Com. v. McCrommon, S. ( 2016 )


Menu:
  • J. S45026/16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                     :
    :
    SHANE LENELL MCCROMMON                     :
    Appellant                         :
    :     No. 1749 WDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 13, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0004830-2013
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                     :
    :
    SHANE LENELL MCCROMMON                     :
    Appellant                         :
    :     No. 1750 WDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 13, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0005377-2014
    BEFORE: OLSON, DUBOW AND PLATT, JJ.*
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                           FILED AUGUST 10, 2016
    Appellant, Shane Lenell McCrommon, appeals from the Judgment of
    Sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County on
    July 13, 2015. We affirm.
    *
    Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court.
    J.S45026/16
    On October 24, 2013, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with one
    count each of Third Degree Murder and Aggravated Assault1 arising from the
    death of Jeffrey Edwards (the “Victim”).         On November 4, 2014, in a
    separate criminal information, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with
    Criminal     Solicitation-Hindering   Prosecution,2   alleging   that   Appellant
    attempted to solicit two people to contact proposed Commonwealth
    witnesses to prevent or alter their testimony at Appellant’s trial on the
    Murder and Aggravated Assault charges. The trial court consolidated these
    cases for purposes of trial.
    On March 30, 2015, at Appellant’s Pre-Trial Conference, his counsel
    filed a Motion for Continuance, which the trial court denied.               Trial
    commenced on April 7, 2015.           Prior to empaneling the jury, Appellant’s
    counsel again moved for a continuance in order to obtain an expert witness.
    The trial court likewise denied this Motion, although the court permitted
    Appellant to contact an expert witness if so desired. Appellant also filed a
    Motion in Limine prior to the commencement of trial seeking to suppress
    letters the Commonwealth sought to use as evidence in support of its
    Hindering Prosecution charge, which the trial court also denied.
    On April 13, 2015, a jury convicted Appellant of the above charges.
    On July 13, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of 20 to 40
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c) and § 2702(a)(1), respectively.
    2
    18 Pa.C.S. § 902(a).
    -2-
    J.S45026/16
    years’ incarceration for the Murder conviction3 and a concurrent sentence of
    two to four years’ incarceration for the Criminal Solicitation-Hindering
    Prosecution conviction.   Appellant timely filed a Post-Sentence Motion on
    July 22, 2015, which the trial court denied on October 16, 2015. This timely
    appeal followed.
    The trial court set forth the facts as elicited at trial as follows:
    Facts at trial showed that [Appellant] was angry with [the
    Victim] because [the Victim] was supposed to be selling
    drugs for [Appellant], but instead was diverting customers
    to other drug dealers. On June 25, 2012, [the Victim]
    appeared at a residence located at 1005 Victoria Avenue in
    New Kensington, PA.      Present at that time were Lisa
    Schreckengost, Michelle Monfredi [ ,] and Takayla Witcher.
    At approximately 11:30 p.m., [Appellant], who had arrived
    somewhat earlier asked Ms. Schreckengost to get [the
    Victim], who was located in the back bedroom of the
    apartment. [The Victim] entered the front bedroom and
    was confronted by [Appellant]. Ms. Schreckengost heard
    thumping sounds and when she entered the room,
    observed [Appellant] kicking [the Victim] in the side and in
    his face. He was unconscious and gasping for air. The
    confrontation and beating lasted 7-10 minutes.
    Michelle Monfredi heard grunting and groaning indicative of
    someone being beaten.        The altercation lasted 5-10
    minutes. After [Appellant] left the home, she observed
    that [the Victim’s] face was bloody, he was unconscious
    and groaning and “not in there.”
    Takayla Witcher[ ], also present, heard [Appellant] accuse
    [the victim] of “backdooring” him and saw him strike [the
    Victim] in the face. The beating continued despite the fact
    that after the first punch [the Victim] fell to the floor.
    After the beating ceased, Ms. Witcher noted that [the
    3
    The Assault conviction merged for the purposes of sentencing.             N.T.
