North City Development Co. v. General Foods LLC ( 2015 )


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  • J-A15019-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    NORTH CITY DEVELOPMENT CO.                        IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    GENERAL FOODS, LLC
    Appellant                 No. 1440 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 30, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No(s): September Term, 2013 No. 03382
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:                         FILED NOVEMBER 05, 2015
    Appellant, General Foods, LLC, (General Foods) appeals from the
    portion of the April 30, 2014 order denying its petition to open or strike a
    confessed judgment entered in favor of Appellee, North City Development
    Company (North City). After careful review, we affirm.
    The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history
    of this case as follows.
    [North City] confessed judgment pursuant to a
    commercial lease with General Foods (hereinafter
    “Lease”). At the time the Lease was signed, General
    Foods and North City were both fully owned by the
    same person – Mr. Abraham Woidislawsky, a real
    estate investor who has been managing properties
    for over 30 years.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A15019-15
    The Lease pertains to a property (hereinafter
    “the Property”) that is located in a shopping center
    owned by North City (hereinafter “Shopping
    Center”). Mr. Woidislawsky served as the property
    manager of the Shopping Center. The Lease, which
    was drafted by Mr. Woidislawsky’s attorney, is for a
    99-year term and, at the time that the Complaint
    was filed, set rent for the Property at $1,537.34 per
    month. As part of the Lease, General Foods was
    required    to    pay    estimated    common     area
    maintenance fees and a pro rata share of taxes and
    insurance each month (hereinafter collectively
    referred to as “CAM”), in addition to rent. This was
    supplemented by a CAM reconciliation total, which
    was calculated and billed to each shopping center
    tenant at the end of each year, and represented the
    difference between the estimated CAM monthly
    payments and the actual CAM costs.            Though
    General Foods is North City’s tenant, Mr.
    Woidislawsky had subleased the Property to a third
    party for about $6,500 per month, thereby allowing
    General Foods to reap a profit of roughly $5,000 per
    month. Undoubtedly, General Foods’ rent is so far
    below market value because Mr. Woidislawsky owned
    both entities at the time his attorney drafted this
    Lease.
    The Lease provides for several events of
    default, the most relevant of which for the instant
    case are described in Section 16(a) and 16(g) of the
    Lease. Under Section 16(a), a tenant has defaulted
    “to pay when due any installment of rent hereunder
    or any other sum herein required to be paid by
    Tenant, if such failure continues for 10 days after
    written notice thereof by Lessor is received by
    Tenant: is an event of default. Under Section 16(g)
    of the Lease, it is an event of default when there is
    “[r]epetition or continuation of any failure to timely
    pay any rent or other sums herein required to be
    paid by Tenant where such failure shall continue or
    be repeated for two (2) months in any period of
    twelve consecutive months.”         The Lease also
    contains a confession of judgment clause in Section
    17(b), which allows for judgment to be entered
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    pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2950, et seq. upon a default
    by the lessee.
    In May of 2007, Kyun Duk Seo and Myung Kyu
    Seo purchased 89 shares of stock in North City.
    They bought the remaining stock in April of 2013,
    becoming the sole shareholders of North City.
    Though Paul Seo, the new owners’ son, began
    managing North City in 2010, Mr. Woidislawsky
    remained the Shopping Center’s property manager.
    As the property manager, Mr. Woidislawsky was in
    charge of collecting the CAM reconciliations from the
    tenants, including General Foods. However, in early
    2011, shortly after becoming North City’s manager,
    Paul Seo discovered that Mr. Woidislawsky had not
    collected CAM reconciliation from General Foods for
    the years 2007 through 2010. Mr. Seo testified in
    his deposition that he informed Mr. Woidislawsky as
    soon as he became aware of this fact. Mr. Seo
    repeatedly requested satisfaction of the charges and
    Mr. Woidislawsky consistently responded with
    promises of payment, but then would fail to follow
    through. Indeed, Mr. Woidislawsky admitted that he
    did not pay the charges until after the confessed
    judgment was entered. General Foods paid the CAM
    reconciliation for 2011, but then failed to pay it again
    for 2012. Mr. Woidislawsky maintains that he has
    paid all that he owed because he disagreed with the
    calculations of the CAM reconciliations and, thus, he
    was not required to pay them.
