Coulter, J. v. Lindsay, A. , 159 A.3d 947 ( 2017 )

J-A01019-17
2017 Pa. Super. 92
JEAN COULTER, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
ALEXANDER H. LINDSAY, JR., LINDSAY
LAW FIRM, JOSEPH VICTOR CHARLTON
AND PATRICIA LINDSAY,
Appellees No. 627 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 1, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County
Civil Division at No(s): Case No. 15-10340
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
OPINION PER CURIAM: FILED APRIL 7, 2017
Serial Appellant, Jean Coulter, appeals pro se from the order entered
on April 1, 2016. In this case, we hold that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
Procedure 233.1 is not void for vagueness under the federal and state
constitutions and that our Supreme Court had the authority under the
Pennsylvania Constitution to promulgate Rule 233.1. We also hold that
Appellant’s repeated, frivolous appeals to this Court warrant the awarding of
attorney’s fees and issuance of a filing injunction. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion and the accompanying order.
The relevant factual background and procedural history of this case
are as follows. On May 11, 2007, Appellant pled nolo contendere to
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court
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aggravated assault1 for the brutal abuse of her minor daughter. See
Commonwealth v. Coulter, CP-10-CR-0000727-2006 (C.C.P. Butler). As a
result of the heinous abuse of her daughter, the Court of Common Pleas of
Butler County terminated Appellant’s parental rights as to her daughter.
See In the Interest of A.C., CP-10-DP-0000051-2006 (C.C.P. Butler).
Alexander H. Lindsay, Jr., Lindsay Law Firm, Joseph Victor Charlton, and
Patricia Lindsay (collectively “Appellees”) represented Appellant during both
the criminal and termination proceedings.
Over the ensuring decade, Appellant filed dozens of actions in both the
state and federal courts of this Commonwealth. For example, on March 2,
2015, Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. In that complaint,
Appellant “allege[d] that [Appellees] conspired with one another to deny her
[] due process in those court proceedings.” Coulter v. Lindsay, 2015 WL
11117718, *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2015) (hereinafter “Lindsay”). That
complaint was dismissed with prejudice. See id.
On May 4, 2015, Appellant instituted the instant action in the Court of
Common Pleas of Butler County. In her complaint, Appellant conceded that
she was raising the same exact claims that she raised in Lindsay. On
December 22, 2015, Appellant filed a motion seeking the trial court’s
recusal. Appellant’s recusal motion was denied that same day. On February
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4).
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8, 2016, Appellant filed her fifth amended complaint. On March 11, 2016,
Appellees filed preliminary objections. In their preliminary objections,
Appellees argued that Appellant’s claims were barred by res judicata.
Moreover, Appellees argued that, to the extent Appellant’s claims were not
barred by res judicata, the trial court should dismiss the complaint under
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 233.1 (frivolous actions filed by pro se
plaintiffs). Finally, Appellees argued that Appellant failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. On March 28, 2016, Appellant filed
preliminary objections to Appellees’ preliminary objections.
The trial court heard argument on Appellant’s and Appellees’
preliminary objections on April 1, 2016. That same day, the trial court
overruled Appellant’s preliminary objections, sustained Appellees’
preliminary objections, and dismissed Appellant’s complaint. This timely
appeal followed.2 The appeal of this case was argued before this Court on
January 10, 2017. On January 19, 2017, Appellant filed a motion seeking
the recusal of all three members of this panel.
Appellant presents five issues for our review:
1. [Did the trial court err by denying Appellant’s recusal motion?
2
On May 5, 2016, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On May 24, 2016, Appellant filed her concise statement.
On June 13, 2016, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion. All issues
raised on appeal were included in Appellant’s concise statement.
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2. Did the trial court err by concluding that Appellant’s claims
were barred by res judicata and by dismissing her complaint
pursuant to Rule 233.1?
3. Does Rule 233.1 violate the United States and Pennsylvania
constitutions?
4. Did the trial court err in concluding that Appellant’s claims
were barred by the statute of limitations?
5. Did the trial court err in concluding that Appellant failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted?]
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.3
Preliminarily, we must consider Appellant’s recusal motion. Appellant
argues that all three members of this panel should recuse from this case
because the panel was not randomly assigned. She also argues that all
three members of this panel are biased against her. This argument is
waived. “A party seeking recusal or disqualification is required to raise the
objection at the earliest possible moment, or that party will suffer the
consequence of being time barred.” In re Lokuta, 11 A.3d 427, 437 (Pa.
2011) (internal alterations and citation omitted). In this case, the earliest
opportunity to raise the recusal issue was at oral argument. Appellant,
however, did not move for recusal until nine days after this case was argued.
