Com. v. Bridgeford, V ( 2022 )

J-A07032-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
VANN BRIDGEFORD :
:
Appellant : No. 670 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 3, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002150-2020
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED MAY 13, 2022
Appellant, Vann Bridgeford, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, following his
bench trial conviction for driving under the influence (“DUI”).1 We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this
case as follows:
On December 22, 2019, at approximately 1:40 am, Lavar
Stevens (“Mr. Stevens”), a security guard at The Wyncote
Towers for Cardinal Point, located at 8470 Limekiln Pike, in
Cheltenham Township, Montgomery County, received a call
that an individual, later identified as [Appellant], had run his
vehicle into the metal garage door of Building Two.
Responding immediately, Mr. Stevens arrived at the lobby
level garage entryway of Building Two to find [Appellant],
seated behind the wheel of his still-running Porsche
Panamera which had been driven into the Building’s garage
door. After asking [Appellant] if he was alright, Mr. Stevens
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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
J-A07032-22
asked [Appellant], the sole occupant of the vehicle, to shut
the vehicle’s engine off. Returning to his security rover to
contact police and write up a report of the incident, Mr.
Stevens heard [Appellant] restart his vehicle, and turned to
observe [Appellant] reverse, and then drive his vehicle
again into the garage door. Alarmed by [Appellant]’s
behavior, Mr. Stevens immediately called 911 and the police
arrived minutes later.
Upon arrival, Officers Nicholas O’Connor (“Ofc. O’Connor”)
and Dave Choi (“Ofc. Choi”) of the Cheltenham Township
Police Department spoke briefly with Mr. Stevens before
approaching [Appellant], still seated behind the wheel of his
vehicle, impacting the garage door as a result of which was
crushed at the bottom. Upon reaching [Appellant]’s open
driver side window, Ofc. O’Connor observed that, in addition
to exhibiting telltale signs of alcohol intoxication, including
bloodshot eyes, heavily slurred speech, a disheveled
appearance, and an odor [of] alcohol, [Appellant]’s pants
were also inexplicably wet and he appeared baffled and
perplexed by the circumstances in which he found himself.
During the interaction, [Appellant], whose speech was
slurred, appeared to be on his cell speaking with someone,
continued his call while Ofc. O’Connor attempted to learn
[Appellant]’s identity and what had happened. He also
repeatedly asked [Appellant] for his license and registration
to no avail, and instead, [Appellant] responded incorrectly
that his name was “Shawn,” and was unable to explain how
his vehicle had crashed into the lowered garage door.
Following the initial interaction, [Appellant] departed the
vehicle where he almost stumbled into Ofc. O’Connor.
[Appellant], unsteady on his feet, was assisted to the police
cruiser which furthered Ofc. O’Connor’s belief of
[Appellant]’s intoxication. Ultimately, [Appellant] admitted
both that he had been drinking a few hours earlier at the
residence of his mother, located at 4945 Fairhill Street,
Philadelphia, and left her home after midnight, to drive back
to the Towers where he lives with his girlfriend. Ofc.
O’Connor did not conduct any field sobriety test at the time
because [Appellant] clearly displayed signs of intoxication
and the potential danger of [Appellant] harming himself
when performing the test. Given [Appellant]’s unsteady
gate, disheveled appearance, slurred speech, bloodshot
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eyes, and odor of alcohol, Ofc. O’Connor determined, based
on his experience and training that [Appellant] was
incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle and proceeded
to place [Appellant] under arrest for driving under the
influence. Once in the police cruiser, Ofc. O’Connor read
[Appellant] the PennDOT DL-26 form twice.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed June 25, 2021, at 1-3). On March 3, 2021, following
a bench trial, the court convicted Appellant of DUI and sentenced him to 48
hours of house arrest. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on March 26,
2021. On April 14, 2021, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Appellant
timely complied on May 27, 2021.
Appellant now raises one issue for our review:
Whether the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction for 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1),
Driving Under the Influence (DUI), where the
Commonwealth did not introduce evidence to establish that
Appellant drove on a “Highway” or “Trafficway” while
intoxicated or impaired, as required under 75 Pa.C.S. §
3101, and as those terms are defined by 75 Pa.C.S. § 102.
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
Appellant argues that the area in which he was found operating his car
while intoxicated is not open to the public for vehicle traffic and can only be
accessed via key card or permission from security. Therefore, Appellant avers
that the area is not a “highway” or “trafficway” as defined by Section 102 of
the Motor Vehicle Code, but more akin to a private road or driveway. Appellant
maintains that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he drove his
vehicle outside of this private area while intoxicated. Appellant stresses that
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the Commonwealth presented no evidence that he was intoxicated such that
he was rendered incapable of safely driving a vehicle when he was driving on
a public road. Appellant concludes the Commonwealth presented insufficient
evidence to establish that he drove while intoxicated on a highway or
trafficway which is a material element of DUI, and this Court must vacate his
judgment of sentence. We disagree.
Our standard and scope of review in this case are as follows:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition,
we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may
be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
[finder] of fact while passing upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free
to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
The Motor Vehicle Code defines the offense of DUI—general impairment
as follows:
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§ 3802. Driving under influence of alcohol or
controlled substance
(a) General impairment.—
(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in
actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle
after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that
the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving,
operating or being in actual physical control of the
movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
Section 3101 of the Motor Vehicle Code provides that: “The provisions
of…Chapter 38 (relating to driving after imbibing alcohol or utilizing drugs)
shall apply upon highways and trafficways throughout this Commonwealth.”
