Com. v. George, S. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S16005-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    STEPHEN GEORGE
    Appellant                  No. 198 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 26, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003167-2014
    BEFORE: MOULTON, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:                       FILED SEPTEMBER 05, 2017
    Stephen George appeals from the May 26, 2015 judgment of sentence
    entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas following his
    convictions for possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), possession of a
    controlled substance, and simple assault by physical menace.1      We vacate
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (a)(16), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3),
    respectively.
    While the sentencing order states George was convicted of simple
    assault – bodily injury under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1), this appears to have
    been a clerical error. The trial transcript establishes that the trial court
    convicted George of simple assault by physical menace under 18 Pa.C.S. §
    2701(a)(3). At the non-jury trial, when declaring the verdict, the trial court
    stated:
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    J-S16005-17
    the judgment of sentence and remand with instructions to correct a clerical
    error in the sentencing order.
    The trial court described the facts as follows:
    This matter arises . . . out of [George]’s arrest on
    January 7, 2014 following a domestic dispute. At the time
    of the arrest he was found to be in possession of 55 stamp
    bags of heroin and additional heroin was found in the
    residence where he was residing. An Affidavit of Probable
    Cause dated January 7, 2014 was sworn to by one of the
    arresting officers from the City of Pittsburgh police, Sean
    Jozwiak, detailing the facts and circumstances related to
    the investigation of the domestic dispute, including his
    contact with the victim, Lacy Hass [(“Victim”)].        The
    affidavit also described [George]’s arrest outside their
    residence at 4805 Dearborn Street where he fled after . . .
    attacking [Victim]. The affidavit also detailed [George]’s
    arrest and the search incident to the arrest that found
    [George] in possession of 55 stamp bags of heroin and two
    cell phones. [Victim] then consented to a search of the
    residence and an additional 18 stamp bags of heroin
    similar to those found on [George] were found in a coin
    purse on a mantel in the residence. A handgun was also
    found in an armoire in the residence.
    A preliminary hearing was held on February 27, 2014 at
    which Officer Jozwiak testified that he and other officers
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    Now on simple assaults, there’s one causing bodily
    injury, Count 5. The other one is simple assault by
    physical menace.
    I don’t think 5 applies, so I find you not guilty on that.
    But on Count 6, simple assault by physical menace, I do
    think that applies given the fact that there was evidence
    that the victim was so shaken up and a little roughed up at
    the time. So on Count 6 I find you guilty.
    N.T., 3/23/15, at 3.
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    were dispatched to a domestic dispute at the K2
    convenience store located at the 900 block of Penn Avenue
    in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Upon arriving they met
    [Victim] at the convenience store and noted that she had
    scratches and red marks around her neck and behind her
    ear. In addition, Officer Jozwiak testified that he had an
    opportunity to observe a videotape of the incident in which
    he observed [George] grabbing [Victim] around the neck
    by the shirt and trying to force her out of the store. The
    officers were informed that [George] left the scene and
    was at his residence located at 4805 Dearborn Street and
    that a child was there. Several officers responded to that
    scene and located [George] outside the residence where
    he was taken into custody. Officer Jozwiak also testified
    that they transported the victim to her home and after
    [George] was taken into custody, the child was located in
    the residence and they obtained consent from [Victim] to
    search the home. The Commonwealth also presented the
    testimony of Officer Steven Schueler at the preliminary
    hearing who testified that he arrived at the address of
    4805 Dearborn Street and encountered [George] outside
    the residence. [George] was placed under arrest and as a
    result of a search incident to the arrest was found to have
    55 stamp bags of heroin in his left front jacket pocket.
    A hearing was held on [George]’s Habeas Corpus Motion
    on January 15, 2015 at which time Officer Jozwiak again
    testified, however, his testimony was limited to describing
    the recovery of a handgun, men’s clothing and some
    indicia related to [George] from an armoire in the
    Dearborn Street residence during the search after
    [George]’s arrest. On January 22, 2015[,] an order was
    entered denying the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the case
    proceeded to a stipulated non-jury trial on March 10, 2015
    at which it was agreed that the Affidavit of Probable Cause,
    as well as the testimony from the preliminary hearing,
    would be incorporated into the record.             After an
    appropriate colloquy in which [George] acknowledged that
    he understood and agreed to the proceedings, the
    Commonwealth introduced the lab report analyzing the
    drugs in question, as well as [George]’s certified record
    which establish him as a person not to possess.