    In April of 2013, when the Seos assumed
    complete ownership of North City and after they
    found out that Mr. Woidislawsky was not collecting
    CAM reconciliation from General Foods, they hired a
    new company to manage the properties, thereby
    replacing Mr. Woidislawsky. Subsequently, General
    Foods did not pay its rent on time for May, June,
    July, or September of 2013 and North City sent
    letters via regular mail demanding payment of rent
    and other charges dated May 6, 2013, June 6, 2013,
    July 8, 2013 and August 6, 2013. In his deposition,
    Mr. Woidislawsky contended that he always paid rent
    on time, but North City didn’t pick up the checks on
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    time. [H]owever, he also stated that, though the
    Seos owned 89 percent of North City at the time, he
    believed that he could pay whenever he wanted,
    because he believed the properties still belonged to
    him and, in addition, because he managed the
    properties. On September [9], 2013, North City sent
    a letter requesting payment of the unpaid charges
    via UPS, which was received and signed for by Mr.
    Woidislawsky’s secretary, Ms. June Amey, on
    September 13, 2013.      North City instituted this
    action after General Foods did not respond to that
    letter in 10 days.
    On September 27, 2013, North City filed its
    Complaint for Confession of Judgment for Money and
    Possession       of    Real     Property   (hereinafter
    “Complaint”). On October 25, 2013, General Foods
    filed its Petition to Open/Strike Judgment. …
    On November 13, 2013, North City filed its
    Praecipe to Attach a Verification to its Complaint in
    order to comply with Pa.R.C.P. 2952(a)(10) and
    Pa.R.C.P. 1024.     Five days later, it filed its
    [r]esponse [to General Foods’ petition]. …
    Subsequently, [the trial c]ourt entered an
    [o]rder granting leave to the parties to take
    discovery on disputed issues of fact. On March 31,
    the   parties    submitted    notes    of   testimony,
    documentation and supplemental memoranda as
    required by [the trial c]ourt’s January 14, 2014
    [o]rder and on April 10, 2014, [the trial c]ourt held a
    hearing on the Petition. Pursuant to leave granted
    by [the trial c]ourt, the parties submitted additional
    supplemental memoranda on April 14 and 15, 2014.
    On April 30, 2014, after thorough consideration
    of the record, briefs and oral argument, [the trial
    c]ourt denied the Petition to Strike the confessed
    judgment for possession and money and denied the
    Petition to Open the confessed judgment for
    possession; however [the trial c]ourt granted the
    Petition to Open the confessed judgment for money
    so that the proper amount of the judgment could be
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    determined by a fact finder.[1] [The trial c]ourt also
    ruled that that amount of the judgment and the
    amount in controversy were not grossly excessive.
    On May 7, 2014, General Foods [filed a timely notice
    of appeal]. Pursuant to [the trial c]ourt’s May 8,
    2014 order, General Foods filed its Statement of
    Errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on May 21,
    2014 …. On July 23, 2014, [the trial c]ourt entered
    an Order by Agreement, which stayed the execution
    upon the confessed judgment for possession.
    Trial Court Opinion, 9/9/14, at 1-6 (internal citations and footnote omitted).
    On appeal, General Foods raises the following two issues for our
    review.
    1.     Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an error
    of law and/or manifestly abused its discretion
    by refusing to strike the judgments for
    possession and for money in favor of [North
    City] and against General Foods[?]
    2.     Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an error
    of law and/or manifestly abused its discretion
    by refusing to open the judgment for
    possession in favor of [North City] and against
    General Foods[?]
    General Foods’ Brief at 4.
    In its first issue, General Foods avers that the trial court erred in not
    striking the confessed judgment for possession or money.        General Foods’
    Brief at 22-39.      We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review
    pertaining to petitions to strike.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    North City has not filed a cross-appeal from this portion of the trial court’s
    April 30, 2014 order.
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    A petition to strike a judgment is a common[-
    ]law proceeding [that] operates as a demurrer
    to the record. A petition to strike a judgment
    may be granted only for a fatal defect or
    irregularity appearing on the face of the
    record….    An order of the court striking a
    judgment annuls the original judgment and the
    parties are left as if no judgment had been
    entered.