    Sentencing, 7/13/15, at 19.
    -3-
    J.S45026/16
    Victim] did not move and was gasping for air. Despite
    efforts to revive him, he remained slumped on the floor.
    She noted his lip and head were bleeding and his body
    limp. No ambulance was called.
    The following day, June 27, 2012, Raymond Nelson was
    contacted and asked to take [the Victim] to the hospital.
    He proceeded to the second floor of 1005 Victoria Avenue
    and observed [the Victim] lying under the window in the
    corner of the bedroom. [The Victim] had defecated and
    urinated on himself and was unconscious. Mr. Nelson
    rolled him onto a blanket, carried him to his car, and took
    him to the Emergency Room at Citizens Hospital. Medical
    personnel were told that [the Victim] was found at the
    bottom of a stairway.
    Nurse Leighanne Saliba, and Emergency Room nurse at
    Citizens, testified that at 2:20 p.m. on June 27, 2012, she
    assisted in removing [the Victim] from a vehicle. He was
    unconscious, with bruising on both temporal areas of his
    face, had a small lip laceration and only responded to
    painful stimuli.      She characterized his appearance as
    decerebrate, his arms extended and palms pointing
    outward, indicative of a brain injury. His condition was
    critical and Life Flight was summoned and transported him
    to Allegheny General Hospital.
    [The Victim] underwent surgery on July 3, 2012 for
    herniated cervical disks and spinal cord trauma.           An
    electroencephalogram revealed a severe cortical brain
    injury. Cheryl Edwards, [the Victim’s] sister, testified that
    she visited her brother at Allegheny General Hospital and
    later at Forbes Nursing Facility until his death on
    November 9, 2012.        Her brother never spoke and
    remained curled in a fetal position. He was fed from a
    feeding tube and breathed through a trachestomy tube.
    Dr. Cyril Wecht performed an autopsy and determined that
    the immediate cause of death was pneumonia.          The
    underlying    cause    of  death    was     posttraumatic
    encephalopathy due to severe concussive forces.
    [Appellant] was arrested. While incarcerated he wrote
    letters to his girlfriend, Noel Bridges, instructing her to
    -4-
    J.S45026/16
    contact Takayla Witcher and Jason Jackson and to tell
    them that if questioned by police, they should “play dumb”
    and deny being present during the beating. A letter was
    also given to Janelle Houser during her transport to a
    magistrate’s office on November 13, 2014. Ms. Houser
    was incarcerated with Michelle Monfredi.        The letter,
    Exhibit 38, instructed Ms. Houser to find out what [Ms.
    Monfredi] intended to do.      This letter was signed by
    [Appellant] and turned over to Detective Klein.
    Testimony was also provided by Shane DelGrosso, an
    inmate in the Clearfield County Jail. Mr. DelGrosso stated
    that [Appellant] told him that he had beat someone up
    because he owed him money and guessed that he killed
    him.
    In defense, [Appellant] presented the testimony of Sheth
    Houser who stated that he spent June 26-27, 2012, with
    Takayla Witcher.
    Trial Ct. Op., 10/16/2015, at 1-4.
    Appellant raises the following six issues on appeal:
    1. The Court of Common Pleas abused its discretion in
    allowing into evidence letters purported to have been
    written by Appellant which could not properly be
    authenticated due to a lack of a known sample letter
    written by the Appellant, over the pre-trial objection of
    Appellant’s counsel.
    2. The Court of Common Pleas abused its discretion in
    denying Appellant a continuance in order to better assist
    counsel in preparing a defense, to allow counsel more time
    to contact witnesses, and to appoint an expert witness in
    order to determine the actual cause of the victim’s death.
    3. The Court of Common Pleas abused its discretion when
    it denied Appellant’s request for an involuntary
    manslaughter jury instruction, which was appropriate
    given the facts and circumstances of the case.
    4. The Court of Common Pleas erred in denying Appellant’s
    Post-Sentence Motions based on the uniformly [c]aucasian
    -5-
    J.S45026/16
    jury selected at trial, which was an unfair representation of
    Appellant’s peers.
