Com. v. Maxwell, T. ( 2017 )

J-S38004-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
TYREEK MAXWELL :
:
Appellant : No. 1716 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order May 4, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009181-2010
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2017
Appellant, Tyreek Maxwell, appeals from the order entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition
brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant
facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to
restate them.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR AND ABUSE [ITS] DISCRETION
IN DENYING [APPELLANT’S] PCRA CLAIM RAISING OUT OF
COURT PHOTO ARRAY IDENTIFICATION [THAT] WAS MADE
UNDER UNDULY SUGGESTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHERE
____________________________________________
1
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
___________________________
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S38004-17
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED ONE EYE-WITNESS WAS
INFLUENCED IN MAKING IDENTIFICATION BY
DETECTIVES?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR AND ABUSE [ITS] DISCRETION
IN DENYING PCRA RELIEF WHERE THE IN[-]COURT
IDENTIFICATION WAS BASED ON OUT[-]OF[-]COURT
TAINTED PHOTO ARRAY IDENTIFICATION AND A RESULT
OF CONFRONTATION AT [THE] PRELIMINARY HEARING
AND NOT [THE] WITNESS[’] PERSONAL RECOLLECTION OF
THE EVENTS SURROUNDING [THE] CRIME?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR AND ABUSE [ITS] DISCRETION
IN MAKING HIS RULING WHEN [THE] PCRA COURT
DENIED [APPELLANT’S] CLAIM OF BEING DENIED DUE
PROCESS AND [A] FAIR TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE 6TH
AND 14TH AMENDMENT[S] TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR AND ABUSE [ITS] DISCRETION
IN DENYING [APPELLANT] THE RIGHT TO AMEND [THE]
PCRA PETITION TO CURE PLEADING DEFECTS IN
[APPELLANT’S] FIRST TIMELY PCRA PETITION?
WAS DIRECT APPEAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING
TO RAISE: (A) TRIAL COURT ERROR WHEN [THE] TRIAL
COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED [THE] JURY REGARDING
A CHANGE OF APPEARANCE; [AND] (B) TRIAL COURT
ERROR IN ALLOWING [THE] COMMONWEALTH TO
INTRODUCE OTHER ACTS AND/OR PRIOR BAD ACTS
EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR AND ABUSE [ITS] DISCRETION
IN DENYING [APPELLANT’S] PCRA CLAIM THAT DIRECT
APPEAL [COUNSEL] AND TRIAL COUNSEL WERE
INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO CHALLENGE AND/OR
DISCOVER DURING DIRECT APPEAL AND TRIAL THE
EXISTENCE AND IDENTITY TO BECOME A SUSPECT AND
INCLUDED IN [THE] LINE-UP, THEREBY CAUSING AND/OR
FACILITATING THE DEPRIVATION OF [APPELLANT’S] 6TH
AND 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR AND ABUSE [ITS] DISCRETION
IN DENYING [APPELLANT’S] PCRA CLAIM THAT TRIAL
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COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO CHALLENGE
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR AND ABUSE [ITS] DISCRETION
IN DENYING [APPELLANT’S] PCRA CLAIM OF ACTUAL
INNOCENCE?
DID THE PCRA COURT ERR AND ABUSE [ITS] DISCRETION
IN DENYING [APPELLANT’S] PCRA CLAIM THAT TRIAL
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO CALL
AND/OR USE ALIBI WITNESSES AND DEFENSE DURING
TRIAL?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Glenn B.
