In Re: S.R.S., a Minor ( 2017 )

J-S38002-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: S.R.S., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: C.A.S., MOTHER : No. 2786 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order and Decree July 25, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000018-2016,
CP-51-DP-0001672-2013, FID: 51-FN-003313-2013
IN RE: S.N.G., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: C.A.S., MOTHER : No. 2793 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order and Decree July 25, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000017-2016,
CP-51-DP-0001511-2014, FID: 51-FN-003313-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2017
Appellant, C.A.S. (“Mother”), appeals from the orders and the decrees,
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas Family Court
Juvenile Division, which changed the family goal to adoption and granted the
petitions of the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) for involuntary
termination of Mother’s parental rights to her minor children, S.R.S. and
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*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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S.N.G. (“Children”).1 We affirm.
In its opinion, the Juvenile Court correctly set forth the relevant facts
and procedural history of this case. We add only the following: procedurally,
DHS filed petitions on January 7, 2016, to change the family goal from
reunification to adoption and involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights
to Children. Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of
errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) on August 23,
2016.
Mother raises two issues for our review:
THE [JUVENILE] COURT ERRED AND/OR ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY ENTERING AN ORDER ON JULY 25, 2016,
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1
The trial court held a goal change and termination hearing for Children on
July 25, 2016, changed the family goal from reunification to adoption, and
involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children. Mother timely
filed notices of appeal. Notwithstanding the initial appeal filing date, the
appeal was not listed for disposition due to the delay in transmittal of the
certified record to this Court. The certified record was first due on
September 22, 2016. After initial contact with the trial court, it informed
this Court that the trial court had not started the opinion yet. Following
numerous requests for updates, this Court finally received the certified
record on February 15, 2017. As a result, the briefing schedule for this case
was delayed by nearly five months. Further delay occurred when Mother’s
counsel requested a thirty-day extension, but received only a two-week
extension, and then failed to file Mother’s appellate brief, which prompted
this Court to file an abandonment order on April 3, 2017. Counsel untimely
filed Mother’s appellate brief on April 7, 2017; this Court vacated the
abandonment order on April 12, 2017. We offer this procedural history to
explain the delay in the resolution of this child-fast-track appeal. See In re
T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 609 n.7, 71 A.3d 251, 255 n.7 (2013) (reproaching
this Court for unexplained delays in disposition of cases involving at-risk
children, causing them to remain in stasis for substantial, unnecessary
time).
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INVOLUNTARILY TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF
MOTHER…. MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE [JUVENILE] COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS SUBSTANTIAL, SUFFICIENT
AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT THE TIME
OF TRIAL WHICH WOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIATED DENYING
THE PETITION FOR GOAL CHANGE/TERMINATION. [DHS]
HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN FOR TERMINATION BY
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE UNDER 23
PA.C.S.[A.] SECTIONS 2511(A)(1) AND (2) BECAUSE THE
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED THAT [MOTHER] HAD
SUBSTANTIALLY MET HER [FAMILY SERVICE PLAN] GOALS
AND THEREBY REMEDIED HER SITUATION.
FURTHERMORE, THE [JUVENILE] COURT ERRED BY
FINDING THAT MOTHER DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO
PARENT.
THE [JUVENILE] COURT ERRED AND/OR ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF
MOTHER AND CHANGING [CHILDREN’S] GOAL TO
ADOPTION, PURSUANT TO 23 PA.C.S.A. SECTIONS
2511(B) WHERE DHS FAILED TO PROVE CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT INVOLUNTARY
TERMINATING [MOTHER’S] PARENTAL RIGHTS AND GOAL
CHANGE TO ADOPTION BEST SERVED THE EMOTIONAL
NEEDS AND WELFARE OF…CHILDREN. EVIDENCE WAS
PRESENTED THAT…CHILDREN HAD A BOND
WITH…MOTHER WHICH WOULD BE HARMFUL
TO…[CHILDREN] TO SEVER.
(Mother’s Brief at 5).
Appellate review of goal change decisions implicates the following
principles:
On appeal, goal change decisions are subject to an abuse
of discretion standard of review. In re N.C., 909 A.2d
818, 822 (Pa.Super. 2006).
In order to conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion, we must determine that the court’s
judgment was “manifestly unreasonable,” that the
court did not apply the law, or that the court’s action
was “a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will,”
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as shown by the record. We are bound by the trial
court’s findings of fact that have support in the
record. The trial court, not the appellate court, is
charged with the responsibilities of evaluating
credibility of the witnesses and resolving any
conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these
responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe all,
part, or none of the evidence. When the trial court’s
findings are supported by competent evidence of
record, we will affirm, “even if the record could also
support an opposite result.”
Id. at 822-23 (internal citations omitted).
The Juvenile Act controls the disposition of dependent children. In re
R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1217 (Pa.Super. 2008). Section 6351 provides in
relevant part:
§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child
* * *
(f) Matters to be determined at permanency
hearing.—At each permanency hearing, a court
shall determine all of the following:
(1) The continuing necessity for and
appropriateness of the placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent
of compliance with the permanency plan
developed for the child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward
alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
the original placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the
current placement goal for the child.
