Com. v. Ebo, M. ( 2017 )


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  • J-A07033-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                  :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                           :
    :
    v.                                 :
    :
    MATTHEW EBO,                                   :
    :
    Appellant                          :      No. 92 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 28, 2012
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0002821-2012
    BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:                           FILED JUNE 21, 2017
    Matthew Ebo (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed following his conviction for first-degree homicide and related
    offenses.    We affirm Appellant’s convictions, but vacate his judgment of
    sentence and remand for resentencing.
    Because we write only for the parties, a full recitation of the facts is
    unnecessary.       Relevant   to   this   appeal,   Appellant   and   co-defendant
    Thaddaeus Crumbley (Crumbley) (collectively, the co-defendants), were
    tried jointly in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County on charges
    related to the May 16, 2011 shooting death of Todd Mattox. A jury found
    both men guilty of first-degree homicide; robbery - serious bodily injury;
    robbery of a motor vehicle; two violations of the Uniform Firearms Act:
    carrying a firearm without a license and possession of firearms by a
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A07033-17
    prohibited person; conspiracy to commit criminal homicide; and conspiracy
    to commit robbery - serious bodily injury. On November 28, 2012, during
    the joint sentencing hearing, Appellant was sentenced to a term of life
    imprisonment for his homicide conviction, and an aggregate term of 46 to 92
    years of consecutive imprisonment on the remaining counts.           Relevant
    herein, as part of the aggregate sentence, the trial court imposed
    consecutive ten-to-20-year sentences at count three (robbery of a motor
    vehicle) and count six (conspiracy to commit robbery - serious bodily injury).
    On November 30, 2012, Appellant’s trial counsel moved to withdraw
    from representation. The trial court granted this request by order dated
    December 12, 2012. After being appointed by the court, appellate counsel
    from the Allegheny County Public Defender’s Office filed an emergency
    petition for leave to file post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc, which was
    granted.   Appellant’s post-sentence motion was subsequently denied by
    operation of law on June 26, 2013.
    On July 25, 2013, counsel timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court,
    which was docketed at 1194 WDA 2013. However, before the appeal was
    heard, counsel filed an application for remand based upon a claim of after-
    discovered evidence. This Court granted counsel’s request and ordered the
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    trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether Appellant’s claim
    merited a new trial.1
    On October 29, 2015, the trial court held a joint hearing on the co-
    defendants’ claims of after-discovered evidence.     On December 22, 2015,
    the trial court denied the requested relief. Appellant filed timely a notice of
    appeal, and both Appellant and the trial court have complied with the
    mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises four issues for our review.
    I.     Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to award
    [Appellant] a new trial based upon the recantation of the
    sole witness connecti[ng] him to the crime?
    II.    Was the evidence that [Crumbley] was involved in gun
    violence and possessed a firearm two weeks after the
    homicide inadmissible evidence of other bad acts and was
    it completely irrelevant to whether [Appellant] was
    involved in the homicide when the subsequent incident had
    no connection to [Appellant]?
    III.   Should identification evidence have been suppressed when
    the highly suggestive pre[-]trial identification procedure
    tainted the main eyewitness’[s] in-court identification of
    [Appellant]?
    1
    Crumbley’s case followed a similar post-trial trajectory. Crumbley, through
    counsel, timely filed a notice of appeal after the November 28, 2012
    sentencing. His appeal was docketed at 1997 WDA 2012. On January 5,
    2015, while Crumbley’s case was pending on appeal before this Court, his
    counsel filed a petition for remand on the basis of after-discovered evidence.
    This Court initially denied Crumbley’s request, as well as his request for
    reconsideration of the same, and oral argument was scheduled for August
    11, 2015. However, on August 11, 2015, before argument occurred, this
    Court remanded Crumbley’s case for an evidentiary hearing on the after-
    discovered evidence claim.
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    IV.   Was the trial court’s imposition of sentence under the
    unconstitutional statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 9712, illegal when
    the factfinder never found the facts necessary beyond a
    reasonable doubt for the imposition of the mandatory
    minimum sentence?
    Appellant’s Brief at 12 (unnecessary capitalization and trial court answers
    omitted).
    Appellant first claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion
    for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 27-
    39. We address this claim mindful of the following.
    To warrant relief, after-discovered evidence must meet a
    four-prong test: (1) the evidence could not have been obtained
    before the conclusion of the trial by reasonable diligence; (2) the
    evidence is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the
    evidence will not be used solely for purposes of impeachment;
    and (4) the evidence is of such a nature and character that a
    different outcome is likely. At an evidentiary hearing, an
    appellant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
    each of these factors has been met in order for a new trial to be
    warranted.
    Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
    939 A.2d 355
    , 359 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
    omitted).
    The after-discovered evidence at issue is the unsworn statement of
    eyewitness Saday Robinson in which she recanted her pre-trial and in-court
    identification of the co-defendants. The certified record shows the following.
    The May 16, 2011 shooting that resulted in Mattox’s death occurred outside
    of Robinson’s apartment. Robinson was presented with a number of photo
    arrays following the shooting, but did not identify Appellant as one of the
    shooters until July of 2012.    At trial, Robinson made a positive in-court
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    identification of both co-defendants, and noted that it was fear of retaliation
    that prevented her from identifying the men in the initial photo arrays.
    Robinson was cross-examined extensively as to the credibility of her
    identification.
    In 2014, after both co-defendants had been sentenced, Robinson was
    interviewed by a defense investigator.         This interview was recorded in
    writing and on video; however, Robinson was not sworn, nor did she give
    the statement under penalty of perjury. Robinson told the investigator that
    she did not witness the shooting, that her trial testimony was fabricated, and
    that her identification of the co-defendants was coerced by the police.
    Robinson was called to testify at the October 29, 2015 evidentiary
    hearing. At that time, she recanted her statements to the investigator and
    claimed that her 2014 recorded statement was untruthful. When asked why
    she lied, she explained that she had been threatened by persons close to
    Appellant and Crumbley and had been offered a large sum of money to
    recant her trial testimony.   However, Robinson affirmed at the evidentiary
    hearing that she was telling the truth when she identified Appellant and
    Crumbley as the shooters during their trial.
    Appellant argues that he met his burden under Rivera and is entitled
    to a new trial based on Robinson’s statement to the defense investigator
    because (1) the evidence of her recantation could not have been obtained
    before the conclusion of trial, (2) the evidence is not corroborative or
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    cumulative, (3) the evidence would not be used solely for the purposes of
    impeachment, and (4) the recantation is of such “immense importance” that
    a new outcome would have resulted had the jury been permitted to hear it.
    Appellant’s Brief at 27-32.
    As our Supreme Court has explained,
    [r]ecantation testimony is extremely unreliable. When the
    recantation involves an admission of perjury, it is the least
    reliable form of proof. The trial court has the responsibility of
    judging the credibility of the recantation. Unless the trial court is
    satisfied that the recantation is true, it should deny a new trial.
    An appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s determination
    absent a clear abuse of discretion.
    Commonwealth v. Henry, 
    706 A.2d 313
    , 321 (Pa. 1997) (citations
    omitted).
    Here, the trial court determined that a new trial was not warranted
    because, at the evidentiary hearing on the co-defendants’ claims of after-
    discovered evidence, Robinson “credibly recanted her unsworn recantation
    statements” made to the investigator. Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/2015, at 5.
    In so holding, the court found credible Robinson’s explanation for why she
    made false statements to the investigator only to later recant those
    statements at the hearing. 
    Id. The court
    explained as follows.
    As noted by the parties, [] Robinson provided testimony at
    the October 29, 2015 evidentiary hearing, during which she
    recanted the statements that she had made to [the] defense
    investigator … in videotaped and handwritten form. The
    videotaped and handwritten statements served as the
    recantation evidence upon which the defendants have relied in
    seeking a new trial based on after-discovered [] evidence. It
    should be noted that [] Robinson never took an oath to tell the
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    truth prior to giving the videotaped statement and did not write
    the handwritten statement under penalty of perjury. During her
    testimony at the October 29, 2015 hearing, Ms. Robinson
    explained that the statements that she had made in video and
    written form were untruthful. She explained that she had lied to
    [the] defense investigator … because she had been threatened
    by people associated with the defendants. Additionally, she had
    been offered a substantial sum of money -- $25,000 -- to recant
    her trial testimony.
    The court paid extremely close attention to [] Robinson’s
    demeanor throughout the evidentiary hearing, and it finds highly
    credible her explanation for why she initially attempted to recant
    her trial testimony to [the] defense investigator…. [] Robinson
    acknowledged that she is in fear for her life from the defendants.
    Her fear is due, in part, to her knowledge of the reputation of
    the defendants, their friends, associates and families, as well as
    the events she herself witnessed. She indicated, convincingly,
    that she would rather have lied than lost her life. [] Robinson
    was in fear from the defendants, given that people associated
    with them kept finding her despite several moves. Further, she
    testified credibly that she believed that, if she cooperated with
    the defense efforts, she would be left alone by the defendants.
    The court also found highly credible her explanation for why she
    recanted her post-trial recantation statements during the
    evidentiary hearing. [] Robinson indicated that she did not want
    guilty people to be let out of jail and that the defendants
    deserved to be in jail for what they had done. [] Robinson did
    not waver in her testimony at the evidentiary hearing and was
    adamant that her post-trial recantation statements were made
    out of fear and not as a result of any crisis of conscience that
    she was experiencing as to the certainty of her observations. At
    the October 29, 2015 hearing, [] Robinson very clearly,
    convincingly, and without hesitation, identified the defendants as
    the perpetrators of the murder. It must be noted that this was
    the second time that she made her identification of the
    defendants as murderers in a courtroom, in the presence of the
    defendants and under oath.
    This court had the benefit of sitting through the original
    homicide trial, and it observed firsthand [] Robinson’s demeanor
    when she provided her eyewitness account of the brutal murder
    and identified the defendants as the perpetrators. [] Robinson
    shook uncontrollably throughout her testimony and was clearly
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    J-A07033-17
    frightened to be involved in the case. As the Commonwealth
    noted in its brief, [] Robinson had nothing to gain and everything
    to lose by testifying against the defendants during the homicide
    trial. This holds equally true with regard to her testimony at the
    evidentiary hearing related to her supposed recantation. []
    Robinson has nothing to gain and everything to lose by recanting
    the unsworn recantation statements[.] She continues to place
    herself in danger of retribution by maintaining her position that
    the defendants were the perpetrators of the murder, which
    makes her identification testimony all the more credible. The fact
    that she maintains her identification of the defendants as
    murderers when under oath and forced to confront them face-to-
    face, and in light of her fear of the defendants based on their
    reputations, threats made to her, and her inability to remain
    hidden, makes [] Robinson’s identification ring with truthfulness
    and credibility.
    Accordingly, after taking into account the strength of []
    Robinson’s identification testimony at trial and after finding []
    Robinson’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing credible in all
    respects, this court finds that a new trial is not warranted under
    these circumstances. Given that [] Robinson has consistently
    identified the defendants while under oath, and given that her
    identification testimony has been very credible each time, the
    court does not find that the purported recantation evidence
    would “likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were
    granted.” Commonwealth v. Padillas, 
    997 A.2d 356
    , 363 (Pa.
    Super. 2010).
    Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/2015, at 2-4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted;
    emphasis in original).
    Based on our thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the unsworn statement
    offered to the defense investigator was not credible, and that Robinson had
    fabricated the statements out of fear of the co-defendants and their
    associates. Importantly, we agree that Appellant’s argument fails as to the
    fourth prong of the applicable test. When presented with the purported
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    recantation testimony, the circumstances surrounding Robinson’s statement
    to the defense investigator, and Robinson’s later recantation of those
    statements under oath, it is unlikely that the verdict would be rendered in
    Appellant’s favor. As such, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant a
    new trial based upon this evidence.
    We now turn to Appellant’s second issue on appeal: whether the trial
    court erred in denying a motion in limine, filed by Crumbley and joined by
    Appellant, which sought to exclude from the co-defendants’ joint trial
    evidence regarding other bad acts attributable to Crumbley. Appellant’s Brief
    at 40-52.
    We provide the following background. The police recovered seven .40
    caliber shell casings and two 357 Sig2 shell casings from the scene of the
    May 16, 2011 shooting that resulted in the death of Mattox. Forensic testing
    showed that two of the recovered .40 caliber shell casings had been fired
    from one gun, while the other five had been fired from another. The
    presence of the two 357 Sig shell casings recovered from the scene
    evidenced the involvement of a third gun.
    On June 2, 2011, a few weeks after the Mattox shooting, Crumbley
    was injured in a shootout in Swissvale, Allegheny County.         When police
    arrived at that scene, they found a number of spent shell casings in and
    2
    As explained during trial, “the 357 Sig caliber is a 40 caliber cartridge case
    which is bottlenecked down to fit a nine millimeter [bullet].” N.T., 8/20-
    9/4/2012, at 457.
    -9-
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    around the vehicle in which Crumbley had been riding. Those shell casings
    were tested and determined to have come from two separate firearms: a
    9mm and a .40 caliber. The 9mm casings were all determined to have been
    discharged from a Ruger P89 firearm recovered from the vehicle in which
    Crumbley had been riding prior to and during the June 2, 2011 shootout.
    Crumbley’s blood was found on the side of the Ruger and on the barrel.
    Also present at the scene of the shootout was Asa Thompkins, who
    was released after a brief detention. On June 9, 2011, Thompkins was a
    passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police. Police recovered a .40
    caliber Springfield Armory pistol during a search of that vehicle.
    Three bullets were recovered from Mattox’s body during his autopsy,
    two 9mm rounds and one .40 caliber. At trial, the Commonwealth’s firearms
    and tool marks expert, Raymond Everett, testified that his examination of
    the recovered bullets led him to conclude that the two 9mm bullets were
    fired from the same gun: either a 357 or a 9mm firearm; however, no
    definitive comparison could be made to any 357 or 9mm firearm tested in
    connection with this case. N.T., 8/20-9/4/2012, at 460-61, 471-72. Everett
    testified that the class characteristics present on the .40 caliber bullet
    recovered during Mattox’s autopsy were similar to those made by Springfield
    Armory brand pistols. 
    Id. at 452-53.
        Further, it was determined that the
    .40 caliber casings recovered from both the May 16, 2011 homicide matched
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    those recovered from the .40 caliber casings recovered from the scene of the
    2011 Swissvale shootout. 
    Id. at 451-54.
    On May 30, 2012, the Commonwealth filed notice of its intent to
    present evidence, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b), of Crumbley’s involvement in
    the June 2, 2011 shootout. The Commonwealth averred that the Ruger and
    Springfield Armory firearms associated with the June shootout linked
    Crumbley to the Mattox shooting on May 16, 2011.               Thus, it sought to
    introduce testimony regarding the June 2 incident at the co-defendants’ trial
    in order to prove identity. While Crumbley was obviously present at the June
    2 incident, Appellant was not; thus, he argued that the evidence was
    prejudicial and, therefore, inadmissible against him.      Following a hearing,
    the trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible at the joint trial, and
    denied the motion in limine.
    “When reviewing the denial of a motion in limine, we apply an
    evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review.” Commonwealth v.
    Stokes, 
    78 A.3d 644
    , 654 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).              “The
    admissibility of evidence is a matter directed to the sound discretion of the
    trial court, and an appellate court may reverse only upon a showing that the
    trial court abused that discretion.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    The crux of Appellant’s argument is that evidence recovered from the
    June 2, 2011 incident involving Crumbley has no bearing on Appellant’s
    identity as one of the shooters involved in the May 16, 2011 death of
    - 11 -
    J-A07033-17
    Mattox.   Appellant’s    Brief    at    46.       However,   this   argument   fails   to
    acknowledge that Appellant and Crumbley were joined for trial. 3 The co-
    defendants herein did not object to joinder.                 Indeed, “joint trials are
    preferred where conspiracy is charged.” Commonwealth v. Housman, 
    986 A.2d 822
    , 834 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).
    Pennsylvania      Rule     of    Evidence     404(b)   governs   admissibility   of
    evidence of other bad acts.4
    Generally, evidence of prior bad acts or unrelated criminal
    activity is inadmissible to show that a defendant acted in
    conformity with those past acts or to show criminal propensity.
    However, evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible when
    offered to prove some other relevant fact, such as motive,
    opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and
    absence of mistake or accident. In determining whether evidence
    of other prior bad acts is admissible, the trial court is obliged to
    balance the probative value of such evidence against its
    prejudicial impact.
    The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt that a defendant has committed the particular crime of
    which he is accused, and it may not strip him of the presumption
    of innocence by proving that he has committed other criminal
    acts.
    Commonwealth v. Ross, 
    57 A.3d 85
    , 98–99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc)
    (citations omitted).
    3
    The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that “[d]efendants charged in
    separate indictments or informations may be tried together if they are
    alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same
    series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.”
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(2).
    4
    Rule 404(b) does not distinguish between prior and subsequent acts.
    Commonwealth v. Wattley, 
    880 A.2d 682
    , 687 (Pa. Super. 2005).
    - 12 -
    J-A07033-17
    Here, the trial court properly admitted the evidence related to the June
    2, 2011 incident as probative of the identity of Crumbley and his
    involvement in the May 16, 2011 shooting that resulted in the death of
    Mattox. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/2014, at 23-28. Of significance, we
    note that the trial court offered a limiting instruction concerning this
    testimony, which was rejected by both Crumbley’s counsel and Appellant. 5
    N.T., 8/20-9/4/2012, at 1318-23, 1411-12.
    5
    We find instructive the following portion of Justice Saylor’s concurring and
    dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Housman, 
    986 A.2d 822
    , 848 (Pa.
    2009) (Saylor, J., concurring and dissenting).
    In Zafiro v. United States, 
    506 U.S. 534
    , 539, [] (1993), the
    high Court opined that when defendants have properly been
    joined, a district court should only grant severance if there is a
    serious risk that a joint trial “would compromise a specific trial
    right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making
    a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” 
    Id. at 539
    [].
    The Court went on to say that where evidence is admitted at a
    joint trial that would not be admissible in a separate trial, a
    defendant might be prejudiced:
    Such a risk might occur when evidence that the jury
    should not consider against a defendant and that
    would not be admissible if a defendant were tried
    alone is admitted against a codefendant. For
    example, evidence of a codefendant's wrongdoing in
    some circumstances erroneously could lead a jury to
    conclude that a defendant was guilty. When many
    defendants are tried together in a complex case and
    they have markedly different degrees of culpability,
    this risk of prejudice is heightened. Evidence that is
    probative of a defendant's guilt but technically
    admissible only against a codefendant also might
    present a risk of prejudice. Conversely, a defendant
    might suffer prejudice if essential exculpatory
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    In light of the forgoing, following our review of the certified record, the
    parties’ briefs, and the relevant law, we conclude that the opinion of the
    Honorable Beth A. Lazzara thoroughly and correctly addresses and disposes
    of Appellant’s second issue and supporting arguments and evidences no
    abuse of discretion or errors of law. Accordingly, we adopt section C of the
    trial court’s opinion, pages 23 through 28, filed on June 25, 2014, as our
    own and hold, based upon the reasons stated therein, that the trial court
    committed neither an error of law nor an abuse of discretion in denying the
    co-defendants’ motion in limine.
    In his third claim of error, Appellant asks this Court to consider
    whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion, filed by Crumbley
    and joined by Appellant, that sought suppression of Robinson’s pre-trial
    identification of the co-defendants due to the “highly suggestive” nature of
    the administered photo arrays. Appellant’s Brief at 40-63.      Appellant also
    evidence that would be available to a defendant tried
    alone were unavailable in a joint trial. The risk of
    prejudice will vary with the facts in each case, and
    district courts may find prejudice in situations not
    discussed here. When the risk of prejudice is high, a
    district court is more likely to determine that
    separate trials are necessary, but, as we indicated in
    Richardson v. Marsh, less drastic measures,
    such as limiting instructions, often will suffice
    to cure any risk of prejudice. [See 
    481 U.S. 200
    ,
    
    107 S. Ct. 1702
    , 
    95 L. Ed. 2d 176
    (1987)].
    
    Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539
    [] (internal citations omitted).
    Housman, at 848 (emphasis added).
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    J-A07033-17
    argues that the suggestive pre-trial procedure tainted Robinson’s in-court
    identification, and admission of both was in error. 
    Id. Our standard
    of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
    court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
    whether the factual findings are supported by the record and
    whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
    correct.
    [W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution
    and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
    uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
    whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression
    court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the
    court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the
    facts. Moreover, it is within the lower court’s province to pass on
    the credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to be given
    to their testimony.
    When determining the admissibility of identification
    testimony, this Court has held that suggestiveness in the
    identification process is a factor to be considered in determining
    the admissibility of such evidence, but suggestiveness alone
    does not warrant exclusion. A pretrial identification will not be
    suppressed as violative of due process rights unless the facts
    demonstrate that the identification procedure was so infected by
    suggestiveness as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of
    irreparable misidentification.
    Due process does not require that every pretrial
    identification of witnesses must be conducted under laboratory
    conditions of an approved lineup. In reviewing the propriety of
    identification evidence, the central inquiry is whether, under the
    totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable.
    Additionally, the purpose of a suppression order regarding
    exclusion of identification evidence is to prevent improper police
    action. Thus, where a defendant does not show that improper
    police conduct resulted in a suggestive identification,
    suppression is not warranted.
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    Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 
    135 A.3d 606
    , 610 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal
    denied, 
    145 A.3d 724
    (Pa. 2016) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Once more, our thorough review of the certified record, the parties’
    briefs, and the relevant law leads us to conclude that the opinion of Judge
    Lazzara thoroughly and correctly addresses and disposes of this issue and
    evidences no abuse of discretion or errors of law.     Accordingly, we adopt
    section B of the trial court’s opinion, pages 15 through 23, filed on June 25,
    2014, as our own and hold, based upon the reasons stated therein, that the
    trial court committed neither an error of law nor an abuse of discretion in
    denying the co-defendants’ suppression motion, nor did the court err in
    permitting Robinson’s in-court identification of the co-defendants.