    The Commonwealth also presented the stipulated
    expert testimony of Detective Edward Fallert as follows:
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    [COMMONWEALTH]:         The only other stipulation
    would be had we proceeded to trial in this case, we
    would have called an expert: namely, Detective
    Edward Fallert from the City of Pittsburgh Police who
    would have testified that based on the facts in this
    case, along with his training and experience, he
    believed that [George] possessed the heroin on his
    person with the intent to deliver said heroin.
    [COURT]:    Anything you want to add?
    [GEORGE’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, just a few
    things. . . . With respect to the heroin that Detective
    Fallert would have testified to that was actually
    found in the home on a mantel in a coin purse. With
    respect to the controlled substance that was found
    on . . . George, I believe that was a de minimis
    amount.
    [COURT]:    How much?
    [COMMONWEALTH]:         There were 55 stamp bags
    found on his person.
    Based on the above evidence, [George] was found
    guilty of possession and [PWID] and simple assault by
    physical menace.      [George] was found not guilty of
    possession of firearm prohibited, endangering the welfare
    of a child and simple assault.
    Opinion, 8/2/16, at 2-5 (“1925(a) Op.”) (internal citations and quotation
    marks omitted).
    On May 26, 2015, the trial court sentenced George to 2 to 4 years’
    incarceration and a consecutive 5 years’ probation on the PWID conviction,
    and a concurrent 2 years’ probation on the simple assault conviction. The
    trial court imposed no further penalty on the conviction for possession of a
    controlled substance by a person not to possess.
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    On July 9, 2015, George filed a pro se motion requesting appointment
    of counsel and, on July 10, 2015, he filed a pro se notice of appeal.
    Following appointment of counsel, George filed a petition pursuant to the
    Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, seeking
    reinstatement of his direct appeal rights and rights to pursue post-sentence
    motions nunc pro tunc.    On September 10, 2015, the trial court granted
    George’s PCRA petition. George timely filed his post-sentence motion, which
    the trial court denied on September 28, 2015. On January 19, 2016, George
    again filed a petition for PCRA relief seeking reinstatement of his direct
    appeal rights due to a mistake by his counsel’s office, which the trial court
    granted. On February 8, 2016, George timely filed his notice of appeal.
    George raises the following issues on appeal:
    I. Was the evidence presented insufficient as a matter of
    law to support the guilty verdict for [PWID] in that the
    Commonwealth failed to prove that [George], a known
    and admitted heroin addict, possessed the 55 stamp
    bags found on his person with an intent to deliver?
    II. Was the evidence presented insufficient as a matter of
    law to support the conviction for Simple Assault insofar
    as the only evidence presented to prove that an assault
    occurred was the testimony at the preliminary hearing
    that a police officer, who did not testify at trial,
    observed a surveillance video and scratches on the
    victim?
    George’s Br. at 5.
    We apply the following standard when reviewing a sufficiency of the
    evidence claim:
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    [W]hether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the
    light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
    sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
    applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
    and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder.           In
    addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
    established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
    defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
    the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
    of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
    combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
    its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
    evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
    record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
    received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact
    while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
    or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Best, 
    120 A.3d 329
    , 341 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Harden, 
    103 A.3d 107
    , 111 (Pa.Super. 2014)).
    George first claims there was insufficient evidence to convict him of
    PWID.   He claims that the 55 stamp bags found on his person were for
    personal use and there was no proof of intent to deliver.
    To establish that a defendant is guilty of PWID:
    [t]he Commonwealth must prove both the possession of
    the controlled substance and the intent to deliver the
    controlled substance. It is well settled that all the facts
    and circumstances surrounding possession are relevant in
    making a determination of whether contraband was
    possessed with intent to deliver.
    In Pennsylvania, the intent to deliver may be inferred from
    possession of a large quantity of controlled substance. It
    follows that possession of a small amount of a controlled
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    substance supports the conclusion that there is an absence
    of intent to deliver.
    Notably, “if, when considering only the quantity of a
    controlled substance, it is not clear whether the substance
    is being used for personal consumption or distribution, it
    then becomes necessary to analyze other factors.”
    Commonwealth v. Lee, 
    956 A.2d 1024
    , 1028 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    904 A.2d 925
    , 931-32 (Pa.Super. 2006)).