Bronson, we conclude Appellant’s issues on appeal merit no relief. The PCRA
court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the
questions presented. (See PCRA Court Opinion, filed August 16, 2016, at 5-
15) (finding: (1) Superior Court rejected on direct appeal Appellant’s claim
that unduly suggestive photo array led to identification of Appellant as
perpetrator; because Appellant previously litigated this claim, it is not
cognizable on collateral review; (2) Appellant could have raised on direct
appeal claim that in-court identification was based on unduly suggestive out-
of-court photo array and confrontation at preliminary hearing; Appellant
failed to do so, so this claim is waived; (3) exhibits D2 and D3 were forms
victims filled out at pre-trial lineup, which described perpetrators of robbery;
Appellant made formal request for exhibits during PCRA proceeding;
however, Appellant failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances
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entitled him to discovery of exhibits; thus, PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s
request for exhibits did not deny his due process rights; (4-5) Appellant
failed to raise on direct appeal claims that trial court erred when it issued
jury instruction about change of appearance and allowed Commonwealth to
introduce “other acts” evidence; thus, these particular claims are waived;2
(6) Detective Leahy created photo array based on tips police received in
response to news coverage of robbery; Detective Leahy showed photo array
to two victims, who both identified Appellant as one of robbers; Appellant
claims trial counsel was ineffective for failure to learn source of tips, which
led to violation of Appellant’s Confrontation Clause rights at trial; however,
tips led only to creation of photo array; as such, statements about tips at
____________________________________________
2
In his PCRA petition, Appellant raised claims of trial court error contained
in issue five without any reference to ineffectiveness of direct appeal
counsel. The PCRA court properly determined Appellant waived these claims
for failure to raise them on direct appeal. Appellant now raises the
allegations of trial court error under the rubric of ineffective assistance of
direct appeal counsel; however, Appellant’s failure to do so in his PCRA
petition results in waiver for purposes of our review. See Commonwealth
v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 612 Pa.
698, 30 A.3d 487 (2011) (explaining issues not raised in PCRA petition
cannot be considered on appeal). To the extent Appellant asserts the PCRA
court should have warned him of the pleading defect related to the
allegations of trial court error, Appellant fails to cite any relevant law to
support his claim. See Commonwealth v. Owens, 750 A.2d 872, 877
(Pa.Super. 2000) (explaining failure to cite case law or other legal authority
in support of argument results in waiver of claim). Further, Appellant chose
to proceed pro se despite appointment of counsel. Appellant cannot fault
the PCRA court for any pleading defect, because the PCRA court has no duty
to act as counsel for Appellant, who must accept the consequences of his
decision to proceed pro se.
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J-S38004-17
trial were used merely to explain Detective Leahy’s course of investigation,
not to prove truth of matter asserted; thus, Confrontation Clause challenge
would have been meritless; further, trial counsel’s failure to discover and
challenge source of tip information did not prejudice Appellant because
discovery of source would have only identified additional inculpatory
evidence against Appellant; therefore, knowledge of source of tips would not
have led to different outcome at trial; (7) Appellant did not raise in PCRA
court claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to challenge weight of
evidence; therefore, claim is waived on appeal; Appellant’s claim also fails to
explain how verdict was against weight of evidence or how trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge weight of evidence; thus, Appellant’s claim
is further waived for vagueness; (8) Appellant claims exhibits and trial
testimony contradict identification evidence at trial and prove Appellant was
not perpetrator of robbery; Appellant asserts direct appeal counsel should
have raised this challenge to weight of evidence claim on direct appeal;
initially, direct appeal counsel cannot be ineffective for failure to raise actual
innocence claim because Appellant did not challenge weight of identification
evidence in post-sentence motion; further, Appellant cannot demonstrate he
was prejudiced by direct appeal counsel’s actions; two victims identified
Appellant in photo array, and at trial, as one of individuals who had robbed
them at gunpoint; while Appellant claims victims’ failure to mention tattoos
or identify Appellant in lineup proves misidentification, jury was free to
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J-S38004-17
accept victims’ testimony and reject Appellant’s arguments; moreover, fact
that surveillance video was unable to delineate Appellant’s tattoos did not
undermine convincing identification testimony at trial; because compelling
evidence existed to support jury’s conclusion that Appellant committed
crime, court would have denied weight of evidence challenge; thus, direct
appeal counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise actual innocence claim
on this basis; (9) evidence presented at PCRA hearing established that
counsel had reasonable basis for not calling alibi witnesses at trial; at PCRA
hearing, trial counsel testified she spoke with each potential alibi witness
prior to trial; according to trial counsel, each potential alibi witness gave trial
counsel conflicting answers to Appellant’s whereabouts on date of robbery;
trial counsel said she did not think witnesses provided true alibi defense
because they could not remember with specificity when Appellant left their
presence; trial counsel explained she chose not to call witnesses at trial
because their stories were not particularly strong or helpful; trial counsel
also noted that witnesses’ stories conflicted with Appellant’s version of
events on night of robbery; trial counsel was concerned presentation of
weak alibi evidence would cause jury to question entire defense; PCRA court
believed trial counsel’s testimony, finding counsel had reasonable basis for
failure to present alibi evidence). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the
PCRA court’s opinion.