    In his final claim of error, Appellant contends that imposition of
    mandatory minimum sentences at counts three and six is illegal under
    Alleyne v. United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
    (2013).6 Appellant’s Brief at 64-
    67.   The Commonwealth concedes that this case must be remanded for
    resentencing because the applicable statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712, has been
    found unconstitutional. Commonwealth’s Brief at 54; see Commonwealth
    v. Newman, 
    99 A.3d 86
    , 104 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (holding the
    mandatory minimum sentencing scheme under section 9712 unconstitutional
    pursuant to Alleyne). See also Commonwealth v. Valentine, 
    101 A.3d 6
      In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that “any fact that increases the
    mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury” and
    found beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155
    .
    - 16 -
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    801 (Pa. Super. 2014). We agree. Because section 9712 has been
    invalidated by Alleyne, and Appellant is currently appealing from his
    judgment of sentence, we vacate the illegal, mandatory minimum terms
    imposed at counts three and six, and remand for resentencing on those
    charges.
    In sum, we affirm Appellant’s convictions, but vacate his judgment of
    sentence as to count three (robbery of a motor vehicle) and count six
    (conspiracy to commit robbery - serious bodily injury), and remand for
    resentencing. The parties shall attach a copy of the trial court’s June 25,
    2014 opinion to this memorandum in the event of future proceedings.
    Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/21/2017
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    Circulated 05/22/2017 01:02 PM
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
    CRIMINAL DIVISION
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                                              i1
    r
    v.                                                               m
    0
    THADDEUS CRUMBLEY,
    Defendant.
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,         No. CR 2821-2012
    v.
    MATTHEW EBO,                          OPINION
    Defendant.                  BETH A. LAZZARA, JUDGE
    Court of Common Pleas
    Copies Sent To:
    Michael W. Streily, Esquire
    Office of the District Attorney
    Allegheny County Courthouse
    Pittsburgh, PA 15219
    Sally Frick, Esquire
    437 Grant Street
    Suite 407
    Pittsburgh, PA 15219
    Jessica L. Herndon, Esquire
    Office of the Public Defender
    400 County Office Building
    542 Forbes Avenue
    Pittsburgh, PA 15219
    THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
    COMMONWEAL TH OF                                   CRIMINAL DIVISION
    PENNSYLVANIA,
    vs.
    CC: 2820-2012
    THADDEUS CRUMBLEY,
    Defendant.
    COMMONWEALTH OF                                    CRIMINAL DIVISION
    PENNSYLVANIA,
    vs.
    CC: 2821-2012
    MATTHEW EBO,
    Defendant.
    OPINION
    This   is    an appeal   following   the    imposition   of   sentences   to   life
    imprisonment for both Defendants following a jury trial in which both Defendants
    were found guilty of First Degree Murder, Robbery -- Serious Bodily Injury,
    Robbery -- Motor Vehicle, Carrying a Firearm without a License, Conspiracy --
    Robbery and Conspiracy - Murder. The trial occurred between Auqust 22, 2012
    and September 4, 2012, and the Defendants were sentenced on November 28,
    2012.    On appeal, the Defendants have raised numerous allegations of error,
    which will be set forth and discussed below.          Many of the issues raised by the
    Defendants are identical, which is why this court has chosen to address them in a
    single opinion.
    I.       ALLEGATIONS OF ERROR
    The Defendants have raised numerous allegations of error in their Concise
    Statements of Matters Complained of on Appeal.              These are listed below, by
    Defendant, and it is further noted at which section of this opinion the alleged
    error is discussed.
    Defendant Crumbley:
    1. The court failed to exclude the testimony of Saday Robinson due to
    alleged violations of Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 573. (Section Ill. A.)
    2. The court failed to exclude the testimony of Saday Robinson due to
    police taint or bias in the identification. (Section Ill. B.)
    3. The court erred          in admitting   evidence of a subsequent     shooting
    involving     Defendant Crumbley, failed to give a limiting        instruction
    regarding the evidence and failed to exclude evidence relating to a
    Ruger handgun. (Section Ill. C.)
    4. The court failed to either strike a comment, or provide a curative
    instruction     related to the comment, made by the Assistant          District
    Attorney      referring to Defendant Crumbley as "the Angel of Death."
    Additionally,    Defendant Crumbley has alleged ineffective assistance of
    counsel due to his counsel's lack of objection to the comment. (Section
    Ill. D.)
    2
    5. The court failed to exclude testimony of certain "[allhouse" witnesses
    due to alleged violations of Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 573. (Section Ill. E.)
    6. The court failed to give a "missing witness" instruction as to witness
    Richard Carpenter. (Section Ill. F.)
    7. The court violated     Defendant Crumbley's right to a speedy trial by
    granting a continuance on June 7, 2012 (Section Ill. G.)
    8. The evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. (Section Ill. H.)
    9. The verdict was against the weight of the evidence. (section Ill. H.)
    Defendant Ebo:
    1. The court failed to exclude the testimony of Saday Robinson due to
    alleged violations of Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 573. (Section Ill. A.)
    2. The court erred in admitting           evidence of a subsequent      shooting
    involving   Defendant    Crumbley, failed to give a limiting       instruction
    regarding the evidence and failed to exclude evidence relating to a
    Ruger handgun. (Section Ill. C.)
    3. The court failed to exclude the testimony of Saday Robinson due to
    police taint or bias in the identification. (Section Ill. B.)
    4. The verdict was against the weight of the evidence. (section Ill. H.)
    This court disagrees with the Defendants' allegations of error and asserts
    that it has committed no errors.     This court requests that its rulings, the jury's
    verdict and the sentences of the Defendants be upheld.
    3
    II.      FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    On May 16, 2011, Todd Mattox was shot to death in the parking lot of the
    Leechburg Garden apartments in Penn Hills.                     (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 240)1.         He had
    suffered three (3) gunshot wounds, two (2) to the trunk and one (1) fatal shot to
    the head. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 246-261, Ex. 4-16).
    An eyewitness, Saday Robinson, described the sounds of an altercation
    above her apartment in the minutes before the shooting, followed by the noise of
    people running down stairs. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 527-528). She then saw Mr. Mattox
    being pushed out the front door of the apartment complex by two (2) African-
    American males with handguns. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 528-529). She was able to hear
    Mr. Mattox pleading for his life, offering the two (2) males everything that he had,
    and backing away from them with his hands up. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 529, 531). The
    eyewitness described seeing a man that she later identified as Defendant Ebo
    shooting at Mr. Mattox three (3) times. (T.R. 8/20/12, p, 531 ). Mr. Mattox fell to the
    ground after the gunshots were fired. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 531 ).                        The witness then
    described seeing Defendant Ebo going through the pants pockets of Mr. Mattox
    1
    The notation ''T.R. 8/20/12" refers to Volumes I and II of the trial transcript for August 20, 2012 through
    September 4, 2012.
    4
    before she saw a person that she later identified as Defendant Crumbley walk up
    to Mr. Mattox, stand over his body as it lay in the parking lot, and shoot him
    directly in the head. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 532-534). She then indicated that she saw
    the Defendants get into Mr. Mattox's white Nissan and speed out of the parking
    lot. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 534). Mr. Mattox's vehicle was later found after it had been
    set on fire on Hill Street in Penn Hills. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp.757-759, 762-780, 782-787,
    804, 818, 841; Ex. 58-63, Ex. 66-67).
    It should be noted that other witnesses corroborated key points contained
    in Ms. Robinson's      description   of the events that night.    For example, John
    Gardone also testified that Mr. Mattox was chased by two (2) African-American
    males before he was shot several times in the parking lot of the Leechburg
    Gardens.     (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 591 -592). He also saw the two (2) suspects enter a
    white vehicle and speed from the parking lot. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 492-493). Another
    witness, Yurri Lewis, heard multiple shots that day, although he did not witness
    the shooting.     (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 513). He did, however, see an African-American
    male going through the pockets of a man lying in the parking lot of Leechburg
    Garden Apartments.      (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 515).   He saw the man who had been rifling
    through the victim's pockets enter a white car and speed out of the parking lot.
    (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 515).    Detective Anthony Perry confirmed that the right front
    pants pocket of Mr. Mattox was pulled out when he arrived at the scene. (T.R.
    8/20/12, pp. 302-304, 330-334, Ex. 41). The left front pocket was in its normal
    position.   (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 302-304).
    5
    Despite the fact that th_ere were several eyewitnesses to the events that
    occurred on May 16, 2011, none of the witnesses interviewed by either Penn Hills
    police officers or Allegheny County detectives were able to positively identify the
    actors.
    The Defendants became suspects in the Todd Mattox murder following a
    string of events occurring over the course of the several months following the
    slaying.    On June 2, 2011, Defendant Crumbley was involved in a shooting in
    Swissvale, in which he was shot several times. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 855-858). Two
    types of shell casings were recovered from the scene, including the same type of
    shell casings that were found at the Todd Mattox murder scene, those being from
    a .40 caliber Smith and Wesson Springfield Armory pistol. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 885-
    886).     A friend of Defendant Crumbley's, Asa Thompkins, was present at the
    scene of the shooting.     (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 847, 852). One week later, on June 9,
    2011, Asa Thompkins was pulled over for a traffic stop in South Park. (T.R. 8/3/12,
    p. 20; T.R. 8/20/12, p. 1009). A Springfield Armory pistol was found under the front
    passenger seat of the car, and Mr. Thompkins said that the gun was his. (T.R.
    8/20/12, pp.1010-1011).
    6
    On September 6, 2011, Thomas Julian Brown wrote a letter from the
    Allegheny   County jail to Detective Garlicki, of. the Allegheny County police,
    asking that he be put in touch with the detective who was handling the Todd
    · Mattox homicide.    (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 697).    He indicated that he was willing to
    provide information on that case. (T.R. 8/2C/12, pp. 697-698). Mr. Brown further
    indicated that he had heard, several months earlier, Defendant Crumbley saying
    that he had "smoked" Todd Mattox.          (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 698-699).   Mr. Brown's
    cousin was Asa Thompkins, and Mr. Brown's son, Leron Brown, was a friend of
    Defendant Crumbley.      (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 695-696). Leron Brown was found shot
    dead in January or February 2012, inside a car with Roman Herring, a cousin of
    Defendant Crumbley's, who was also found dead in that same car. (T.R. 8/20/12,
    pp. 948, 991). Roman Herring was allegedly involved in the burning of a vehicle
    on Hill Street in Penn Hills. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 945).
    Defendant Crumbley became a suspect in the Todd Mattox murder In
    September 2011, after Detective Anthony Perry received a report connecting the
    handguns     used in the Todd Mattox homicide with the weapons used in the
    Swissvale shooting on June 2, 2011, and after witness Thomas Brown came
    forward with information about the homicide.        (T.R. 8/20/11, pp. 1017, 1020, 1021,
    1025). Defendant Ebo also became a suspect at that time. (T.R. 8/20/11, p. 1017).
    7
    Ill.   ARGUMENT
    A. Alleged Discovery Violation regarding Saday Robinson
    The Defendants' first allegation of error is that this court erred in admitting
    the testimony       of eyewitness Saday Robinson.                The Defendants argue that the
    testimony        should have been excluded as a sanction for the Commonwealth's
    violation of Pa. R. Crim Proc. 573. The Defendants allege that the Commonwealth
    failed to provide full and timely discovery by failing to provide information to the
    Defendants regarding Ms. Robinson's "misidentification" during presentation of a
    photo array.
