Com. v. Robinson, J. , 166 A.3d 1272 ( 2017 )

J-S40023-17
2017 PA Super 234COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOSHUA ROBINSON, :
:
Appellant : No. 1536 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 5, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: MC-51-MD-0000750-2014
BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 19, 2017
Appellant, Joshua Robinson, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence
imposed in connection with six summary criminal contempt convictions
incurred in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on May 5,
2014.1 After careful review, we affirm.
Appellant sought to represent himself in connection with numerous
offenses pending against him, including Robbery and Attempted Murder.2
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
The court imposed six consecutive terms of three to six months’
incarceration, one for each contempt conviction, for an aggregate of 18 to
36 months’ incarceration, and a $100 fine for Appellant’s first contempt
conviction.
2
Appellant had allegedly shot at a police officer.
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On May 5, 2014, the trial court held a Grazier3 hearing. The court first
reviewed Appellant’s mental health evaluation, in which a psychiatrist
concluded that, although Appellant “was at times not cooperative with the
interviewer’s questions[,]” he was “capable of taking part in legal
proceedings.” N.T., 5/5/14, at 5. The trial court then began the Grazier
colloquy by asking Appellant his age. Before answering the question,
Appellant immediately interrupted the proceedings by asking if he could “say
something before we begin[.]” Id. at 6. Appellant then asked the trial court
numerous questions about the nature of the proceedings and his
representation by counsel. After several more questions, Appellant claimed
to be confused about his status as the defendant:
THE DEFENDANT: …You saying I am the defendant?
THE COURT: Yes.
THE DEFENDANT: I’m the defendant?
THE COURT: You are a defendant Mr. Robinson, yes.
THE DEFENDANT: You sure?
THE COURT: Mr. Robinson, I am not going to play games with
you. I have a mental health examination that indicates that you
are not cooperative. You did this in my courtroom the last time
we had you.
THE DEFENDANT: That wasn’t me. You sure?
N.T., 5/5/14, at 7-8.
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3
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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Appellant continued arguing with the trial court, and the sheriff
ordered Appellant to “[c]alm down.” Id. at 9. The transcript indicates that
Appellant’s misbehavior escalated during the remainder of the hearing, with
the trial court finding Appellant in direct criminal contempt six times, as
follows:
THE COURT: Why are you asking me if I am sure you are a
defendant?
THE DEFENDANT: I am just confused. I just --
THE COURT: No, no. Answer my questions.
THE DEFENDANT: I mean, you yelling --
THE COURT: Answer my questions.
THE DEFENDANT: That doesn’t help me understand. I cannot
answer --
THE COURT: I am holding you in contempt for willfully trying to
disrupt the operation --
THE DEFENDANT: I --
THE COURT: Shut up while I am talking. Three to six months for
contempt.
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t consent to that. I don’t consent to
that.
THE COURT: I will ask you again; answer my question. Why are
you questioning me --
THE DEFENDANT: I would love to.
THE COURT: Stop interrupting me.
THE SHERIFF: Chill out.
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THE COURT: Stop.
THE DEFENDANT: I would love to answer your question.
THE COURT: Why did you ask -- consecutive three to six months
and a hundred dollar fine.
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t consent to that. I don’t consent to
that.
THE COURT: I will ask you again: Why are you asking me
whether I consider you a defendant? I don’t understand why
would you say you are not a defendant. You have two criminal
cases pending against you in my courtroom, so why are you
considering yourself not a defendant? Answer that question.
THE DEFENDANT: I would love to answer that question.
THE COURT: Go ahead. I am waiting.
THE DEFENDANT: Soon as somebody comes forth with evidence
that I have liability here in this instant matter. I mean, me, as a
man --
THE COURT: Does the Commonwealth have any thoughts on
this? He is not cooperating. I guess he’s attacking -- what I
think he’s doing is trying to attack the jurisdiction of the Court --
THE DEFENDANT: What jurisdiction? Which --
THE COURT: -- which isn’t getting far. Be quiet while I am
talking.
THE SHERIFF: Don’t talk.
THE COURT: Three to six months contempt consecutive to the
other two contempts.
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t consent to that.
THE COURT: A fourth contempt, three to six months
consecutive. You are now serving 12 to 24 months in contempt.
Who is handling this for the Commonwealth?
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MR. FURBER: I am.
THE COURT: Is the Commonwealth in any way prejudiced in
giving this a regular date until he decides to behave himself and
act like a civilized human in the courtroom and stop trying to
disrupt the proceedings of my courtroom? I have 14 cases. I
don’t have the time to do this all day. You did this before when
you were in my courtroom. You didn’t cooperate with the
mental health --
MR. FURBER: Judge, I have no problem giving it a regular date.
