In Re: Private Criminal Complaint D. Miles , 170 A.3d 530 ( 2017 )

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2017 PA Super 279IN RE: PRIVATE CRIMINAL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
COMPLAINT DONALD MILES : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: DONALD MILES : No. 434 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered February 22, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Civil Division at No(s): 2016 -CV-6308
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2017
Appellant, Donald Miles, appeals pro se from the order entered in the
Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, which denied and dismissed his
petition for approval of his private criminal complaint. We affirm.
The trial court opinion sets forth the relevant facts and procedural
history of this case as follows:
BACKGROUND
1. [Appellant] has attempted to file a private criminal
complaint against Vincent Butkiewicz, John Munley,
Thomas Davis, Harold Zech, all alleged to be Detectives
with the Lackawanna County District Attorney’s Office. He
has also in the same pleading attempted to file a criminal
complaint against Attorneys James R. Elliot and Corey
Kolcharno and “…others to be charged from the DA’s Office
magistrates & judge. Unlimited John Doe, unlimited Jane
Doe.”
2. [Appellant] has also attempted to file a criminal
complaint against Assistant District Attorney Cathy Ann
Tully, District Attorney James Henry Scanlon IV, Andrew
Jarbola (Judge, Lackawanna County Court of Common
Pleas), John Pesota (Magisterial District Judge) and Alyce
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Farrell (Magisterial District Judge), Vito P. Geroulo (Judge,
Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas). … For the
reasons that follow, the relief sought by [Appellant] is
denied and dismissed.
3. All of the above are alleged to have criminally
wronged [Appellant] relative to a criminal matter filed to
OTN number L924393 at Magisterial District Judge Alyce
Farrell’s Office 45-1-02. The location of the alleged crime
is at 521 Arthur Avenue, Scranton, PA 18510. The date of
the offense is in dispute but approximately February 17,
2016.
4. [Appellant] attempted to file a private criminal
complaint with the issuing authority against the District
Attorney and members of his staff on or about September
9, 2016. The matter had to be referred by the issuing
authority to the District Attorney for approval to proceed
with the case per Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(A).
5. On or about October 13, 2016, a letter from the first
Assistant District Attorney Gene P. Riccardo directed to
[Appellant] acknowledged the private [criminal] complaint
attempted to be filed by [Appellant] against Attorney
Cathy Tully. At that time, recognizing the conflict of
interest, the Lackawanna County District Attorney’s Office
referred the putative criminal complaints to the Office of
the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. …
6. This referral was acknowledged as received by the
Office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania on December 28, 2016. …
7. [Appellant] erroneously filed a Petition for Review of
the District [Attorney’s] “…disapproval of his Private
Criminal Complaint.” The Petition for Review…is in error
because at that point on November 8, 2016, the District
Attorney’s Office had not disapproved his private criminal
complaint but had referred it, due to conflicts, to the Office
of the Attorney General. …
8. On February 6, 2017 at 3:09 p.m., this [c]ourt
received an email from an attorney with the Office of the
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Attorney General with two attachments. … The
attachments indicate the Office of Attorney General for the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania refuses to approve
[Appellant’s] private criminal complaint…per Pa.R.Crim.P.
506(2). The reason for the disapproval as articulated
in…Request to Close the Case dated January 26, 2017 is[:]
“In his lengthy PCC [Appellant] completely failed, however,
to articulate or produce any evidence of criminal conduct
by anybody. … It is clear he is merely trying to confuse
and delay his criminal trial with this PCC.”
9. Due to the response by the Office of the Attorney
General, closing the case of [Appellant’s] [private criminal
complaint], [Appellant’s] untimely and inaccurate
[p]etition for review had now become ripe for decision.
This is so because now the erroneous alleged rejection of
the [p]rivate [c]riminal [c]omplaint by the Office of the
District Attorney has in fact occurred by the Office of the
Attorney General. Accordingly, the November 8, 2016
Petition for Review filed by [Appellant] will now be
entertained on its merits by this [c]ourt.
