of the
nature of this crime and not wanting to depreciate the
seriousness of the crime, frankly, it may also be necessary,
[Appellant], for you.
…You are 20. Perhaps in your mid[-]thirties you will be out of
your, what I would call based on this offense, violent lifestyle.
Perhaps you will grow out of that, and that alone may protect
society a little bit more. When people get into their thirties and
forties, they generally don’t commit the violent crimes such as
the one that you committed here you were found by a jury to
commit.
I hear the evidence too, and so when I say it was horrifying and
senseless and reckless and all of those things, I heard that
evidence and that’s the way I feel, and I’m going to sentence
accordingly. Because anything less than a maximum sentence in
this case, which will give you an aggregate of 12 and a half
years to 25 years, anything less than that overall maximum
would not be appropriate.
N.T. Re-Sentencing, 6/9/15, at 6-7.
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After careful review of the record, we are satisfied that the trial court
gave appropriate consideration to the relevant factors before issuing
Appellant’s sentence. Thus, we ascertain no abuse of discretion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/24/2016
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Circulated 09/30/2016 11:33 AM
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLANDCOUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v.
.
ROBERTS. GILMORE : CP-21-CR-1212-2014
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 1925
Masland, J.1 November 2, 2015:--
Defendant, Robert S. Gilmore, appeals his convictions and judgments of
sentence for Attempted Murder, Conspiracy-AttemptedMurder, Aggravated Assault
(Attempted Serious Injury), Aggravated Assault (Causing Bodily Injury with a Deadly
Weapon), Recklessly Endangering Another Person (Steven Robinson), and Recklessly
Endangering Another Person (Jayonna Pope).
He complains of the following matters on appeal:
1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
convict [Defendant] of Attempted Murder.
2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
convict [Defendant)of Conspiracy-AttemptedMurder.
3. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
convict [Defendant] of Aggravated Assault (Attempted
Serious Injury).
4. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
convict [Defendant] of Aggravated Assault (Causing Bodily
Injury with a Deadly Weapon).
5. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
convict [Defendant] of Recklessly Endangering Another
Person (Steven Robinson)..
6. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
convict [Defendant] of Recklessly Endangering Another
Person (Jayonna Pope).
7. Whether the jury's finding of guilty as it relates to the
charge of Attempted Murder was against the weight of the
evidence presented at trial.
CP-21-CR-1212-2014
8. Whether the Jury's finding of guilty as it relates to the
charge of Conspiracy-Attempted Murder was against the
weight of the evidence presented at trial.
9. Whether the Jury's finding of guilty as it relates to the
charge of Aggravated Assault (Attempted Serious Injury)
was against the weight of the evidence presented at trial.
10. Whether the Jury's finding of guilty as it relates to the
charge of Aggravated Assault (Causing Bodily Injury with a
Deadly Weapon) was against the weight of the evidence
presented at trial.
11. Wl}ether the Jury's finding of guilty as it relates to the
charge of Recklessly Endangering Another Person (Steven
Robinson) was against the weight of the evidence presented
at trial. ·
12. Whether the Jury's finding of guilty as it relates to the
charge of Recklessly Endangering Another Person (Jayonna
Pope) was against the weight of the evidence presented at
trial.
13. Whether the Court erred in allowing the admission of
text messages allegedly composed by Steven Robinson.
14. Whether the Court erred when it instructed the Jury on
transferred intent in that a killing did not occur and the
standard Jury instruction was substantially modified from its
original form.
15. Whether the Court abused its discretion in that the
sentence imposed was unreasonable and excessive under
the circumstances of the case.
16. Whether the Court erred when· _it failed to merge
Aggravated Assault (Causing Bodily Injury with a Deadly
Weapon) (Jayonna Pope) wit_h Attempted Murder.
Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, filed July 8, 2015.
r. Facts
On the afternoon of February 13, 2014 in downtown Carlisle! Pennsylvania, the
Defendant and an as yet unidentified coconspirator tried to kill Stephen Robinson. The
Defendant fired a gun repeatedly at Mr. Robinson, tracking him with the aim of his pistol
as the victim fled down the street. Mr. Robinson escaped without harm. Sixteen-year-
old Jayonna Pope was less fortunate. She was an innocent bystander struck in the
head by a stray bullet. Thankfully, she survived. Another innocent bystander, Ashley
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Brown, was also caught in the hail of gunfire and was grazed by a bullet. After firing at
least 10 shots, the Defendant and the coconspirator fled on foot, both laughing, to a
waiting car and drove away.
There were several witnesses to the crime. Fortuitously, for the Commonwealth
but not the Defendant, off-duty Pennsylvania Constable Kevin Preston was stopped in
his vehicle at a red light across from the shooters who were about 50 yards away.
Constable Preston observed the two firing repeatedly at an Indiscriminate rate while
tracking two fieeing intended victims with the aim of their semiautomatic handguns.
After the shooters ceased firing, they ran away from the scene In the direction of
Constable Preston while simultaneously trying to keep their pants from falling down and
putting their guns into the waistband of their pants. Part of this account was
corroborated by the lronSky video survelllance system that is deployed at that
intersection. The video depicted two African-American men running through the
intersection in the direction described by Constable Preston while trying to keep their
pants from falling down. Another witness, John Hopcraft, who observed the shooters
from a second story window in a building at the intersection facing the crime scene, also
testified that the shooters were two African-American men who fired approximately 1 O
shots.
Constable Preston then saw the shooters enter a white vehicle which he
endeavored to follow, though his efforts were hampered by the fact that he was off-duty,
in a civilian vehicle, and not empowered to violate traffic laws In his pursuit of the
shooters. However, he has able to give chase long enough to get a clear view of the
face of one of the shooters whom he later Identified unequivocally from a photo array as
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the Defendant. When he could no longer safely pursue the· shooters' vehicle, Constable
Preston stopped his vehicle and borrowed a cell phone from a bystander to call the
Carlisle Police Department regarding the shooting.
Carlisle Police Officer Christopher Darhower was the first officer from the
Department to arrive on the scene. Shortly after arriving, he was alerted to an injured
victim inside the Buzz Express, a small convenience store at the scene of the crime.
Inside, Officer Darhower discovered Jayonna Pope with a gunshot wound to the head.
As a trained EMT, Officer Darhower immediately provided first aid. When supplemental
EMTs arrived, Officer Darhower exited the Buzz Express and began looking for another
possible victim. Just outside the store, he spoke to Ashley Brown·, another bystander,
who had been grazed by a bullet. He examined her to verify that she was not seriously
injured and then moved on to help tape off the crime scene and begin to interview
witnesses.
Officer Darhower observed two males walklng through the area and stopped
them for questioning. One of those males was later determined to be the intended
victim, Stephen Robinson. At the time, Mr. Robinson was uninjured but also
uncooperative and refused to answer questions. Officer Darhower was then called
away from the scene to assist in a lockdown of the Carlisle Hospital as there were
reports that one of the shooters may have been sending text messages to Jayonna
Pope.
As noted by the trial testimony of Detective Freedman of the Carlisle Police
Department, the investigation of this case was marked by resistance and lack of
cooperation from witnesses and some victims because "[a] lot of people did not want to
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talk about anything because of the fear involved of retallatton." Notes of Testimony,
January 28, 2015 at 323 (hereinafter N. T., 1 /28/2015 at_). Despite the refusal of
cooperation of both Jayonna Pope and Stephen Robinson, Detective Freedman was
able to get a tip leading him to an address that, through investigation, he would learn
had last been rented by Robert Gilmore. That Information allowed the Detective to
compile a photo array that included the Defendant's picture which allowed Constable
Preston to make an immediate and unequivocal identification of the Defendant as the
shooter whose face he had seen. Based on that evidence, a warrant was issued for the
Defendant's arrestand he was subsequently apprehended by the United States
Marshall Service Fugitive Task Force in Brooklyn, New York.