Here’s my issue: Obviously, the way the defendant is acting, I
don't think --
THE COURT: He’s just trying to disrupt the operations of the
courtroom. That’s what he’s trying to do.
MR. FURBER: The way I see this going forward, Judge, is, I don’t
think this is a case in which he should be representing himself
because he would just be disruptive the entire trial.
THE COURT: I have a feeling you are right about that, too.
MR. FURBER: This is a case where Mr. Robinson will not be
present at his trial but can watch --
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t consent --
THE COURT: Stop interrupting the district attorney. Three to six
months consecutive, holding you in contempt. You are now
serving 15 to 30 months for contempt. We won’t have to worry
about felonies of the first degree pretty soon.
* * *
THE COURT: Take him away.
THE DEFENDANT: I would be more than willing to consent to
that --
THE COURT: Good-bye.
THE DEFENDANT: -- on the condition that somebody explain the
nature of these charges.
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THE COURT: Good-bye, Mr. Robinson.
MR. FURBER: Could he be advised of the appeal rights for the
contempt issues?
THE COURT: Yes. Ten days to file a --
THE DEFENDANT: You --
THE COURT: -- motion to reconsider and 30 days --
THE DEFENDANT: I can’t consent to that.
THE COURT: Shut up. Stop interrupting me. You constantly
interrupt me. I will hold you in another contempt, 18 to 36
months for six contempts. Give this a regular date.
N.T., 5/5/14, at 9-13, 16-17.
At that point, the court continued the proceedings in each of
Appellant’s scheduled criminal matters, and the sheriff removed Appellant
from the courtroom. The court also ordered that Appellant undergo an
additional mental health evaluation.
On May 15, 2014, Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal. The trial
court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Errors.
The trial court filed a brief Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion and summarily opined
that Appellant’s appeal was interlocutory and should be dismissed.4
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4
Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence for his six direct criminal contempt
convictions constitutes a final Order, which is immediately appealable. See
Pa.R.A.P. 341; Commonwealth v. Ashton, 824 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Pa.
Super. 2003) (“A person’s right to appeal from a criminal contempt citation
is immediate.”).
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Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
Do Appellant’s consecutive sentences constitute a violation of
Double Jeopardy because Appellant’s consecutive sentences
stem from one instance of contempt?
Appellant’s Brief at 4. Appellant argues that his actions constituted “one
instance of contempt,” that is, his “contesting the trial court’s jurisdiction
over Appellant.” Appellant’s Brief at 8-9. Relying on Commonwealth v.
Williams, 753 A.2d 856 (Pa. Super. 2000), Appellant contends that the trial
court’s six consecutive sentences for his “single offense” violated Double
Jeopardy.5 Appellant’s Brief at 10.
As this Court has made clear, Double Jeopardy claims “implicate the
fundamental legal authority of the court to impose the sentence that it did”
and, therefore, challenge the legality of the sentence imposed.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 21 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Both the U.S. and the Pennsylvania Constitutions provide that “[n]o
person shall . . . for the same offence . . . be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. V; Pa. Const. art. I, § 10. The rights
provided by the two clauses are “coextensive.” Commonwealth v. States,
938 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Pa. 2007). Because the protections afforded by each
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5
Although Appellant frames the issue as a Double Jeopardy claim, Appellant
effectively challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his several
contempt convictions. Appellant’s Brief at 8-10. Significantly, Appellant
does not argue that his actions were not contemptuous, were not committed
in the presence of the court, or did not obstruct the administration of justice.
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Constitution are identical, we utilize “a unitary analysis of the state and
federal double jeopardy clauses[.]” Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 919 A.2d
241, 250 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
“The protections afforded by double jeopardy are generally recognized
to fall within three categories: (1) protection against a second prosecution
for the same offense after an acquittal; (2) protection against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) protection against
multiple punishments for the same offense.” Id. Most relevant to
Appellant’s argument, we observe that the double jeopardy clause “prohibits
the Commonwealth from punishing an accused twice for the same offense.”
Commonwealth v. Owens, 649 A.2d 129, 137 (Pa. Super. 1994).
With respect to contempt, our Supreme Court has held that “[t]he
power to punish for contempt, including the power to inflict summary
punishment, is not derived by statute but rather is a right inherent in courts
and is incidental to the grant of judicial power under Article 5 of our
Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Marcone, 410 A.2d 759, 763 (Pa.
1980); see also Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 849 (Pa.
2008) (observing “[c]ontempt of court is unlike other substantive crimes.
The Crimes Code abolished common law crimes, 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 107(b), but
also provided in its preliminary provisions that ‘this section does not affect
the power of a court to declare forfeitures or to punish for contempt or to
employ any sanction authorized by law for the enforcement of an order’”).