    During testimony taken on August 21, 2012 in connection with a pre-trial
    motion seeking exclusion of Ms. Robinson's identification of the Defendants on
    the basis that the identification was the product of bias and taint, Ms. Robinson
    indicated that, during one of the photo arrays prior to July 24, 2012, she had
    pointed to a photograph and said that the individual in the photograph "looked
    like"   Defendant     Ebo.     (T.R.   8/20/12, pp.        59-61).     However, this    alleged
    misidentification     was not reported in any police report by either Penn Hills
    officers or Allegheny County homicide detectives. (LR. 8/20/12, p. 82). After Ms.
    '"
    Robinson's pretrial testimony about the alleged intentional misidentification, and
    defense counsel's request for any report that detailed the misidentification, this
    court    advised      the    Commonwealth          that,    if    discovery   related   to   the
    9
    misidentification   was not turned over to the Defendants, Ms. Hobinson would not
    be permitted to testify. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 83).
    The following day, while the jury was at lunch, Assistant District Attorney
    Steven Stadtmiller indicated that, after speaking with the officers involved in the
    investigation,   he was advised that the misidentification     did not occur.   (T.R.
    8/20/12, pp. 152-154). Detective Hitchings, who had shown Ms. Robinson the
    November 4, 2011 lineup, which was the first photo array to contain Defendant
    Ebo, indicated that no identification       at all had occurred on that date.   (T.R.
    8/20/12, p. 153).
    Ms. Robinson took the stand on August 22, 2012 to continue her testimony
    related to the pre-trial motion.    (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 155). She again stated that she
    had previously pointed to someone who looked like Defendant Ebo in a photo
    array prior to July 24, 2012. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 166-167). Her clearest discussion of
    the issue was in the following exchange with Defense Attorney Wendy Williams:
    Q.     Okay. Are you saying now that you mistakenly said that or that you
    were lying under oath yesterday?
    A.      You are confusing me.
    Q.      Did that in fact occur? Did you point to somebody else and say that
    this is the guy that did the crime?
    10
    A.     No, I said that this looks like the guy who did the crime.
    Q.     Okay. And you pointed to somebody other than Mr. Ebo and Mr.
    Crumbley?
    A.      Yes.          (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 163).
    Ms. Robinson also testified that the misidentification occurred when she was in a
    car with Detective Perry before her grandmother died. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 176-177).
    It should be noted that only the September 16, 2011 photo array meets all three
    (3) of these criteria.      Ms. Robinson also specifically      denied that Detective
    Hitchings was present during the alleged misidentification. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 176).
    Following Ms. Robinson's        testimony, Detective Anthony Perry took the
    stand and testified      regarding   the photo arrays that he had shown to Ms.
    Robinson.     (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 186-203). Detective Perry had shown Ms. Robinson
    two (2) photo arrays, one in June 2011 containing Asa Thompkins (T.R. 8/20/12,
    pp. 187, 189) and one in September 2011 containing Defendant Crumbley. (T.R.
    8/20/12; p. 187). He did not show Ms. Robinson any photo arrays containing a
    picture of Defendant Ebo.       (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 188). A photo array containing Mr.
    Eba's photo was not prepared until October 2011, and that array was presented to
    Ms. Robinson in November, 2011 by Detectives Hitchings and Langan.                (T.R.
    8/20/12, p.    188).     Detective   Perry   emphatically   stated   that any   alleged
    misidentification   by Ms. Robinson did not occur when he showed Ms. Robinson
    any photo arrays.      (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 193, 195, 196).   He clearly stated that no
    i1
    identifications     at all were made when he presented photo arrays to her (T.R.
    8/20/12, pp. 195-196), and that, had there been an identification, he would have
    followed    his regimented protocol     of having her circle     or initial the person
    identified. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 193).
    Detective Steven Hitchings also provided testimony related to the issue of
    a misidentification. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 204-207). He indicated that he showed Ms.
    Robinson two (2) photo arrays on November 4, 2011, one containing a photo of
    Defendant Crumbley and the other containing a photo of Defendant Ebo. (T.R.
    8/20/12, p. 204). Detective Hitchings clearly indicated that Ms. Robinson made no
    identifications   from either photo array and, further, that she did not indicate that
    any of the photos "looked like" one of the actors. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 204-5, 206,
    207).    In fact, he was "absolutely      sure" that no identifications   occurred on
    November 4, 2011. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 207).
    Following    the testimony    of Ms. Robinson and Detectives Perry and
    Hitchings, this court found that there was conflicting evidence regarding any
    alleged discovery violation and any alleged misidentification,     but stated that the
    issue could be revisited later, after further development of trial testimony, if
    necessary. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 214-215).
    12
    On appeal, the Defendants assert that the court erred in permitting Ms.
    Robinson to testify because the Commonwealth had not turned over police
    reports detailing a prior misidentification.          Rule 573(e} of the Pennsylvania Rules
    of Criminal      Procedure provides that, if a party has failed to comply with a
    discovery request, the court may, inter elte, prohibit a party from introducing the
    evidence not disclosed, or may order any other remedy that it deems just under
    the circumstances.            Pa. R. Crim. P 573. The Commonwealth does not violate
    Rule 573 when it fails to disclose to the defense evidence that it does not possess
    and of which it is unaware. Com. v. Collins, 
    957 A.2d 237
    , 253 (Pa. 2008).
    In this case, there was no clear evidence of a discovery violation at all, let
    alone one of such seriousness to justify complete exclusion of Ms. Robinson's
    testimony.       There was clearly       conflicting     evidence as to whether a prior
    identification    or misidentification    had even occurred.        While Ms. Robinson said
    that she had pointed to someone in a photo array and said it "looked like"
    Defendant Ebo, not a sing le detective who had presented a photo array to her had
    any recollection      of this occurring.        Each detective was also aware of his
    responsibility    to place an identification         or misidentification   in a police report.
    (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 193, 198, 205).            None of the police reports indicate any
    identification    occurred.    (T.R. 8/20/12 p. 79; Ex. A, C). This court was presented
    with no evidence, facts or questioning from which it could conclude that any of
    the detectives testifying       during pre-trial motions or who were involved in the
    13
    presentation of photo arrays to Ms. Robinson had lied, hid information or were in
    any way negligent or lacking in their duties.
    In failing to find that an identification    or misidentification occurred, this
    court is not indicating that it in any way disbelieved Ms. Robinson's testimony.
    On the contrary, Ms. Robinson was a tremendously compelling witness, who
    clearly became involved in this case against her best interests and all of the
    advice of her family and friends.        It was obvious that she was terrified as she
    testified during the pre-trial motion proceeding, and again when she gave her trial
    testimony.     Ms. Robinson shook and trembled throughout the entirety of her
    testimony.     As to the misidentification,   it is possible that she indicated to police
    that someone else "looked like" Mr. Ebo. It is also possible that she remembers
    thinking    that someone looked like Mr. Ebo, but did not actually verbalize that
    thought     to the detectives.    Ms. Robinson even indicated at one point in her
    testimony that she did not tell the officers when she picked out the wrong person,
    with her answer being somewhat ambiguous as to whether she told the officers
    that she had picked someone or whether she told the officers that it was the
    wrong person. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 67).          It is also possible that she mentioned
    someone looking like Defendant Ebo to the detectives, but was so vague about it
    that the detectives did not consider it to be an "identification" as they understand
    that word. No matter what occurred at the time, there was no clear evidence of a
    discovery    violation having occurred, and, therefore, this court did not err in
    failin.g to exclude evidence or testimony in order to cure a non-existent violation.
    14
    B. Alleged Error Regarding Tainted Identification Given by Saday Robinson
    Defendant Crumbley's      second allegation of error, and Defendant Eba's
    third allegation of error, is that this court erred in permitting Saday Robinson to
    testify    because her identification      was the product of taint and bias.       More
    specifically, the Defendants assert that her identification of them on July 24, 2012
    resulted from taint, bias and influence from the media exposure related to this
    case, from      information     provided   to her by neighbors or friends, and from
    comments made by the police to her prior to that identification.
    Questions regarding the admission and exclusion of evidence are within
    the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent
    an abuse of discretion.       Com. v. Kendricks, 
    30 A.3d 499
    , 503 (Pa. Super. 2011). An
    abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might
    have reached a different conclusion, but requires a showing that the trial court's
    conclusion was the result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice,
    bias or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous.            Com. v.
    Brougher, 
    978 A.2d 373
    , 376 (Pa. Super. 2009).
    A photographic identification        is unduly suggestive if, under the totality of
    the circumstances, the identification      procedure creates a substantial likelihood of
    15
    misidentification.    Com. v. DeJesus, 
    860 A.2d 102
    , 112 (Pa. 2004).            Photographs
    used in photo array line-ups are not unduly suggestive if the suspect's picture
    does not stand out more than those of the others, and the people depicted in the
    array all exhibit similar facial characteristics. Com. v. Fisher, 
    769 A.2d 1116
    , 1126
    (Pa. 2001 ). The photographs in the array should all be the same size and should
    be shot against similar backgrounds.            
    Kendricks, supra, at 504
    . When an out-of-
    court identification     is alleged to be tainted, an in-court identification may still
    stand if, again considering the totality of the circumstances, the identification had
    an   orig in sufficiently     distinguishable        to    be   purged of the primary     taint.
    
    Kendricks, supra, at 506
    . The factors a court should consider in determining
    whether     there was an independent            basis for identification     include:   (1) the
    opportunity      of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
    witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description
    of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness during the
    confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
    Com. v. Abdul-Salaam, 
    678 A.2d 342
    (Pa. 1996).
    Before Ms. Robinson testified in front of the jury at trial, this court heard
    lengthy    testimony     by   her   regarding        the    circumstances   surrounding    her
    identification   of the Defendants, including her interviews by police, her exposure
    to media coverage of the case prior to her July 2012 identification                     of the
    Defendants, and information that she may have heard in the community regarding
    this murder. She was subjected to extensive cross-examination on these issues
    16
    by the attorneys for both Defendants.                This court ultimately ruled that Ms.
    Robinson       was permitted to testify        and that she was permitted to provide
    testimony       regarding her July 2012 identification       of the Defendants.   She was
    further permitted to make an in-court identification of the Defendants.
    The Defendants assert that several factors tainted the identification of the
    Defendants        by Ms.      Robinson,   including    media exposure, information   from
    neighbors       identifying   the alleged shooters and improper comments from the
    · police.     In terms of media exposure, it is true that there was media coverage of
    this   case, which included         televised   and printed photos of the Defendants
    following their arrest, and there may have been media coverage of Mr. Crumbley
    as a result of the shooting in which he was a victim in early June 2011.               Ms.
    Robinson denied seeing any such coverage repeatedly during her testimony
    regarding the pre-trial motion in limine.
    Ms. Robinson moved from Allegheny County across the country in mid-
    October 2011. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 41, 68). Aside from a brief return to Pittsburgh in
    November 2011 for the funeral of her grandmother, she did not return to the area
    until July 2012, when· detectives asked her to return to make an identification of
    the shooters. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 42). Ms. Robinson testified that she saw no media
    coverage, pictures or video of the Defendants either before she left the area or
    after. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 42). She specifically indicated that she saw no photos of
    17
    Defendant Crumbley prior to being shown the first photo array in September
    2011. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 64, 68). She also denied seeing any media coverage from
    the time of the shooting until being contacted by telephone by detectives in late
    June, early July, 2012. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 70-71 ). She advised the detectives during
    that phone contact that she had seen no media coverage ragarding the case. (T.R.
