Com. v. Jones, B. ( 2016 )

J. A18025/16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 198 MDA 2016
:
BARTON PATRICK JONES :
Appeal from the Order Entered January 15, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Criminal Division at No. CP-28-CR-0000376-2015
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., AND STEVENS,* P.J.E.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 29, 2016
The Commonwealth appeals from the January 15, 2016 order granting
appellee’s pre-trial motion to sever Counts 2 and 3 of the criminal
information. The Commonwealth certified, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d),
that this order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution and
contends it is entitled to an interlocutory appeal as of right. The
Commonwealth further argues that the severance order constituted a
collateral order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. (Commonwealth’s brief at 4-6.)
For the foregoing reasons, we disagree and quash the appeal.
In its opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court
concluded that the January 15, 2016 severance order was interlocutory and
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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not appealable, and that this court should quash the Commonwealth’s
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (Rule 1925(a) opinion, 3/8/16 at 2.) In
support of this rationale, the trial court relied on our supreme court’s
decision in Commonwealth v. Smith, 544 A.2d 943 (Pa. 1988) (plurality).
(Id. at 4-5.) In Smith, our supreme court held that an order granting
severance of two criminal informations was interlocutory, and thus not
appealable by the Commonwealth. Smith, 544 A.2d at 945. The Smith
court reasoned that the severance order did not constitute one that
substantially handicaps the prosecution because the Commonwealth was still
able to seek convictions on the charges it filed, albeit in two separate
proceedings rather than one. Id.
Recognizing that “the law regarding Commonwealth appeals under
Rule 311(d) is far from settled[,]” a panel of this court recently reiterated in
Commonwealth v. Woodard, 136 A.3d 1003 (Pa.Super. 2016), that the
Smith holding remains good law. Woodard, 136 A.3d at 1005.
The Woodard court stated as follows:
Applying the reasoning from Smith, an order
denying joinder, like an order granting
severance, is interlocutory and thus not
appealable. Here, the Commonwealth is free to
seek conviction on all counts, against each
defendant, in three separate trials. Therefore, denial
of the motion for joinder does not terminate or
substantially handicap the prosecution and is not
appealable under Rule 311(d). To expand
Rule 311(d) to encompass such interlocutory
review would be to disturb the orderly process
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of litigation. Strict application of the Rule assures
that trials will go forward as scheduled.
Woodard, 136 A.3d at 1007 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted; emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing precedent, we are constrained to conclude that
the Commonwealth’s appeal of the order granting appellee’s motion to sever
must be quashed because the order is not appealable under Rule 311(d).
Furthermore, we reject the Commonwealth’s assertion that the trial
court’s January 15, 2016 severance order qualified as a collateral order.
(See Commonwealth’s brief at 4-6.) Rule 313(b) defines a collateral order
as one that is “[(1)] separable from and collateral to the main cause of
action [(2)] where the right involved is too important to be denied review
and [(3)] the question presented is such that if review is postponed until
final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.”
Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) (numeration added). To benefit from the collateral order
doctrine, an order must satisfy all three elements. Commonwealth v.
Williams, 86 A.3d 771, 780 (Pa. 2014). We have found no case law in this
Commonwealth wherein a severance order has been found to constitute a
collateral order. Moreover, contrary to the Commonwealth’s contention, the
instant order does not satisfy prong 2 to qualify as a collateral order under
Rule 313(b).
Appeal quashed.
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J. A18025/16
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/29/2016
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