Com. v. Smith, L. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S49003-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    :
    LARRY E. SMITH,                            :
    :
    Appellant                :   No. 549 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 18, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
    Criminal Division at No.: CP-07-CR-0001415-2014
    BEFORE: DUBOW, J., SOLANO, J., and FITZGERALD J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                            FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2017
    Appellant, Larry E. Smith, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence
    entered in the Blair County Court of Common Pleas, following his conviction
    after a jury trial for Persons Not to Possess Firearms.1       He challenges the
    sufficiency of the evidence. After careful review, we affirm.
    The relevant facts, as gleaned from the certified record, are as follows.
    The instant charges stemmed from the Pennsylvania State Police’s seven-
    month investigation into Appellant’s suspected drug activity with co-
    conspirator Gary Williams.         Police used a confidential informant (“CI”) to
    conduct several controlled buys of narcotics from Appellant and Williams.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6105.
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    On May 8, 2014, police conducted a final controlled buy of narcotics at
    the CI’s residence. Before the controlled buy of narcotics with the CI, police
    observed Appellant and Williams exit 1818 15th Avenue in Altoona,
    Pennsylvania, as they had on numerous prior occasions.          Police arrested
    Appellant and Williams after the controlled buy with the CI. Police recovered
    $500 of prerecorded buy money from Appellant and a key to the second-
    floor apartment at 1818 15th Avenue.
    Police obtained and executed a search warrant for Appellant’s
    apartment at 1818 15th Avenue.      Police found marijuana packaged in the
    same manner as marijuana obtained during all of the previous controlled
    buys, codeine-laced cough syrup, cocaine, heroin, unused baggies for
    packaging, a digital scale, “a fake can” for hiding items, $1990 in U.S.
    currency, and a Sig Sauer 9mm pistol.        Police recovered all of the drugs,
    distribution paraphernalia, and the firearm from common areas of the
    apartment.
    Pennsylvania   State   Trooper    Steven   Peterson   testified   that   he
    participated in executing the search warrant at Appellant’s apartment and
    found the 9mm Sig Sauer pistol in the pocket of Lucky brand blue jeans in a
    large pile of clothing bags located in a common hallway area in the
    apartment.    Police also discovered mail addressed to both Appellant and
    Williams within the apartment.
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    The Commonwealth charged Appellant with numerous drug-related
    offenses, as well as Persons Not to Possess Firearms. Appellant litigated a
    Motion to Suppress the evidence recovered during the May 8, 2014 search of
    the apartment, which the suppression court denied. On July 29, 2015, the
    trial court granted Appellant’s Motion to Sever the instant firearm charge
    from the drug-related offenses.2
    Appellant proceeded to a jury trial.      Appellant filed a Motion for
    Judgment of Acquittal after the Commonwealth rested its case-in-chief, and
    renewed the Motion after the close of evidence, which the trial court denied.
    On December 18, 2015, a jury convicted Appellant of Persons Not to Possess
    Firearms following a two-day jury trial. The trial court imposed a term of
    four to ten years’ imprisonment for Appellant’s firearm conviction.
    Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on April 15, 2016.          Both
    Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
    Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by denying Appellant’s Motion
    for Judgment of Acquittal because the testimony and evidence
    presented during the two (2) day criminal trial was insufficient to
    establish each material element of the crime charged and the
    commission thereof by [Appellant] beyond a reasonable doubt.
    ____________________________________________
    2
    A jury convicted Appellant of the drug-related offenses, and the trial court
    imposed a term of 9½ to 19 years’ imprisonment. This Court affirmed
    Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence on December 9, 2016. Commonwealth
    v. Smith, No. 1802 WDA 2015 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 9, 2016) (unpublished
    memorandum).
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    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    “A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence to sustain a conviction on a particular charge, and is granted only
    in cases in which the Commonwealth has failed to carry its burden regarding
    that charge.” Commonwealth v. Abed, 
    989 A.2d 23
    , 26 (Pa. Super. 2010)
    (citations omitted).      Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
    supporting his firearm conviction.
    We review claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence by
    considering whether, “viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
    most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable
    the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt.”   Commonwealth v. Melvin, 
    103 A.3d 1
    , 39 (Pa. Super. 2014)
    (citation and quotation omitted).      Further, a conviction may be sustained
    wholly on circumstantial evidence, and the trier of fact—while passing on the
    credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence—is free to believe
    all, part, or none of the evidence.          
    Id. at 40
     (citation and quotation
    omitted). In conducting this review, the appellate court may not weigh the
    evidence and substitute its judgment for the fact-finder.        
    Id. at 39-40
    (citation and quotation omitted).
    The trial court found Appellant guilty of the firearms offense codified at
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).       Section 6105, Persons Not to Possess Firearms
    provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person who has been convicted of an
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    offense enumerated in subsection (b) . . . shall not possess, use, control,
    sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control,
    sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa.C.S. §
    6105(a)(1).