    Further, “[w]hen determining whether a defendant had the requisite intent
    to deliver, relevant factors for consideration are ‘the manner in which the
    controlled substance was packaged, the behavior of the defendant, the
    presence of drug paraphernalia, and large sums of cash.’” Commonwealth
    v.   Carpenter,     
    955 A.2d 411
    ,    414   (Pa.Super.   2008)       (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 
    934 A.2d 1233
    , 1237-38 (Pa. 2007)).
    “Expert opinion testimony is also admissible ‘concerning whether the facts
    surrounding the possession of controlled substances are consistent with an
    intent to deliver rather than with an intent to possess it for personal use.’”
    
    Id. (quoting Ratsamy,
    934 A.2d at 1237-38).
    During a search incident to his arrest, George was found with 55
    stamp bags of heroin.      N.T., 3/10/15, at 19-20.    30 stamp bags were
    marked “madmen” and the other 25 were marked “black list?” Aff. Probable
    Cause, 1/7/14, at 2. The search of George’s person also revealed two cell
    phones.    N.T., 3/10/15, at 20.      Moreover, the parties stipulated that
    Detective Fallert would have testified “that based on the facts in this case,
    along with his training and experience, he believed that [George] possessed
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    the heroin on his person with the intent to deliver.” 
    Id. at 9.
    Finally, the
    trial court found that “the expert testimony of Detective Fallert, combined
    with the quantity of the stamp bags of heroin found [in George]’s possession
    and the lack of any use paraphernalia found on [George] or in the residence,
    establishes sufficient evidence that [George] possessed the heroin with the
    intent to deliver.” 1925(a) Op. at 6. We agree.
    Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to convict George
    of PWID.       See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    782 A.2d 1040
    , 1041
    (Pa.Super. 2001) (finding sufficient evidence where appellant was in high
    drug area; police seized nine baggies containing 1.8 grams of crack cocaine,
    $86 in cash, and a beeper; and an expert testified as to appellant’s intent to
    distribute).
    George next claims there was insufficient evidence to convict him of
    simple assault – bodily injury under 18 Pa.C.S. 2701(a)(1). The transcripts,
    however, establish the trial court convicted George of simple assault by
    physical menace under 18 Pa.C.S. 2701(a)(3), see supra note 1, and not
    simple assault – bodily injury.   The sentencing order merely reflected a
    clerical error. George does not challenge his conviction for simple assault by
    physical menace.
    Even if George had challenged the simple assault by physical menace
    conviction, we would conclude the Commonwealth presented sufficient
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    evidence. A person commits simple assault under section 2701(a)(3) when
    he “attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious
    bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3).
    We have stated the following regarding the sufficiency of a simple
    assault by physical menace conviction:
    The elements which must be proven are intentionally
    placing another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury
    through the use of menacing or frightening activity. 
    Id. at 1151–1155.
        Intent can be proven by circumstantial
    evidence and may be inferred from the defendant’s
    conduct under the attendant circumstances. 
    Id. at 1154.
    Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 
    835 A.2d 720
    , 726 (Pa.Super. 2003)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Repko, 
    817 A.2d 549
    , 554 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
    The trial court stated:
    In this case the victim was observed by police officers
    at the scene and found to have scratches and red marks
    [a]round her neck and behind her ear. They also observed
    a videotape of the incident which showed [George]
    grabbing the victim around the neck by the shirt and trying
    to force her out the store. [George] was attacking the
    victim to the extent that an employee of the store left the
    store to stop [George] from attacking the victim at which
    time he fled. The victim indicated that she stayed at the
    store for a brief time and then fled in fear of [George]
    coming back to continue to beat or kill her. Even while
    standing with the officers, victim refused to stand near the
    convenience store, expressing her fear to the officers that
    [George] may return and attempt to beat her. The fact
    that the victim did not testify or that the video was not
    exhibited at trial does not negate the evidence of the
    assault that was admitted. Based on all of the evidence in
    this case it is clear that the Commonwealth met its burden
    of proving simpl[e] assault by physical menace beyond a
    reasonable doubt.
    1925(a) Op. at 7-8 (internal citations omitted). We agree.
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    Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for the trial court to
    correct the sentencing order to reflect Count Six being simple assault by
    physical menace under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3). Judgment of sentence is
    affirmed in all other respects. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/5/2017
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