Order affirmed.
-6-
J-S38004-17
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/28/2017
-7-
Circulated 08/02/2017 09:14 AM
FILED
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AUG 1' 6 2016
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION Appeals/Post1Wal
Office of Judicial Records
COMMONWEALTH OF CP-51-CR-0009181-2010
PENNSYLVANIA
CP·51.CR-0009181-2010_Comm. v. Maxwell, Tyreek
v. Op1mon
TYREEK MAXWELL
11111117486459991
lll lllllftl II
OPINION
BRONSON, J. August 16, 2016
I. PROCEDURALBACKGROUND
On March 10, 2011, following a jury trial before this Court, defendant Tyreek Maxwell
was convicted of two counts of first-degree robbery (18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(l)(ii)), one count of
conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery (18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 3701(a)(l)(ii)), one count of
possessing an instrument of crime ("PIC") (18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a)), and one count of possession of
a firearm by a prohibited person (18 Pa.C.S § 6015(a.l)).1 On May 5, 2011, the Court imposed
an aggregate sentence of eight-and-one-half to twenty years incarceration in state prison. On
May 12, 2011, defendant filed a post-sentence motion, which the Court denied on July 26, 2011.
Defendant was represented at trial and at sentencing by Bernice Melamud, Esquire, of the
Defender Association of Philadelphia, and the Defender Association continued to represent
defendant on appeal.
I
The section 6105 charge required the Commonwealth to prove defendant's prior juvenile adjudication, which
disqualified him from owning a gun, as an.element of the offense. The Court severed that charge and submitted it to
the jury after the jury returned its verdict of guilty on the robbery, conspiracy, and PIC charges. N.T.3/9/2011 at
102; 3/10/2011 at 16-17.
On August 3, 2012, the Superior Court affirmed defendant's judgment of sentence.
Defendant then filed a pro se petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") on August
31, 2012. Gary Server, Esquire was appointed to represent defendant on June 24, 2013. On
August 4, 2014, defendant filed a'motion, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81(Pa. 1998), requesting that he be permitted to proceed prose. The Court held a Grazier hearing
on March 19, 2015, after which the Court relieved Mr. Server and permitted defendant to
proceed prose. On September 15, 2015, defendant filed an Amended PCRA Petition
("Amended Petition") raising multiple claims of trial and appellate counsel ineffectiveness and
claims regarding the legality of defendant's sentence. On December 15, 2015, defendant also
filed a document entitled Issues to be Asserted on Initial P.C.R.A./Right to Amend
("Supplemental Petition"), in which defendant raised additional claims of counsel
ineffectiveness, as well as multiple claims of trial court error. On May 4, 2016, the Court held an
evidentiary hearing on a claim defendant raised concerning counsel's failure to call alibi
witnesses. Following the evidentiary hearing, the Court entered an order dismissing all of
defendant's claims. Defendant has now appealed this Court's dismissal of his PCRA petitions,
claiming: 1) the photo array prepared in this matter was unduly suggestive; 2) defendant's right
of confrontation was violated during trial; 3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an
alibi defense at trial; 4) defendant was denied due process when he was denied a copy of trial
exhibits D2 and D3; 5) the trial court erred by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce other
acts evidence at trial; 6) the Commonwealth was impermissibly allowed to argue concerning
defendant's change in appearance at trial and the Court erred in instructing the jury regarding
defendant's changed appearance; 7) the trial court erred in permitting witnesses to make an in-
court identification of defendant; 8) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve or
2
raise an "actual innocence" claim; 9) defendant is serving an illegal sentence, as the mandatory
minimum statute he was sentenced under has been ruled unconstitutional and defendant's
sentences should have merged; and 10) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
weight of the evidence during trial.2 Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal
("Statement of Errors") at ~1 1-10.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case is set forth in this Court's 1925(a) Opinion in
defendant's direct appeal as follows:
At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Lauro Paulino, Carlos
Salguero, Philadelphia Police Officers Christopher Hyk, Kyle Morris, Brian
Waters, and James McCullough, and Philadelphia Police Detectives Francis Graf,
Shawn Leahy, and Bill Urban. Viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner, their testimony establishedthe following.
