Com. v. Wise, S. , 171 A.3d 784 ( 2017 )

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2017 PA Super 295COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SHERRY LYNN WISE,
Appellant No. 1684 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 13, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0006928-2015
BEFORE: SHOGAN and MOULTON, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2017
Appellant, Sherry Lynn Wise, appeals from the judgment of sentence
of two years of probation, payment of costs and fines, plus 100 hours of
community service imposed on September 13, 2016, following her conviction
by a jury that same day of Fleeing or Attempting to Elude a Police Officer, 75
Pa.C.S. § 3733.1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts as follows:
[Appellee, t]he Commonwealth[,] presented one witness,
Officer Holly Rowland (“Officer Rowland”) of the Southwestern
Regional Police Department. Officer Rowland was on duty on
September 24, 2015. At approximately 6:15 p.m. that day,
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
The court also convicted Appellant of the summary offense of Drivers
Required to be Licensed, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1501(a), and sentenced her to a $200
fine. N.T., 9/13/16, at 6.
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Officer Rowland was in the area of York Road and Jacobs Mill
Road in York County. She was in this area due to a minor
vehicle accident, and she was standing on the Jacob Mill side of
the road (by the stop sign) talking to witnesses and determining
whether there were injuries.
At that time of day, it was still sunny, and the lights on
Officer Rowland’s marked patrol unit vehicle were on. While she
was talking to witnesses, Officer Rowland observed “a green
Mustang with a convertible top that was down approach ... the
intersection” from the direction of Jacobs Mill Road. She
observed that “the vehicle was coming up to make a right-hand
turn on York Road.” Officer Rowland testified that she “was able
to make contact with the driver of the Green Mustang, who she
did identify as the Appellant.”
Officer Rowland recognized the Appellant as the driver of
the vehicle that day. Officer Rowland testified that she knew
Appellant did not have a valid driver’s license due to previous
dealings with the Appellant. Upon seeing the vehicle, Officer
Rowland “approached the vehicle and ... said to the Appellant,
Sherry, what’s going on? And the Appellant said, what do you
mean? And Officer Rowland said, you don’t have a driver’s
license, I’m going to need you to pull over, please.” This
interaction between Officer Rowland and Appellant had occurred
at the intersection while Appellant sat in the driver seat and
Officer Rowland spoke standing just outside of the passenger
side of the car. Officer Rowland was in full uniform at that time,
including a vest, full duty belt, badge, and patches on the arms.
After instructing the Appellant to pull over, Officer Rowland
“pointed in the direction that Officer Rowland wanted Appellant
to . . . turn onto York Road, and Officer Rowland pointed out that
there is a driveway that Appellant could pull into safely and wait
for Officer Rowland to come over to speak with her.” In
response to these instructions, Appellant “asked, where, and
Officer Rowland again motioned to the Appellant . . . in the
direction that Officer Rowland wanted her to travel, and Officer
Rowland again stated, the driveway shoulder area located on
York Road. To motion to the Appellant, Officer Rowland “[u]sed
her arms as a signal for the Appellant to follow that direction.”
Importantly, Officer Rowland had specifically told [Appellant] to
pull over. According to Officer Rowland’s testimony, the
Appellant did not ask any further questions, or express any other
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concern or reason about why Appellant could not stop at that
time.
After the instructions, Appellant turned right down York
Road and drove away instead of stopping in the area that Officer
Rowland instructed her to. In fact, according to Officer
Rowland’s testimony, after Appellant pulled out into the
intersection, Appellant “accelerated at a very fast speed out of
the area” and did not stop at any point, which was not following
the directions Officer Rowland had given. In addition, there was
more than one place along the roadway that Appellant was
driving near the officer that Appellant could have pulled over but
did not do so. At the time, Officer Rowland was not able to
pursue the Appellant since the officer was still on the scene of
the car accident and because the officer needed to stay at the
scene of the car accident for the tow companies to arrive. The
Appellant did not come back to Officer Rowland or contact the
police department that evening.
