Com. v. Zorger, D. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S51027-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    DAVID J. ZORGER, JR.,
    Appellant                 No. 167 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 2, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0001811-2016
    BEFORE: BOWES and SHOGAN, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                           FILED AUGUST 25, 2017
    David J. Zorger, Jr. (“Appellant”) appeals the judgment of sentence
    entered on September 2, 2016. We affirm.
    This case arose on January 25, 2016, when Appellant assaulted his
    mother and the responding Bristol Township police officers.     On June 13,
    2016, Appellant pled guilty to four counts of aggravated assault, two counts
    of possessing an instrument of crime, two counts of terroristic threats, one
    count of resisting arrest, and one count of criminal mischief.1 On September
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(3), 907, 2706(a)(1), 5104, and 3304(a)(5),
    respectively.
    J-S51027-17
    2, 2016, Appellant admitted to violating his probation, waived a Gagnon II2
    hearing, and proceeded to sentencing. The trial court first found Appellant
    in direct violation of his probation on a 2014 conviction as a result of the
    guilty plea.     The trial court then sentenced Appellant on the probation
    violation to incarceration for eighteen to forty-eight months and on each of
    the aggravated assault counts to incarceration for two to five years, the
    latter to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to
    Appellant’s probation-violation sentence. N.T., 9/2/16, at 8, 22–24.
    Appellant filed a counseled motion to modify and reconsider sentence
    on September 6, 2016. He filed a pro se post-sentence motion to modify
    sentence on September 12, 2016.3               The trial court held a hearing on the
    counseled motion on December 14, 2016. Appellant presented evidence of a
    treatment program he was participating in and requested that all sentences
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
    411 U.S. 778
    , 782 (1973) (noting that probationer
    is entitled to two hearings, a pre-revocation hearing and a final revocation
    hearing, before a final revocation decision can be made).
    3
    Appellant also filed a premature pro se petition pursuant to the Post
    Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546, on November 21,
    2016, which he withdrew during the hearing on his counseled motion for
    reconsideration of sentence. N.T., 12/14/16, at 7. Appellant filed a second
    premature pro se PCRA petition on January 17, 2017. “The PCRA provides
    petitioners with a means of collateral review, but has no applicability until
    the judgment of sentence becomes final.” Commonwealth v. Kubis, 
    808 A.2d 196
    , 198 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2002). Therefore, Appellant’s second PCRA
    filing should be dismissed without prejudice and refiled once his judgment of
    sentence becomes final. Accord Commonwealth v. Leslie, 
    757 A.2d 984
    ,
    985 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“A PCRA petition may only be filed after an
    appellant has waived or exhausted his direct appeal rights”).
    -2-
    J-S51027-17
    run concurrently.     N.T., 12/14/16, at 11–12.              The trial court denied
    Appellant’s post-sentence motion, and Appellant filed this timely appeal.
    Following the appointment of new counsel, Appellant and the trial court
    complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue for our consideration:
    A. WHETHER APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY,
    INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED UNDER
    CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE HE WAS NOT ADVISED OF THE
    POTENTIAL FOR CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WITH A
    PROBATION/PAROLE VIOLATION?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    Appellant argues that he did not enter a knowing, voluntary, and
    intelligent plea because he “was not advised of the potential that his
    sentence on the probation violation could be run consecutive to the sentence
    on the new case.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. The Commonwealth counters that
    “Appellant has waived his appellate claims with respect to the validity of his
    plea because he failed to preserve these claims before the trial court.”
    Commonwealth’s      Brief   at    7.   Upon      review,     we    conclude    that    the
    Commonwealth is correct.
    “Settled Pennsylvania law makes clear that by entering a guilty plea,
    the   defendant   waives    his    right    to   challenge    on    direct    appeal   all
    nonjurisdictional defects except the legality of the sentence and the validity
    of the plea.”   Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 
    72 A.3d 606
    , 609 (Pa. Super.
    2013) (citation omitted). However:
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    J-S51027-17
    [a] defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty
    plea on direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy
    or file a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of
    sentencing. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i). Failure to
    employ either measure results in waiver. Commonwealth v.
    Tareila, 
    895 A.2d 1266
    , 1270 n. 3 (Pa.Super.2006). Historically,
    Pennsylvania courts adhere to this waiver principle because “[i]t
    is for the court which accepted the plea to consider and correct,
    in the first instance, any error which may have been committed.”
    Commonwealth v. Roberts, 
    237 Pa.Super. 336
    , 
    352 A.2d 140
    ,
    141 (1975) (holding that common and previously condoned
    mistake of attacking guilty plea on direct appeal without first
    filing petition to withdraw plea with trial court is procedural error
    resulting in waiver; stating, “(t)he swift and orderly
    administration of criminal justice requires that lower courts be
    given the opportunity to rectify their errors before they are
    considered on appeal”; “Strict adherence to this procedure could,
    indeed, preclude an otherwise costly, time consuming, and
    unnecessary appeal to this court”).
    Likewise:
    Normally, issues not preserved in the trial court may
    not be pursued before this Court. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
    For example, a request to withdraw a guilty plea on
    the grounds that it was involuntary is one of the
    claims that must be raised by motion in the trial
    court in order to be reviewed on direct appeal. . . .
    Commonwealth v. Rush, 
    959 A.2d 945
    , 949
    (Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied, 
    601 Pa. 696
    , 
    972 A.2d 521
     (2009).
    Lincoln, 
    72 A.3d at
    609–610.
    In determining that Appellant did not preserve his guilty-plea
    challenge, the trial court opined as follows:
    Here, Appellant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea
    prior to sentencing. Further, no argument as to the validity of
    the guilty plea was raised in Appellant’s counseled Motion to
    Modify and Reconsider Sentence. This issue was also not raised
    at the hearing on the Motion to Modify and Reconsider. The
    [c]ourt was not required to confront this issue until Appellant
    -4-
    J-S51027-17
    filed his Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal on March
    13, 2017.      Accordingly, the [c]ourt believes that Appellant
    waived his right to assert this issue on appeal.
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/28/17, at unnumbered 5. We agree.
    Appellant did not object to the guilty plea during the plea colloquy.
    N.T., 6/13/16, at 2–11.     Although Appellant’s counsel filed a timely post-
    sentence motion, that motion did not challenge the guilty plea or seek
    withdrawal of the plea. Motion to Modify and Reconsider Sentence, 9/6/16.
    Additionally, Appellant’s pro se post-sentence motion affords no relief on two
    grounds.     First,   Appellant   is   not   entitled   to   hybrid   representation.
    Commonwealth v. Jette, 
    23 A.3d 1032
    , 1036 (Pa. 2011). Accordingly, pro
    se motions have no legal effect and, therefore, are legal nullities.
    Commonwealth v. Nischan, 
    928 A.2d 349
    , 355 (Pa. Super. 2007).
    Second, even if legally effective, Appellant’s pro se motion did not seek
    withdrawal of the plea. Motion to Modify Sentence, 9/12/16.
    Thus, we conclude that Appellant cannot obtain review of his claim on
    direct appeal because he failed to preserve it properly by either objecting
    during the plea colloquy or by raising it in a timely post-sentence motion to
    withdraw the plea. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(1)(a)(i). Accordingly, we decline to
    review Appellant’s challenge to the validity of his plea.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    -5-
    J-S51027-17
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/25/2017
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Zorger, D. No. 167 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 8/25/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/26/2017