Coley, J. v. Keystone Turf Club, Inc. ( 2018 )

J-A25034-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JAMES COLEY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KEYSTONE TURF CLUB, INC., BENSALEM
RACING ASSOCIATION, INC.,
GREENWOOD GAMING AND
ENTERTAINMENT, INC., D/B/A PARX
CASINO, GREENWOOD RACING, INC.,
TURF CLUB SERVICES, INC., KEYSTONE
PARK SERVICES CO., AND PARX CASINO
DESIGN, INC.
Appellants No. 3837 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment Entered November 21, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No: 141201773
BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JANUARY 11, 2018
Appellant, Greenwood Racing, Inc. (“Greenwood”),1 appeals from the
November 21, 2016 judgment of $150,000 in compensatory and $200,000 in
punitive damages entered in favor of Appellee, James Coley. We remand.
The trial court summarized the facts and procedure in its Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion:
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The remaining captioned Appellants are no longer participating.
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On July 31, 2014, at approximately 9:30 p.m., [Appellee]
was a customer in the Turf Club, a business for off track betting
located at 1635 Market Street in Philadelphia. [Appellee’s]
Amended Complaint alleged that each of the corporate defendants
owned, possessed, maintained, controlled, and operated the Turf
Club.
While [Appellee] was at a betting machine, he was verbally
threatened and physically beaten and robbed by additional
defendants John Gleason Jr. and John Gleason Sr. [Appellee]
sustained injuries to his head, eye, leg, ankle, and foot. Before
the altercation, John Gleason Jr. had been drinking and had
threatened another patron.
[Appellee] sued the corporate defendants for negligently
failing to have proper or adequate security in the Turf Club, failing
to come to his aid when he was attacked by the Gleasons, failing
to remove John Gleason Jr. from the premises after his earlier
altercation with a patron, failing to monitor John Gleason Jr.’s later
activities in the Turf Club, and continuing to serve the Gleasons
alcohol after they became visibly intoxicated. The corporate
defendants joined John Gleason Jr. and John Gleason Sr. as
additional defendants.
At trial, nonsuits were granted to John Gleason Jr.; John
Gleason Sr.; Bensalem Racing Association, Inc.; Greenwood
Gaming and Entertainment, Inc., d/b/a Parx Casino
[“Greenwoord”]; Turf Club Services, Inc.; Keystone Park Services
Co.; and Parx Casino Design, Inc. Trial proceeded against
Keystone Turf Club, Inc. and [Greenwood].
The jury found in favor of [Appellee] and against Keystone
Turf Club and [Greenwood] and awarded compensatory damages
in the total amount of $300,000. Liability was apportioned 50
percent for each defendant. The jury separately awarded
[Appellee] $200,000 in punitive damages against [Greenwood]
only.
[Greenwood] filed a timely motion for post-trial relief;
Keystone Turf Club did not seek post-trial relief.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/17, at 1-2. The trial court concluded that Greenwood
failed to preserve any issues in its post-trial motion and recommended quashal
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of this appeal. Id. at 4. The trial court therefore did not address Greenwood’s
substantive issues.
Greenwood raises four assertions of error, the first of which is as follows:
Did the trial court err in holding that the post-trial motion of
[Greenwood] failed to preserve any issues for review, where (1)
no Pennsylvania court has ever found waiver under these
circumstances, (2) [Greenwood’s] post-trial motion complied with
Rule 227.1 by setting forth the grounds for appeal and where
those grounds were preserved, and incorporating its own (and
only) arguments at trial that the evidence was insufficient for any
claim against it, and (3) the trial court could clearly address the
issues raised, there was no prejudice, and justice required
resolving the case on the merits?
Greenwood’s Brief at 4 (underscoring in original). We find Greenwood’s first
argument meritorious, and therefore remand to the trial court for preparation
of an opinion addressing the issues raised in Greenwood’s post-trial motion.
We do not address Greenwood’s remaining issues.
The trial court relied on Rule 227.1(b), which provides as follows:
(b) Except as otherwise provided by Pa.R.E. 103(a), post-
trial relief may not be granted unless the grounds therefor,
(1) if then available, were raised in pre-trial
proceedings or by motion, objection, point for charge,
request for findings of fact or conclusions of law, offer of
proof or other appropriate method at trial; and
[…]
(2) are specified in the motion. The motion shall state
how the grounds were asserted in pre-trial proceedings or
at trial. Grounds not specified are deemed waived unless
leave is granted upon cause shown to specify additional
grounds.
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Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.1(b). The explanatory comment to Rule 227.1 indicates:
“In requiring the motion to state the specific grounds therefor, motions which
set forth mere ‘boilerplate’ language are specifically disapproved.” Pa.R.C.P.
No. 227.1, Explanatory Comment—1983. “The purpose of this rule is ‘to
provide the trial court the first opportunity to review and reconsider its earlier
rulings and correct its own error.’” Chalkey v. Roush, 757 A.2d 972, 975
(Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Soderberg v. Weisel, 687 A.2d 839,
845 (Pa. Super. 1997)), aff’d, 805 A.2d 491 (Pa. 2002).