On September 2, 2009, Lauro Paulino, his employee Carlos Salguero, and two
customers were in Mr. Paulina's corner grocery store at 140 East Wyoming
Avenue in Philadelphia. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 54-55, 106-107. At approximately 10
p.m., Mr. Paulino was behind the store's counter when a tall man wearing a
striped shirt3 walked into the store, grabbed a bottle out of a refrigerator, and
smashed it over the head of a customer, Antonio Lera. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 55-57,
65, 109: After incapacitating Mr. Lera, the tall man grabbed him in a headlock
and used him "as a hostage" as he pointed a gun at Mr. Paulino. N.T. 3/8/2011 at
56. Mr. Paulino reached under the counter for his gun, but was unable to remove
it from its holster. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 57.
As Mr. Paulino attempted to pull out his gun, defendant, who had entered the
store behind his accomplice and was wearing a black hooded jacket and jeans,
approached Mr. Paulino N.T. 3/8/2011 at 57-58, 11 I. Pointing his own gun at
Mr. Paulino, defendant demanded that Mr. Paulino give up his gun, as the man in
the striped shirt threw Mr. Lara on the ground, knocking him unconscious. N.T.
3/8/2011 at 57-59, 65. At that point, defendant was standing approximately "two
or three feet" from Mr. Paulino. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 59. Mr. Paulino handed
defendant his gun, still in its holster. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 60. As defendant then put
2
Defendant filed an Amended Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal in which he claims that the
Court erred in denying his claims that the Court erred in letting in other acts evidence and in giving the jury charge
regarding his change in appearance, without giving him the right to cure pleading defects in these claims. As will be
seen below, these claims were denied since they were previously litigated, and not due to pleading defects.
3
Defendant's accomplice was not located or charged.
3
his own gun in his pocket and attempted to get Mr. Paulino's gun out of its
holster, Mr. Paulino looked straight at defendant's face for 20 seconds. N.T.
3/8/2011 at 60.
Defendant's accomplice then stole approximately fifteen hundred dollars from the
combination of Mr. Paulina's wallet and the cash register, along with Mr.
Paulina's cell phone and firearm permit. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 63-64, 96. As his
accomplice robbed Mr. Paulino, defendant robbed Mr. Salguero of his wallet,
which contained approximately fifty dollars, and a gold chain that Mr. Salguero
was wearing. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 112-113. He also robbed customer Satronino
Garcia of a wallet containing five hundred dollars, a cell phone, and a gold chain.
N.T. 3/9/2011 at 22-23, 31-32. After he robbed the victims, defendant's
accomplice told everyone not to move, and he and defendant fled the store. N.T.
3/8/2011 at 65-66. Mr. Paulino and another customer ran after defendant and his
accomplice, but did not catch them. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 66-67. Mr. Paulino then
called the police. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 68-69.
As the robbery took place, Philadelphia Police Officers Brian Waters and Frysiek"
were patrolling the 25th District, which encompasses Wyoming Avenue. N.T.
3/9/2011 at 14-16. Within one minute of Mr. Paulina's phone call to police,
Officer Waters and Officer Frysiek arrived at the scene of the crime. N.T.
3/9/2011 at 17. The officers acquired a description of the suspects from the
witnesses. N.T. 3/9/2011 at 28-29. Mr. Paulino then went to the police station to
give a statement. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 83-84. Mr. Salguero went to the police station
and gave a statement the following day. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 120-121.
At the same time, Philadelphia Police Officers ChristopherHyk, Kyle Morris, and
Sawicki" were doing a routine patrol of the 25th District. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 131.
At approximately 11 :50 p.m., the officers observed defendant bending down
between two parked vehicles. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 133, 151-152. The officers exited
their squad car, at which point defendant ran. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 133-134. All
three officers pursued defendant as he ran down North Marvin Street and through
the front door of a house. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 133-136. As he entered the house,
defendant discarded a handgun. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 152-153. Defendant Officers
Morris and Sawicki caught defendant and arrested him, while Officer Hyk
recovered the gun. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 136, 155-156. Defendantwas arrested on the
charge of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, for the gun that he
discarded during the chase.
Mr. Paulina's store had twelve functioning security cameras, which recorded the
events of the robbery. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 69, 73. The night of the robbery, the
police and Mr. Paulino viewed the video, but had trouble downloading it. N.T.
3/9/2011 at 40-41. The next day, on September 3, 2009, the security company
that had installed the cameras came and made a copy of the security camera
4
Officer Frysiek's first name was not given during testimony.
5
Officer Sawicki's first name was not given during testimony.