    In assessing whether there are fatal defects on the
    face of the record …, a court may only look at what
    was in the record when the judgment was entered.
    Moreover, if any defect disclosed by the record is one
    that can be remedied by an amendment of the
    record or other action, nunc pro tunc, the judgment
    should not be stricken off. We will reverse a trial
    court’s denial of a petition to strike a judgment only
    if there is a manifest abuse of discretion or an error
    of law.
    When a proceeding to confess judgment is instituted
    by complaint, the complaint and confession of
    judgment clause must be read together to determine
    whether there are defects on the face of the record.
    It is a firmly established rule of construction in
    the case of warrants of attorney to confess
    judgments that the authority thus given must
    be clear, explicit and strictly construed, that if
    doubt exists it must be resolved against the
    party in whose favor the warrant is given, and
    that all proceedings thereunder must be within
    the strict letter of the warrant. If the authority
    to enter judgment by confession on a warrant
    of attorney is not strictly followed, the
    judgment will be stricken.
    Notably, we have observed that the rule of strict
    construction may be constitutionally mandated in
    light of … due process attacks on cognovit clauses.
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    It has always been held that formal defects,
    mistakes and omissions in confessions of
    judgment may be corrected by amendment
    where the cause of the action is not changed,
    where the ends of justice require the allowance
    of   such    amendment,      and   where    the
    substantive rights of defendant or of any third
    persons will not be prejudiced thereby.
    Dime Bank v. Andrews, 
    115 A.3d 358
    , 364-365 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis in original).
    In arguing that the trial court erred in not striking the confessed
    judgments, General Foods makes four distinct assignments of error. First,
    General Foods argues that North City did not aver or prove a demand for
    rent in its complaint.   General Foods’ Brief at 25.   Second, General Foods
    avers that North City’s attaching a notice of default was not a permissible
    technical amendment. 
    Id. at 28.
    Third, General Foods submits that North
    City did not sufficiently aver notice of eviction in its complaint.   
    Id. at 35.
    Fourth, General Foods maintains that the trial court incorrectly concluded
    that North City’s complaint alleged a default by General Foods under a
    section of the lease that did not require pre-confession notice.      
    Id. at 37.
    We elect to address General Foods’ first two arguments together as they are
    interrelated to each other.
    General Foods argues that North City did not aver or prove a demand
    for rent, relying heavily on our Supreme Court’s decision in Elizabethtown
    Lodge No. 596 Loyal Order of Moose v. Ellis, 
    137 A.2d 286
    (Pa. 1958).
    General Foods’ Brief at 23-27. General Foods also avers that the trial court
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    erred in considering evidence de hors to the record, i.e., a demand letter
    attached to North City’s response to General Foods’ petition.      
    Id. at 26.
    Related to this argument, General Foods maintains that the trial court
    improperly considered this demand letter as an amendment to the record.
    
    Id. at 28.
    In Elizabethtown, our Supreme Court held that a petition to strike a
    confessed judgment must be granted where the landlord “fail[s] to aver or
    prove a demand for rent.”       Elizabethtown, supra at 289 (emphasis
    added). Our Supreme Court noted that this is consistent with the common
    law rule that “forfeitures are odious and must be strictly construed.” 
    Id. at 290.
    Instantly, the trial court concluded that Elizabethtown only required
    North City to aver or to prove in its complaint that a demand for rent was
    made, not both. Trial Court Opinion, 9/9/14, at 8. We agree with the trial
    court that this is the best reading of the case. Our Supreme Court’s use of
    the conjunction “or” strongly indicates its intent that under Pennsylvania law
    a landlord may elect to aver in the complaint’s text itself, or prove via
    exhibits attached to the complaint or otherwise in the record, that a demand
    for rent was made.    This is reinforced by our Supreme Court pointing out
    that the landlord in Elizabethtown conceded that “no demand for payment
    of the rent was made on the due date[.]” 
    Id. at 289.
