Com. v. Austin, M. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S33031-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :           PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee              :
    :
    v.                    :
    :
    MICHAEL AUSTIN,                             :
    :
    Appellant            :     No. 916 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order Entered May 3, 2016
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0000398-2004
    CP-22-CR 0003099-2004
    BEFORE: BENDER, OTT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:                         FILED JULY 07, 2017
    Michael Austin (Appellant) appeals pro se1 from the order entered on
    May 3, 2016, granting his motion to correct clerical errors. We dismiss this
    appeal as moot.
    The motions court set forth the following procedural history.
    [Appellant] was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary,
    and simple assault on April 20, 2005. On June 15, 2005,
    [Appellant] was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, [10
    to 20] years of imprisonment for burglary, and [one to two]
    years of imprisonment for simple assault. The burglary and
    simple assault sentences were ordered to run consecutive to the
    life sentence.
    [Appellant] challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on
    appeal, and the Superior Court filed a memorandum opinion on
    May 16, 2006, affirming [Appellant’s] judgment of sentence.
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    Appellant’s May 11, 2017 application for appointment of counsel is denied.
    J-S33031-17
    [See Commonwealth v. Austin, 
    903 A.2d 40
    (Pa. Super.
    2006), appeal denied, 
    907 A.2d 1100
    (Pa. 2006).] Years later,
    on April 4, 2016, [Appellant] filed a “motion to correct clerical
    errors.” [Appellant] claimed [the sentencing court] entered an
    oral judgment of sentence, not a written one, and asked to be
    provided with the sentencing order. [The motions court] granted
    [Appellant’s] motion on May 3, 2016, with instructions for the
    [c]lerk of [c]ourts to transmit to [Appellant] a certified copy of
    [the court’s] sentencing order from June 15, 2005.
    On May 31, 2016, [Appellant] filed a “motion to compel
    disclosure of the court’s sentencing order.”[2] On the same date,
    [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court.
    Specifically, [Appellant] appealed from “the final judgment
    entered in this matter on the 3rd day of May, 2016[.]” On June
    9, 2016, after the notice of appeal had been filed, [the motions
    court] filed an order denying [Appellant’s] motion to compel.[3]
    Motions Court Opinion, 10/13/2016, at 1-2.4
    Appellant asks us to decide whether Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(a)(2) requires
    the clerk of courts of Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas to file a
    written judgment of sentence in the official record for Appellant’s criminal
    case. Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    2
    In his second motion, Appellant alleged that “the [c]lerk of [c]ourts only
    furnished [Appellant] with [his] guideline sentencing forms, a Department of
    Corrections 300-B form reflecting [his] sentence from June 15, 2005, and
    the [sentencing court’s] sentencing forms.”         Motions Court Opinion,
    10/13/2016, at 2. Although his motion was not a model of clarity, it appears
    that Appellant sought a certified copy of his actual sentencing order, or in
    the alternative, a newly-created-judgment-of-sentence order he believed he
    needed to file an appeal. Motion to Compel, 5/31/2016, at 1.
    3
    The motions court explained that the clerk already had provided Appellant
    with “[o]fficial sentencing information” from the docket, except the copy of
    the transcript from the sentencing hearing, which it then forwarded. Order,
    6/9/2016, at 1.
    4
    Both Appellant and the motions court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    -2-
    J-S33031-17
    Initially, we note that Appellant’s notice of appeal references only the
    May 3, 2016 order granting his motion to correct clerical errors.       In this
    motion, the relief requested by Appellant was for the motions court to “issue
    an order upon the clerks[’] office directing it to provide [Appellant] with a
    certified copy of [his s]entencing [o]rder.”5 Motion to Correct Clerical Errors,
    4/4/2016, at 1.    The motions court granted the precise relief sought by
    Appellant. See Order, 5/3/2016, at 1 (“[T]his court grants Appellant’s pro
    se motion and hereby directs the clerk of courts to transmit to defendant a
    certified copy of the court's sentencing order of this docket on or about June
    15, 2005.”) (capitalization altered). On appeal, Appellant requests that we
    order the motions court to produce a certified copy of the sentencing order.