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Notwithstanding this inherent power in the courts, our legislature has
sought to define the crime of contempt and regulate the punishment for its
commission. Section 4132 of the Judicial Code provides:
The power of the several courts of this Commonwealth to issue
attachments and to impose summary punishments for contempts
of court shall be restricted to the following cases:
* * *
(3) The misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court,
thereby obstructing the administration of justice.
42 Pa.C.S. § 4132.
“[T]o sustain a conviction for direct criminal contempt under this
provision there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) of
misconduct, (2) in the presence of the court, (3) committed with the intent
to obstruct the proceedings, (4) that obstructs the administration of justice.”
Williams, 753 A.2d at 856. “Much weight should be given to the trial
court’s judgment in assessing the necessities of a particular situation.”
Commonwealth v. Moody, 125 A.3d 1, 12 (Pa. 2015). “A trial court’s
finding of contempt will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Id.In Commonwealth v. Owens, 436 A.2d 129 (Pa. 1981), our
Supreme Court affirmed three contempt convictions imposed after
contemptuous outbursts by a defendant who wanted to dismiss his attorney
and obtain new counsel just before closing arguments in his jury trial. Id. at
130-31. In pursuit of his desire to obtain new counsel, the defendant
caused a physical disturbance in the courtroom during a hearing out of the
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jury’s presence, and then proceeded to interrupt the proceedings further
when the jury returned to the courtroom for closing arguments. Id. at 130-
32. The trial court summarily found the defendant in contempt after each
outburst, imposed three consecutive sentences of six months’ incarceration
for a total of eighteen months’ incarceration, and declared a mistrial. Id.
Our Supreme Court affirmed Owens’ three summary contempt
convictions and the consecutive sentences imposed, even when considering
the brief period of time in which the acts occurred as well as the single
motivation of dismissing his attorney and obtaining new counsel.6 Id.
Here, Appellant’s conduct and misbehaviors during the hearing
constituted six distinct contemptuous acts obstructing the administration of
justice. Appellant persisted in his misbehaviors despite the trial court’s
warnings, despite the efforts of the sheriff, and despite the contempt
sentences preceding each subsequent contemptuous act. Appellant’s
conduct obstructed the administration of justice with respect to the trial
court’s other cases that day. Appellant also obstructed the trial court’s
resolution of his own Grazier hearing, which was continued and delayed the
pending trial, in addition to Appellant’s other matters scheduled for trial in
another courtroom pending resolution of the Grazier hearing. N.T., 5/5/14,
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6
Owens did not raise a Double Jeopardy claim; rather, Owens challenged
the sufficiency of the evidence and raised a due process claim challenging
the adequacy of the summary proceedings. Owens, 436 A.2d at 130, 133.
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at 22-23. Further, as a result of Appellant’s misconduct in the courtroom,
the trial court ordered an additional mental health evaluation, which added
even more delay to the proceedings. Id. at 26-27. The record adequately
supports six distinct findings of direct criminal contempt in light of
Appellant’s misbehaviors.
Appellant’s novel assertion that this Court should focus narrowly on
examining the motivation behind his actions when deciding how many
contemptuous acts occurred is unsupported by the case law. It is of no
moment that Appellant decided to contest the trial court’s jurisdiction.
We further note that Appellant’s reliance on Williams is misplaced.
After he was sentenced, Williams gave the trial court the middle finger and
at the same time stated, “F—k You.” Williams, supra at 859. The trial
court found Williams in contempt for the finger gesture and, separately, for
the verbal remark. For each of the two contempt convictions, the trial court
stated its intent to sentence Williams to five months and twenty-nine days
imprisonment to be served consecutively. On appeal, Williams argued, inter
alia, that the consecutive sentences violated the Double Jeopardy clauses of
the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. This Court agreed,
concluding that the “verbal utterance and hand gesture were
contemporaneously executed, and Appellant's hand gesture is universally
recognized throughout Western civilization as having the same meaning as
his foul utterance.” Williams, supra at 864. Accordingly, the conduct
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constituted “one unified act of contemptuous misconduct directed toward the
[t]rial [c]ourt[.]” Id. at 864-65.
Here, Appellant’s actions did not constitute one unified
contemporaneous act similar to Williams. Rather, Appellant committed six
separate contemptuous acts during his hearing while paying absolutely no
heed to the court’s admonitions and instructions. Our resolution is
necessary to vindicate the authority of trial courts to maintain order in the
courtrooms of this Commonwealth and to punish offenders who obstruct the
administration of justice through their misdeeds in the court’s presence.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and
we discern no violation of Double Jeopardy under these particular
circumstances.
Judgment of Sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/19/2017
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