4
videotape for the police and a copy for Mr. Paulino. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 69-70.
Police took still images from the videotape and circulated them in both television
and print media in an attempt to identify the robbers. N.T. 3/9/2011 at 106.
Based on information the police received as a result of the circulation of the
images, police developed defendant as a suspect. N.T. 3/9/2011 at 107-108.
On December 31, 2009, detectives compiled a photo array and showed it to Mr.
Paulino. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 85-86. Mr. Paulino identified defendant as one of the
robbers. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 86. Detectives showed a photo array to Mr. Salguero,
who also identified defendant as the man who robbed him. N.T. 3/8/2011 at 121-
122.
Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/19/11 atpp. 2-4.
III. DISCUSSION
An appellate court's review of a PCRA court's grant or denial of relief "is limited to
determining whether the court's findings are supported by the record and the court's order is
otherwise free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Yager, 685 A.2d 1000, 1003 (Pa. Super. 1996)
(citing Commonwealth v. Legg, 669 A.2d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. 1995)). The reviewing court "will
not disturb findings that are supported by the record." Id. Moreover, "[w]here a PCRA court's
credibility determinations are supported by the record, they are binding on the reviewing court."
Commonwealth v. White, 734 A.2d 374, 381 (Pa. 1999) (citing Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal,
720 A.2d 79, 93-94 (Pa. 1998)).
A. Unduly Suggestive Photo Array
Defendant first alleges that the Court erred in denying defendant's claim "that the photo
array presented to the Commonwealth witnesses, Lauro Paulino and Carlos Salguero, was unduly
suggestive .... " Statement of Errors at 11. This claim was initially raised in defendant's direct
appeal and rejected by the Superior Court. See Superior Court Opinion, filed 8/3/12 at pp. 10-11.
Because this claim was previously litigated on defendant's direct appeal, it is not cognizable
5
under the PCRA. 42 P.A.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) & 9544; see Commonwealth v. Johnson, --- A.3d---,
*10 (Pa. 2016).
B. Right to Confrontation
Defendant next claims that the Court "erred in making his ruling by denying
[defendant's] P.C.R.A. claim, that [defendant's] ... right to confrontation was violated during
trial." Statement of Errors at ,r 2. Presumably, defendant is seeking to reassert his Amended
Petition claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "discover and challenge how
[defendant] was developed as a suspect in this case in order to permit him rightful confrontation
of his accuser .... " Amended Petition at ,r 9. This claim is without merit.
Under Pennsylvania law, counsel is presumed effective and the burden to prove
otherwise lies with the petitioner. Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 728 (Pa. 2000),
n.10 (citing Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 719 A.2d 242, 250 (Pa. 1998)). To obtain collateral
relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that counsel's
representation fell below accepted standards of advocacy and that as a result thereof, the
petitioner was prejudiced. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In
Pennsylvania, the Strickland standard is interpreted as requiring proof that: ( 1) the claim
underlying the ineffectiveness claim had arguable merit; (2) counsel's actions lacked any
reasonable basis; and (3) the ineffectiveness of counsel caused the petitioner prejudice.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 987 A.2d 638, 648 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d
973, 974-75 (Pa. 1987). To satisfy the third prong of the test, the petitioner must prove that, but
for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different. Commonwealth v. Sneed, 899 A.2d 1067, 1084 (Pa. 2006) (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
6
Here, defendant cannot demonstrate that the underlying claim has merit. At trial,
Philadelphia Police Detective Shawn Leahy testified that he prepared a photo array, including
defendant's photo, based on information that he had received after posting stills of the video
surveillance footage recovered in this matter, which depicted defendant's face, in the news
media. N.T. 3/9/11 at 106-108. Detective Leahy then testified that he showed this array to the
two victims of the robbery, who both identified defendant as one of the individuals who robbed
them. N.T. 3/9/11 at 109-114.
"Under both the United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution, the right
to confrontation specifically guarantees a person accused of a crime the right 'to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.?' Commonwealth v. Williams, 84 A.3d 680, 684 (Pa. 2014).
"The Confrontation Clause may be violated by the admission of harmful hearsay testimony as
substantive evidence against the defendant. However, it is elemental that an out of court
statement which is not offered for its truth, but to explain the witness' course of conduct is not
hearsay." Commonwealth v. Carson, 913 A.2d 220, 258 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
Here, the challenged statements were used by Detective Leahy as the basis for creating a
photo array. They were offered solely to explain Detective Leahy's course of conduct, and not
for the truth of the matter asserted. For that reason, any objection to Leahy's testimony based on
the Confrontation Clause would have been meritless.