At trial, both Jayonna Pope and Stephen Robinson were unable to identify the
Defendant as the shooter. Ms. Pope testified that on the day of the shooting she saw
two black males that she didn't recognize near the Buzz Express before she was shot.
She could not identify her shooter, but when asked whether it was Robert Gilmore who
shot her she said:
No, It couldn't have been. I didn't see him there. I know him.
He is a very close friend of mine. He used to be at my house
all the time. We were inseparable. You could never take us
apart. He was not there. I was seeing two black males that I
had never seen them before.
N.T., 1/28/2015 at 405-06.
The Commonwealth declined to cross examine Ms. Pope and the court does not
now ascribe any evil motive to her testimony though it was clearly discredited by the
jury. Rather, the court reads this as the testimony of a crime victim who cannot identify
her assailant and who, due to the bonds of friendship, cannot accept that she may have
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been the accidental victim of a crime committed by her rrlend, the Defendant, despite all
the evidence to the contrary.
On the other hand, the court finds it hard not to characterize the testimony of the ·
intended victim, Stephen Robinson, as anything other than intentionally unreliable and
motivated by a misguided sense of criminal ornerta and a malicious desire to extract
personal vengeance against the Defendant. Throughout his testimony, Mr. Robinson
was evasive and equivocatinq, claiming he had no memory of the shooting but then
later recalling details. He claimed the Defendant was not one of the shooters, but
instead the shooters were alternately two white men or a white man and a Hispanic man
that he did not recognize. He further testified that he was not the intended target of the
shooting. This testimony, however, was thoroughly impeached by the text messages
Mr. Robinson sent immediately after the shooting to multiple recipients wherein he
claimed that he was the target of the shooting. When asked by one of the text
recipients how he would respond to the shooting, his response was. "Get em." N.T.,
1/27/2015 at 212-13; Commonwealth Ex. 18. For his part, Mr. Robinson explained
away the text messages as nothing more than boastful falsehoods Intended to impress
women who liked so-called bad boys.
Neither the jury nor the court were Impressed. The verdicts demonstrate the
jury's rejection ?f Mr. Robinson's testimony. Instead, they chose to believe the
objective, contemporaneously written text messages which prove that Mr. Robinson
knew he was the Intended target of the shooting and that he intended to exact his own
revenge, and which amply explained his refusal to cooperate with the Investigative
authorities and prosecution. Even in court, Mr. Robinson testified that if he had believed
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the Defendant had tried to kill him, "we'd have issues that would have already been
dealt with probably." N.T., 1/27/2015, at 213.
In light of the credible evidence presented, including the unequivocal positive
eyewitness identification by Constable Preston, the corroborating testimony of Mr.
Hopcraft, and the objective evidence of the video surveillance camera and Mr.
Robinson's text messages, the jury found the Defendant guilty of all charges.
II. Discussion
As previously recited, the Defendant alleges sixteen errors for appellate review.
The matters may-be analyzed In six categories: challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence, challenges based on the weight of the evidence, an evldentiary claim, an
erroneous jury instruction regarding the transferred intent doctrine, a challenge to the
length of sentence, and a challenge to the erroneous application of the merger doctrine.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
"The standard of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the
evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is sufficient to
support all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v.
Strouse, 909 A.2d 368, 368-69 (Pa. Super. 2006). "The Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence or establish the defendant's guilt to a
mathematical certainty." Commonwealth v. Btotnerson, 888 A.2d 901, 904 (Pa. Super.·
2005). "The finder of fact-here, the jury-exclusively weighs the evidence, assesses
the credibility of witnesses, and may choose to believe all, part, or none of the
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evidence." Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 39 (Pa. 2011) (internal citations
omitted).