    8/20/12, pp. 158-159). She also indicated that she did not have a computer until
    she started school, which did not occur until after October 2011, when she left
    Pennsylvania. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 157-158). The credible testimony in the case was
    that Ms. Robinson had seen no media coverage related to the Defendants prior to
    her identification   of them in July 2012 as the shooters.        It should be noted that
    Ms. Robinson testified consistently     to this lack of exposure to media coverage
    during her trial testimony.   (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 624, 626-628).
    During her pre-trial motion testimony, Ms. Robinson also addressed the
    issue of whether her identifications        were the product of information         from
    community members.        On the night of the murder, a neighbor indicated to Ms.
    Robinson that "Mo" was the shooter. (T.R.         8/20/12, pp. 42-43). Later, a friend
    named Ace told her that "Mat-Mat" was responsible. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 58). Ms.
    Robinson was clear that: she did not know Defendant Ebo to be called "Mo" prior
    to the shooting (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 42-43); she did not know anyone named "Mo"
    prior to the shooting      (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 169); she never learned Defendant
    Crumbley's name (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 68); she did not know Defendant Eb o's name
    when she saw him at the apartment complex (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 169-170); she did
    18
    not know anyone named "Mat-Mat" (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 171 ); she never found out who
    "Mat-Mat" was (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 71 ); and she did not know anybody named "Mo" or
    "Mat-Mat" when she picked out Defendant Eba's photo. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 178-179).
    Ms. Robinson was very clear that she selected the Defendants' photos from the
    photo arrays because she saw them shoot Mr. Mattox. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 44, 178-
    179).     Again, the credible testimony         did not support that Ms. Robinson's
    identification was in any way tainted, biased or even influenced by the comments
    made by her neighbor and friend.
    Lastly, the issue of whether police comments had tainted Ms. Robinson's
    identification   was explored.    Ms. Robinson was contacted in late June or early
    July by detectives who asked her to return to Pittsburgh to look at photo arrays.
    At the time that she was contacted, she was told that two gentlemen had been
    arrested (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 182, 183) and that the detectives thought that these
    men were responsible for the murder of Todd Mattox. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 174-175).
    At no point did the detectives tell her the names of who they thought was
    responsible for the shooting. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 175). The detectives also did not
    suggest who they thought was responsible for the murder when they showed Ms.
    Robinson the photo arrays. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 175). Ms. Robinson did have an
    understanding that photos of the responsible people were contained in the photo
    arrays that she was shown, but no detective told her that. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 183-
    185).   Additionally,   she was unaware that a trial was scheduled to begin at the
    point when the police contacted her in July, 2012. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 183).     The
    19
    credible testimony eliminated from further consideration this issue of possible
    taint from   police comments     in the identification   of the Defendants by Ms.
    Robinson at the photo array in July, 2012.
    Even though this court does not believe that there was any taint, bias or
    suggestion   in Ms. Robinson's identifications,    the court will note that there are
    strong independent bases supporting Ms. Robinson's identifications here. It has
    never been disputed that Ms. Robinson's vantage point from her apartment
    window gave her a clear view of Todd Mattox's murder.              Her window was
    approximately 8-10 feet from the front door of the building and 70-80 feet from the
    parking lot. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 283, 1179; Ex. 28). According to Detective Perry,
    Ms. Robinso'n had the best vantage point to see the events that night.          (T.R.
    8/20/12, p. 377). There were no obstructions      of her view of the parking lot from
    her window. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 167). The Defendants were only ten (10) feet away
    from her during the incident, and it occurred while it was still light outside. (T.R.
    8/20/12, pp. 168-169). Additionally,   she indicated that the entire incident lasted
    ten (10) minutes, that she watched the entire incident, (T.R. 8/20/12, p, 178), and
    she had seen both Defendants in her apartment building prior to the shooting,
    (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 44, 177-178), making them familiar to her at the time of the
    shooting.
    20
    What Ms. Robinson witnessed was a brutal, unprovoked shooting of a man
    begging for his life, and then the execution of a wounded, fallen man. Images
    from such violent events tend to remain imprinted in one's mind, especially the
    faces of the perpetrators of such a horrific event. Ms. Robinson indicated this
    herself during her trial testimony, stating that the faces of the Defendants were
    "stuck in her head." (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 547). While not exceptionally descriptive, Ms.
    Robinson did provide relatively accurate descriptions of the two men involved in
    this shooting, including skin tone, relative size and clothing.    (T.R. 8/20/12, pp.
    413, 590-593, 1166-1170). Even if her identification was in some way tainted by
    media coverage or comments from nelqhbors, friends or police, which this court
    strongly believes is not the case, Ms. Robinson certainly had independent bases
    upon which to make her July, 2012 identifications.
    Although defense counsel focused on Ms. Robinson's failure to select
    either Defendant from previous photo array lineups as strong evidence that her
    July, 2012 identification   must have been the product of taint or bias, this court
    instead focused on Ms. Robinson's understandable fear to be a witness in this
    case. Ms. Robinson was immediately interviewed after the shooting and made
    herself available for questioning.   (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 540). However, even from this
    beginning interaction with the police, she was afraid, telling the police officers of
    her fear on the night of the shooting and inviting them into her apartment so that
    she would not be seen talking with them. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 53). As was mentioned
    earlier, Ms. Robinson shook through the entirety of her testimony, both during
    21
    the pre-trial proceedings and at trial.   Her entire demeanor reflected her fear of
    being involved in this case.
    Ms. Robinson also certainly verbalized her fear during her trial testimony,
    indicating that she did not want involved in this case because of the culture in her
    community that perpetuated the phrase "snitches get stitches" (T.R. 8/20/12, pp.
    535-536), a sentiment echoed by another witness to the shooting, John Gard one.
    (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 493-494). Her fear throughout her involvement in the case was
    clear through her actions: by her waiting until her neighbors left before she talked
    to the police (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 535); by her taking the police into her apartment so
    no one would see her talking to them (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 53); by only agreeing to
    meet detectives elsewhere for subsequent meetings so that no one would see her
    talking to them (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 583); by her testimony that she deliberately failed
    to identify the Defendants in photo arrays even though she was sure that they
    were there (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 552); by the fact that she told Detective Perry that she
    moved because she was fearful (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 381); and by the fact that she
    finally identified the Defendants only after moving across the country and being
    informed that suspects were in custody.        (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 550). Ms. Robinson's
    own family warned her that she should not become involved in this case for fear
    that something would happen to her if she did. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 548).
    22
    This court does not believe that prior failures to identify the Defendants in any
    way support a contention that the identifications in July, 2012 were the result of
    taint, bias or suggestion.        Rather, the prior failures to identify the Defendants
    were the product of a fear so intense that Ms. Robinson exhibited physical
    manltestatlons    of that fear over fifteen (15) months atter the incident that she
    witnessed. This court permitted Ms. Robinson to testify at trial regarding her
    eyewitness identification of the Defendants, finding that there was no media taint
    and no taint from community or police sources. There was an independent basis
    for her identification.     (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 214-215). This court's ruling in this regard
    is well-supported by the record and should be upheld.
    C. Alleged Error Regarding Admission of Evidence of June 2, 2011 Shooting
    Defendant Crumbley's         third   allegation   of error, and Defendant Ebo's
    second, is that this court erred in admitting testimony regarding the June 2, 2011
    shooting   in which Defendant Crumbley             was a victim. More specifically,    the
    Defendants assert that this evidence was improperly admitted under Pa. Rule of
    Evidence 404(b)(2), that this court erred in not granting the Defendants' Motion in
    Limine regarding the evidence and that the court erred in not providing a limiting
    instruction during trial.
    There were two (2) arguments held on the issue of the admissibility of the
    June 2, 2011 shooting. The first took place on July 27, 2012, and the court ruled,
    23
    after argument, that the subsequent shooting involving Defendant Crumbley
    would be admissible as to the issue of identity only, i.e. to show that, because' the
    same gun, a .40 caliber, was used in a shooting that occurred two (2) weeks after
    Mr. Mattox's shooting where Defendant Crumbley was present, it is circumstantial
    evidence that he was present at the Todd Mattox shooting where shell casings
    from the same gun were found. (T.R. 7/27/12, pp. 58-59).
    On August 21, 2012, a second argument on the issue of the June 2, 2011
    shooting took place. In this argument, the court entertained Defendants' Motion
    in Umine re~arding a Ruger handgun found at the scene of the June 2, 2011
    shooting in Swissvale. A Ruger handgun was found outside of the vehicle where
    the shooting had occurred, and Defendant Crumbley's blood was found on it.
    (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 10). Defendant Crumbley argued that the evidence of the Ruger
    was irrelevant to the May 6, 2011 shooting of Todd Mattox and was prejudicial to
    the Defendants in that all that it showed was that Defendant Crumbley must have
    had a gun in his hand in the Swissvale shooting so he must also have had a gun
    at the Todd Mattox shooting.      (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 11, 17).   The Commonwealth
    argued that photos of the Ruger showed blood on the side of the gun and the
    barrel, which was identified as Defendant Crumbley's. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 12). It was
    the intention of the prosecution to argue that Defendant Crumbley had the .40
    caliber gun at the time of the Swissvale shooting, providing it with circumstantial
    evidence that Defendant Crumbley must have had that same gun two (2) weeks
    earlier when Todd Mattox was killed.   (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 14). This court, with some
    24
    misgiving, ruled that evidence regarding the Ruger would be permitted, but would
    be limited to the issue of identity only. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 20).
    On August 30, 2012, counsel and this court discussed the closing jury
    instructions,    including a court suggested limiting instruction based on Standard
    Jury Instruction     3.08 -- Evidence of Other Offenses as Proof of Guilt.       (T.R.
    8/20/12, p. 1317). Defendant Crumbley's attorney, Ms. Wendy Williams, stated that
    she did not want a limiting instruction regarding the June 2, 2011 shooting. (T.R.
    8/20/12, p. 1318). This court read its proposed limiting instruction to all counsel:
    I [sic] have heard evidence tending to prove that the defendant Thaddeus
    Crumbley was involved in a shooting incident for which he is not on trial.
    I'm speaking of testimony to the effect that Mr. Crumbley was involved in a
    shooting incident in Swissvale on June 2, 2011. This evidence is before
    you for a limited purpose, that is for the identity of Mr. Crumbley as a
    participant in the May 16, 2011 incident at Leechburg Gardens. This
    evidence must not be considered by you in any way other than for the
    purpose I just stated. You must not regard this evidence as showing that
    the defendant, Mr. Crumbley, is a person of bad character or criminal
    tendencies from which you might be inclined to infer guilt. (T.R. 8/20/12,
    pp. 1318-1319).
    The Commonwealth         did not object to the limiting instruction,   but Defendant
    Crumbley's attorney did, indicating that she would like time to think about it
    overnight,     and would advise the court the next day prior to the closing
    instructions    being read to the jury whether she wanted the instruction.       (T.R.
    8/20/12, p. 1321).