    Appellant     specifically   challenges       the     evidence     supporting     the
    possession     element      of   this    offense.      Appellant        argues    that   the
    Commonwealth failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to
    establish that Appellant constructively possessed the firearm.3                  Appellant’s
    Brief at 14-19. Thus, we limit our analysis to this element only.4
    This Court has held that “[p]ossession can be found by proving actual
    possession, constructive possession, or joint constructive possession.”
    Commonwealth v. Heidler, 
    741 A.2d 213
    , 215 (Pa. Super. 1999). Where
    a defendant is not in actual possession of the recovered firearm, the
    Commonwealth        must     establish    that   the       defendant    had   constructive
    possession to support the conviction.               Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 
    67 A.3d 817
    , 820 (Pa. Super. 2013). “Constructive possession is a legal fiction,
    a pragmatic construct to deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement.”
    ____________________________________________
    3
    We note that the Commonwealth did not argue that Appellant actually
    possessed the firearm.     N.T. Trial, 12/18/15, at 17.        Rather, the
    Commonwealth relied on a theory of joint constructive possession. 
    Id.
    4
    Appellant concedes that “[t]here was ample testimony proffered by the
    Commonwealth to show that [Appellant] is in the class of individuals who is
    not to own a firearm.” Appellant’s Brief at 14 (citing N.T. Trial, 12/17/15, at
    37-39).
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    Id.
     (citation and quotation omitted).                “We have defined constructive
    possession as conscious dominion.”             
    Id.
     (citation and quotation omitted).
    “We subsequently defined conscious dominion as the power to control the
    contraband and the intent to exercise that control.”                    
    Id.
     (citation and
    quotation omitted).        “To aid application, we have held that constructive
    possession may be established by the totality of the circumstances.”                      
    Id.
    (citation and quotation omitted).
    It is well established that, “[a]s with any other element of a crime,
    constructive     possession     may     be    proven    by      circumstantial   evidence.”
    Commonwealth v. Haskins, 
    677 A.2d 328
    , 330 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation
    omitted)..      In other words, the Commonwealth must establish facts from
    which the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the defendant exercised
    dominion and control over the weapon.                  See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
    Davis, 
    743 A.2d 946
    , 953-54 (Pa. Super. 1999) (holding evidence was
    sufficient to prove constructive possession over drugs found in common
    areas of apartment where defendant entered apartment using his own key,
    possessed $800 in cash on his person, and police recovered defendant’s
    identification    badge,    size-appropriate        clothing,     and   firearms   from    a
    bedroom).
    It   is    insufficient   to    infer    “dominion     and     control”    when     the
    Commonwealth only provides evidence of the defendant’s presence.                        See
    Commonwealth v. Valette, 
    613 A.2d 548
    , 551 (Pa. 1992) (holding mere
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    presence at a place where contraband is found or secreted is insufficient
    standing alone to prove constructive possession).        Moreover, if the only
    inference that the fact finder can make from the facts is a suspicion of
    possession, the Commonwealth has failed to prove constructive possession.
    
    Id.
     “It is well settled that facts giving rise to mere ‘association,’ ‘suspicion’
    or ‘conjecture,’ will not make out a case of constructive possession.” 
    Id.
    Here, the trial court summarily concluded that the evidence was
    sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for Persons Not to Possess
    Firearms.   Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/27/16, at 4-5.     After reviewing the
    record and case law, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion.
    The extensive testimony about the lengthy investigation showed
    Appellant and Williams were engaged in an ongoing drug distribution scheme
    based out of their shared apartment at 1818 15th Avenue.                     The
    Commonwealth established that Appellant frequently entered and exited this
    apartment, that Appellant had his own key to the apartment, and that
    Appellant had mail addressed to him at 1818 15th Avenue inside the
    apartment. Appellant also had a cashable check inside the apartment.
    From this evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that
    Appellant exercised dominion and control over the apartment itself, as well
    as the numerous items in the common areas of the apartment.            Since the
    police found the firearm in the jeans lying in a pile of clothing bags in the
    hallway of the apartment, the jury could reasonably infer that Appellant
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    exercised dominion and control over the gun as well. See Davis, 
    supra at 953-54
    .        Accordingly, we conclude that the Commonwealth presented
    sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that Appellant constructively
    possessed the firearm.
    Appellant argues that the jury erroneously concluded that he exercised
    dominion and control over the gun because the police recovered the gun in a
    shared hallway closer to his co-conspirator’s room and the defense witness
    testified that he brought the firearm into the apartment without Appellant’s
    knowledge. This argument ignores our standard of review. We must view
    all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
    verdict winner and we may not reweigh the evidence and substitute our
    judgment for that of the fact-finder. See Melvin, supra at 39-40.
    Viewing the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth as the verdict winner, it is clear that the Commonwealth
    proved each element of Section 6105.       Appellant’s sufficiency challenge,
    thus, fails.
    Judgment of Sentence affirmed.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/12/2017
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