Accordingly, Appellant waived any argument related to the recusal of the
three members of this panel.
3
We have re-numbered the issues for ease of disposition.
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Moreover, even if Appellant preserved her recusal claim, it is frivolous.
This case was assigned to this panel pursuant to 210 Pa.Code
§ 65.5(C)(1)(a). Specifically, a member of this Court originally assigned to
hear this case became unavailable to participate in the disposition of this
case and the President Judge appointed a replacement.4 Accordingly, all
relevant internal operating procedures regarding panel composition were
followed with respect to this case.
As to Appellant’s claims of bias, when
considering a recusal request, the jurist must first make a
conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the
case in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in
the outcome. The jurist must then consider whether his or her
continued involvement in the case creates an appearance of
impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public confidence in
the judiciary.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 498 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
omitted).
All three members of this panel individually determined that they are
capable of assessing the case in an impartial manner, free of personal bias.
Moreover, all three members of this panel individually determined that their
involvement in this case does not create the appearance of impropriety and
4
Appellant’s argument that the member of this Court who recused herself
from this case abused her discretion in so recusing is without merit. Cf.
Commonwealth v. King, 839 A.2d 237, 239–240 (Pa. 2003) (When a
judge recuses herself, that decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.).
Appellant has failed to indicate how recusal of this judge was an abuse of
discretion.
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will not undermine public confidence in the judiciary. Although all three
judges of this panel are familiar with Appellant, that fact does not
necessitate recusal. Cf. Commonwealth v. Abu–Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 90
(Pa. 1998) (Familiarity with the defendant and prior adverse rulings do not
require recusal). Moreover, as discussed infra, there are few (if any)
members of this Court who are unfamiliar with Appellant and her repeated,
vexatious, and frivolous litigation. Accordingly, we deny Appellant’s recusal
motion directed at the members of this panel.
Turning to the merits of the issues raised by Appellant, she first argues
that the trial court erred in denying her recusal motion. We review “the trial
court’s denial of the recusal motion for abuse of discretion.” Becker v. M.S.
Reilly, Inc., 123 A.3d 776, 778 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). The
trial court was required to apply the same standard that the members of this
panel applied when ruling on Appellant’s recusal motion. See Brown, 141
A.3d at 498 (citation omitted).
Appellant’s claims of bias, and the appearance of bias, are frivolous.
Appellant argues that the trial court took all necessary actions in order to get
its desired result. The record belies this assertion. The trial court acted with
great restraint in permitting Appellant to continually amend her frivolous
complaint and held a hearing on the parties’ respective preliminary
objections. Instead of imposing harsh sanctions for her violations of the
rules of civil procedure, the trial court instead simply overruled Appellant’s
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preliminary objections and sustained Appellees’ preliminary objections. We
ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s
recusal motion.
In her second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
dismissing her complaint pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
233.1, which provides, in relevant part:
Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se plaintiff
in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file a motion to
dismiss the action on the basis that
(1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims
which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior action against the
same or related defendants, and
(2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to a
written settlement agreement or a court proceeding.
Pa.R.C.P. 233.1(a). “To the extent that the question presented involves
interpretation of rules of civil procedure, our standard of review is de novo.
To the extent that this question involves an exercise of the trial court’s
discretion in granting a motion to dismiss, our standard of review is abuse of
discretion.” Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1086 (Pa. Super. 2014),
appeal denied, 110 A.3d 998 (Pa. 2014) (hereinafter “Ramsden III”).
As this Court has explained, Rule 233.1 does not
mandate the technical identity of parties or claims imposed by
res judicata or collateral estoppel; rather, it merely requires that
the parties and the claims raised in the current action be
“related” to those in the prior action and that those prior claims
have been “resolved.” These two terms are noteworthy in their
omission of the technical precision otherwise associated with
claim and issue preclusion; whereas parties and/or claims are to
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be “identical” under the purview of those doctrines, Rule 233.1
requires only that they be sufficiently related to inform the trial
court, in the exercise of its discretion, whether the plaintiff’s
claim has in fact been considered and “resolved.” The drafting
committee’s recourse to the word “resolved” in this context is
equally significant. In [Rule 233.1’s] requirement that the
matter have been “resolved pursuant to a written settlement
agreement or a court proceeding,” the language assures that the
pro se litigant is availed of a chance to address his claim subject
to the contractual guarantee of a settlement agreement or to the
procedural safeguards that attend a court proceeding. It does
not require, however, that the matter has progressed to a “final
judgment on the merits[.]”