1. Attempted Murder
A person commits attempt when "with Intent to commit a specific crime, he does
any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime." 18
Pa.C.S. § 901(a). To establish Murder in First Degree, the Commonwealth must prove
the Defendant "acted with a specific intent to kill; that a human being was unlawfully
killed; that the person accused did the killing; and that the killing was done with
deliberation." Commonwealth v. Smith, 861 A.2d 892, 895 (Pa. 2004). Specific Intent
may be established through circumstantial evidence, such as the use of a deadly
weapon on a vital part of the victim's body. Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, 613 Pa. 316,
33 A.3d 602, 607 (Pa. 2011 ). Malice also may be inferred from the use of a deadly
weapon upon a vital part of the victim's body. Id. at 607-08.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence presented
at trial is sufficient to prove that the Defendant acted with the specific intent to kill and
malice by firing a handgun repeatedly at Mr. Robinson while tracking him with his aim
as Mr. Robinson fled for his life. By firing upwards of ten shots, the Defendant clearly
took a substantial step towards killing Mr. Robinson. The volume of shots also tends to
show the Defendant acted with the specific intent to kill . These facts were established
by the credible eyewitness testimony of Constable Preston. Further, Mr. Robinson's
contemporaneous text messages showing that he knew he was the intended target of
the shooting also support that the Defendant acted with the specific Intent to kill. For
CP-21-CR-1212-2014
these reasons, the jury's verdict of guilty for the crime of Attempted Murder is supported
by sufficient evidence.
2. Conspiracy-Attempted Murder
The Defendant argues that his conviction for Conspiracy-Attempted Murder is not
supported by sufficient evidence. This Issue is moot as Defendant's conviction as to
this count was dismissed by court order dated March 10, 2015.1
3. Aggravated Assault (Attempted Serious Injury)
To establish Aggr~vated Assault (Attempted Serious Injury), the Commonwealth
must prove the Defendant attempted "to cause serious bodily injury to another, or
cause[d) such rnjury Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life .... " 18 Pa.C.S. §
2702(a)(1 ). Here, the Defendant fired several gunshots at Mr. Robinson while tracking
him with his aim as Mr. Robinson ran away. By doing so, he clearly took a substantial
step towards seriously Injuring Mr. Robinson. The fact that the Defendant fired these
gunshots in daylight and in the presence of several innocent bystanders further proves
that he behaved recklessly and with an extreme indifference to human life. As such, the
jury's guilty verdict to this count was supported by sufficient evidence. The Defendant's
objection, that Mr. Robinson testified that the Defendant was not the shooter, has no
merit as the jury clearly found Mr. Robinson's testimony to that effect to be not credible.
As always, the jury may choose to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Sanchez,
36 A.3d at 39 (Pa. 2011).
1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §906 ("A person may not be convicted of more than one of the inchoate crimes of
criminal attempt, criminal sollcttatton or criminal conspiracy for conduct designed to commit or to
culminate In the commission of the same crime.").
CP-21-CR-1212-2014
4. Aggravated Assault (Causing Bodily Injury with a De~dly Weapon)
To establish this charge, the Commonwealth must prove the Defendant
"attempt[ed] to cause or intentionally or knowingly cause[d) bodily injury to another with
a deadly weapon ... " 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4). The Intent to cause bodily injury to one
victim may be transferred to establish the intent element of a crime committed against
an unintended victim. 18 Pa.C.S. § 303(b)(1). Here, the Defendant shot a handgun
repeatedly at his intended victim resulting in his unintended victim, Ms. Pope, .being shot
in the head. Clearly, that constitutes a bodily injury caused by? deadly weapon. And,
just as above, Ms. Pope's testimony that the Defendant did not shoot her was simply
discredited by the jury. As such, the jury's verdict for this count of aggravated assault
was supported by sufficient evidence.