10. [T]he January 26, 2017 letter from the Office of the
Attorney General to [Appellant] and…the request to Close
Case also dated January 26, 2017 were submitted to this
[c]ourt by email dated February 6, 2017.
11. The context of both [documents] indicate[s] the
conclusion of the Office of the Attorney General that the
proposed private [criminal] complaints of [Appellant] are
lacking substantive merit. The letter…states, “[Y]our
private criminal complaint fails to articulate or produce any
evidence of criminal conduct by any person. Moreover, the
events you describe therein are the same incidents for
which you are currently awaiting trial.” (Docket No. CP
35-482-2015).
12. The Request to Close Case…states, “To conclude,
[Appellant] neither alleged nor substantiated at all any
facts to support any criminal charge against any person. I
do not find this PCC to be in good faith.”
(Trial Court Opinion, filed February 22, 2017, at 1-4).
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Procedurally, by order and opinion filed February 22, 2017, the trial
court denied and dismissed Appellant’s petition for approval of his private
criminal complaint. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on March
7, 2017. The trial court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant did not
voluntarily file a Rule 1925(b) statement.
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR AN ERROR OF LAW WHERE THE TRIAL
COURT DEPRIVED APPELLANT HIS DUE PROCESS OF LAW
UNDER OUR UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WHEN THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ALLOW APPELLANT A FAIR
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A PROPER AND TIMELY PETITION
FOR REVIEW PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA RULE[] OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE…506(B)(2) IN THE COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS OF LACKAWANNA COUNTY FOR SENIOR
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL BERNARD A. ANDERSON’S
DISAPPROVAL OF APPELLANT’S PRIVATE CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
Appellant argues he was deprived of his due process rights.
Particularly, Appellant questions the referral of his private criminal complaint
to the Attorney General’s Office. Appellant does not understand why the
District Attorney’s Office of Lackawanna County refused to rule on the
private criminal complaint. Appellant maintains he did not receive timely
notification of approval or disapproval of his private criminal complaint as
well. Appellant asserts his concern about “deadlines” prompted him to file a
premature petition for review on November 8, 2016. Appellant contends the
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Attorney General unreasonably delayed his decision to disapprove
Appellant’s private criminal complaint.
Appellant further asserts the trial court deprived Appellant of his due
process rights by directly reviewing the disapproval of the Attorney General’s
Office. Appellant contends he was denied the opportunity to file a proper
petition for review per Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(B)(2) to defend or challenge the
Attorney General’s disapproval. Appellant concludes he is the victim of a
conspiracy to divest him of his constitutional due process rights, and this
Court should reverse the trial court’s order denying approval of Appellant’s
private criminal complaint. We disagree.
Appellate examination of a trial court’s review of the District Attorney’s
decision to disapprove a private criminal complaint implicates the following:
[W]hen the district attorney disapproves a private criminal
complaint solely on the basis of legal conclusions, the trial
court undertakes de novo review of the matter.
Thereafter, the appellate court will review the trial court’s
decision for an error of law. As with all questions of law,
the appellate standard of review is de novo and the
appellate scope of review is plenary.
* * *
[W]hen the district attorney disapproves a private criminal
complaint on wholly policy considerations, or on a hybrid of
legal and policy considerations, the trial court’s standard of
review of the district attorney's decision is abuse of
discretion. This deferential standard recognizes the
limitations on judicial power to interfere with the district
attorney’s discretion in these kinds of decisions.
In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 610
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Pa. 600, 20 A.3d 489 (2011) (quoting In re Private Criminal Complaint
of Wilson, 879 A.2d 199, 214–15 (Pa.Super. 2005) (en banc) (internal
citations omitted)).
A private criminal complaint must at the outset set forth a prima facie
case of criminal conduct. In re Ullman, supra at 1213. Nevertheless,
even “a well-crafted private criminal complaint cannot be the end of the
inquiry for the prosecutor.” Id. (quoting In re Private Complaint of
Adams, 764 A.2d 577, 580 (Pa.Super. 2000). The district attorney must
investigate the allegations of the complaint to permit a proper decision on
whether to approve or disapprove the complaint. In re Ullman, supra at
1213. “[S]uch investigation is not necessary where the allegations of
criminal conduct in the complaint are unsupported by factual averments.”