    25
    The following day, during Defendant Crumbley's closing argument, his
    attorney,     Ms. Williams, addressed the June 2, 2011 shooting at length and
    reiterated the defense position that he was nothing more than a victim in that
    shooting.       (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 1363-1368). This court then again discussed its
    proposed limiting instruction with counsel outside the presence of the jury. (T.R.
    8/20/12, p. 1411 ). Counsel for both Defendants agreed that they did not want the
    limiting instruction read to the jury. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 1411). As such, this court did
    not give a limiting instruction in its closing charge to the jury.
    A trial court's decision to grant or deny a Motion in limine is subject to an
    evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review. Com. v. Reese, 
    31 A.3d 708
    ,
    715 (Pa. Super. 2011 ). Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of
    the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly
    abused       its discretion.   Com. v. Drumheller, 
    808 A.2d 893
    , 904 (Pa. 2002).
    Admissibility     depends on relevance and probative value. IQ. Evidence is relevant
    if it tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue
    more or less probable, or supports         a reasonable inference or presumption
    regarding a material fact. .Lg.
    Evidence of other crimes may be admitted for other relevant purposes,
    such as "proof of motive, opportunity,          intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
    identity or absence of mistake or accident," though such evidence should only be
    26
    admitted     if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for
    prejudice.    Pa. R.E. 404(b)(2)-(3), Com. v. Tedford, 
    960 A.2d 1
    , 37 (Pa. 2008). The
    particular prejudice that Rule 404(b)(3) seeks to prevent is the misuse of other-
    offense evidence. Specifically, the rule is designed to generally eliminate other-
    offense evidence, unless admissible for some specific purpose as indicated
    above, so that jurors do not convict a defendant simply because they perceive
    that the defendant has a bad character or a propensity to commit crimes. 
    Reese, supra, at 723
    . Evidence that the defendant possessed a device or instrument that
    could have been the murder weapon is admissible. See Com. v. Miller, 
    897 A.2d 1281
    (Pa. Super. 2006). Evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is
    . harmful to the defendant.    Com. v. Dillon, 
    925 A.2d 131
    , 141 (Pa. 2007). When
    other-offense evidence is admitted, the Defendant is entitled to request a jury
    instruction explaining to the jury that the specific evidence was only admitted for
    a limited purpose. Com. v. Billa, 
    555 A.2d 835
    , 841-842 (Pa. 1989). The trial court
    is permitted to use its own form of expression to explain difficult legal concepts
    to the jury. Com. v. Spotz, 
    759 A.2d 1280
    , 1287 (Pa. 2000).
    Here, the evidence regarding the shooting         on June 2, 2011 and the
    presence      of the Ruger handgun      were properly admitted.      While certainly
    prejudicial to the Defendants, as all evidence tends to be, the evidence of the
    subsequent     bad acts was relevant to make a fact in the case, i.e., whether
    Defendant Crumbley was present at the scene of the Todd Mattox murder two (2)
    weeks earlier, more or less probable.     The evidence also was relevant to support
    27
    the inference that Defendant Crumbley was in possession of the .40 caliber gun
    used in Mr. Mattox's murder. Clearly, the evidence of the June        2nd   shooting is not
    dispositive     of these issues, but there is no requirement in the law that the
    evidence of other bad acts be dispositive on some disputed issue. The jurors
    had the        opportunity   to hear. effective    cross-examination    on the evidence
    presented, as well as hear the informed arguments of all counsel on the relevance
    of the subsequent shooting.
    The fact that the jurors found the Defendants guilty of all charges does not
    mean that they misused the evidence of the June            2nd   shooting.    Certainly, the
    strength and compelling nature of the eyewitness testimony from the time of Mr.
    Mattox's murder led more to the verdict than evidence of this subsequent event.
    This court committed no error in the admission of this evidence.
    D. Error Reaarding "Angel     of Death" Comment in Commonwealth'sclosing
    Defendant Crumbley's fourth allegation ~f error is that this court failed to
    strike   the "Angel of Death" comment             made by Assistant     District Attorney
    Stadtmiller in his closing, and that this court failed to give a curative instruction
    to the jury regarding this same comment. On appeal, Defendant Crumbley also
    asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney
    failed to object to the comment or request a curative instruction.
    28
    In his closing on behalf of the Commonwealth, Assistant District Attorney
    Steven Stadtmiller made the following statement: "She (Saday Robinson) wasn't
    afraid to say that and describe him (Matthew Ebo), but that angel of death over
    there, Thaddeus Crumbley, with his hood up, that has what it takes to walk up to
    a man, stand over him and blow his brains out, she wasn't as hot on identifying."
    (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 1437).   No objection was made by either defense attorney at the
    time that the comment was made or immediately following the Commonwealth's
    closing. In fact, this issue was not raised at all until Defendant Crumbley's Post-
    Trial Motion.
    A prosecutor must have reasonable latitude to present his case to the jury,
    and he must be free to present his arguments with "logical force and vigor." Com.
    v. D'Amato, 
    526 A.2d 300
    , 309 (Pa. 1987).      Comments by a prosecutor do not
    constitute   reversible error unless the "unavoidable effect of such comments
    would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility
    toward the defendant so that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and
    render a true verdict." & The prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's remarks must
    be evaluated in the context in which they occurred. 
    Id. When no
    objection has
    been made to the allegedly improper comments, the trial court has been deprived
    of its opportunity   to rule on the propriety of the comments and then render
    cautionary instructions to cure any potentially prejudicial impact. ~ at 312. The
    29
    reviewing   court      must assess counsel's           performance in failing to make an
    objection    or request other relief by examining the effectiveness of counsel's
    representation.       
    Id. Specifically, the
    trial court should examine whether the
    objection or. request would have had arguable merit, and, if so, whether counsel
    had any reasonable basis to not make the objection, which would further his
    client's interests.     kL.   The court should also consider whether the omission by
    counsel could have prejudiced the defendant. 
    Id. It must
    first be noted that Assistant District Attorney Stadtmiller's comment
    was a brief, isolated statement.              The language quoted above was the only such
    reference to the "Angel of Death" or anything that could be construed to be
    Biblical in nature made during the Commonwealth's closing or, as a matter of
    fact, at any time during the trial. Assistant District Attorney Stadtmiller certainly
    did not attach this phrase to Defendant Crumbley's name at each mention of him
    or refer to Defendant Crumbley by this phrase instead of using his name. Given
    the context of the single use of the phrase, this court does not deem its use in
    this instance to be improper, inflammatory or unduly prejudicial.           This court did
    not err by failing to sua sponte give a curative instruction.        This court was never
    asked to give such an instruction, and so did not do so. Throughout the closings
    by the Defendants and the Commonwealth,                   numerous sidebars were held to
    address statements made by counsel (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 1369-1370, 1386-1388,
    1394-1395), and, at one point, this court gave a curative instruction to address an
    improper comment by Defendant Crumbley's counsel. (T.R.                  8/20/12, p. 1396).
    30
    -,
    )
    Counsel for all parties were certainly aware that this court would hear them on
    any objection and was willing to provide curative instructions to the jury.
    Further, this court does not believe that Ms. Wendy Williams, Defendant
    Crumbley's counsel, was in any way ineffective for failing to object or request a
    curative instruction.   Had Ms. Williams did as Defendant Crumbley now suggests,
    she would have been calling attention to a phrase that most people in the
    courtroom never registered in their minds, given the brevity of the mention. Had
    she objected and requested a curative instruction, this court would have been
    forced to repeat the phrase in order to tell the jury to disregard it. This would
    have done nothing more than increase the impact of the comment and lodge it
    more firmly in the jurors'   minds.   Counsel for Defendant Crumbley is very a
    experienced and skilled trial lawyer, and she is most certainly not ineffective in
    this court's eyes for allowing a comment to pass essentially unnoticed and
    unregarded, as opposed to drawing significantly more attention to it. It must also
    be noted that this court, in its opening comments and closing instructions to the
    jury, advised the members of the jury on several occasions that the arguments of
    counsel are not evidence. (T.H. 8/20/12, pp. 101-102, 1455).       The jurors were
    certainly aware that Mr. Stadtmiller's    singular comment regarding Defendant
    Crumbley was no more than passionate, and perhaps overstated, argument.
    31
    This court did not err in regard to this single comment made by the
    Assistant     District Attorney.   This court neither struck the comment nor gave a
    curative    instruction,   because neither was requested.              Defendant Crumbley's
    attorney was not ineffective.        She made a judgment call that was in the best
    interest of her client to not call attention to the phrase. This court should be
    upheld in this regard.
    E. Alleged Discovery Violations regarding "Jeimouse" Witnesses
    Defendant Crumbley's fifth allegation of error is that this court erred in
    permitting jailhouse informants to testify without the Commonwealth delivering
    timely discovery in violation of Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 573. This allegation of error
    pertains    specifically   to   discovery   involving       "[ailhouse" witnesses·    Richard
    Carpenter and Thomas Julian Brown.
    Defendant Crumbley filed a discovery motion on June 8, 2012, which was
    argued before this court on July 27, 2012.                 During this motion, Defendant
    Crumbley      requested    additional   information        regarding    Richard   Carpenter's
    involvement     in the witness protection       program.      At that time, Detective Perry
    answered defense counsel's         questions        regarding the details of this program.
    (T.R. 7/27/12, pp. 30-32).      This appears to have satisfied Defendant Crumbley's
    discovery     request regarding     the witness        protection   program as no further
    requests were made regarding this subject.
    32
    Discovery issues were raised again by Defendant Crumbley on the morning
    of   August 22, 2012, prior to the beginning of the jury trial.     Defense counsel
    requested additional discovery on Thomas Julian Brown (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 84-87,
    88-89) and Richard Carpenter (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 87-88). This court advised the
    Commonwealth that, if this discovery was not provided to the Defendants, these
    witnesses would not be permitted to testify.     (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 88-89). Later that
    same afternoon, on August 22, 2012, Defendant Crumbley again raised issues
    regarding discovery requests not being provided to the defense, specifically in
    relation to Mr. Brown's testimony in other cases on behalf of the Commonwealth.
    (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 216-219).    This court advised the Commonwealth that this
    discovery   would have to be provided to the Defendants prior to Mr. Brown
    testifying at trial. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 219). Counsel received the requested discovery
    the following day, on August 23, 2012. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 326).
    Mr. Brown took the witness stand and began his testimony on August 24, ·
    2012. On August 28, 2012, after Mr. Brown's first day of testimony, Defendant
    Crumbley requested additional discovery related to Mr. Brown, including records
    from his prior criminal cases and detainers related to those cases. (T.R. 8/20/12,
    pp. 753-755). The Commonwealth        indicated that it did not have these records,
    and this court instructed the Commonwealth to provide whatever it had related to
    Defendant Crumbley's request to the Defendants. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 754).     It should
    33
    be noted that Mr. Carpenter ultimately failed to appear for trial and did not testify.
    Thus, any allegations of error to exclude his testimony are moot.
    Despite these alleged discovery             issues, defense counsel conducted a
    thorough     cross-examination        of a variety      of witnesses    regarding   Richard
    Carpenter and Thomas Brown.              For example, Detective Perry was questioned
    extensively regarding money paid to Richard Carpenter as part of the witness
    protection    program.      (T.R.     8/20/12, pp.     1026-1044, 1037-1040, 1041-1043).