Gray v. Buonopane, 53 A.3d 829, 836 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied,
64 A.3d 632 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).
Appellant contends that her claims are not “related” to her prior
lawsuits; however, she conceded in her complaint that her claims are
identical to those raised in Lindsay. See Appellant’s Fifth Amended
Complaint, 2/8/16, at 1. As such, the claims are the “same,” as required by
Rule 233.1(a)(1). Moreover, Appellant’s claims were “resolved” in Lindsay.
See Lindsay, 2015 WL 11117718 at *1. Specifically, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed the claims
with prejudice. See id. The dismissal of the claims in Lindsay satisfied the
requirements of Rule 233.1(a)(2) as the dismissal resolved Appellant’s
claims against Appellees. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed
Appellant’s complaint under Rule 233.1.5
5
As the trial court properly dismissed Appellant’s complaint under Rule
233.1, we decline to address Appellant’s arguments related to res judicata,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In her third issue, Appellant argues that our Supreme Court lacked the
authority under Pennsylvania’s Constitution to promulgate Rule 233.1. She
also argues that Rule 233.1 is unconstitutionally vague. We review the
constitutionality of a rule of civil procedure de novo and our scope of review
is plenary. See Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty., 436 A.2d
147, 150–157 (Pa. 1981) (reviewing de novo determination that rule of civil
procedure was unconstitutional).
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that our “Supreme Court shall
have the power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and
the conduct of all courts . . . if such rules are consistent with this
Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge[,] nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant.” Pa. Const. art IV, § 10(c). Our Supreme Court has
held that when determining if a rule is substantive or procedural in nature,
“we must [] seek to determine the purpose of the rule in order to properly
characterize its nature.” Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 150.
In this case, the explanatory comment to Rule 233.1 indicates that the
purpose behind Rule 233.1 is to ease congestion in the courts by eliminating
frivolous pro se litigation. As our Supreme Court noted in Laudenberger,
that purpose makes the rule procedural and not substantive. See id. at
151. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Rule 233.1 impacts
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
the statute of limitations, and Appellees’ demurrer for failure to state a
claim.
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Appellant’s substantive rights, our Supreme Court is not “prevented from
exercising its duty to resolve procedural questions merely because of a
collateral effect on a substantive right.” Id. at 155. Any effect upon
Appellant’s substantive rights is collateral as Rule 233.1 preserves
Appellant’s right to at least one prior substantive presentation of her claims.
Accordingly, our Supreme Court had the authority to promulgate Rule 233.1.
Next, Appellant argues that Rule 233.1 is void for vagueness under
both the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions. A vague rule offends
the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions’ due process clauses 6 if it
“result[s] in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in the absence of
explicit guidelines for [its] application[.]” In re William L., 383 A.2d 1228,
1232 (Pa. 1978).
Rule 233.1 is not vague so as to result in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. To the contrary, Rule 233.1 provides very specific guidelines
for when a trial court may dismiss a pro se complaint. First, the complaint
6
As this Court recently explained:
Appellant specifically refers neither to the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution nor
to Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, but
instead expresses a generic due process claim. The lack of
specificity is of no moment to our review, however, as our courts
have generally treated the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution as coextensive.
Commonwealth v. Romeo, 2017 WL 24702, *3 n.4 (Pa. Super. Jan. 3,
2017) (citation omitted).
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must be related to, or the same, as a previously filed complaint by the
plaintiff. Appellant’s argument that determining whether a complaint is
“related” is arbitrary is frivolous. A complaint is related when it deals with
the same subject matter as a previous complaint.7 Similarly, Rule 233.1’s
requirement that the previous litigation be “resolved” is not vague. A claim
is resolved when there has been a definite decision thereon. See Black’s
Law Dictionary, 1505 (10th ed. 2014). Accordingly, we conclude that Rule
233.1 is not void for vagueness.
“Having disposed of h[er] issues in this appeal, we cannot ignore
[Appellant’s] repeated abuse of our judicial system. Under the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, we sua sponte may impose upon [Appellant attorney’s]
fees.” Morgan v. Morgan, 117 A.3d 757, 762 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation
omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2744 provides that:
In addition to other costs allowable by general rule or Act of
Assembly, an appellate court may award as further costs
damages as may be just, including [] a reasonable counsel fee
. . . if it determines that an appeal is frivolous or taken solely for
delay or that the conduct of the participant against whom costs
are to be imposed is dilatory, obdurate[,] or vexatious.
7
At least two courts have rejected arguments similar to Appellant’s.