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Muroski, 506 A.2d 1312, 1317 (Pa.Super.
1986) (en banc). Both the district attorney and the trial court have a
responsibility to prevent the misuse of judicial and prosecutorial resources in
the pursuit of pointless prosecutions. In re Ullman, supra at 1213.
Moreover,
[E]ven if the facts recited in the complaint make out a
prima facie case, the district attorney cannot blindly bring
charges, particularly where an investigation may cause
him to question their validity. Forcing the prosecutor to
bring charges in every instance where a complaint sets out
a prima facie case would compel the district attorney to
bring cases he suspects, or has concluded via
investigation, are meritless. The public prosecutor is duty
bound to bring only those cases that are appropriate for
prosecution. This duty continues throughout a criminal
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proceeding and obligates the district attorney to withdraw
charges when he concludes, after investigation, that the
prosecution lacks a legal basis.
Id. at 1214 (quoting In re Private Criminal Complaint of Wilson, supra
at 212).
The district attorney is permitted to exercise sound
discretion to refrain from proceeding in a criminal case
whenever he, in good faith, thinks that the prosecution
would not serve the best interests of the state. This
decision not to prosecute may be implemented by the
district attorney’s refusal to approve the private criminal
complaint at the outset.
In re Ullman, supra at 1214 (quoting Commonwealth v. Malloy, 450
A.2d 689, 692 (Pa.Super. 1982). “When the district attorney disapproves a
private criminal complaint, based on the sufficiency of the facts necessary to
establish the elements of the crime charged, that decision is a legal
conclusion subject to de novo review.” In re Ullman, supra at 1214 (citing
Commonwealth ex rel. Guarrasi v. Carroll, 979 A.2d 383, 385
(Pa.Super. 2009) (stating district attorney’s disapproval of private criminal
complaint, due to lack of evidence to prove elements of crimes charged,
constitutes legal conclusion subject to de novo review).
Rule 506 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure applies to
review of private criminal complaints and provides:
Rule 506. Approval of Private Complaints
(A) When the affiant is not a law enforcement officer, the
complaint shall be submitted to an attorney for the
Commonwealth, who shall approve or disapprove it
without unreasonable delay.
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(B) If the attorney for the Commonwealth:
(1) approves the complaint, the attorney shall indicate
this decision on the complaint form and transmit it to the
issuing authority;
(2) disapproves the complaint, the attorney shall state
the reasons on the complaint form and return it to the
affiant. Thereafter, the affiant may petition the court of
common pleas for review of the decision.
* * *
Pa.R.Crim.P. 506. “If the district attorney disapproves a private criminal
complaint, the complainant can petition the Court of Common Pleas for Rule
506 review.” In re Ullman, supra at 1214.
The trial court must first correctly identify the nature of the
district attorney’s reason(s) for denying a private criminal
complaint.
* * *
Under Rule 506 and settled case law, the private criminal
complainant has no right to an evidentiary hearing in
connection with the trial court’s review of the district
attorney’s decision to disapprove the private criminal
complaint. Rule 506 merely allows the private criminal
complainant the opportunity to have his complaint
reviewed in the Court of Common Pleas, following the
district attorney’s adverse decision.
Id. (quoting In re Private Criminal Complaint of Wilson, supra at 212–
13) (internal citations omitted)).
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the offense of unsworn
falsification to authorities as follows:
§ 4904. Unsworn falsification to authorities
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(a) In general.─A person commits a misdemeanor of
the second degree if, with intent to mislead a public
servant in performing his official function, he:
(1) makes any written false statement which he
does not believe to be true;
(2) submits or invites reliance on any writing
which he knows to be forged, altered or otherwise
lacking in authenticity; or
(3) submits or invites reliance on any sample,
specimen, map, boundary mark, or other object
which he knows to be false.
(b) Statements “under penalty”.─A person commits a
misdemeanor of the third degree if he makes a written
false statement which he does not believe to be true, on or
pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to
the effect that false statements made therein are
punishable.