In response to Appellant not pulling over and driving away,
Officer Rowland “radioed to . . . York Dispatch to let them know
that this vehicle had left the scene and to notify future [sic]
departments.” Officer Rowland had “noted to . . . York County
Dispatch to note that the vehicle had fled the scene.”
Trial Court Opinion, 12/2/16, at 2–6 (footnotes omitted).
As noted, on September 13, 2016, a jury convicted Appellant of fleeing
or attempting to elude a police officer, the court convicted her of driving
without a license, and she was sentenced as described supra. Appellant filed
a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied on
September 22, 2016. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on
October 11, 2016, and both Appellant and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Appellant raises the following two issues on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to present a complete
jury instruction on the elements of the offense of Fleeing or
Attempting to Elude a Police Officer when the trial court denied
Appellant’s request to include the language “pursuing police
officer” in the jury instruction?
2. Whether the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence in order to convict Appellant beyond a reasonable
doubt because the Commonwealth failed to prove the Appellant
was fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing police officer?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
In reviewing a jury charge, we determine “whether the trial court
committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the
outcome of the case.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 911 A.2d 576, 582–583
(Pa. Super. 2006). We must view the charge as a whole; the trial court is
free to use its own form of expression in creating the charge.
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 766 A.2d 874, 878 (Pa. Super. 2001).
“[Our] key inquiry is whether the instruction on a particular issue
adequately, accurately and clearly presents the law to the jury, and is
sufficient to guide the jury in its deliberations.” Id. Moreover,
[i]t is well-settled that “the trial court has wide discretion in
fashioning jury instructions. The trial court is not required to
give every charge that is requested by the parties[,] and its
refusal to give a requested charge does not require reversal
unless the appellant was prejudiced by that refusal.”
Commonwealth v. Scott, 73 A.3d 599, 602 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting
Brown, 911 A.2d at 583).
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The jury was charged, in relevant part, as follows:
[Appellant] has been charged with the offense of fleeing or
attempting to elude a police officer. To find [Appellant] guilty of
this offense, you must find the following elements have been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that [Appellant] was the driver of a motor vehicle;
Second, that [Appellant] was given a visual and audible
signal by the police officer to bring her vehicle to a stop. The
signal given by the police officer may be given by hand, voice,
emergency lights, or siren;
Third, that [Appellant] failed or refused to bring her vehicle
to a stop or fled;
And, fourth, that [Appellant] did so willfully, that is she
was aware of the officer’s signal to stop and refused to do so.
N.T., 9/12/16, at 118–119.
While Appellant has not acknowledged our standards of statutory
interpretation, a reading of her first issue compels the conclusion that it
includes aspects of such a claim. Thus:
Statutory interpretation is a question of law, therefore our
standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is
plenary. Commonwealth v. Hall, 622 Pa. 396, 80 A.3d 1204,
1211 (2013). “In all matters involving statutory interpretation,
we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et
seq., which provides that the object of interpretation and
construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the General Assembly.” Commonwealth v.
McCoy, 599 Pa. 599, 962 A.2d 1160, 1166 (2009) (citation
omitted).
Generally, a statute’s plain language provides the best indication
of legislative intent. Id. We will only look beyond the plain
language of the statute when words are unclear or ambiguous,
or the plain meaning would lead to “a result that is absurd,
impossible of execution or unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).
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Therefore, when ascertaining the meaning of a statute, if the
language is clear, we give the words their plain and ordinary
meaning. Hall, 80 A.3d at 1211. Commonwealth v.
Popielarcheck, 151 A.3d 1088, 1091-92, 2016 WL 7103930 at
*2 (Pa. Super. 2016).
Commonwealth v. Torres-Kuilan, 156 A.3d 1229, 1231 (Pa. Super.
2017). “Where a case involves the proper construction of a statute, our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See
Octave ex rel. Octave v. Walker, 103 A.3d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2014).”