Specifically, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
held that whether an activity is “related” to religious worship is not an
arbitrary determination. Konikov v. Orange Cty., Fla., 302 F. Supp. 2d
1328, 1355–1356 (M.D. Fla. 2004), rev’d in part on other grounds, 410 F.3d
1317 (11th Cir. 2005). The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio held that whether an action is “related” to employment is not
an arbitrary determination. Dayton Christian Sch. v. Ohio Civil Rights
Comm’n, 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1027 (S.D. Ohio 1984), rev’d on other
grounds, 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
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Pa.R.A.P. 2744.
Appellant’s conduct is the definition of vexatious. Although it is
impractical to calculate the exact number of cases Appellant has initiated
over the past decade in the various courts of common pleas, Appellant has
filed at least 78 appeals over the past decade related to her criminal case
and/or the termination of her parental rights. See 2078 WDA 2007; 2181
WDA 2007; 1953 WDA 2009; 1981 WDA 2009; 2086 WDA 2009; 2116 WDA
2009; 2140 WDA 2009; 185 WDA 2010; 265 WDA 2010; 428 WDA 2010;
574 WDA 2010; 586 WDA 2010; 807 WDA 2010; 808 WDA 2010; 853 WDA
2010; 1181 WDA 2010; 1373 WDA 2010; 1860 WDA 2010; 266 WDA 2011;
267 WDA 2011; 268 WDA 2011; 269 WDA 2011; 270 WDA 2011; 271 WDA
2011; 294 WDA 2011; 295 WDA 2011; 296 WDA 2011; 297 WDA 2011; 298
WDA 2011; 299 WDA 2011; 300 WDA 2011; 301 WDA 2011; 302 WDA
2011; 303 WDA 2011; 304 WDA 2011; 305 WDA 2011; 306 WDA 2011;
307 WDA 2011; 308 WDA 2011; 309 WDA 2011; 310 WDA 2011; 311 WDA
2011; 312 WDA 2011; 313 WDA 2011; 314 WDA 2011; 315 WDA 2011; 316
WDA 2011; 317 WDA 2011; 318 WDA 2011; 319 WDA 2011; 447 WDA
2011; 555 WDA 2011; 662 WDA 2011; 676 WDA 2011; 1070 WDA 2011;
1437 WDA 2011; 30 WDM 2011; 1013 WDA 2012; 1199 MDA 2013; 582
WDA 2013; 583 WDA 2013; 584 WDA 2013; 585 WDA 2013; 586 WDA
2013; 678 WDA 2013; 679 WDA 2013; 1046 WDA 2013; 1213 WDA 2013;
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1277 WDA 2014; 1278 WDA 2014; 1279 WDA 2014; 1890 WDA 2014; 2080
WDA 2014; 895 MDA 2015; 779 MDA 2016; and this appeal.
This Court has not granted Appellant relief on a single one of those 78
appeals and our Supreme Court has denied allocatur in every case in which
Appellant petitioned for review of this Court’s decision. See Coulter v.
Mahood, 2016 WL 3364893 (Pa. Super. June 16, 2016) (unpublished
memorandum), appeal denied, 2017 WL 213194 (Pa. Jan. 18, 2017);
Coulter v. Levenson, 122 A.3d 1140, 2015 WL 6957054 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(unpublished memorandum); Coulter v. Doerr, 105 A.3d 40, 2014 WL
10917585 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied,
110 A.3d 998 (Pa. 2014); Coulter v. Mahood, 105 A.3d 39, 2014 WL
10917636 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied,
110 A.3d 998 (Pa. 2014); Coulter v. Ramsden, 105 A.3d 39, 2014 WL
10916977 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied,
110 A.3d 998 (Pa. 2014); Coulter v. Allegheny Cty. Bar Ass’n, 105 A.3d
39, 2014 WL 10919339 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum),
appeal denied, 110 A.3d 998 (Pa. 2014); Coulter v. Lope, 105 A.3d 39,
2014 WL 10917622 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum), appeal
denied, 110 A.3d 998 (Pa. 2014); Coulter v. Gale, 105 A.3d 39, 2014 WL
10916978 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied,
110 A.3d 998 (Pa. 2014); Coulter v. Butler Cty. Children & Youth
Servs., 100 A.3d 295, 2014 WL 10965724 (Pa. Super. 2014) (per curiam)
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(unpublished judgment order), appeal denied, 99 A.3d 926 (Pa. 2014);
Ramsden III, 94 A.3d at 1080; In re A.C., 64 A.3d 28 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(unpublished memorandum); In re A.C., 48 A.3d 469 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 49 A.3d 441 (Pa. 2012); CYS,
Butler Co. v. J.C., 47 A.3d 1256 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished
memorandum), appeal denied, 49 A.3d 441 (Pa. 2012); In re A.C., 47 A.3d
1242 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 49
A.3d 441 (Pa. 2012); Wilder & Mahood, PC v. Coulter, 46 A.3d 824 (Pa.
Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 50 A.3d 126 (Pa.
2012); In re A.C., 38 A.3d 928 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished
memorandum), appeal denied, 42 A.3d 1058 (Pa. 2012); Commonwealth
v. Coulter, 24 A.3d 467 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum),
appeal denied, 30 A.3d 486 (Pa. 2011); In re Adoption of A.C., 23 A.3d
577 (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 20 A.3d
482 (Pa. 2011).
Moreover, Appellant has filed at least 11 cases in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania stemming from her
criminal case and/or the termination of her parental rights. Coulter v.
Forrest, 10cv965; Coulter v. Doerr, 11cv1201; Coulter v. Studeny,
12cv60; Coulter v. Butler Cty. Children & Youth Servs., 12cv338;
Coulter v. Allegheny Cty. Bar Ass’n, 12cv641; Coulter v. Ramsden,
12cv978; Coulter v. Ramsden, 12cv1050; Coulter v. Mahood, 12cv1241;
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Coulter v. Gale, 12cv1461; Coulter v. Lindsay, 15cv289; Coulter v.
Bissoon, 16cv1881. Appellant has similarly filed at least two actions in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Coulter
v. Forrest, 12cv2050; Coulter v. Unknown Probation Officer, 12cv2067.
As in the state court proceedings, Appellant has not prevailed in a single
federal case. As a result of this vexatious litigation, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania issued a filing
injunction barring Appellant from filing further civil actions related to her
criminal case and/or the termination of her parental rights. Coulter v.
Ramsden, 2012 WL 6592597, *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2012), aff'd, 13-1077
(3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2013) (hereinafter “Ramsden II”).
This, therefore, is at least the 91st time that Appellant has litigated a
frivolous case in this Court or the federal courts in this Commonwealth. “[I]t
is clear [A]ppellant’s insistence on repeatedly raising previously litigated
issues goes beyond the conduct tolerated by our judicial system. This case
is a clear example of a litigant who has abused the process of the courts of
this Commonwealth. Accordingly, we [impose] costs, fees[,] and damages.”
Winpenny v. Winpenny, 775 A.2d 815, 818 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Finally, we consider whether a filing injunction is appropriate in this
case. See Bolick v. Commonwealth, 69 A.3d 1267, 1269 (Pa. Super.
2013), appeal denied, 84 A.3d 1061 (Pa. 2014) (issuing a filing injunction);
Lal v. Borough of Kennett Square, 786 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Pa. Cmwlth.
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2001), appeal denied, 805 A.2d 527 (Pa. 2002) (same); Winpenny, 775
A.2d at 818 (same); see also Chipps v. U.S.D.C. for the M.D. of Pa., 882
F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[A] pattern of groundless and vexatious
litigation will justify an order prohibiting further filings without permission of
the court.”).
As noted above, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania has issued a filing injunction against Appellant. See
Ramsden II, 2012 WL 6592597 at *3. The Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County has similarly issued a filing injunction against Appellant.
See Coulter v. Ignelzi, GD-15-002176 (C.C.P. Allegheny Dec. 15, 2015).
Both state and federal trial courts have issued filing injunctions against
Appellant because of her continued vexatious litigation. Nonetheless, she
continues to file frivolous lawsuits and appeal to this Court after trial courts
properly dismiss her claims. We conclude that it is necessary to take the
extraordinary measure of issuing a filing injunction at the appellate level.
The vast amount of judicial resources that this Court expends affirming
dismissals of Appellant’s frivolous lawsuits is beyond that required by both
the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions’ due process clauses. Cf.
In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam) (“Every paper filed
with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires
some portion of the institution’s limited resources. A part of the Court’s
responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that
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promotes the interests of justice.”). Accordingly, we bar Appellant from
taking any further pro se appeals in non-criminal matters to this Court
without prior leave of this Court.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Appellant’s recusal motion. We hold that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
Procedure 233.1 is not void for vagueness under the federal and state
constitutions. We also hold that our Supreme Court had the authority under
the Pennsylvania Constitution to promulgate Rule 233.1. We conclude that
the trial court properly dismissed Appellant’s complaint under Rule 233.1.
Finally, we hold that Appellant’s continued vexatious conduct before this
Court warrants the awarding of attorney’s fees and issuance of a filing
injunction.
Order affirmed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/7/2017
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