(c) Perjury provisions applicable.─Section 4902(c)
through (f) of this title (relating to perjury) applies to this
section.
(d) Penalty.─In addition to any other penalty that may
be imposed, a person convicted under this section shall be
sentenced to pay a fine of at least $1,000.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4904. The Crimes Code defines the offense of false reports
to law enforcement authorities as follows:
§ 4906. False reports to law enforcement
authorities
(a) Falsely incriminating another.─Except as
provided in subsection (c), a person who knowingly gives
false information to any law enforcement officer with intent
to implicate another commits a misdemeanor of the
second degree.
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(b) Fictitious reports.─Except as provided in
subsection (c), a person commits a misdemeanor of the
third degree if he:
(1) reports to law enforcement authorities an
offense or other incident within their concern
knowing that it did not occur; or
(2) pretends to furnish such authorities with
information relating to an offense or incident when
he knows he has no information relating to such
offense or incident.
(c) Grading.—
(1) If the violation of subsection (a) or (b) occurs
during a declared state of emergency and the false
report causes the resources of the law enforcement
authority to be diverted from dealing with the
declared state of emergency, the offense shall be
graded one step greater than that set forth in the
applicable subsection.
(2) If the violation of subsection (a) or (b) relates
to a false report of the theft or loss of a firearm, as
defined in section 5515 (relating to prohibiting of
paramilitary training), the offense shall be graded
one step greater than that set forth in the applicable
subsection.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4906. The Crimes Code defines the offense of false swearing
as follows:
§ 4903. False swearing
(a) False swearing in official matters.―A person who
makes a false statement under oath or equivalent
affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of such a
statement previously made, when he does not believe the
statement to be true is guilty of a misdemeanor of the
second degree if:
(1) the falsification occurs in an official
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proceeding; or
(2) the falsification is intended to mislead a public
servant in performing his official function.
(b) Other false swearing.―A person who makes a
false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or
swears or affirms the truth of such a statement previously
made, when he does not believe the statement to be true,
is guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree, if the
statement is one which is required by law to be sworn or
affirmed before a notary or other person authorized to
administer oaths.
(c) Perjury provisions applicable.―Section 4902(c)
through (f) of this title (relating to perjury) applies to this
section.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4903.
The Crimes Code describes the offense of perjury as follows:
§ 4902. Perjury
(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of perjury, a
felony of the third degree, if in any official proceeding he
makes a false statement under oath or equivalent
affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of a statement
previously made, when the statement is material and he
does not believe it to be true.
(b) Materiality.—Falsification is material, regardless of
the admissibility of the statement under rules of evidence,
if it could have affected the course or outcome of the
proceeding. It is no defense that the declarant mistakenly
believed the falsification to be immaterial. Whether a
falsification is material in a given factual situation is a
question of law.
(c) Irregularities no defense.—It is not a defense to
prosecution under this section that the oath or affirmation
was administered or taken in an irregular manner or that
the declarant was not competent to make the statement.
A document purporting to be made upon oath or
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affirmation at any time when the actor presents it as being
so verified shall be deemed to have been duly sworn or
affirmed.
(d) Retraction.—No person shall be guilty of an offense
under this section if he retracted the falsification in the
course of the proceeding in which it was made before it
became manifest that the falsification was or would be
exposed and before the falsification substantially affected
the proceeding.
(e) Inconsistent statements.—Where the defendant
made inconsistent statements under oath or equivalent
affirmation, both having been made within the period of
the statute of limitations, the prosecution may proceed by
setting forth the inconsistent statements in a single count
alleging in the alternative that one or the other was false
and not believed by the defendant. In such case it shall
not be necessary for the prosecution to prove which
statement was false but only that one or the other was
false and not believed by the defendant to be true.
(f) Corroboration.—In any prosecution under this
section, except under subsection (e) of this section, falsity
of a statement may not be established by the
uncorroborated testimony of a single witness.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4902. “The general purpose of this section is to define the
various situations in which lying constitutes a felony. The essential elements
of the offense are (1) oath or affirmation; (2) materiality of the lie; and (3)
requirement that the lie be told in an official proceeding involving a hearing.