    Nor was the same
    averred in the complaint.       The judgment of our Supreme Court in
    Elizabethtown was that because the landlord did not demand payment of
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    rent and there was no waiver of such a demand in the underlying lease, the
    confessed judgment was required to be stricken. 
    Id. at 291.
    In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that North City did not
    specifically aver in its complaint that it made a demand for rent, nor did it
    attach a demand letter to the same.      However, this does not support the
    conclusion that a demand for payment was never made, as was the case in
    Elizabethtown.
    Appellant is correct that when considering a petition to strike a
    judgment, the trial court is confined to “only the record as filed by the party
    in whose favor the warrant is given, i.e., the complaint and the documents
    which contain confession of judgment clauses [and m]atters dehors the
    record filed by the party in whose favor the warrant is given will not be
    considered.” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Copley Qu-Wayne Assocs., 
    683 A.2d 269
    , 273 (Pa. 1996) (emphasis in original). However, as noted above,
    Pennsylvania law prohibits the striking of a confessed judgment if an
    “omission” can be corrected by the trial court allowing an amendment of the
    record.   Dime 
    Bank, supra
    ; see also Atl. Nat’l Trust, LLC v. Stivala
    Invs., 
    922 A.2d 919
    , 923 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating, “a motion to strike
    may not be granted ‘[i]f the defect is one that can be remedied by an
    amendment of the record or other action[]’”) (citation omitted), appeal
    denied, 
    936 A.2d 39
    (Pa. 2007).      Here, North City’s failure to attach its
    demand letter as an exhibit to its original complaint was undoubtedly an
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    “omission.” However, the trial court properly considered the September 9,
    2013 letter attached as an exhibit to North City’s response to General Foods’
    petition to effectively amend the record and cure the omission. See A. B. &
    F. Contracting Corp. v. Matthews Coal Co., 
    166 A.2d 317
    , 320 (Pa.
    Super. 1960) (stating, “the failure to attach a copy of the notice [of the
    default] was merely a formal defect[]”).         This further distinguishes the
    instant   case   from   the   situation   our   Supreme   Court   confronted   in
    Elizabethtown, most notably that a demand was made, and said demand
    letter was supplied.
    General Foods also argues the omission of the September 9, 2013
    demand letter at the time of the filing of the complaint, caused it prejudice
    because it was deprived of raising three meritorious defenses. Specifically,
    General Foods claims it was prevented from raising the issues that it
    contacted North City’s property manager within the 10-day period, that it
    disputed the sums in North City’s September 9, 2013 letter, and that it did
    pay all rent that was due and thus substantially performed under the terms
    of the lease. General Foods’ Brief at 34.
    We fail to see how North City’s initial omission of the September 9,
    2013 demand letter “cause[d] General Foods to focus primarily on its strike
    allegations in its Petition to Strike or Open.” 
    Id. There was
    no practical or
    legal obstacle to General Foods raising as many defenses and arguments as
    it wanted. General Foods was always free to present to the trial court any
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    and every reason as to why the confessed judgments should be open or
    stricken. As we explain infra, this is required by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
    Procedure 2959.        See generally Pa.R.C.P. 2959(a)(1).    Based on these
    considerations, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion or
    legally err when it denied General Foods’ petition to strike the confessed
    judgments for possession and money.2 See Dime 
    Bank, supra
    .
    In its second issue on appeal, General Foods avers that the trial court
    erred when it failed to grant its petition to open the confessed judgment for
    possession. General Foods’ Brief at 40-52. We begin by noting our standard
    of review.    “A petition to open a confessed judgment is an appeal to the
    equitable powers of the court.”          Midwestern Fin. Acceptance Corp. v.
    Lopez, 
    78 A.3d 614
    , 623 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “We review
    a court's order denying a petition to open a confessed judgment for an
    abuse of discretion.”       Huntington Nat’l Bank v. K-Cor, Inc., 
    107 A.3d 783
    , 785 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    117 A.3d 1281
    (Pa. 2015). “A petition to open a judgment should be granted when a
    party acts promptly, alleges a meritorious defense to the judgment and
    ____________________________________________
    2
    In its last two arguments, General Foods avers first that the trial court
    incorrectly concluded that North City sufficiently averred notice in its
    complaint and second that the defaults complained of did not require notice
    at all. General Foods’ Brief at 35, 37. However, because we have resolved
    General Foods’ first two arguments in North City’s favor, we need not
    address General Foods’ remaining two arguments since they are contingent
    on this Court’s disagreeing with the trial court’s reading of Elizabethtown.