    Assistant District Attorney Mark Tranqullll, who was called as a Commonwealth
    witness regarding Richard Carpenter's detainer on a Judge Cashman case, was
    also subjected     to a thorough       cross-examination      by defense counsel.      (T.R.
    8/20/12, pp. 1117-1132, 1142-1148). Mr. Tranquilli, now Judge Tranquilli, was also
    questioned    at length regarding Thomas Brown's involvement as a witness in
    other criminal cases. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 1132-1142). Defendant Crumbley called as
    a witness     Assistant    District    Attorney      Christopher   Stone to discuss     Mr.
    Carpenter's sentence on the Judge Cashman case (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 1219-1236),
    and he also called Thomas Brown's probation officer, Robert Tutko, who provided
    detailed information on his dealings with Mr. Brown, including the detainers that
    he had and the terms of his probation.       (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 1187-1216).
    As     was   previously    stated,   questions      regarding    the admission   and
    exclusion of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will
    34
    not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.        
    Kendricks, supra, at 503
    . An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court
    might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a showing that the trial
    court's conclusion   was the result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,
    prejudice, bias or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous.
    Brougher, supra at 376. Rule 573(e) provides that, if a party has failed to comply
    with a discovery     request, the court    may, inter alia, prohibit   a party from
    introducing   the evidence not disclosed, or may order any other remedy that it
    deems just under the circumstances.        Pa. R. Crim. P 573. The Commonwealth
    does not violate Rule 573 when it fails to disclose to the defense evidence that it
    does not possess and of which it is unaware. 
    Collins, supra, at 253
    .
    Furthermore, a discovery violation does not automatically warrant relief in
    the form of a new trial. Com. v. Jones, 
    668 A.2d 491
    , 513 (Pa. 1995). A defendant
    seeking relief from a discovery violation must demonstrate prejudice.       Com. v.
    Hood, 
    872 A.2d 175
    , 181 (Pa. Super. 2005). Courts have held that discovery turned
    over the day prior to trial is nonetheless     admissible if the defendant is not
    otherwise prejudiced by the delay. See Jones, supra; Co_m. v. Boring, 
    684 A.2d 561
    (Pa. Super. 1996); Com. v. Gordon, 
    528 A.2d 631
    (Pa. Super. 1987).
    Here, the appropriate   remedy for any discovery violations        was not to
    exclude the testimony    of either witness.    All information possessed by the
    35
    Commonwealth       was turned over to the Defendants, albeit late.          The defense
    attorneys    never complained     that they had insufficient      time to review the
    information, nor did they request additional time to do so. This court certainly
    would have granted any such requests.            The attorneys for the Defendants were
    able to thoroughly      question   all witnesses      after receiving this    information.
    Additionally,   given the lengthy and thorough cross-examlnatlons            of Mr. Brown
    and witnesses having knowledge of Mr. Brown, as well as the ability to call
    witnesses with knowledge of Mr. Brown on behalf of the Defendants, any delay in
    turning over discovery certainly did not hamper or adversely impact the defense
    in this case.       Not every discovery      violation justifies exclusion     of witness
    testimony.      This court   ensured    that discovery     was turned   over, and the
    Defendants ability to effectively cross-examine and present witness testimony
    was not impeded by any delays.           This court committed no error in failing to
    exclude Mr. Brown's testimony.
    F. Alleged Error for Failure to Give a Missing Witness Charge
    Defendant Crumbley's sixth allegation of error is that this court erred in
    failing to charge the jury on the missing witness instruction           with regard to
    Richard Carpenter. Defendant Crumbley also asserts that, in its closing charge to
    the jury, this court committed         error by mentioning     "testimony"    by Richard
    Carpenter even though Mr. Carpenter never appeared and never took the witness
    stand.
    36
    The missing witness adverse inference rule provides that, when a potential
    witness is available to only one of the parties to a trial, and it appears that the
    witness has special information material to the issues at trial, and the witness's
    testimony would not merely be cumulative, if such party does not produce the
    testimony     of this witness, the jury may draw an inference that the witness's
    testimony     would have been unfavorable           to the party having control of the
    witness. Com. v. Boyle, 
    733 A.2d 633
    , 638 (Pa. Super. 1999).
    The missing witness instruction        should not be given every time that a
    witness     does not testify.     In fact,        our appellate   courts   have set forth
    circumstances under which the missing witness instruction should not be given,
    including circumstances where: (1) the witness is so hostile or prejudiced against
    the party expected to call him that there is a small possibility              of obtaining
    unbiased truth; (2) the testimony of such a witness is comparatively unimportant,
    cumulative,    or inferior to that already presented; (3) the uncalled witness is
    equally available to both parties; (4) there is a satisfactory explanation as to why
    the party failed to call such a witness; (5) the witness is not available or not within
    the control of the party against whom the negative inference is desired; and (6)
    the testimony    of the uncalled witness is not within the scope of the natural
    interest of the party failing to produce him. Com. v. Evans, 
    664 A.2d 570
    , 573-574
    (Pa. Super. 1995). The relevant inquiry in reviewing a trial court's failure to give a
    37
    jury instruction    is whether such charge was warranted by the evidence in the
    case.      
    Boyle, supra, at 639
    . If the instruction     proffered is inapplicable and
    improper, the court should not charge on it. lg.
    In the case at issue, Detective Perry provided testimony during cross-
    examination by Defendant Crumbley's attorney that Richard Carpenter positively
    identified the Defendants in photo arrays on December 5, 2011. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp.
    364-365).      This identification   led to the arrest of Defendant Crumbley on
    December 7, 2011. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 366). Carpenter was in jail when he became a
    witness in this case, and he is identified as Witness #1 in the Affidavit of Probable
    Cause.      (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 367, 373).   Mr. Carpenter never appeared to testify
    during the trial, despite being served with a subpoena. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 324-325).
    In fact, a bench warrant was issued due to his failure to appear. (T.R. 8/20/12, p.
    325). Although he was referenced many times throughout the trial by all parties,
    he was unable to be located by the Commonwealth and would not answer phone
    calls to determine his whereabouts.     (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 325).
    Before discussion of the closing charge, Ms. Wil Iiams requested, on behalf
    of Defendant Crumbley, that Standard Criminal Jury Charge 3.21A be given by the
    court.    As proposed by Defendant Crumbley, the missing witness instruction
    wou Id have read as follows:
    38
    3.21A (Crim)        FAILURE TO CALL POTENTIAL WITNESS
    1.    There is a question about what weight, if any, you should give
    to the failure of the Commonwealth to call Richard Carpenter as a
    witness.
    2.    If three factors are present, and there is no satisfactory
    explanation for a party's failure to call a potential witness, the jury is
    allowed to draw a common-sense inference that his testimony would
    have been unfavorable to that party. The three necessary factors are:
    First, the person is available to that party only and not to the other;
    Second, it appears the person has special information material to the
    issue; and                                                 ·
    Third, the person's testimony would not be merely cumulative.
    3.    Therefore, if you find these three factors present, and there is
    no satisfactory explanation for the Commonwealth's failure to call
    Richard Carpenter to testify, you may infer, if you choose to do so,
    that his testimony       would have been unfavorable to the
    Commonwealth.
    During discussion      of the closing jury instructions,       this court advised
    counsel that it would not give Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 3.21 A in regards
    to Richard Carpenter, reasoning that it was not an accurate representation of the
    situation   involving Mr. Carpenter.     The Commonwealth did not fail to call Mr.
    Carpenter as a witness.        The Commonwealth,        rather, could not locate him
    because     he failed   to comply    with   his subpoena.     (T.R.   8/20/12, p. 1310).
    Additionally, this court believed that the charge, if given, would have required the
    jury to speculate as to whether the criteria in the charge had been met since no
    information   was provided to the jury regarding the first factor in the charge.
    There was no testimony or discussion         from which the jury could find that Mr.
    Carpenter was available only to the Commonwealth.          While certainly it was in the
    Commonwealth's interest to call Mr. Carpenter as a witness in its case, there was
    nothing to preclude or prohibit the defense from contacting and/or calling Mr.
    Carpenter as far as this court is aware. The situation that was presented to the
    court regarding the missing witness charge was squarely addressed in 
    Evans, supra
    , and 
    Boyle, supra
    .
    Additionally,    to assert the    missing   witness   instruction   against the
    Commonwealth, not only must the witness be solely and only available to the
    Commonwealth,      but none of the other exceptions above must apply. Com. v.
    Culmer, 
    604 A.2d 1090
    , 1098 (Pa. Super. 1992). As was stated previously, there
    was no evidence that Mr. Carpenter was only available as a witness to the
    Commonwealth.          Even if it is the case that he was only available to the
    Commonwealth, another exception applies, namely, that there is a satisfactory
    explanation   as to why the Commonwealth           failed to call the witness.     The
    Commonwealth was unable to call Mr. Carpenter because he failed to appear
    pursuant to his subpoena, which resulted in a bench warrant being issued for his
    arrest. Thus, the court did not err in refusing to charge the jury with the missing
    witness instruction.
    As to the Defendant's assertion that this court referred to Mr. Carpenter's
    testimony in its closing, this court read the following instruction to the jury:
    You have heard evidence that some of the witnesses- John Gardone- they
    have been convicted of crimes. John Gardone was convicted of the crime
    of theft by unlawful taking; Richard Carpenter was adjudicated delinquent
    for burglary and Thomas Julian Brown pied guilty to theft by unlawful
    40
    taking and has been convicted of theft by unlawful taking and burglary.
    The only purpose for which you may consider this evidence of prior
    conviction is deciding whether or not to believe all or part of the testimony
    of John Gardone, Richard Carpenter or Thomas Julian Brown. In doing so,
    you may consider the type of crime committed and how it may effect the
    likelihood that John Gardone, Richard Carpenter or Thomas Julian Brown
    have testified truthfully in this case. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 1470).
    Mr.   Carpenter   himself   did not testify   in this     case.   However, his
    identification   of the Defendants as the shooters in this case was testified to by
    Detective Perry under cross-examination          by Defendant Crumbley's        attorney.
    (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 364-367). When Detective Perry was recalled to the stand on
    August     29, 2012, he was extensively         questioned   again regarding     Richard
    Carpenter by both defense attorneys and the Commonwealth on re-direct.              (T.R.
    8/20/12, pp. 1026-1034, 1043~1044, 1037-1040, 1041-1043).          Mr. Carpenter was also
    discussed extensively by Assistant District Attorneys Mark Tranquilli and Chris
    Stone, especially in regard to his criminal record.     Defense witness Rachel Bundy
    also testified with regard to Richard Carpenter; stating that he could not have
    witnessed the shooting.     (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 127, 1273, 1275).
    Given all of the testimony with regard to Richard Carpenter, which included
    his identification   of the Defendants, the jurors were placed in a position where
    they cou Id be required to evaluate Mr. Carpenter's credibility, even though he did
    not testify himself. Because of this potential issue with Mr. Carpenter's credibility
    and the extensive discussion of his criminal record, this court believed it to be
    most prudent to include him in the afore-mentioned charge.             If this mention of
    41
    "testimony" with regard to Richard Carpenter was error, it was clearly harmless
    error, as everyone involved in this matter was aware that Richard Carpenter had
    not actually testified.       The harmless error doctrine reflects the reality that the
    accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial. 
    Reese, supra, at 719
    .