If there is no oath or affirmation, the falsification can only be a
misdemeanor….” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4902 Comment. Subsection (f) of the
perjury statute has produced explanatory and applicable case law which
states corroboration of perjury still requires two witnesses or one witness
and circumstantial evidence to support the witness. Commonwealth v.
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Johnson, 534 Pa. 51, 626 A.2d 514 (1993). The circumstantial evidence
“must fit together so tightly as to preclude any reasonable doubt of guilt…
and [serves] the principal purposes of the common law two-witness rule,
namely, protecting the defendant against good-faith mistakes and against
the grudge witness.” Id. at 54, 626 A.2d at 515.
Prosecution under subsection (e) for perjury involving
inconsistent statements made under oath or equivalent
affirmation, however, does not require corroboration:
[W]here…there is proof that the defendant made two
contradictory statements under oath. When such
conflicting statements are made there is no doubt
that the person making them has committed perjury
for he establishes it, but the difficulty is as to which
of the two statements is the false one. In such case,
the problem is reduced to one of determining
whether there is some competent evidence from
which the jury might find that the perjury was
committed on the occasion charged in the
indictment. The evidence necessary to identify the
perjured statement may be direct or circumstantial
but it must be competent.
In re Ullman, supra at 1215-16.
The Crimes Code defines official oppression as follows:
§ 5301. Official oppression
A person acting or purporting to act in an official capacity
or taking advantage of such actual or purported capacity
commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, knowing
that his conduct is illegal, he:
(1) subjects another to arrest, detention, search,
seizure, mistreatment, dispossession, assessment,
lien or other infringement of personal or property
rights; or
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(2) denies or impedes another in the exercise or
enjoyment of any right, privilege, power or
immunity.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines conspiracy in
relevant part as follows:
§ 903. Criminal conspiracy
(a) Definition of conspiracy.―A person is guilty of
conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a
crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its
commission he:
(1) agrees with such other person or persons that
they or one or more of them will engage in conduct
which constitutes such crime or an attempt or
solicitation to commit such crime; or
(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in
the planning or commission of such crime or of an
attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.
(b) Scope of conspiratorial relationship.―If a person
guilty of conspiracy, as defined by subsection (a) of this
section, knows that a person with whom he conspires to
commit a crime has conspired with another person or
persons to commit the same crime, he is guilty of
conspiring with such other person or persons, to commit
such crime whether or not he knows their identity.
(c) Conspiracy with multiple criminal
objectives.―If a person conspires to commit a number of
crimes, he is guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such
multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement or
continuous conspiratorial relationship.
* * *
(e) Overt act.―No person may be convicted of
conspiracy to commit a crime unless an overt act in
pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to
have been done by him or by a person with whom he
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conspired.
(f) Renunciation.―It is a defense that the actor, after
conspiring to commit a crime, thwarted the success of the
conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete
and voluntary renunciation of his criminal intent.
(g) Duration of conspiracy.―For purposes of 42
Pa.C.S. § 5552(d) (relating to commission of offense):
(1) conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct
which terminates when the crime or crimes which
are its object are committed or the agreement that
they be committed is abandoned by the defendant
and by those with whom he conspired;
(2) such abandonment is presumed if neither the
defendant nor anyone with whom he conspired does
any overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy during
the applicable period of limitation; and
(3) if an individual abandons the agreement, the
conspiracy is terminated as to him only if and when
he advises those with whom he conspired of his
abandonment or he informs the law enforcement
authorities of the existence of the conspiracy and of
his participation therein.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.
Instantly, the trial court reasoned:
15. A review of the proposed [private criminal
complaints] offered by [Appellant] shows incongruity
between the factual allegations and the elements of the
criminal statutes that he is attempting to employ.
Essentially, the pleading of [Appellant] is an attempt to fit
the proverbial square peg into the round hole. An example
of this has been referenced in the Attorney General’s
Request to Close Case…. In it, the Commonwealth
observes, “…[Appellant] claimed it was perjury for the
Commonwealth to amend at the preliminary hearing a date
alleged in the complaint.” This amendment was approved
by the Magisterial District Judge at the preliminary hearing
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and subsequently approved by the trial judge. The facts
as alleged by [Appellant] simply do not add up to the
elements necessary to establish the criminal violations as
alleged.