Neither can defendant demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to
discover and somehow challenge the information that led Leahy to place defendant's photo in the
array. Assuming, arguendo, that counsel had managed to identify the source of information
linking defendant to the video, counsel would have only identified additional inculpatory
7
witnesses who could have testified as to defendant's identity as one of the robbers. That
evidence would not have reasonably lead to a different outcome at trial. No relief is due.
C. Failure to Present an Alibi Defense
Defendant next claims that the Court erred in denying defendant's claim that trial counsel
"was ineffective for failing to call and/or use [ defendant's] alibi witnesses or alibi defense during
trial." Statement of Errors at 1 3. This claim is without merit.
At a PCRA hearing, the defendant has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of
the evidence that he is eligible for relief under the Act. 42. Pa.C.S. § 9543(a). Here, the
evidence presented at the hearing clearly established that trial counsel had a reasonable basis for
not calling defendant's alibi witnesses at trial.
At the evidentiary hearing, defendant presented the testimony of trial counsel Bernice
Melamud, Esquire, and purported alibi witnesses Maurice Ford, and Alyssa Ford.6 Ms.
Melamud testified at the hearing that defendant informed her of three potential alibi witnesses:
Alyssa Goodwin (now Alyssa Ford), Maurice Ford, and Denelia Santiago. N.T. 5/4/16 at 8-9.
Ms. Melamud further testified that she reached out to these possible witnesses through her
investigator prior to trial, and that these witnesses each provided conflicting answers concerning
defendant's whereabouts on the day of the robbery. N.T. 5/4/16 at 10-16. Ms. Melamud also
testified that she did not believe that the recollections of the alibi witnesses truly provided an
alibi defense, as the witnesses could not remember with specificity what time defendant left their
presence. N.T. 5/4/16 at 25-26. Ms. Melamud testified that she did not call these witnesses at
trial as she did not believe that their stories were particularly strong or would be helpful, and
because the witnesses conflicted with what defendant stated he had been doing that night. N.T.
5/4/16 at 17-18, 29-30. Ms. Melamud testified that she was concerned that putting weak
6
Alyssa Ford's maiden name was Alyssa Goodwin. N.T. 5/4/16 at 46.
8
witnesses before the jury would cause the jury to question, and then disregard, the rest of the
defense. N.T. 5/4/16 at 18. Instead, Ms. Melamud pursued a misidentification defense, as
defendant's tattoos did not appear to match the individual in the surveillance footage, and
witnesses had previously failed to correctly identify defendant in a lineup. N.T. 5/4/16 at 21-24.
The Court found Ms. Melamud's testimony to be credible. N.T. 5/4/16 at 74-77. The testimony
of purported alibi witnesses Maurice and Alyssa Ford, did not, in any way, undermine the
testimony of Ms. Melamud. N.T. 5/4/16 at 74-77.
The record thus amply supports the Court's finding that Ms. Melamud had a reasonable
basis for not calling defendant's alibi witnesses at trial. Given the conflict between witnesses'
recollections, the failure of these witnesses to actually place defendant somewhere other than the
scene of the crime at the actual time of the crime, and a viable alternative defense that did not
require putting on weak alibi witnesses, the Court did not err in determining that trial counsel
had a reasonable basis for not calling defendant's proposed alibi witnesses. Miller, 987 A.2d at
648. Therefore, the Court properly found that Ms. Melamud did not deprive defendant of
effective assistance of counsel.
D. Denial of Due Process Concerning Exhibits D2 and D3
Defendant next claims that he was "denied due process due to [defendant] being denied
and/or refused a copy of exhibits (D2 and D3) which is exculpatory evidence." Statement of
Errors at ,r 4. This claim is without merit.
Exhibits D2 and D3 were forms filled out by victims Lauro Paulino and Carlos Salguero,
respectively, at a pretrial lineup proceeding, and which included descriptions of some
characteristics of the robbers. These exhibits were marked by defense counsel at trial and shown
to Detective Bill Urban, who conducted the lineup proceeding. N.T. 3/9/11 at 129, 141-144.