    5. The Court of Common Pleas erred in denying Appellant’s
    Post-Sentence Motions as the evidence presented at trial
    was not sufficient to convict the Appellant of the crimes
    charged.
    6. The Court of Common Pleas erred in denying Appellant’s
    Post-Sentence Motions as the jury verdict was against the
    weight of the evidence, such as to shock one’s sense of
    justice.
    Appellant’s Brief at 2.
    Appellant first challenges the trial court’s denial of his Motion in Limine
    to preclude admission of the letters in support of the Commonwealth’s
    Hindering Prosecution charge. Appellant avers that the letters, sent to Noel
    Bridges and Janelle Houser, were improperly authenticated because the
    Commonwealth did not have a “known” sample of Appellant’s handwriting to
    which a comparison the letters could be made.           Appellant’s Brief at 7.
    Appellant claims that the Commonwealth offered no proof that the “known”
    samples—35 letters signed by Appellant containing his return address and
    seized by police from Appellant’s girlfriend—were, in fact, written by
    Appellant.   Therefore, Appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting
    letters into evidence.
    We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.
    Commonwealth v. Stokes, 
    78 A.3d 644
    , 654 (Pa. Super. 2013). An abuse
    of discretion is not a mere error in judgment but, rather, involves bias, ill
    -6-
    J.S45026/16
    will, partiality, prejudice, manifest unreasonableness, or misapplication of
    law. Commonwealth v. Riley, 
    19 A.3d 1146
    , 1149 (Pa. Super. 2011).
    The rules of evidence provide that the requirement of authentication or
    identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by
    evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
    its proponent claims. Pa.R.E. 901. In In re F.P., this Court held:
    A document may be authenticated by direct proof and/or
    by circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Brooks, [
    ] 
    508 A.2d 316
    , 318 (Pa. Super. 1986) (citations omitted).
    “‘[P]roof of any circumstances which will support a finding
    that the writing is genuine will suffice to authenticate the
    writing.’” 
    Id. at 319
    , quoting McCormick, Evidence § 222
    (E. Cleary 2d Ed. 1972).             “The courts of this
    Commonwealth have demonstrated the wide variety of
    types of circumstantial evidence that will enable a
    proponent to authenticate a writing.”        Id. (collecting
    cases).
    In re F.P., 
    878 A.2d 91
    , 94 (Pa. Super. 2005).
    We agree with the trial court that there was sufficient proof of the
    authenticity of the letters such that their admission into evidence was
    proper.   Noel Bridges, Appellant’s girlfriend, testified that she exchanged
    correspondence with Appellant during his incarceration and that the police
    seized a stack of letters she had received from Appellant. N.T. Trial, 4/7/15-
    4/13/15, at 392-93.     All of the seized letters contained Appellant’s return
    address. N.T. at 320. One of the letters, Exhibit 37, instructed Ms. Bridges
    to contact Takayla Witcher through a third-party in order to instruct Ms.
    -7-
    J.S45026/16
    Witcher to deny being present at and having knowledge of the assault on the
    Victim. N.T. at 394-96.
    Janelle Houser testified that she received a letter, Exhibit 38, which
    was signed by Appellant. N.T. at 387. This letter asked Ms. Houser to find
    out what witness Michelle Monfredi was “going to do” and stated, “[i]f any of
    them telling hoes down there are around, you knock somebody’s head off.”
    N.T. at 485.
    In addition, a document examiner and handwriting expert, Corporal
    Robert Negherbon, examined Exhibits 37 and 38.          He confirmed, after
    comparing the exhibits with the other letters seized from Ms. Bridges, that
    the handwriting in Exhibits 37 and 38 was that of Appellant. N.T. at 369
    In light of the direct and circumstantial evidence demonstrating the
    authenticity of Exhibits 37 and 38, we conclude the trial court did not abuse
    its discretion in admitting them into evidence. Accordingly, Appellant is not
    entitled to relief on this issue.