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101. Thus, an essential element of DUI is that a vehicle has
been operated on a highway or trafficway while the operator of the vehicle is
under the influence of alcohol. See Commonwealth v. Zabierowsky, 730
A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super. 1999). The Motor Vehicle Code defines “highway”
and “trafficway” as follows:
§ 102. Definitions
Subject to additional definitions contained in subsequent
provisions of this title which are applicable to specific
provisions of this title, the following words and phrases
when used in this title shall have, unless the context clearly
indicates otherwise, the meanings given to them in this
section:
* * *
“Highway.” The entire width between the boundary lines
of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is
open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.
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The term includes a roadway open to the use of the public
for vehicular travel on grounds of a college or university or
public or private school or public or historical park.
* * *
“Trafficway.” The entire width between property lines or
other boundary lines of every way or place of which any part
is open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel as a
matter of right or custom.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.
“Pennsylvania law recognizes that roadways in private areas, or areas
restricted to permit-holders, can still meet the ‘public use’ requirement for
purposes of Sections 3101, 102 and the DUI statute.” Commonwealth v.
Lees, 135 A.3d 185, 189 (Pa.Super. 2016). “Even if restricted by signs, if a
parking lot is used by members of the public, it is a trafficway for purposes of
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 553 A.2d 452, 454
(Pa.Super. 1989), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 603, 562 A.2d 826 (1989) (affirming
DUI conviction where intoxicated driver operated vehicle within private Elks
Club parking lot).
Further, “Subsection (a)(1) [of the DUI statute] is a general provision
and provides no specific restraint upon the Commonwealth in the manner in
which it may prove that an accused operated a vehicle under the influence of
alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe driving.”
Commonwealth v. Loeper, 541 Pa. 393, 402-03, 663 A.2d 669, 673-74
(1995). Further:
The types of evidence that the Commonwealth may proffer
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in a subsection 3802(a)(1) prosecution include but are not
limited to, the following: the offender’s actions and
behavior, including manner of driving and ability to pass
field sobriety tests; demeanor, including toward the
investigating officer; physical appearance, particularly
bloodshot eyes and other physical signs of intoxication; odor
of alcohol, and slurred speech. Blood alcohol level may be
added to this list, although it is not necessary....
* * *
Regardless of the type of evidence that the Commonwealth
proffers to support its case, the focus of subsection
3802(a)(1) remains on the inability of the individual to drive
safely due to consumption of alcohol—not on a particular
blood alcohol level.
Commonwealth v. Segida, 604 Pa. 103, 115-16, 985 A.2d 871, 879 (2009).
Instantly, the trial court concluded that the parking area where
Appellant drove his car while intoxicated was a “trafficway”.2 The
Commonwealth presented evidence that the area where Appellant was
operating his vehicle was a common space between three large apartment
buildings. Each apartment building has approximately thirteen floors and the
residents of all three buildings regularly use the road where Appellant was
driving. Further, although access to the area was restricted to those who have
an authorized keycard, guests of residents and delivery workers were also
permitted to enter and use the road. Based on the forgoing evidence, we
discern no error in the trial court’s determination that the Commonwealth
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2 Appellant does not dispute that he was intoxicated such that he was
incapable of operating a vehicle safely while in the parking area of his
apartment complex.
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presented sufficient evidence to meet the public use requirement of Section
102.3 See Commonwealth v. Cameron, 668 A.2d 1163 (Pa.Super. 1995)
(holding parking lot adjacent to large apartment building where access was
restricted to tenants satisfied “public use” requirement of Section 102 where
sufficient number of users, such as guests of tenants and occasional third
persons, would use lot; tenants, employees, and others who have advantage
of restricted parking facility still deserve and expect to be protected from
incidents involving serious traffic offenses).
Further, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence to conclude that Appellant drove on public roads outside of his
apartment complex while intoxicated. Appellant admitted that he drank wine
at his mother’s house which was approximately 20 minutes from his
apartment. There was no evidence that Appellant consumed alcohol anywhere
other than his mother’s house. Appellant further stated that he left his
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3 Appellant asserts that this case is controlled by Commonwealth v.
McFadden, 547 A.2d 774 (Pa.Super. 1988) (holding Commonwealth failed to
present sufficient evidence to establish that dead-end road used by residents
of trailer park was “trafficway” as defined by Section 102). We note that
McFadden predates Cameron and is a non-binding plurality decision.
Appellant also relies on Commonwealth v. Wyland, 987 A.2d 802(Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa. 623, 8 A.3d 346 (2010) for the
proposition that roads with access restricted by security and keycards are not
“trafficways.” However, Wyland involved a road within a heavily guarded
military installation. The facts of this case are much more analogous to
Cameron which involved the parking lot of a large apartment complex with
limited access to non-tenants. As such, neither McFadden nor Wyland are
controlling in the instant matter.
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mother’s house after midnight and drove to his apartment. Shortly after 1:00
a.m., Appellant crashed his vehicle into the parking garage door at his
apartment complex. The security guard who responded to the incident found
Appellant alone in his vehicle with the engine still running. The security guard
observed Appellant crash into the garage door again and believed that
Appellant was intoxicated. The responding police officer observed that
Appellant had bloodshot eyes, heavily slurred speech, smelled of alcohol, was
unresponsive to questioning, and unsteady on his feet. The officer further
determined that Appellant so clearly displayed signs of intoxication that it was
unnecessary to perform field sobriety tests out of concern that Appellant would
hurt himself. See Segida, supra.Based on this evidence, the trial court concluded that Appellant drove
while intoxicated from his mother’s house to his apartment. Viewed in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the
Commonwealth presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain
Appellant’s conviction for DUI. See Jones, supra. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/13/2022
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