9
These exhibits were not, however, moved into evidence. N.T. 3/9/11 at 157. Accordingly, the
physical copies of the forms were not made part of the trial record. Defendant made a formal
request to have copies of these two exhibits provided to him, arguing only that the exhibits were
required and that defendant "will not be able to complete his amended petition as directed
without the requested exhibits." Motion for Extension of Time, filed 8/28/15 at 12.
Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(l), a PCRA petitioner in a non-capital case is entitled to
discovery in PCRA proceedings only upon leave of the Court after a showing of exceptional
circumstances. Defendant did not set forth any extraordinary circumstances that would entitle
defendant to discovery, particularly as the contents of these exhibits were revealed during
testimony at the trial. As defendant did not establish that exceptional circumstances existed, his
request for copies of these documents, which were not part of the Court file, was properly denied
and in no way deprived him of due process.
E. Admission of Other Acts Evidence
Defendant next claims that the Court "erred by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce
other acts evidence during trial." Statement of Errors at 15. This claim is waived as defendant
could have, but did not raise this matter in his direct appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b) ("an issue is
waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, [orJ on
appeal"); see Commonwealth v. Lambert, 797 A.2d 232, 240 (Pa. 2001).
F. Defendant's Change of Appearance
Defendant next claims that the Court "erred by allowing the Commonwealth to argue
and/or present a false and.or [sic] argument of change of appearance during trial and Lower
Court improperly instructed the Jury regarding change of appearance." Statement of Errors at 1
10
6. This claim is waived as defendant could have, but did not raise this matter in his direct appeal.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b); Lambert, 797 A.2d at 240.
G. In-Court Identification
Defendant next claims that the court "erred by allowing the Commonwealth witnesses
Lauro Paulino and Carlos Salguero to make an in court identification that followed an out of
court suggestive identification and after both witnesses failed to identify [defendant] out of a line
up on March 22, 2010." Statement of Errors at 17. This claim is waived as defendant could
have, but did not raise this matter in his direct appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b); Lambert, 797 A.2d
at 240.
H Failure to Present "Actual Innocence" Claim
Defendant next claims that appellate counsel was "ineffective for failing to preserve
and/or raise an 'Actual Innocence' claim on direct appeal, and/or denying [defendant's] 'Actual
Innocence' claim on P.C.R.A." Statement of Errors at 18. This claim is without merit.
Defendant bases this claim on the "patent impossibility of [ defendant] being the actor in
light of the photographic exhibits Dl photo of doer #2 (attention to both the right and left hands),
C41 Photo of [defendant's] mug shot (attention to his right hand), and C43 Photo of
[defendant's] mug shot (attention to his left hand)." Supplemental Petition at 16. Defendant
asserts that appellate counsel should have asserted that these exhibits, in conjunction with the
trial testimony, prove that defendant was not the perpetrator, contradicting the other
identification evidence presented at trial. Supplemental Petition at 116-11. Therefore, defendant
appears to be claiming that the jury's conclusion that he was one of the robbers was against the
weight of the identification evidence, and that appellate counsel should have raised this issue in
defendant's direct appeal.
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Initially, appellate counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to raise a weight of
the evidence claim on direct appeal, as defendant did not file a post-sentence motion challenging
the weight of the identification evidence and thus waived the issue. Commonwealth v. Bryant,
57 A.3d 191, 196 (Pa. Super. 2012) (challenges to weight of the evidence must be presented at
trial in an oral or written motion prior to sentencing, or in a post-sentence motion, or the claim
will be waived); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 278 (Pa. 2011) (no merit to claim that
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a waived claim).
In any event, defendant cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by appellate
counsel's actions. It is well-established that a new trial may only be granted by the trial court
where the verdict was so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to "shock one's sense of
justice." Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 863 A.2d 1185, 1191 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 878
A.2d 864 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hunter, 554 A.2d 550, 555) (Pa. Super. 1989)).
Moreover, credibility determinations are solely within the province of the fact-finder, and "an
appellate court may not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the finder of
fact." Commonwealth v. Taylor, 63 A.3d 327 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Shaffer, 40 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2012)). In considering a claim that the trial court erred
in refusing to find that a verdict was against the weight of the evidence, "appellate review is
limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim."
Taylor, 63 A.3d at 327 (quoting Shaffer, 40 A.3d at 1253).