Greenwood’s post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
alleged that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that
Greenwood breached a duty to Appellee, that Greenwood’s conduct was a
legal cause of harm to Appellee, and that Greenwood was liable for punitive
damages to Appellee, contending as follows:
1. The [c]ourt erred and abused its discretion in denying
[Greenwood’s] Motions for Compulsory Non-suit and for Directed
Verdict, and should now grant JNOV in favor of [Greenwood],
because the evidence taken as a whole, and viewed in the light
most favorable to [Appellee] as verdict winner, was insufficient as
a matter of law to make out a claim that [Greenwood] owed or
breached any duty to [Appellee]. [Greenwood] incorporates
herein by reference its Motions for Compulsory Nonsuit and for
Directed Verdict, and the related briefing and argument.
2. The [c]ourt erred and abused its discretion in denying
[Greenwood’s] Motions for Compulsory Non-suit and for Directed
Verdict, and should now grant JNOV in favor of [Greenwood],
because the evidence taken as a whole, and viewed in the light
most favorable to [Appellee] as verdict winner, was insufficient as
a matter of law for the jury to find that any alleged breach on the
part of [Greenwood] (any such breach being denied) was a legal
cause of the harm to [Appellee]. [Greenwood] incorporates herein
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by reference its Motions for Compulsory Nonsuit and for Directed
Verdict, and the related briefing and argument.
3. The [c]ourt erred and abused its discretion in denying
[Greenwood’s] Motions for Compulsory Non-suit and for Directed
Verdict, and should now grant JNOV in favor of [Greenwood],
because the evidence taken as a whole, and viewed in the light
most favorable to [Appellee] as verdict winner, was insufficient as
a matter of law for a jury to hold [Greenwood] liable for punitive
damages. [Greenwood] incorporates herein by reference its
Motions for Compulsory Nonsuit and for Directed Verdict, and the
related briefing and argument.
Greenwood’s Post-Trial Motion, 10/14/16, at ¶¶ 1-3. As is evident from the
foregoing, Appellant incorporated by reference the detailed briefing and
argument of its prior nonsuit and directed verdict motions. The trial court
believed Greenwood’s JNOV motion was too boilerplate because of its
incorporation by reference of prior arguments. Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/16,
at 2. We believe Greenwood’s motion was sufficient to apprise the trial court
of its arguments in support of JNOV. In concluding otherwise, the trial court
relied on inapposite case law.
For example, the trial court relied upon Hall v. Jackson, 788 A.2d 390,
401 (Pa. Super. 2001), in which a defendant doctor incorporated by reference
the post-trial motion of the co-defendant hospital. On appeal, the doctor
challenged the trial court’s admission of hearsay testimony from three
witnesses. The doctor did not raise the hearsay issue in his post-trial motion,
but the hospital did as to two of the three witnesses. Id. We noted that
failure to include an issue in a post-trial motion results in waiver under Rule
227.1, but we also analyzed the merits of the doctor’s argument as to the two
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witnesses referenced in the hospital’s motion. Id. The trial court’s reliance
on Hall is misplaced because the Hall Court analyzed the merits of issues that
the doctor incorporated by reference in his post-sentence motion.
The trial court also relied on Therres v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of
Borough of Rose Valley, 947 A.2d 226 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), appeal denied,
963 A.2d 473 (Pa. 2008). There, the appellants challenged a zoning board
order. By statute, a notice of appeal in a land use case must set forth the
grounds on which the appellant relies. Id. at 231. The appellants’ notice
incorporated the zoning board’s findings and conclusions and asserted that
they were erroneous. Id. at 231. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial
court’s quashal of the appeal from the zoning board order, reasoning that the
statute governing such notices would be rendered meaningless if we held the
appellants’ notice to be sufficient. Id. at 232. Therres is distinguishable for
two reasons. First, it was governed by a statute that does not apply to the
instant matter. Second, there is no indication in Therres that the appellants
fully developed the arguments at an earlier stage of the proceedings.
Likewise, this Court’s opinion in Siculietano v. K & B Amusements
Corp., 915 A.2d 130, 133 (Pa. Super. 2006), is distinguishable because the
appellant’s post-trial motion purported to preserve “such other errors as may
be disclosed by a transcript of the trial.” On appeal, the appellant attempted
to raise an issue under the Dead Man’s Act, but that issue was not included in
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the appellant’s post-trial motion. Id. at 132. Boilerplate language such as
“such other errors . . . ” was not sufficient to preserve the issue. Id.Instantly, in contrast, Greenwood’s issues were the subject of detailed
argument and briefing at several times during the trial. Greenwood is
therefore in a stronger position than the defendant doctor in Hall, whose
arguments were addressed on the merits even though he incorporated the
arguments of a co-defendant. Unlike the appellant in Siculietano,
Greenwood did not leave the trial court guessing with a vague assertion of
“other errors.” In summary, nothing in the language of Rule 227.1 or any
case law decided thereunder supports the trial court’s waiver analysis. We
therefore conclude that the trial court erred in deeming Greenwood’s issues
waived. In light of the trial court’s finding of waiver, it did not prepare an
opinion addressing the merits of Greenwood’s issues. Greenwood, in turn,
prepared its brief without the benefit of the trial court’s reasons for denying
post-trial relief. We remand this matter to the trial court for preparation of
an opinion, to be filed with this Court within 60 days of the date of this
memorandum, addressing the merits of Greenwood’s arguments. We direct
the Prothonotary to issue a new briefing schedule upon receipt of the trial
court’s opinion.
Case remanded. Panel jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/11/18
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