Commonwealth v. T.J.W., 114 A.3d 1098 (Pa. Super. 2015). Moreover,
although we must strictly construe penal statutes,
courts are not required to give words of a criminal statute their
narrowest meaning or disregard evident legislative intent. Thus,
we will not adopt the strictest possible interpretation if doing so
would defeat the plain intent of the legislature. Again, we must
bear in mind that the legislature “does not intend a result that is
absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable, and that the
legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.”
Commonwealth v. Brown, 956 A.2d 992 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(internal citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 125 A.3d 822, 831 (Pa. Super. 2015).
Appellant’s first issue concerns the phrasing of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733,
Fleeing or Eluding a Police Officer, which provides as follows:
(a) Offense defined.--Any driver of a motor vehicle who
willfully fails or refuses to bring his vehicle to a stop, or who
otherwise flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police officer,
when given a visual and audible signal to bring the vehicle to a
stop, commits an offense as graded in subsection (a.2).
* * *
(b) Signal by police officer.--The signal given by the police
officer may be by hand, voice, emergency lights or siren.
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75 Pa.C.S. § 3733.
The trial court, citing to the language of the statute and referring to
this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Scattone, 672 A.2d 345 (Pa.
Super. 1996), concluded that there is a requirement of pursuit in order to
find eluding a police officer but not for fleeing from a police officer. Trial
Court Opinion, 12/2/16, at 10. The trial court relied on the statute’s use of
the word “or” in separating the phrases “fleeing” and “‘eluding a pursuing
officer,’ making it so that a pursuit was not required to find [that Appellant]
fled.” Id. at 10–11. Thus, the court concluded it did not err in failing to
include the phrase “pursuing police officer” in the jury instructions. Id. at
12.
Appellant argues that the absence of a comma after the phrase “or
who otherwise flees” (“Oxford comma”), compels that the statute requires
“‘a pursuing police officer,’ regardless of whether a motorist ‘flees’ or
‘attempts to elude’ the police.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. Because
Officer Rowland never pursued Appellant, she contends the jury was
misinformed regarding this “element.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant
then presents two pages of discussion about the Oxford comma and her
asserted import of its absence in the statute. Appellant attempts to present
allegedly clearer language that could have been utilized by the Legislature,
id. at 16, and cites to other statutes where the Oxford comma was not used
because, in her view, it would have been superfluous. Id. at 20.
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The Commonwealth, citing Scattone, responds that this Court, albeit
when evaluating a different aspect of the statute’s language, has held that
75 Pa.C.S. § 3733 is clear and unambiguous on its face. Commonwealth’s
Brief at 12. Further, the Commonwealth agrees with the trial court that the
statute’s use of the word “or” defines the behavior identified in the statute.
Id. at 13–15. Moreover, the Commonwealth underscores that the trial court
utilized the suggested standard jury instruction for Section 3733. Id. at 18.
Examining the language of the statute, we conclude it is clear that any
driver:
1) who willfully2 fails or refuses to stop, or
2) who otherwise flees or
3) attempts to elude a pursuing police officer
when given a visual and audible signal to stop, commits the offense.
This is not a question of punctuation, it is a question of terminology.
In reading the plain language, “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed
according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved
usage.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). Moreover, “[o]ur courts do not dissect
statutory text and interpret it in a vacuum.” Commonwealth v. Griffin,
149 A.3d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 2016).
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2
“Willfully” is defined in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code as when “a person
acts knowingly with respect to the material element of the offense[.]”
18 Pa.C.S. § 302(g).
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This Court in Scattone observed that we give effect to a statute as a
whole and reinforced that “the Legislature would not seek an absurd result
by enacting legislation. . . .” Scattone, 672 A.2d at 347 (citing 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1921). We stated therein that the “statute is clear and unambiguous on
its face as to the elements necessary to trigger its violation: an operator’s
‘willful’ failure to bring his/her vehicle to a stop in the face of an audibly or
visually identifiable police officer’s signal to do so.” Id.
The word “or” is used exclusively in the statute in explaining the
behavior proscribed. The word “or” is given its normal disjunctive meaning
unless it produces an unreasonable result. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 663
A.2d 746 (Pa. Super. 1995); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). Giving “or” its usual
disjunctive meaning in this case does not produce an unreasonable result.