Here, two victims identified defendant in a photo array. N.T. 3/8/11 at 85-86, 121-122;
3/9/11 at 110-114. Both victims identified defendant at trial as one of the two individuals who
robbed them at gunpoint. N.T. 3/8/11 at 58-59, 117-118. Victim Lauro Paulino testified at trial
that he did not mention defendant's tattoos at the preliminary hearing in this case as it "didn't
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come to [his] mind at that time." N.T. 3/8/11 at 102-103. Paulino clarified that he had never
been asked about defendant's tattoos prior to trial, either by police or at the preliminary hearing.
N.T. 3/8/11 at 104. While defendant argued that the failure to mention defendant's tattoos,
together with failure to identify defendant at a pretrial lineup, proved misidentification, the jury
was free to accept Paulino's testimony and reject defendant's arguments. Moreover, that the
video surveillance was unable to clearly delineate defendant's tattoos did not undermine the
compelling identification testimony.
Therefore, there was compelling evidence to support the jury's conclusion that defendant
committed the crimes of which he was convicted. As a result, the Court would have properly
denied any post-sentence motion based on the weight of the evidence. Of course, appellate
counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless weight claim, even if it
had been preserved. Miller, 987 A.2d at 648.
I. Illegal Sentence
Defendant next asserts that the Court erred in denying defendant's claim that
"[ defendant] is still serving an illegal sentence, since the Court has ruled, that a mandatory
sentence is Unconstitutional...," and that defendant's "charges should have been merged."
Statement of Errors at , 9. This claim is without merit.
Defendant claimed that his sentence was unconstitutional because the statute under which
he was sentenced has been ruled unconstitutional. Supplemental Petition at p. 6. Defendant was
sentenced to a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712 (visibly
possessing a firearm during a crime of violence), which was subsequently held unconstitutional
by Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801 (Pa. Super. 2014), as the statute violated the
United States Supreme Court holding in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013).
13
However, defendant's sentence became final thirty days after the Superior Court affirmed his
sentence on August 3, 2012, prior to the holding in Alleyne, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has recently held that Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral review.
Commonwealth v. Washington, --- A.3d ---, *8 (Pa. 2016).
Defendant's companion claim, that his sentence is illegal because his sentences for
robbery and conspiracy should have merged, is frivolous. Pennsylvania courts have long held
that the crime of conspiracy does not merge with the completed underlying offense. See
Commonwealth v. Stocker, 622 A.2d 333, 347 (Pa. Super. 1993).
J Failure to Challenge the Weight of the Evidence
Finally, defendant alleges that trial counsel "was ineffective for failing to challenge the
weight of the evidence during trial." Statement of Errors at ,r 10. While defendant implicitly
raised a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue a weight of the evidence
claim (see section IIl(H), above), defendant never argued that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise a weight claim at any time prior to this appeal. Because defendant's claim was
never raised before the trial court, it has been waived for purposes of appeal. Commonwealth v.
Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084-85 (Pa. Super. 2014). Similarly, defendant's claim is waived for
vagueness, as the Court is left without direction as to how the verdict was allegedly against the
weight of the evidence, or how trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge it.
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1248-49 (Pa. Super. 2015) (a claim challenging the
weight of the evidence will be waived where defendant fails to specify in his 1925(b) statement
which verdict or verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence, or to offer specific reasons
as to why those verdicts were against the weight of the evidence). To the extent that defendant is
14
reasserting a weight claim based on the identification evidence, the claim fails on the merits for
the reasons set forth in section III(H), above.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court's order dismissing defendant's PCRA petition
should be affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
~@~
GLENN B. BRONSON, J.
15
Commonwealth v. Tyreek Maxwell CP-51-CR-0009181-2010
Type of Order: 1925(a) Opinion
PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing Court Order upon the person(s), and
in the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P.114:
Defense Counsel/Party:
Tyreek Maxwell
JK-7424
SCI Mahanoy
301 Morea Rd.
Frackville, PA 17932
Type of Service: () Personal (X) First Class Mail () Other, please specify:
District Attorney(s):
Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Esquire
Chief, Appeals Unit
Philadelphia District Attorney's Office
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Type of Service () Personal (X) First Class Mail () Other, please specify:
Additional Counsel/Party:
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esquire
Prothonotary
Office of the Prothonotary - Superior Court
530 Walnut Street, Suite 315
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Type of Service; ( ) Personal (X) First Class Mail ( ) Other, please specify:
Dated: August 16, 2016