(5) The likely date by which the placement goal
for the child might be achieved.
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(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to
finalize the permanency plan in effect.
(6) Whether the child is safe.
* * *
(9) If the child has been in placement for at
least 15 of the last 22 months or the court has
determined that aggravated circumstances exist
and that reasonable efforts to prevent or
eliminate the need to remove the child from the
child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to
preserve and reunify the family need not be
made or continue to be made, whether the
county agency has filed or sought to join a
petition to terminate parental rights and to
identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified
family to adopt the child unless:
(i) the child is being cared for by a
relative best suited to the physical, mental
and moral welfare of the child;
(ii) the county agency has documented
a compelling reason for determining that
filing a petition to terminate parental rights
would not serve the needs and welfare of
the child; or
(iii) the child’s family has not been
provided with necessary services to achieve
the safe return to the child’s parent,
guardian or custodian within the time
frames set forth in the permanency plan.
* * *
(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the
determinations made under subsection (f) and all
relevant evidence presented at the hearing, the court
shall determine one of the following:
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(1) If and when the child will be returned to the
child’s parent, guardian or custodian in cases
where the return of the child is best suited to
the safety, protection and physical, mental and
moral welfare of the child.
(2) If and when the child will be placed for
adoption, and the county agency will file for
termination of parental rights in cases where
return to the child’s parent, guardian or
custodian is not best suited to the safety,
protection and physical, mental and moral
welfare of the child.
(3) If and when the child will be placed with a
legal custodian in cases where the return to the
child’s parent, guardian or custodian or being
placed for adoption is not best suited to the
safety, protection and physical, mental and
moral welfare of the child.
(4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit
and willing relative in cases where return to the
child’s parent, guardian or custodian, being
placed for adoption or being placed with a legal
custodian is not best suited to the safety,
protection and physical, mental and moral
welfare of the child.
* * *
(f.2) Evidence.—Evidence of conduct by the parent
that places the health, safety or welfare of the child
at risk, including evidence of the use of alcohol or a
controlled substance that places the health, safety or
welfare of the child at risk, shall be presented to the
court by the county agency or any other party at any
disposition or permanency hearing whether or not
the conduct was the basis for the determination of
dependency.
(g) Court order.—On the basis of the
determination made under subsection (f.1), the court
shall order the continuation, modification or
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termination of placement or other disposition which
is best suited to the safety, protection and physical,
mental and moral welfare of the child.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f), (f.1), (f.2), (g).
“When the child welfare agency has made reasonable efforts to return
a [dependent] child to [the child’s] biological parent, but those efforts have
failed, then the agency must redirect its efforts towards placing the child in
an adoptive home.” In re N.C., supra at 823 (citing In re G.P.-R., 851
A.2d 967, 973 (Pa.Super. 2004)).
Although the agency has the burden to show a goal change
would serve the child’s best interests, “[s]afety,
permanency, and well-being of the child must take
precedence over all other considerations” under Section
6351. In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2009),
appeal denied, 601 Pa. 702, 973 A.2d 1007 (2009)
(emphasis in original); In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 978
(Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 782, 959 A.2d
320 (2008). “[T]he parent’s rights are secondary” in a
goal change proceeding. In re D.P., supra.Because the focus is on the child’s best interests, a goal
change to adoption might be appropriate, even when a
parent substantially complies with a reunification plan. In
re N.C., supra at 826-27. Where a parent’s “skills,
including her judgment with regard to the emotional well-
being of her children, remain problematic[,]” a goal change
to adoption might be appropriate, regardless of the
parent’s compliance with a permanency plan. Id. at 825.
The agency is not required to offer services indefinitely,
where a parent is unable to properly apply the instruction
provided. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.Super.
2002). See also In re S.B., supra at 981 (giving priority
to child’s safety and stability, despite parent’s substantial
compliance with permanency plan); In re A.P., 728 A.2d
375, 379 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 560 Pa. 693,
743 A.2d 912 (1999) (holding where, despite willingness,
parent cannot meet “irreducible minimum parental
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responsibilities, the needs of the child must prevail over
the rights of the parent”). Thus, even where the parent
makes earnest efforts, the “court cannot and will not
subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and
stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the
future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513
(Pa.Super. 2006).
In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d 339, 347 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa.
648, 12 A.3d 372 (2010) (some internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases implicates the
following principles:
In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our
standard of review is limited to determining whether the
order of the trial court is supported by competent
evidence, and whether the trial court gave adequate
consideration to the effect of such a decree on the welfare
of the child.”
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972
A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. … We must
employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record
in order to determine whether the trial court’s
decision is supported by competent evidence.
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004)
(internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the
finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility
of witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be
resolved by the finder of fact. The burden of proof is
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on the party seeking termination to establish by
clear and convincing evidence the existence of
grounds for doing so.
In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.
2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The standard of clear and convincing evidence means
testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
In re J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We
may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis
exists for the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197,
1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings
are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
court’s decision, even if the record could support an
opposite result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191-92
(Pa.Super. 2004).
In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d
1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d
1165 (2008)).
DHS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother’s
parental rights to Children on the following grounds:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing
of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose
of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
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subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent.