    Appellant’s Brief at 14.      Because the motions court already granted
    Appellant’s request for a certified copy of the sentencing order, his appeal of
    5
    The Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s motion constituted an
    untimely-filed petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42
    Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. In the motion, Appellant simply requested a certified
    copy of his sentencing order. PCRA review is limited to defendants who
    claim that they are wrongfully convicted and/or are serving an illegal
    sentence. See Commonwealth v. Burkkett, 
    5 A.3d 1260
    , 1275 (Pa.
    Super. 2010). Appellant’s motion did not seek substantive relief regarding
    his conviction or sentence, and, therefore, it is not a petition under the
    PCRA. Although Appellant argues in his brief that he is being detained
    illegally because there is no evidence of a written judgment of sentence, he
    did not make this claim in his motion to correct clerical errors. If he had, his
    motion would have constituted a petition for habeas corpus, not a PCRA
    petition. See Joseph v. Glunt, 
    96 A.3d 365
    (Pa. Super. 2014).
    -3-
    J-S33031-17
    the May 3, 2016 order is moot.6,7,8    See Printed Image of York, Inc. v.
    Mifflin Press, Ltd., 
    133 A.3d 55
    , 59 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“An issue before a
    6
    We also note that, because the motions court decided the motion in
    Appellant’s favor, Appellant is not an aggrieved party within the meaning of
    Pa.R.A.P. 501. See In re J.G., 
    984 A.2d 541
    , 546 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“A
    prevailing party is not ‘aggrieved’ and therefore, does not have standing to
    appeal an order that has been entered in his or her favor.”). Although the
    Commonwealth mentions in its brief that Appellant was a prevailing party, it
    did not argue specifically that Appellant lacked standing. Since standing is
    not jurisdictional, we cannot raise an issue of standing sua sponte.
    Commonwealth v. Allen, 
    107 A.3d 709
    , 711 (Pa. 2014).
    7
    In addition to seeking an order compelling production of a certified copy of
    his sentencing order, Appellant also requests that this Court “arrest
    judgment” and direct the trial court to schedule a sentencing hearing.
    Appellant’s Brief at 10. This request is related to his averment on appeal
    that he is serving an illegal sentence imposed without a written sentencing
    order. Appellant’s Brief at 11. However, Appellant did not present this
    argument to the motions court, and, therefore, it is waived. Even if it were
    not waived, this argument would have no merit based upon other documents
    in the record reflecting Appellant’s sentence. See 
    Joseph, 96 A.3d at 372
    (holding that the prisoner was not being detained illegally despite the
    absence of a sentencing order because the criminal docket and transcript of
    the sentencing hearing confirmed his sentence).
    8
    Although Appellant did not file a notice of appeal from the June 9, 2016
    order denying his motion to compel, it is clear from Appellant’s concise
    statement and brief that the June 9, 2016 order is the order with which
    Appellant actually takes issue. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief at 5 (listing the
    text of the June 9, 2016 order as the order in question); 
    id. at 6
    (“The
    present appeal follows denial of Appellant’s motion to compel disclosure of
    the court’s sentencing order….”) (capitalization altered); 
    id. at 10
    (arguing
    that the motions court “has no legal standing to allow” the clerk to “refuse to
    adhere” to Pa.R.Crim.P. 114, which, according to Appellant, requires the
    clerk to draft and file a written judgment of sentence after the court signs
    it).
    However, not only did Appellant fail to appeal the June 9, 2016 order, on
    the same day that he filed the motion to compel, and before the motions
    court ruled on the motion, he filed the instant notice of appeal, which
    divested the motions court of jurisdiction regarding Appellant’s request for a
    -4-
    J-S33031-17
    court is moot ‘when a determination is sought on a matter which, when
    rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.’”)
    (citation omitted).
    Appeal dismissed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/7/2017
    certified copy of his written judgment of sentence. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a)
    (prohibiting the trial court from proceeding “further in the matter” after an
    appeal is taken, except as otherwise prescribed). Because these exceptions
    do not apply here, the motions court lacked jurisdiction to enter the June 9,
    2016 order denying Appellant’s motion to compel, and the order is a nullity.
    See Bell v. Kater, 
    839 A.2d 356
    , 358 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding that an
    order entered by trial court regarding the same matter after the matter was
    appealed was a legal nullity).
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Austin, M. No. 916 MDA 2016

Filed Date: 7/7/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/7/2017