5. Recklessly Endangering Another Person (Stephen Robinson)
"A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly
engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or
serious bodily Injury." 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. Here. the Defendant fired numerous rounds
in the direction of Mr. Robinson during daylight hours on a populated city street. In
short, he recklessly placed Mr. Robinson In danger of death or serious bodily injury, and
the Jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.
6. Recklessly Endangering Another Person (Jayonna Pope)
Here, Ms. Pope was on the same street in the vicinity of Mr. Robinson when the
Defendant opened fire. By trying to shoot Mr. Robinson among innocent bystanders
that Included Ms. Pope, the Defendant's actions were manifestly reckless and placed
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CP-21-CR-1212-2014
Ms. Pope in danger of death or serious bodily injury. The jury's verdict of guilty for this
count was supported by sufficient evidence.
8. Weight of the Evidence
The Defendant contends that the guilty verdicts discussed, supra, were against
the weight of the evidence. Our Superior Court has stated:
An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Our
Supreme Court has explained that appellate review of a
weight claim Is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of
the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence. A motion for new trial on the
grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the
evidence, concedes that there is sufficient evidence to
sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no obligation
to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict
winner. A new trial should be awarded when the jury's
verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's
sense of justice and the award of a new trial Is imperative so
that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.
Stated another way, ... this Court has explained that the
evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the
verdict shocks the conscience of the court.
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 805-06 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Rather than discuss each count individually,'the court will simply state that after
hearing all the evidence at trial, none of the verdicts shocked our sense of justice or
caused us to fall out of our chair. A new trial is not necessary. It is respectfully
submitted that this discretionary determination not be disturbed on appeal.
C. Admission of Text Messages
"The admission of evidence ls within the sound discretion of the trial court and
will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion."
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Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 902 A.2d 430, 452 (Pa. 2006). At trial, Defendant's counsel
objected to the admission of Mr. Robinson's text messages on the basis that they were
improperly authenticated. At the outset, the court acknowledges that the authentication
of cell phone text messages can be problematic where the authorship of the messages
is uncertain. See Commonwealth v. Koch, 103 A.3d 705 (Pa. 2014). However, where,
· as here, authorship of the messages is admitted, authentication may be established by
traditional evidentiary means. The Rules provide, in relevant part:
(a) In General. To satisfy the requirement of authenticating
or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must
produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item.
is what the proponent claims it is. ·
(b) Examples. The following are examples only-not a
complete list--of evidence that satisfies the requirement:
(1) Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that
an item Is what it is claimed to be.
Pa.R.E. 901 (emphasis added).
As previously noted, Mr. Robinson was a reluctant and uncooperative witness.
When confronted with the text messages copied from his cell phone, he equivocated as
to whether he was the author. However, he did admit to authoring the text messages
sent to a woman, known as "Ride," wherein he discussed being the target of the
shootlng.2 Though he repudiated the veracity of the statement made in the text
2
Mr. Robinson had the following exchange with the District Attorney:
Q I'm showing you what's been marked as Commonwealth's Exhibits No. 12 and 13 which are
copies of texts taken from your phone. It says here, They Just tried to kill me, lol. Yoo s-t-f-u were
you with Jayonna? She walked past me and them nlggas shot in my direction and hit her. That's
so crazy. Who was It? You didn't get hit at all? Nah, I ain't get hit. They shot a lot of times, but I
ain't get hit. My feet was fast, lol. Yo, that's crazy. Glad you're okay. Hope Jay Is too. Yeah, I'm
good. I talked to her mom. I see her when I can. She's gonna be okay? She's In surgery.
A Yeah, I was trying to-· that was what - you see why I put that, that. that, that caption. I mean,
that's a female.
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CP-21-CR-1212-2014
messages, he did admit to being the messages' author. Accordingly, Mr. Robinson's
testimony as a witness with knowledge satisfied any authentication requirement.