    - 11 -
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    presents evidence of that defense sufficient to reach a jury.”     Atl. Nat’l
    Trust, 
    LLC., supra
    .
    [It is axiomatic that] a court should open a
    confessed judgment if the petitioner promptly
    presents evidence on a petition to open which in a
    jury trial would require that the issues be submitted
    to the jury. A petitioner must offer clear, direct,
    precise and believable evidence of a meritorious
    defense, sufficient to raise a jury question.      In
    determining whether sufficient evidence has been
    presented, [courts should] employ the same
    standard as in a directed verdict: [the trial court
    must] view all the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the petitioner and accept as true all
    evidence and proper inferences therefrom supporting
    the defense while … reject[ing] adverse allegations
    of the party obtaining the judgment.
    Stahl Oil Co., Inc. v. Helsel, 
    860 A.2d 508
    , 512 (Pa. Super. 2004)
    (internal citations omitted), appeal denied, 
    885 A.2d 43
    (Pa. 2005).
    Instantly, General Foods raises two arguments in support of its
    position that the confessed judgment for possession should have been
    opened. First, General Foods avers that the trial court applied an incorrect
    standard as it failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to it,
    regarding its compliance within the demand letter’s 10-day period. General
    Foods’ Brief at 42. Second, General Foods argues that the trial court failed
    to apply the proper standard to determine whether it substantially
    performed under the terms of the lease. 
    Id. at 43.
    However, we must first
    consider North City’s argument that General Foods waived these arguments
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    by not presenting them in its petition to open the judgment in the trial court.
    See generally North City’s Brief at 32-34, 39-40.
    Petitions to open or strike a confessed judgment are governed by Rule
    2959, which provides in relevant part, as follows.
    Rule 2959. Striking Off or Opening Judgment;
    Pleadings; Procedure
    (a)(1) Relief from a judgment by confession shall be
    sought by petition. Except as provided in
    subparagraph (2), all grounds for relief whether
    to strike off the judgment or to open it must be
    asserted in a single petition. The petition may be
    filed in the county in which the judgment was
    originally entered, in any county to which the
    judgment has been transferred or in any other
    county in which the sheriff has received a writ of
    execution directed to the sheriff to enforce the
    judgment.
    …
    (c) A party waives all defenses and objections
    which are not included in the petition or
    answer.
    …
    Pa.R.C.P. 2959 (emphases added); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating,
    “issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the
    first time on appeal[]”).
    We have reviewed General Foods’ petition.       Therein, it raised three
    issues regarding its position that the confessed judgment for possession
    should be opened.     First, General Foods asserted that North City had not
    produced any evidence that notice of nonpayment had been provided.
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    General Foods’ Petition, 10/25/13, at ¶¶ 67-69.          Second, General Foods
    averred that the amount of the judgment was excessive and not supported
    by evidence.      
    Id. at ¶¶
    76-78.       Third, General Foods submitted that the
    signature on the lease did not relate to the warrant of attorney provision
    contained in the lease and said warrant was not bolded, underlined, or
    otherwise set apart from the rest of the lease’s text.         
    Id. at ¶¶
    82-86.
    Nowhere in its petition to open did General Foods assert that it complied
    with the 10-day notice or substantially performed under the terms of the
    lease.3   Regarding its alleged compliance with the 10-day notice, General
    Foods did not make this argument until it filed its reply to North City’s
    answer. See generally General Foods Reply, 11/21/13, at 4-5. As a result,
    we agree with North City that General Foods’ arguments regarding its
    petition to open the confessed judgment for possession are waived on
    appeal.
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude all of General Foods’ issues are
    either waived or devoid of merit. Accordingly, the trial court’s April 30, 2014
    order is affirmed.
    Order affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    3
    General Foods acknowledges that it did not raise these issues in its petition
    to open. General Foods’ Brief at 34.
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    J-A15019-15
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/5/2015
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