Indeed, the statute makes clear, that upon a visual and audible signal to
stop by a police officer, a driver who fails or refuses to stop, or flees, or
attempts to elude a pursing officer, commits the offense. Thus, we reject
Appellant’s claim.3
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3
In response to the representation in the Concurring Statement that the
jury instructions herein required a finding only that Appellant was aware of
the officer’s signal to stop and refused to do so,” Concurring Statement at 2
(citing N.T., 9/12/16, at 119), we note that prior to that instruction, the trial
court advised the jury that to find Appellant guilty of the offense, it must
find that she “failed or refused to bring her vehicle to a stop or fled.” N.T.,
9/12/16, at 119 (emphasis added). Moreover, the statutory interpretation
discussion is relevant to both prongs of the statute in that one commits the
offense of “Fleeing or Eluding a Police Officer” by failing or refusing to stop
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant purports to assail the sufficiency of the evidence in her
second issue. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. James, 46
A.3d 776, 779 (Pa. Super. 2012). It is within the province of the fact-finder
to determine the weight to be accorded to each witness’s testimony and to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928
A.2d 1025 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 133 (Pa.
Super. 2011). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410 (Pa.
Super. 2011). Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the
evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.
Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth
v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544 (Pa. Super. 2011). Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
or “otherwise flees or attempts to elude” a police officer. 75 Pa.C.S. §
3733. For these reasons, we conclude that we must address the issue
advanced by Appellant.
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so inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn
from the circumstances. Moreno, 14 A.3d at 133.
Appellant’s sufficiency argument is essentially a three-sentence
contention that because Officer Rowland never pursued Appellant, “a
material element” of the crime was not proven. Appellant’s Brief at 24.
Appellant’s conclusory claim is undeveloped and fails to assert a minimally
sufficient argument. She does not cite to the notes of testimony, fails to
refer to relevant and controlling case law, and merely cites case law relating
to our standard of review. Id. at 23–24. Therefore, we find the issue
waived. See Commonwealth v. Woodard, 129 A.3d 480, 509 (Pa. 2015)
(quoting Wirth v. Commonwealth, 95 A.3d 822, 837 (Pa. 2013), which
stated that “where an appellate brief fails to . . . develop an issue in any
other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived. It is not
the obligation of an appellate court to formulate [the] appellant’s arguments
for him.”) (internal quotations omitted)).
Even if not waived, we would rely on the trial court’s disposition of this
issue, as follows:
This Court finds that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to find Appellant guilty of Fleeing or Attempting to Elude a
Police Officer beyond a reasonable doubt. The Pennsylvania
Fleeing or Attempting to Elude statute provides that “Any driver
of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to bring his
vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise flees or attempts to elude a
pursuing police officer, when given a visual and audible signal to
bring the vehicle to a stop, commits an offense.”54 The signal
that is “given by the police officer may be by hand, voice,
emergency lights or siren.”55 When viewed in the light most
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favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, this
[c]ourt finds there was sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of
Fleeing or Attempting to Elude.
54
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733[.]
55
Id.
Giving the Commonwealth all reasonable inferences, the
jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
fled after [Officer] Rowland gave the signal to Appellant. Here,
as the evidence and testimony shows, Officer Rowland gave both
a visual and audible signal to Appellant, who was driving the
vehicle, when Officer Rowland told Appellant to pull over to the
side of the road and also motioned with her arm to do so.
Appellant kept driving, rather than pull over. The jury was free
to conclude that Officer Rowland’s actions constituted an audible
and visual signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, and the jury was
also free to conclude that the Appellant’s act of driving away
despite Officer Rowland’s instructions constituted fleeing or
willfully failing or refusing to stop her vehicle, despite
Officer Rowland’s audible and visual signals.
As such, there was enough evidence for the jury to find
Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the
jury verdict should stand.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/2/16, at 14–16.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
P.J.E. Stevens joins the Opinion.
Judge Moulton files a Concurring Statement.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/15/2017
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