16. [Appellant] also misquotes Detective Butkiewicz in a
transcript in order to try to contort the facts to try to equal
the facts needed for his alleged criminal charges elements.
17. We have reviewed the proposed pleadings of
[Appellant] including his rights to add “Unlimited John and
Unlimited Jane Doe” and we are compelled to conclude
that the Commonwealth was correct in [its] decision by the
Office of the Attorney General to reject approval of
[Appellant’s] rambling and incongruent pleading.
18. We reach this conclusion by applying the de novo
standard of review and the plenary scope of review as per
[In re Private Criminal Complaint of] Wilson,
supra…since the rejection of this proposed complaint was
on substantive legal grounds, and not on policy grounds.
* * *
20. A lack of factual averment concerning criminal
activity can render a private criminal complaint and
supporting affidavit defective and thus not a properly
drafted complaint as is the case herein. It is incumbent
upon the private complaint to provide the district attorney
to make an informed decision regarding whether to permit
criminal proceedings. … We conclude [Appellant’s]
incongruent factual averments and pleading are fatally
defective. …
21. As Wilson tells us, a district attorney may have an
obligation to investigate a properly drafted private criminal
complaint which sets forth a prima facie case of criminal
conduct. However, a prosecutor is not obligated to
conduct an investigation when allegations made are not
supported by factual averments. Both the district attorney
and the courts have a responsibility to prevent misuse of
both judicial and prosecutorial resources. …
22. We decline to employ a policy analysis of the
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decision by the Pennsylvania Attorney General to deny
approval since the disapproval herein was for substantive
legal deficiencies and not policy reasons.
23. A private criminal complaint is not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing regarding a trial court’s review of the
Commonwealth’s decision to disapprove a private criminal
complaint. Braman v. Corbett, 19 A.3d 1151 (Pa.Super.
2011).
24. For all of the above reasons as stated the Petition of
[Appellant] seeking approval of his putative criminal
complaints, as now rejected by the Office of the Attorney
General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is denied
and dismissed as being totally devoid of merit. An
appropriate Order follows.
(Trial Court Opinion at 5-7) (some internal citations omitted). The certified
record confirms the court correctly used a de novo standard of review of the
Attorney General’s decision, because the Attorney General disapproved
Appellant’s complaint for lack of factual support. See Carrol, supra. Upon
its review, the court confirmed Appellant had failed to articulate sufficient
facts to establish a prima facie case on each of the crimes alleged. See
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4904, 4906, 4903, 4902, 5301, 903. The court validated the
Attorney General’s disapproval of Appellant’s private criminal complaint,
based on the independent finding of no evidence of criminal wrongdoing to
support Appellant’s private criminal complaint.
Here, Appellant submitted a hand-written, multi-paged complaint
consisting of allegations expressed largely as conclusions of law, without
factual specificity to support the offenses alleged, including unsworn
falsification to authorities, false reports to law enforcement authorities, false
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swearing, perjury, official oppression, and criminal conspiracy. Appellant,
however, does show in his complaint that he filed it in retaliation for the
criminal charges filed against him. Further, the general topics Appellant
highlights in his private criminal complaint are matters more properly
brought to the court’s attention in the course of Appellant’s criminal case,
through pretrial motions to suppress and at trial, through cross-examination
and impeachment of witnesses. Limited statements, taken out of context
from a hearing transcript that is not part of this certified record, will not
serve to corroborate Appellant’s allegations against the investigating
detectives, members of the district attorney’s office, and the judiciary.
After an independent review of the certified record, we endorse the
trial court’s evaluation of Appellant’s private criminal complaint and see no
error in the court’s decision. Therefore, applying the proper appellate
standard of review, we hold Appellant failed to show the trial court
committed an error of law when it denied and dismissed Appellant’s petition
for approval of his private criminal complaint. See In re Ullman, supra.Accordingly, we affirm.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/28/2017
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