    In his second issue, Appellant claims the trial court abused its
    discretion in denying Appellant’s March 30, 2015 and April 7, 2015 Motions
    for Continuance. Appellant alleges that the trial court “fail[ed] to recognize
    the nature of the crimes at issue and the intricacy of the evidence.”
    Appellant’s Brief at 10. He claims that, “had the court allowed counsel more
    time to find an expert, the Appellant would have been better able to
    determine the cause of trauma, extent of injury, and cause of death. This
    -8-
    J.S45026/16
    would have enabled the Appellant to more effectively cross examine
    Commonwealth witnesses on these matters and present evidence on his
    behalf.”   Id. at 11.   Appellant avers that he was prejudiced by the trial
    court’s rulings because they precluded him from being able to “actively
    determine causation as it related to his defense.” Id.
    We review an order denying a motion for continuance for an abuse of
    discretion.   Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d 736
    , 745 (Pa. Super.
    2014); Commonwealth v. Hansley, 
    24 A.3d 410
    , 418 (Pa. Super. 2013).
    “In reviewing a denial of a continuance, the appellate court must have
    regard for the orderly administration of justice, as well as the right of the
    defendant to have adequate time to prepare a defense.” Hansley, 24 A.3d
    at 418.
    The Commonwealth charged Appellant with Third Degree Murder and
    Aggravated Assault on October 24, 2013.        On March 29, 2015, over 18
    months later, Appellant provided counsel with a list of potential witnesses
    Appellant wanted counsel to contact on his behalf.4 Counsel took no action
    in the case, but informed the court that he was ready for trial.
    4
    Counsel notes that the court appointed him to represent Appellant in
    November 2014, but shortly thereafter he was hospitalized, and was unable
    to make any progress with the case until mid-January 2014. He claims that
    this fact, and Appellant’s incarceration some distance from Westmoreland
    County, prevented him from meeting with Appellant to discuss the case
    details and trial strategy until the day before the pretrial conference.
    -9-
    J.S45026/16
    On March 30, 2015, at Appellant’s pretrial conference, counsel
    requested a continuance for the first time.         The trial court denied the
    request, based in part on the Assistant District Attorney’s opposition and his
    offer to assist Appellant in locating his potential witnesses.
    At the commencement of trial on April 7, 2015, Appellant again
    requested a continuance, this time claiming that he needed time to explore
    the possibility of hiring a medical expert to testify about the Victim’s cause
    of death.   The Assistant District Attorney opposed this request.      The trial
    court denied the Motion, and noted that Appellant had not re-raised his
    previous request for time to contact witnesses, ostensibly because he had
    interviewed them in the intervening week.
    Although we are mindful of Appellant’s right to adequately prepare his
    defense, after reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not
    abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s Motions. Appellant was aware as
    early as October 2013 that he would need to prepare a defense to the
    Aggravated Assault and Murder charges, yet his counsel waited until trial
    had commenced to notify the trial court that he was considering hiring an
    expert witness to testify as to causation.     The trial court’s decision not to
    permit a continuance at this late date was not manifestly unreasonable in
    light of the facts and the trial court’s interest in the orderly and timely
    administration of justice. See Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d at 745
    .
    - 10 -
    J.S45026/16
    In his third issue on appeal, Appellant claims the trial court abused its
    discretion in denying his request for an involuntary manslaughter jury
    instruction.5 Appellant’s Brief at 13. He avers that the facts presented could
    support a finding of recklessness or gross negligence, and, thus, an
    involuntary manslaughter instruction was warranted. Id. at 15.
    “In reviewing a challenge to the trial court's refusal to give a specific
    jury instruction, it is the function of this Court to determine whether the
    record supports the trial court's decision.” Commonwealth v. Kendricks,
    
    30 A.3d 499
    , 507 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation and citation omitted). “[O]ur
    standard of review when considering the denial of jury instruction is one of
    deference—an appellate court will reverse a court's decision only when it
    abused its discretion or committed an error of law.”        Commonwealth v.
