Com. v. Yount, C. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S27042-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    CLIFFORD E. YOUNT
    Appellant                     No. 1810 WDA 2013
    Appeal from the Order entered October 1, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County
    Criminal Division at Nos: CP-16-CR-0000377-2008; CP-16-CR-0000378-
    2008; CP-16-CR-0000379-2008; CP-16-CR-0000382-2008
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and STABILE, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                              FILED AUGUST 07, 2014
    Appellant Clifford E. Yount appeals pro se
    the Clerk of Court[s], to follow the sentencing order as imposed by the [trial
    1
    Upon review, we vacate the order.
    The factual and procedural history of the case is not at issue here.2
    The only issue raised concerns the cost provisions of the sentencing order.
    The order, in relevant part, provides:
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Elsewhere in the brief, Appellant seems to appeal from the judgment of
    sentence, not the order at issue here. Id
    argument, however, confirms he is challenging the October 1, 2013 order
    denying his motion to compel.
    2
    Briefly, Appellant was charged with several crimes in connection with four
    separate instances of delivery or possession with intent to deliver controlled
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    J-S27042-14
    [S]pecial conditions:
    A.        ....
    B.        The defendant shall pay $100 to the clerk of courts
    pursuant to Act 198.
    C.        The defendant shall submit a DNA sample and pay
    the costs.
    Sentencing Order, 3/11/09, at 2.
    Following imposition of criminal sentence, the county prothonotary
    notified Appellant that a civil judgment was entered against him in the Court
    of Common Pleas of Clarion County Prothonotary in connection with each
    criminal conviction. For each civil judgment, both the trial court docket and
    a hand-filled form provide an item-by-item explanation of how the total
    amount was determined. For example, at docket number CR-377-2008, the
    $973.70 judgment includes restitution in the amount of $255.00, and costs
    in the amount of $718.70; regarding docket number CR-378-2008, the
    $766.00 judgment includes $345.00 in restitution and $421.00 in costs/fees;
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    substances. The Commonwealth moved to consolidate the cases based on
    motion for joinder. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted on all
    charges pertaining to delivery or possession with intent to deliver controlled
    subst
    followed by one year probation. Appellant is currently serving his sentence
    see Commonwealth v. Yount, No. 986 WDA 2012, unpublished
    memorandum (Pa. Super. filed June 5, 2013) (direct appeal), and
    Commonwealth v. Yount, No. 1479 WDA 2009, unpublished memorandum
    (Pa. Super. filed June 1, 2010) (PCRA).
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    J-S27042-14
    regarding docket number CR-379-2008, the $526.00 judgment includes
    $421.00 in costs, and $105.00 in restitution; and regarding docket number
    CR-382-2008, the $746.00 judgment includes $421.00 in costs/fees, and
    $325.00 in restitution.3
    The issue raised here is whether the civil judgments could include
    costs not provided for in the criminal sentencing order.4 Appellant argues it
    could not. In support, among others, Appellant relies on Commonwealth
    v. LeBar, 
    860 A.2d 1105
    (Pa. Super. 2004), for the proposition that
    [a]lthough [the] statute on imposition of court costs against
    criminal defendant provided for imposition of mandatory $60
    assessment, and [sic] inmate could not be held responsible for
    additional costs in absence of sentence or valid court order
    imposing other costs, fees, or restitution.
    Motion to Compel, 9/9/13, at 2.
    ____________________________________________
    3
    It appears all criminal dockets incorrectly show $105.00
    User Fee                                                  Cf. Sentencing
    Order at 2.
    As noted above, restitution is not at issue here, only costs. The same costs
    l
    dockets. However, dockets number CR-377-2008 and CR-382-2008 include
    -378-2008 and
    CR-379-2008. According to the Case Financial Information sheet of docket
    number CR-377-2008, payments were ma
    occurred December 26, 2013.
    4
    As noted above, the only costs mentioned in the sentencing order are Act
    198 costs and costs associated with DNA testing.
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    The trial court, in its 1925(a) opinion, stated the claim was without
    § 1403[5 and] 18 P.S. § 11.1101[6
    ____________________________________________
    5
    Section 1403 (relating to expenses incurred by the district attorney) reads
    as follows:
    All necessary expenses incurred by the district attorney or his
    assistants or any office directed by him in the investigation of
    crime and the apprehension and prosecution of persons charged
    with or suspected of the commission of crime, upon approval
    thereof by the district attorney and the court, shall be paid by
    the county from the general funds of the county. In any case
    where a defendant is convicted and sentenced to pay the costs
    of prosecution and trial, the expenses of the district attorney in
    connection with such prosecution shall be considered a part of
    the costs of the case and be paid by the defendant.
    16 P.S. § 1403.
    6
    The statute reads as follows:
    (a) Imposition.
    (1) A person who pleads guilty or nolo contendere or who is
    convicted of a crime shall, in addition to costs imposed under 42
    Pa.C.S. § 3571(c) (relating to Commonwealth portion of fines,
    etc.), pay costs of at least $60 and may be sentenced to pay
    additional costs in an amount up to the statutory maximum
    monetary penalty for the offense committed.
    ....
    (c) Payment. This cost shall be imposed notwithstanding any
    statutory provision to the contrary.
    (d) Mandamus.
    Services, the commission or any victim shall have standing to
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    The trial court quoted both statutes, but did not elaborate in any fashion
    how the costs sought by the Prothonotary fell within the purview of the two
    provisions.
    On appeal, the Commonwealth, similarly, argues the costs were
    properly assessed, relying on Section 11.1101, and Section 9721(c.1) for
    the proposition that
    In the event the court fails to issue an order for costs pursuant
    to section 9728, costs shall be imposed upon the defendant
    under this section [42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721]. No court order shall
    be necessary for the defendant to incur liability for costs under
    this section. The provisions of this subsection do not alter the
    . 706(C) (relating to
    fines or costs).
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(c.1).7
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    seek a mandamus order requiring the county to collect the
    costs imposed by this section.
    (e) Court order. No court order shall be necessary in order
    for the defendant to incur liability for costs under this section.
    Costs under this section must be paid in order for the
    defendant to be eligible for probation, parole or accelerated
    rehabilitative disposition.
    18 P.S. § 11.1101.
    7
    amendment and addition of 42 Pa.C.S. [§] . . .9721(c.1) . . . shall apply to
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9721, Historical and Statutory Notes.       The costs at issue here
    were imposed in 2009.
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    Before we address the merits of this matter, we determine whether
    the trial court had jurisdiction over the motion.8 We conclude it did not.
    Courts of common pleas generally enjoy original jurisdiction, except
    where jurisdiction has been placed in another court. This exception governs
    this case.     The General Assembly has vested original jurisdiction over civil
    actions against the Commonwealth government in the Commonwealth Court.
    See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 761(a). Here, it is undisputed Appellant is not challenging
    his sentence; rather, he is challenging the actions taken by the Clerk of
    Courts,9 a Commonwealth officer.10 As such, Appellant should have brought
    this motion as a petition for review of a governmental determination within
    ____________________________________________
    8
    ject matter jurisdiction sua
    sponte, since if the court below lacked subject matter jurisdiction, its order
    Commonwealth v. Danysh, 
    833 A.2d 151
    , 152 (Pa. Super. 2003)
    (citing Commonwealth v. Little, 
    314 A.2d 270
    , 272 (Pa. 1974)).
    lthough the court of common pleas lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction, we have appellate jurisdiction since this an appeal from a final
    
