Com. v. William, E. ( 2019 )

J-S26012-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ERIC WILLIAM :
:
Appellant : No. 997 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 5, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003947-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2019
Eric William appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following
his guilty plea conviction of attempted murder. Appellant’s counsel seeks to
withdraw his representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We
affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
On November 21, 2016, Appellant, who was incarcerated while awaiting
trial in a murder case, hid in his victim’s cell. When the victim entered the
cell, Appellant left his hiding place, locked the door, and attacked the victim
stating: “I’m going to kill you like I killed your son.”1 N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing,
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 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Appellant was in jail awaiting trial for murdering the victim’s stepson. Since
then, he was convicted of first-degree murder in the matter and sentenced to
a mandatory life sentence without parole. See Docket No. CP-51-CR-
0008144-2015.
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3/05/18, at 34. Appellant stabbed his victim multiple times in the face, neck,
and testicles, causing him to lose consciousness and ultimately spend several
days in the hospital because of the injuries. See id. at 34-35.
On March 5, 2018, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to
attempted murder. In accordance with the plea, the Commonwealth nolle
prossed all other pending charges associated with the incident. On the same
day Appellant entered his plea, the trial court sentenced him, consistent with
the plea agreement, to a term of not less than ten nor more than twenty years
of imprisonment, to run concurrently to the mandatory life sentence he was
currently serving for murder. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions.
This timely appeal followed.
On October 10, 2018, in response to the trial court’s concise statement
order, counsel filed a statement of intent to file an Anders brief. The trial
court entered a Rule 1925(a) statement on December 4, 2018. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a). On January 4, 2019, counsel filed his petition for leave to withdraw
and Anders brief on the basis that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Appellant
has not responded.
Court-appointed counsel who seek to withdraw from representing
an appellant on direct appeal on the basis that the appeal is
frivolous must:
(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating
that, after making a conscientious examination of the
record, counsel has determined that the appeal would
be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring to anything that
arguably might support the appeal but which does not
resemble a “no-merit” letter or amicus curiae brief;
and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant
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and advise the defendant of his or her right to retain
new counsel or raise any additional points that he or
she deems worthy of the court’s attention.
[T]his Court may not review the merits of the underlying
issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.
Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations
and quotation marks omitted; brackets in original). Further, our Supreme
Court ruled in Santiago, supra, that Anders briefs must contain “a
discussion of counsel’s reasons for believing that the client’s appeal is
frivolous[.]” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 360.
Here, counsel’s Anders brief and motion to withdraw substantially
comply with the applicable technical requirements and demonstrate that he
“has made a conscientious examination of the record in this case and has
determined that an appeal would be frivolous.” Lilley, supra at 997. The
record establishes that counsel served Appellant with a copy of the Anders
brief and motion to withdraw, and a letter of notice, which advised Appellant
of his right to retain new counsel, or to proceed pro se and raise additional
issues to this Court. See Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, 1/04/19. Further,
the motion and brief cite “to anything that arguably might support the
appeal[.]” Lilley, 978 A.2d at 997 (citation omitted); see also Anders Brief,
at 8-12. Accordingly, we conclude that counsel complied with Anders’
technical requirements. See Lilley, 978 A.2d at 997.
Having concluded that counsel’s petition and brief substantially comply
with the technical Anders requirements, we must “conduct [our] own review
of the trial court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment as to
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whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” Id. at 998 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
The Anders brief raises two questions for our review:2
i. [Whether] Appellant was coerced into taking a plea by the
trial court[?]
ii. [Whether t]he trial court erred by failing to allow Appellant
to have substitute appointed counsel because the existing
attorney-client relationship had failed[?]
Anders Brief, at 8, 10.
In the first issue set forth in the Anders brief, Appellant argues that he
is entitled to relief because the trial court coerced him into pleading guilty.
We disagree.
Preliminarily, we observe that “[i]n order to preserve an issue related to
a guilty plea, an appellant must either object at the sentencing colloquy or
otherwise raise the issue at the sentencing hearing or through a post-sentence
motion.” Commonwealth v. Monjaras-Amaya, 163 A.3d 466, 468-69 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Failure to
challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea by objecting at sentencing or
raising the issue through a post-sentence motion results in waiver. See id.
at 469.
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2 Appellant’s statement of questions presented only poses one question,
“whether there are any issues of arguable merit that could be raised on appeal
presently before this court and whether the appeal is wholly frivolous?”
Anders Brief, at 4. However, the argument portion of his brief includes two
specific issues raised. For clarity, we have set forth those questions here.
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Here, the record reveals that Appellant never challenged his guilty plea
in the trial court. Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue is waived.
In the second issue raised in the Anders brief, Appellant contends that
the trial court erred by failing to appoint new counsel after Appellant alleged
the attorney-client relationship had failed. See Anders Brief, at 10. We
disagree.
While Appellant is entitled to appointed counsel, he is not entitled to
appointed counsel of his choosing. See Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d
594, 617 (Pa. 2008). Thus,
[w]hether to grant a defendant’s petition to replace court
appointed counsel is a decision which is left to the sound discretion
of the trial court. As a general rule, however, a defendant must
show irreconcilable differences between himself and his court
appointed counsel before a trial court will be reversed for abuse
of discretion in refusing to appoint new counsel.
Commonwealth v. Floyd, 937 A.2d 494, 497 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations
omitted; brackets in original).
Here, during the guilty plea hearing, the court addressed Appellant’s
motion to substitute counsel. Appellant explained that he was dissatisfied
with counsel’s representation because he did not receive full discovery and did
not adequately discuss defense strategy. Appellant characterized the
relationship as “eroding” and “[not] a good relationship.” N.T., at 22.
The trial court informed Appellant that if that were true he would not
accept the plea. Counsel then stated that he represented Appellant during
the unrelated murder trial, talked about this incident extensively during the
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trial, and went over photographs, videos, and other discovery. The court then
explained that it did not hear anything indicating that counsel was not
prepared, so it denied the motion to substitute counsel. See id. at 28. Finally,
the trial court again asked Appellant whether he was satisfied with counsel’s
representation, to which Appellant responded “Yes.” Id. at 29.
Upon review, we conclude that because Appellant did not show
irreconcilable differences between himself and counsel, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to substitute counsel. See
Floyd, 937 A.2d at 497. Thus, the second issue does not merit relief.
After independent review, we determine that there are no other non-
frivolous bases for appeal, and this appeal is wholly frivolous. See Lilley, 978
A.2d at 998. Therefore, we grant counsel leave to withdraw and affirm the
judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/27/19
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