    Baker, 
    24 A.3d 1006
    , 1022 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation and citation
    omitted). When evaluating a jury instruction, the charge must be read as a
    whole to determine whether it was fair or prejudicial. 
    Id.
    5
    The Crimes Code defines involuntary manslaughter as follows:
    § 2504. Involuntary manslaughter
    (a) General rule.—A person is guilty of involuntary
    manslaughter when as a direct result of the doing of an
    unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or
    the doing of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent
    manner, he causes the death of another person.
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a).
    - 11 -
    J.S45026/16
    Moreover, “a trial court should not instruct the jury on legal principles
    which have no application to the facts presented at trial. Rather, there must
    be some relationship between the evidence presented and the law upon
    which an instruction is requested.”   Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    876 A.2d 916
    , 925 (Pa. 2005) (quotations and internal citation omitted. “Accordingly,
    a criminal defendant must establish that the trial evidence would ‘reasonably
    support’ a verdict based on the desired charge and may not claim
    entitlement to an instruction that has no basis in the evidence presented
    during trial.” Id at 925-26.
    “In determining whether the evidence would support a manslaughter
    charge, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    defendant.” Commonwealth v. Soltis, 
    687 A.2d 1139
    , 1141 (Pa. Super.
    1996).
    In considering Appellant’s request for an involuntary manslaughter
    charge, the trial court noted that it “found no evidence in the record to
    support a determination that the killing resulted from an accident or
    negligence.” Trial Ct. Op., 10/16/15, at 10. It further opined:
    In this case, [Appellant] arranged to be present in order to
    confront [the Victim] about “backdooring” him. Almost
    immediately, he struck the unsuspecting victim in the face
    causing him to collapse. He beat him continuously for 5-
    10 minutes, striking and kicking him in the face and torso.
    Subsequent to this episode [the Victim] lost the ability to
    walk, eat or breathe independently, or speak, and
    remained curled up in a fetal position until his death.
    [Appellant] presented no evidence to show this conduct
    was accidental or grossly negligent. Thus, without making
    - 12 -
    J.S45026/16
    involuntary manslaughter an issue in the case, and
    because the beating was prolonged and brutal, the request
    for a charge of involuntary manslaughter was properly
    denied.
    
    Id.
     The record supports the trial court's decision. We agree with the trial
    court that an involuntary manslaughter jury charge was not appropriate in
    light of the evidence. Therefore, this issue lacks merit.
    In his next issue, Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his
    Post-Sentence Motion in which he alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to
    a jury of his peers was violated.      See U.S. Const. amend. VI.        Appellant
    notes that he is African-American and the jury panel from which he selected
    his jury was all white.6
    To prevail on a claim of underrepresentation of certain groups in a jury
    pool, the complainant must show: “(1) the group allegedly excluded is a
    distinctive group in the community; (2) the representation of this group in
    venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation
    of    the   number    of   such   people   in   the   community;   and   (3)   this
    underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury
    selection process. ‘Systematic’ means caused by or inherent in the system
    by which juries were selected. Proof is required of an actual discriminatory
    practice in the jury selection process, not merely underrepresentation of one
    particular group.”     Commonwealth v. Estes, 
    851 A.2d 933
    , 935 (Pa.
    6
    Appellant raised this issue during jury selection. See N.T. at 29.
    - 13 -
    J.S45026/16
    Super. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted).        “The mere showing of
    underrepresentation, absent an actual discriminatory practice in the jury
    selection process, causes [a defendant’s] constitutional claim to fail.” 
    Id. at 936
    .
    As stated by the trial court, “[i]n this case, other than objecting to the
    composition of the panel, [Appellant] made no showing that the panel was
    unfairly selected or that the underrepresentation of African Americans was
    due to a systemic exclusion of this group.            It was incumbent upon
    [Appellant] to show discrimination in the use of the jury lists. His failure to
    provide this evidence is fatal to this claim.” We agree with the trial court.
    Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.
    Next, Appellant claims the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient
    to convict him of Third Degree Murder. Appellant’s Brief at 17. He avers
    that there was insufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between
    the beating and the Victim’s death, and insufficient evidence to prove that
    Appellant acted with malice. 
    Id.
    Our standard of review of sufficiency claims is well-settled:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
    trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
    is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
    applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence
    and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
    addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
    established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence.        Any doubts regarding a
    - 14 -
    J.S45026/16
    defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
    the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
    of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
    combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
    its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
    evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
    record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
    received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact
    while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
    or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz, 
    911 A.2d 162
    , 165 (Pa. Super. 2006)
    (quotation and citation omitted).
    Murder in the third-degree is defined as “all other kinds of murder”
    other than first-degree and second-degree murder. 18 Pa. C.S. § 2502(c).
    In Commonwealth v. Seibert, 
    622 A.2d 361
    , 364 (Pa. Super. 1993), the
    Court states “the elements of third-degree murder, as developed by case
    law, are a killing done with legal malice but without the specific intent to kill
    required in first-degree murder.” "Malice express or implied is the criteria
    and absolutely the essential ingredient of murder." Commonwealth v.
    Commander, 
    260 A.2d 773
    , 776 (Pa. 1970). “Malice may be found to exist
    not only in an intentional killing, but also in an unintentional homicide,
    where the perpetrator ‘consciously disregarded an unjustified and extremely
    high risk that his actions might cause death or serious bodily harm.’”
    Commonwealth v. Young, 
    431 A.2d 230
    , 232 (Pa. 1981).
    Addressing Appellant’s sufficiency challenges, trial court opined that
    the jury found that the Victim’s “condition prior to the beating, and his
    - 15 -
    J.S45026/16
    condition immediately thereafter was consistent with his injuries as
    established by the coroner and medical witnesses.”       Trial Ct. Op. at 11.
    Although Appellant claims that the Commonwealth’s witnesses provided
    contradictory and inconsistent testimony, the trial court noted that, “the
    jury, making its own credibility determinations, decided which testimony to
    believe and which to reject.” 
    Id.
    The Commonwealth’s evidence established that Appellant arranged to
    to be present in order to confront the Victim about “backdooring” him.
    Almost immediately, Appellant struck the Victim in the face causing him to
    collapse. Appellant continued to beat the Victim for 5-10 minutes, striking
    and kicking him in the face and torso. We agree with the trial court that the
    Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence of malice, and a causal
    connection between the beating and the Victim’s death, for the jury to find
    Appellant guilty of Third Degree Murder. Accordingly, this issue fails.
    Last, Appellant claims the verdict was against the weight of the
    evidence.   Appellant’s Brief at 17. Specifically, Appellant claims that the
    testimony of the medical witnesses was inconsistent with the Victim’s
    injuries.
    We note that, when considering challenges to the weight of the
    evidence, “[]he weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact[,]
    who is free to believe all, none or some of the evidence and to determine the
    credibility of witnesses.”   Commonwealth v. Talbert, 
    129 A.3d 536
    , 545
    - 16 -
    J.S45026/16
    (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further,
    “[i]n order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the
    evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the
    verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” Id. at 546 (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).
    In the instant matter, the jury, as the fact-finder, made its own
    credibility determinations and decided which testimony to believe and which
    to reject. It “found that [the Victim’s] condition prior to the beating, and his
    condition immediately thereafter was consistent with his injuries as
    established by the coroner and medical witnesses.” Trial Ct. Op. at 11. We
    will not disturb the jury’s findings as they do not “shock[] the conscience of
    the [C]ourt.” Talbert, 129 A.3d at 546 (quotation and citation omitted).
    For   the   foregoing reasons, we       affirm Appellant’s   Judgment of
    Sentence.
    Judgment of Sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/10/2016
    - 17 -
    J.S45026/16
    - 18 -