Further, any hearsay concerns are also allayed as Mr. Robinson was personally
confronted with the statements in court before the jury. Thus, the Defendant had the
opportunity to challenge the truth of the matter asserted in those messages by cross
examining Mr. Robinson. Indeed, defense counsel attempted to confront those texts,
but, given Mr. Robinson's machismo-laced bravado, counsel's efforts were Ill-fated from
the start.
For these reasons, the court submits it did not err in admitting the text messages
Into evidence.
D. Transferred Intent
Defendant argues that the court erred by instructing the jury on transferred intent
where no killing occurred and where the court substantially altered the standard jury
instruction. In this case, the issue of transferred intent arose to establish the element of
intent for Aggravated Assault (Causing Bodily Injury with a Deadly Weapon) as to
Jayonna Pope, because she was an unintended victim of the Defendant's attempt to
murder Stephen Robinson.
Q Ride?
A Yeah, Ride, that's a female. At that time I was In a relationship with somebody. So, yeah, I was
trying to make it seem like I was the one who got shot at, like little points with that female
because, you know, she llkes things like that. She likes bad guys. So, maybe she would look at
me like, oh, this Is a bad guy, maybe I get the buns or something like that, no disrespect, or
something like that. So, that's why. I mean, but that doesn't mean that was the truth. Yeah, I told
that female a lot of lies.
THE COURT: I'm sorry, you said you told that female a lot of lies?
THE WITNESS: I told her a lot of lies because I was In a relationship.
N.T., 1/27/2015 at 194-95.
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CP-21-CR-1212-2014
The standard jury instruction relating to transferred Intent reads:
The Commonwealth has alleged that while the defendant[s)
[intended to kill] [conspired with the intent to kill] [name of
Intended victim), [he] [she] [they] actually caused the death
of [name of deceased].
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant[s)
[intended to kill) [conspired with the intent to kill) [name of
intended victim] and [was) [were) acting with that intent at the
time [he) {she) [they) in fact killed [name of deceased), you
may find the defendant[s) acted with the specific intent to kill
under what the law calls the doctrine of transferred intent.
What this means is that if the actual result the defendant[sJ
intended differs from what [heJ [she] [they] contemplated
only because a different person than the one actually
Intended was killed, the element of causing the death with
specific intent to kill is still established.
Pennsylvania Standard Jury. Instruction 15.2501 C .1.
Though the standard jury instruction contemplates a killing, the transferred intent
doctrine, as codified in our criminal code, contains no such requirement. The code
provides:
When intentionally or knowingly causing a particular result Is
an element of an offense, the element Is not established if
the actual result is not within the Intent or the contemplation
of the actor unless:
(1) the actual result differs from that designed or
contemplated as the- case may be, only in the respect that a
different person or different property is Injured or affected or
that the Injury or harm designed or contemplated would have
been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or
(2) the actual result involves the same kind of Injury or harm
as that designed or contemplated and is not too remote or
accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor's
liability or on the gravity of his offense.
18 Pa.C.S. § 303(b) (emphasis added).
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CP-21-CR-1212-2014
Per the statute, a killing is not required.". Here, the injury or harm to Ms. Pope
was established based on the gunshot wound to her head and thus the application of
the transferred intent doctrine was appropriate.
As to the jury instruction, the standard jury instructionsare obviously drafted so
as to accommodate modification for the purpose of tailoring them to the specific facts of
a given case. Here the court instructed the Jury as follows:
The Commonwealth has alleged that while the defendant
intended to kill Stephen Robinson, he actually caused injury
to Jayonna Pope.
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
Intended to kill Stephen Robinson and was acting with that
·intent at the time he injured Jayonna Pope, you may find the
defendant acted with the specific intent to kill under what the
law calls the doctrine of transferred Intent.
What this means is that if the actual result the defendant
intended differs from what he contemplated only because a
different person than the one actually intended was injured,
the element of specific intent to kill Is still established
regarding the attempted murder charge. Similarly, the Intent
to Inflict serious bodily injury would still be established with
regard to the first aggravated assault count, and the Intent to
cause bodily Injury with a weapon would stlll be established
regarding the second aggravated assault count.