    G. Alleged Error with Regard to Granting a Continuance.
    Defendant Crumbley's seventh allegation of error is that he was denied his
    right to a speedy trial when th is court granted the Commonwealth's request for a
    postponement on June 8, 2012 due to the unavailability of several Commonwealth
    witnesses.     The Defendant asserts that the Commonwealth did not show due
    diligence in bringing the case to trial, and he was prejudiced because Saday
    Robinson identified the Defendants subsequent to this postponement.
    The trial for the Defendants was scheduled to begin on June 7, 2012. On
    June 7,      counsel     for   Defendant   Ebo, Mr.   Randall McKinney,     submitted   a
    postponement, stating that he was not prepared to begin trial and had not had an
    opportunity    to review all of the discovery         that he had received from the
    Commonwealth.          (T.R. 6/7/12, p. 3). Counsel for Defendant Crumbley objected to
    the postponement because he was prepared to proceed to trial. (T.R. 6/7/12, pp.
    42
    3-5). The Commonwealth consented to the postponement.           (T.R. 6/7/12, p. 5). On
    June 8, 2012, counsel for Defendant Ebo withdrew his request for a continuance,
    prompting      the Commonwealth       to ask for a continuance because it needed
    additional    time to locate three (3) essential Commonwealth witnesses.           (LR.
    6/8/12, pp. 2~3). Both Defendants objected to the Commonwealth's request for a
    postponement, as they indicated that they were both ready to proceed, despite
    the fact that Defendant Ebo claimed that he was not ready to proceed just the day
    before, and that the 180 days to bring an incarcerated defendant to trial,
    mandated by Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 600, would run on June 17, 2012. (T.R. 6/8/12, p.
    5).
    This court granted the postponement        due to the fact that the missing
    Commonwealth witnesses were essential to the Commonwealth's presentation of
    its case. This court then scheduled a new trial date, as well as set dates for jury
    selection, pre-trial motions and a status conference.       (T.R. 6/8/12, p. 7).   Both
    Defendants indicated that they would be filing bond motions given that the new
    trial date was beyond 180 days. (T. R. 6/8/12, p. 5).
    On June 13, 2012, this court held a bail hearing. The Defendants asserted
    that the Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence in locating the missing
    witnesses     that necessitated   the postponement      on June 8, 2012.     Detective
    Anthony      Perry of the Allegheny    County Police, homicide division,      testified
    43
    regarding his efforts to locate two missing Commonwealth witnesses, Saday
    Robinson and Yurri Lewis. (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 30-38). Detective Perry stated that,
    on May 22, 2011, he had been given subpoenas for witnesses in advance of trial
    and began serving the subpoenas on May 24, 2012.          (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 33, 35).
    Trial preparation interviews were scheduled for May 30, 2012, e.nd Detective Perry
    was unable to serve the subpoenas for Ms. Robinson and Mr. Lewis by that time.
    (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 31, 34).
    Detective Perry testified   regarding his methods for locating witnesses,
    which began with checking the addresses on driver's licenses for witnesses and
    speaking with neighbors.       (T.R. 6/13/12, p. 32). He also searched the Allegheny
    County jail search screen and public assistance records.       (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 31,
    38).    Despite using these search methods, Detective Perry was unable to locate
    the witnesses.     (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 31, 32). With regard to Yurri Lewis, Detective
    Perry also went to his address on three (3) separate occasions, but could not
    locate Mr. Lewis. (T.R. 6/13/12, p. 38).   During his search for Saday Robinson, he
    went to at least four (4) addresses, but cou Id not find her. (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 31,
    38). One address was abandoned and several were vacant. (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 31,
    38).    He visited many of the addresses on more than one occasion, and he left
    business cards with people who might have contact with either witness. (T.R.
    6/13/12, pp. 36-38). Detective Perry continued to look for both witnesses for the
    entire period between May 24, 2012 and the date of the bail hearing on June 13,
    2012.    (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 32, 33-35). In fact, Detective Perry was finally able to
    44
    reach Ms. Robinson and speak with her on the night before this bail hearing.
    (T.R. 6/13/12, p. 33).   This court denied the Defendant's request for bond and
    found that the Commonwealth had exercised due diligence in attempting to find
    the Commonwealth witnesses. (T.R. 6/13/12, p. 43).
    Ru le 600 serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection of the
    accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society. Com. v. Hunt, 
    858 A.2d 1238
    (Pa. Super. 2004).      In determining whether an accused's       right to a .
    speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society's right to
    effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain the guilty of crime and to
    deter those contemplating it. 
    Id. However, the
    administrative mandate of Rule
    600 was not designed to insulate the criminally           accused from good faith
    prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth. 1..Q..
    An appellate court's standard of review in evaluating Rule 600 issues is
    whether the trial court abused its discretion.   Com. v. McNear, 
    852 A.2d 401
    , 404
    (Pa. Super. 2004). The proper scope of review in determining the propriety of the
    trial court's ruling is limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule 600
    evidentiary hearing and the findings of the lower court.       lg.   In reviewing the
    determination of the hearing court, an appellate court must view the facts in the
    light most favorable to the prevailing party.    
    Id. Due diligence
    is a fact-specific
    concept that is determined on a case-by-case basis. 
    Id. Due diligence
    does not
    45
    require   perfect vigilance    and punctilious   care, but rather a showing by the
    · Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has been put forth . .Lg.
    While a mere assertion by the Commonwealth that a witness is unavailable
    does not establish due diligence, the unavailability of a witness is a relevant
    factor in determining whether a. continuance should be granted. Com. v. Ehredt,
    
    401 A.2d 358
    , 360-361 (Pa. 1979). Mere assertions of due diligence and unproven
    facts do not establish cause for an extension.       Com. v. Tyler, 
    555 A.2d 232
    , 234-
    235 (Pa. Super. 1989). Rather, the Commonwealth makes a reasonable effort to
    locate a witness and insure his presence at trial when the Commonwealth
    demonstrates that it has used several methods to locate a witness and subpoena
    him for trial. See 
    Tyler, supra
    .
    In this case, Detective Perry put forth reasonable efforts to locate the
    essential witnesses.    He visited the last known addresses of the witnesses on
    multiple   occasions.     He     checked   the addresses    against   driver   licensing
    information.   He spoke to neighbors about the witnesses' whereabouts.          He also
    checked public records.        While Detective Perry perhaps could have done more,
    this court found that his efforts were reasonable, and this court's findings of fact
    should not be disturbed on appeal.
    46
    H. Allegations that the Verdict Was Against the Weight of the Evidence and
    Insufficient to Sustain a Conviction.
    The Defendants' final allegations of error are that there was insufficient
    evidence to sustain the verdict and that the verdict was against the weight of the
    evidence.
    The standard of review regarding claims of insufficiency of the evidence is
    well-settled.    In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court
    must determine       whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable
    inferences      drawn   therefrom,     viewed         in   the   light   most favorable   to the
    Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every element of the
    offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Com. v. Jones, 
    954 A.2d 1194
    (Pa. Super.
    2008).    An appellate court may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute its
    judgment for that of the fact-finder. J..g. The weight of the evidence is exclusively
    for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence and to
    determine the credibility of the witnesses. When evidence conflicts, it is the sole
    province of the fact finder to determine credibility and to believe all, part or none
    of the evidence. Com. v. Lyons, 
    833 A.2d 245
    , 258 (Pa. Super. 2003). An appellate
    court may only reverse the lower court's verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence
    as to shock one's sense of justice. Com. v. Hunzer, 
    868 A.2d 498
    , 506 (Pa. Super.
    2005). Any question of doubt is for the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
    47
    and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from
    the combined circumstances. Com. v. Perez, 
    931 A.2d 703
    (Pa. Super. 2007).
    There is no requirement that the Commonwealth prove a homicide charge
    by direct evidence;    indeed, in many instances, no witnesses are available to
    describe    the incident which resulted in the death of the victim. Rather the
    Commonwealth       may prove the homicide by circumstantial evidence.         Com. v.
    Smith, 
    568 A.2d 600
    , 602 (Pa. 1989).
    Here, the jury found the Defendants guilty of all charges after hearing both
    direct and circumstantial    evidence of the Defendants' involvement in .the brutal
    murder of Todd Mattox. Although the Defendants attempt to argue that there was
    no direct evidence implicating them in Mr. Mattox's murder, the jury clearly found
    the testimony of Saday Robinson to be compelling. She was an eyewitness to the
    events of May 16, 2011, and she was able to describe what she saw and heard to
    the jury in great detail. (T.R. 8/20/12, 525-644).    Even though defense counsel
    enqaqsd     in a lengthy cross-examination     of Ms. Robinson in an attempt to
    discredit        '
    her and sully her credibility, the jury chose to believe her version of
    what happened that day, which is within their province. (T. R. 8/20/12, pp. 561-637,
    641-647). As this court stated earlier, Ms. Robinson was a compelling witness. It
    certainly does not shock this court's conscience or sense of justice that the
    jurors found her credible.   In fact, this court found her to be credible and truthful
    48
    )
    as well. Her testimony, alone, when believed, is sufficient evidence to uphold this
    )
    verdict.   It should also be noted that there were witnesses              present who
    corroborated Ms. Robinson's testimony, thereby lending it even more credibility.
    See Trial Court Opinion, II. Factual Background, p. 5.
    In addition to the testimony of Ms. Robinson, the jury heard testimony
    regarding the eyewitness identification        of Richard Carpenter. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp.
    365-366). The jurors also listened to the testimony of Mr. Thomas Brown, another
    fearfu I witness   (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 673-676), who heard Defendant Crumbley
    essentially admitting to the murder of Todd Mattox (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 698-699), and
    who identified Defendant Ebo as "Mat-Mat." (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 748). They heard the
    testimony of Anthony Snyder, who identified "Mat-Mat" as Defendant Ebo (T.R.
    8/20/12, p. 657), and who had previously told detectives that the victim had told
    him that he was going to see Mat-Mat just prior to the shooting. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp.
    657-661). The jurors heard Ms. Robinson relate that she had been told by "Ace"
    that Mat-Mat was involved in the shootings. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 601-603). The jurors
    also had evidence of the presence of the murder weapon at the scene of a
    shooting involving Defendant Crumbley two (2) weeks later. (T.R. 8/20/12, 885,
    927-928, 1011, 1017).
    While it is true that no forensic evidence linked the Defendants to this
    murder, that fact does not mean that the evidence presented at trial was
    49
    the scene of a shooting involving Defendant Crumbley two (2) weeks later. (T.R.
    8/20/12, 885, 927-928, 1011, 1017).
    While it is true that no forensic evidence linked the Defendants to this murder,
    that fact does not mean that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain
    the convictions here. It is often the case that forensic evidence is lacking at the scene
    of a crime. Here the jury had the powerful and compelling testimony of a frightened
    eyewitness, as well as circumstantial evidence supporting that testimony. The jury's
    verdict was well-supported by the evidence in the case, and it should be upheld on
    appeal.
    IV.     Conclusion
    This court committed no errors during this trial. Its rulings should be upheld. The
    jury's verdict was well-supported by the evidence, and its verdict should also be upheld.
    The Defendants' request for a new trial should be denied, and the verdict and
    sentencing in this case should be affirmed.
    Date
    47