* * *
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months,
the conditions which led to the removal or placement
of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or
will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve
the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed
from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating
the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors
such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing
and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
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the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). “Parental rights
may be involuntarily terminated where any one subsection of Section
2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration of the subsection 2511(b)
provisions.” In re Z.P., supra at 1117.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section
2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s
conduct warrants termination of…her parental rights does
the court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs
and welfare of the child under the standard of best
interests of the child.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:
To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the
moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence
of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to
the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a
settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a
refusal or failure to perform parental duties. In addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the parent
demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to
perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights
may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if
the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to
perform parental duties.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights,
the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the
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parent’s explanation for…her conduct; (2) the post-
abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3)
consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights
on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted). Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination
petition:
[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given
case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory
provision. The court must examine the individual
circumstances of each case and consider all explanations
offered by the parent facing termination of…her parental
rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality
of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary
termination.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa.
718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not
limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include
acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re
A.L.D., supra at 337. “Parents are required to make diligent efforts
towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.”
Id. at 340. The fundamental test in termination of parental rights under
Section 2511(a)(2) was long ago stated in the case of In re Geiger, 459 Pa.
636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
announced that under what is now Section 2511(a)(2), “the petitioner for
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involuntary termination must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d
327, 330 (Pa.Super. 1998).
“Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) requires
that: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six
months; (2) the conditions which led to removal and placement of the child
continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.” In re Z.P., supra at 1118.
“[T]o terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the
following factors must be demonstrated: (1) [t]he child has been removed
from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to
exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76
(Pa.Super. 2003). “Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12–month time frame for a
parent to remedy the conditions that led to the children's removal by the
court.” In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa.Super. 2003). Once the 12–
month period has been established, the court must next determine whether
the conditions that led to the child's removal continue to exist, despite the
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reasonable good faith efforts of the Agency supplied over a realistic time
period. Id. Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the
court to evaluate a parent's current willingness or ability to remedy the
conditions that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of
Agency services. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 396 (Pa.Super.
2003); In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra.
Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination
will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520
(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability
are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The
court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond,
paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the
bond.” Id. Significantly:
In this context, the court must take into account whether a
bond exists between child and parent, and whether
termination would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship.
When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not
required to use expert testimony. Social workers and
caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally,
Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.
In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines
certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide
for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements
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within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be
considered unfit and have…her rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d
1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
child. Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental
obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association
with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental
duty requires that a parent exert [herself] to take and
maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively
with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
to the best of…her ability, even in difficult circumstances.
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve
the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights
are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities
while others provide the child with [the child’s] physical
and emotional needs.
In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations omitted). “[A] parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of…her child is converted,
upon the failure to fulfill…her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent,
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healthy, safe environment.” Id. at 856.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the opinion of the Honorable Lyris F. Younge, we
conclude Mother’s issues merit no relief. The Juvenile Court opinion
comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions
presented. (See Juvenile Court Opinion, filed February 10, 2017, at 5-8)
(finding: DHS removed Children from Mother’s care because Mother was
homeless and unable to feed Children or perform parental functions;
Mother’s Single Case Plan objectives required her to complete parenting
classes, find appropriate housing, comply with dual diagnosis services,
obtain and maintain employment, attend supervised visitation with Children,
and attend court-ordered parenting capacity evaluation (“PCE”); DHS
referred Mother to Dr. Williams for PCE to determine Mother’s capacity to
provide safety and permanency for Children; Dr. Williams testified that she
had concerns about Mother’s ability to accept responsibility for Children’s
removal from Mother’s care; Dr. Williams further testified Mother did not
understand how her behavior affected Children; at time of July 2015 PCE,
Mother had been unemployed for substantial period and lacked appropriate
housing; at July 2016 termination hearing, Mother still had not obtained
appropriate housing for Children; Mother failed to attend and/or schedule
recommended anger management classes; Family School suspended Mother
for accessing Facebook and displaying sexual pictures during class; DHS
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social worker testified that Mother lacked ability to perform parental duties,
provide Children with safety and care, or adequately address S.R.S.’s
developmental and behavioral needs; DHS social worker further testified
that Mother could not maintain consistent housing or establish realistic
housing budget; Mother resided with various paramours who refused to
submit to appropriate DHS clearances; Mother conceded she lacked
appropriate housing for Children and prioritized relationships with paramours
over Children’s needs; Mother failed to achieve unsupervised visitation with
Children; S.R.S. has not lived with Mother since S.R.S.’s adjudication in
August 2013, and S.N.G. has not ever lived with Mother; Children share
parental bond with foster parent; foster parent satisfies Children’s daily
needs; social worker testified Children would not suffer irreparable harm if
court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children; S.R.S. and Mother
share bond; Mother’s bond with S.R.S., however, is not parental bond;
Mother is merely visitation resource for Children, not permanency resource;
testimony of DHS witnesses supported change of permanency goal from
reunification to adoption; termination of Mother’s parental rights is in
Children’s best interests and proper under Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2),
(a)(5), (a)(8), and (b)). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the Juvenile
Court’s opinion.
Orders and decrees affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/20/2017
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Circulated 06/02/2017 02:17 PM