In essence, the intent to cause injury or to kill one individual
may be transferred to the actual victim. As with the case of
determining accomplice liability, as I explained you had to
determine that with respect to each of the offenses
individually, your determination to apply this doctrine, the
doctrine of transferred Intent, must be made separately for
each offense.
In other words, you must make a separate determination
regarding the application of the doctrine to attempted
murder, -aggravated assault (attempted serious bodily injury)
3
In at least two Pennsylvania appellate cases, the transferred Intent rule was applled to aggravated
assault cases predicated on an attempt to cause an Injury even though no Injury had occurred. See
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 955 A.2d 441 (Pa. Super. 2008) (applying the doctrine to establish the Intent
to cause serious bodlly injury to a group of unintended victims even though no one suffered physical
injuries as a result of a shooting). Clearly, the occurrence of a killing ls not a prerequisite to the
application of the transferred Intent doctrine in Pennsylvania. See also Commonwealth v. Thompson, 739
A.2d 1023, 1029-30 (Pa. 1999).
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CP-21-CR-1212-2014
and aggravated assault (causing bodily injury with a deadly ·
weapon).
N.T.1 1/28/2015 at 441-43.
The court respectfully submits that this Jury instruction was an accurate
statement of Pennsylvania law and presents no basis for reversal.
E. Length of Sentence
The Defendant contends that the court abused its discretion by Imposing a
sentence that was unreasonable and excessive under the circumstances of the case.
We first note that at the original sentencing date, the court erroneously applied an
illegally lengthy sentence which was the result of a calculation error arising from the
Commonwealth's failure to present the issue of serious bodily Injury to the jury as to
Count I, Criminal Attempt- Criminal Homicide. The court subsequently resentenced
the Defendant to an aggregate. sentence of 12 ~ to 25 years. That sentence reflected
consecutive sentences for Criminal Attempt- Criminal Homicide, 10-20 years;
I
Aggravated Assault (Jayonna Pope), 1-2 years; Firearms not to be possessed without a
license, 1-2 years; and, Recklessly Endangering Another Person (Ashley Brown), 6-12
months.
The Defendant's crime was shocking. He opened fire with a deadly weapon
during daylight hours on a populated downtown street In an attempt to kill Stephen
Robinson. He wounded two innocent bystanders, one of whom he shot In the head.
Per eyewitness testimony, he laughed as he fled the scene of his crime. His three
victims each deserved to have their rights vindicated by the imposition of consecutive
sentences and nothing less than the lengthy sentence the court imposed would do
justice to the gravity of the Defendant's crimes. The court was in receipt of letters of
\
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CP-21-CR-1212-2014
support from the Defendant's family, but nothing therein can mitigate the gravity of the
Defendant's actions. His sentence is appropriate.
F. Merger
Finally, the Defendant argues the court erred by failing to merge Aggravated
Assault (Causing Bodily Injury with a Deadly Weapon) (Jayonna Pope) with Attempted
Murder. This claim of error is simply factually erroneous. The Defendant was not
convicted of the attempted murder of Jayonna Pope. He was convicted of the
attempted murder of Stephen Robinson and the Defendant's corresponding aggravated
assault conviction relating to Mr. Robinson was properly merged for sentencing
purposes. This issue presents no basis for reversal.
Ill. Conclusion
In sum, despite two of the victims in this case acting as problematic witnesses,
multiple other eyewitnesses and objective text and video evidence were found credible
by the jury and resulted in appropriate guilty verdicts. The court respectfully submits
that the verdicts and judgment of sentence be affirmed.
By the Court}
~
Albert H. Masland, J.
Matthew P. Smith, Esquire
Assistant District Attorney
Jacob M. Jividen, Esquire
For Defendant
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