    Id. at 152
    n.1.
    9
    See
    10
    In Brown v. Levy, 
    73 A.3d 514
    (Pa. 2013), the Supreme Court noted:
    
    Id., , including
              the courts and other officers or agencies of the unified judicial
    
    Id. at 519.
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    See Commonwealth v.
    Jackson, 
    858 A.2d 627
    , 629-30 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (costs
    deductions action by inmate in a state correctional institution is a civil action
    against an agency of the Commonwealth, the Department of Corrections,
    over which the Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction); Danysh, 833
    at 154 (same).       See also Spotz v. Commonwealth, 
    972 A.2d 125
    (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2009),11 Commonwealth v. Parella, 
    834 A.2d 1253
    , 1255-56 (Pa.
    who was serving sentence in a state correctional institution, to stop costs
    deductions because the Commonwealth Court had original jurisdiction;
    ____________________________________________
    11
    In Spotz, the Commonwealth Court noted:
    properly brought in the [t]rial [c]ourt as the sentencing court of
    of Governmental Action] clearly does not attack the . . .
    sentencing order underlying this matter; the nature of his
    challenge, in fact, relies upon the express wording of that
    sentencing order[, which did not include any express language
    assessing any fines, costs, or reimbursement imposed onto
    inmate].      Spotz is, in the instant matter, clearly and
    unequivocally challenging only the governmental action of
    [Clerk of Courts] and the [Department of] Correction
    Respondents in the wake of the sentencing order, which matter
    the [t]rial [c]ourt has no jurisdiction over under the instant facts.
    
    Id. at 134
    (emphasis added).                   Interestingly, the highlighted quoted
    at 8. Appellant, in addition to not mentioning the source, does not mention
    Spotz brought his action in the Commonwealth Court, not the trial court.
    -7-
    J-S27042-14
    re the method by which an inmate seeks to end . . .
    deductions involves the validity or modification of the underlying sentence,
    place of confinement. 
    Parella, 834 A.2d at 1256
    ). Because the common
    pleas court did not have jurisdiction, we vacate its order, without prejudice
    to Appellant to file a new action in the Commonwealth Court. See 
    Jackson, 858 A.2d at 630
    (citing 
    Danysh, 833 A.2d at 154
    n.4; 
    Parella, 834 A.2d at 1255
    n.5).
    Order vacated. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/7/2014
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