Com. v. Jones, B. ( 2018 )

J-S09013-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
BARTON PATRICK JONES, :
: No. 1670 MDA 2017
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 4, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-28-CR-0000376-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MARCH 27, 2018
Appellant, Barton Patrick Jones, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his jury conviction of one count each of third-degree
murder, abuse of a corpse, false report to law enforcement authorities,
tampering with physical evidence, and two counts of criminal conspiracy.1
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his third-
degree murder conviction. We affirm.
This case arises from the shooting death of Lucas Coons.2 We take the
following facts and procedural history from our independent review of the
certified record. On the night of November 24, 2014, Coons told his friend,
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 5510, 4906(a), 4910(1), and 903, respectively.
2 The victim’s surname has alternate spellings in the record; we have taken
the predominate spelling.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Tyler Larson, that he was going to purchase oxycodone pills using counterfeit
money, and that he had done this once before. Larson unsuccessfully
attempted to dissuade Coons from moving forward with this plan.
Coons went to Appellant’s home to purchase the pills, and met with him
in the basement. Appellant confirmed that he had the drugs, and Coons
handed him the counterfeit cash. The men argued about the counterfeit
money, and Appellant pulled a loaded gun from his front pocket. Appellant
shot Coons, causing him to sustain a contact wound to the center of his chest.
Appellant then asked his adult son, Patrick Holden, who lived with him and
was home at the time, to help him move Coons’ body and clean up the blood.
They loaded Coons’ body into Coons’ car, and Appellant drove away.
Appellant parked in a restaurant parking lot, and, using a disposable
telephone, made a false report to 911 of men fighting. He abandoned the
vehicle and walked to his girlfriend’s home. He then returned to his house
and disposed of Coons’ shoes in a dumpster, tore up the counterfeit money
and let it blow out of his car window, and drove up the interstate and threw
his gun in a river. The following morning, Appellant told Holden to “say
[Appellant] was upstairs in the kitchen cooking that night[,]” if anyone asked,
and indicated that Coons had “mess[ed] with [his] livelihood.” (N.T. Trial,
8/29/17, at 60; see id. at 61-62). Appellant turned himself into authorities
on December 4, 2014, after he learned that a warrant had been issued for his
arrest.
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On August 31, 2017, at the conclusion of a three-day trial, the jury
found Appellant guilty of the above-listed offenses.3 On October 4, 2017, the
trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of not less than 342 nor
more than 720 months’ incarceration. This timely appeal followed.4
Appellant raises one question for our review: “Was the evidence
produced at trial sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for third degree
murder?” (Appellant’s Brief, at 7). Appellant challenges the element of
malice, arguing that the testimony showed only that the shooting was an
unintended accident. (See id. at 10-12). He maintains that, although he
brandished a handgun during the incident with Coons, he did not have any
desire to fire it, where members of his family were in and around his home.
(See id. at 11). This issue does not merit relief.
Our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
is well settled. Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the
verdict is a question of law; our standard of review is de novo and
our scope of review is plenary.
Our standard of review in a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge is to determine if the
Commonwealth established beyond a reasonable
doubt each of the elements of the offense, considering
all the evidence admitted at trial, and drawing all
reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the
Commonwealth as the verdict-winner. The trier of
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3Prior to sentencing, Appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of person
not to possess a firearm, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
4 Appellant filed a timely, court-ordered concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal on November 8, 2017. The trial court issued an
opinion on November 28, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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fact bears the responsibility of assessing the
credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence
presented. In doing so, the trier of fact is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
wholly circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 172 A.3d 1139, 1142 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Third-degree murder is defined [as] all other
kinds of murder other than first degree murder or
second degree murder. The elements of third-degree
murder, as developed by case law, are a killing done
with legal malice.
Malice exists where there is a particular ill-will,
and also where there is a wickedness of disposition,
hardness of heart, wanton conduct, cruelty,
recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless
of social duty.
Malice is established where an actor consciously
disregard[s] an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions
might cause death or serious bodily harm. Malice may be inferred
by considering the totality of the circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Golphin, 161 A.3d 1009, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal
denied, 170 A.3d 1051 (Pa. 2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
“Malice may [also] be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon on a
vital part of the victim’s body.” Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592,
598 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc), appeal denied, 57 A.3d 70 (Pa. 2012)
(citation omitted).
Here, the record reflects that Appellant armed himself with a loaded gun
before he met with Coons to sell him pills. (See N.T. Trial, 8/31/17, at 36,
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40, 64). When the transaction soured, Appellant shot Coons, with the gun
physically touching Coons’ chest, injuring his heart, aorta, and lungs, killing
him immediately. (See id. at 13-14, 16-18). After the shooting, Appellant
abandoned Coons’ body in a parking lot and made a false report to authorities.
(See id. at 44-45). Appellant then took several deliberate steps to rid himself
of evidence related to the shooting, by disposing of Coons’ shoes, destroying
the counterfeit money, throwing the gun in a river, and directing Holden to
clean up the blood. (See id. at 46-47, 49-50; N.T. Trial, 8/29/17, at 58).
Appellant also manufactured an alibi (cooking) and indicated to Holden that
Coons was interfering with his livelihood. (See N.T. Trial, 8/29/17, at 60-62).
After considering the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences
therefrom in favor of the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, we conclude that
the evidence was sufficient to prove that Appellant acted with the requisite
malice to sustain his conviction for third-degree murder. See Jones, supra
at 1142; Golphin, supra at 1018. Although Appellant testified that he
discharged the gun accidentally, (see N.T. Trial, 8/31/17, at 40-41, 64), the
jury was free to assess his credibility, and to disbelieve his testimony. See
Jones, supra at 1142. The totality of the circumstances clearly demonstrate
that Appellant consciously disregarded an unjustified and extremely high risk
that his actions might cause death or serious bodily harm when he used a
deadly weapon—his gun—on a vital part of the Coons’ body—the center of his
chest. See Golphin, supra at 1018; Truong, supra at 598. Therefore,
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Appellant’s sole issue on appeal lacks merit. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/27/2018
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