Oakley, K. v. Clark, T. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S51044-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    KAYEEJAH OAKLEY,                                 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    THOMAS RICHARD CLARK,
    Appellant                No. 3000 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 26, 2015
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No.: 140100583
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:                            FILED AUGUST 12, 2016
    Appellant, Thomas Richard Clark, appeals from the trial court’s August
    26, 2015 order entering judgment in favor of Appellee, Kayeejah Oakley,
    and denying his motion for post-trial relief.1 Specifically, he claims that the
    court should have granted post-trial relief because it erred in granting
    Appellee’s motion in limine. We affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    Appellant purports to appeal from the August 26, 2015 order denying his
    post-trial motion. “An appeal from the denial of post-trial motions is
    interlocutory and not a final appealable order.” Sagamore Estates Prop.
    Owners Ass'n v. Sklar, 
    81 A.3d 981
    , 983 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
    omitted). However, the prothonotary also entered judgment on August 26,
    2015. “The entry of judgment sufficiently perfects our jurisdiction, and we
    may proceed to consider the appeal on its merits.” 
    Id.
     We have corrected
    the caption to reflect that Appellant is appealing from the judgment entered.
    J-S51044-16
    We take the factual and procedural history in this matter from our
    review of the certified record and the trial court’s December 15, 2015
    opinion.     On January 9, 2014, Appellee filed a breach of contract action
    against Appellant alleging that he breached an oral contract between the
    parties when he refused to deliver title to a Porsche Panamera after Appellee
    made all required payments to him.
    Prior to trial, the court considered two motions in limine filed by
    Appellee. The first, filed May 13, 2015, sought to preclude introduction of
    evidence from unrelated criminal proceedings involving the parties.        The
    second, filed May 15, 2015, sought to preclude evidence in the form of text
    messages, which he contended were produced after the discovery deadline
    had passed. Appellant filed an answer to the first motion, but failed to file
    an answer to the second motion, in contradiction of the court’s pretrial
    order, which required a response to motions within ten days of service. 2
    (See Order, 5/04/15).          On June 11, 2015, the court denied Appellee’s
    ____________________________________________
    2
    The relevant portion of the pretrial order provides:
    (4) Motions in Limine shall be filed and served upon all
    opposing counsel not later than fifteen (15) days before jury
    selection for trial. . . . Respondent(s) shall file and serve an
    answer within ten (10) days thereafter. If Motions in Limine
    have been resolved or are uncontested, the trial judge should be
    notified immediately.
    (Order, 5/04/15).
    -2-
    J-S51044-16
    motion to preclude evidence of criminal proceedings.        (See N.T. Hearing,
    6/11/15, at 11; Order, 6/11/15). With respect to Appellee’s motion in limine
    seeking to preclude the text message evidence, it found that counsel had
    nearly one month to answer, and yet failed to file a response or opposition
    to the motion. Therefore, it granted the motion and precluded evidence of
    the text messages. (See N.T. Hearing, 6/11/15, at 11-13; Order, 6/11/15).
    Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied.
    The case proceeded to a jury trial on June 12, 2015. At trial, Appellee
    testified that in July 2012, he was in the market for a new car. (See N.T.
    Trial, 6/12/15, at 46).   However, because his credit score was so low, he
    was unable to obtain financing for a loan.      (See id. at 47).   At the time,
    Appellant and Appellee were close friends. (See id. at 45).
    Appellee testified that when he found out that he was unable to
    purchase the car in his own name, he asked Appellant, “let me just put it in
    your name and then put the rest of the loan in your name, and let me pay it
    off, and then once it’s paid off, you give me the title and I will put the car in
    my name.” (Id. at 49). Appellee intended to pay sixty-thousand dollars as
    a down payment for the car. (See id. at 50). Thereafter, he agreed to pay
    off the car as quickly as possible by giving Appellant “lump sum payments
    every chance that [he] got[,]” and to make the payments either directly, in
    person to Appellant, or by depositing the payments into Appellant’s bank
    account. (Id.; see id. at 169-70). Appellee claims that pursuant to their
    agreement he was responsible for paying off the car before Appellant
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    J-S51044-16
    purchased a new car, which he anticipated would happen in one or two
    years. (See id. at 49-50, 134).
    On July 5, 2012, Appellant and Appellee went to the Main Line Porsche
    dealership and purchased the vehicle.          Appellee paid the agreed to
    $60,000.00 down payment. (See id. at 53). Appellant obtained financing
    for the $35,000.00 balance due on the car through Gateway Lending, the
    dealership’s finance company.     (See id. at 54-55).   The loan had a sixty-
    month term at a twelve and one-half percent interest rate, which resulted in
    monthly minimum payments of $764.57. (See id. at 56-57).
    In his trial testimony, Appellant testified that he and Appellee agreed
    that if Appellee gave him “[h]alf the money down on the car, collateral for
    the remaining balance of the car and [payment of the balance] in six
    months[,]” Appellant would sign for the loan. (N.T. Trial, 6/15/15, at 46).
    He testified that after he and Appellee purchased the car, Appellee gave him
    a Rolex watch, which was worth at least twenty-five thousand dollars, as
    collateral.   (See id. at 50).   He and Appellee had a falling out in October
    2012, after which they agreed that Appellant would give Appellee back the
    watch, Appellee would “cash it out,” meaning that he would sell the watch,
    and use the money to pay off the loan. (Id. at 54; see id. at 52-54).
    Appellant testified that from June through December 2012, Appellee
    made cash deposits of varying amounts into his bank account for the car
    loan, and in January 2013, Appellee gave him $9,000.00 in cash as
    payment.      (See N.T. Trial, 6/12/15, at 195-96).     Appellee’s deposits all
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    J-S51044-16
    exceeded the minimum loan payment.            (See id. at 200).      Appellant
    conceded that in November 2013, Appellee paid him $9,080.00, which he
    confirmed was the final amount due on the loan.         (See id. at 206-07).
    However, Appellant did not pay off the loan from Gateway Lending, because
    he perceived the agreement between the parties to have required the loan
    to be paid off in six months, by December 2012. (See id. at 170, 208).
    Appellant had the car repossessed from Appellee in November 2013.
    (See N.T. Trial, 6/15/15, at 58). He later sold the car for fifty-one thousand
    dollars. (See id. at 93). Appellant agreed that Appellee paid approximately
    ninety-five thousand dollars on the car; however, he explained that he did
    not give him any money back after he sold the car because Appellee had
    breached their contract. (See id. at 91). Appellant did not make an oral or
    written motion for a directed verdict at the close of evidence.
    On June 15, 2015, the jury arrived at a unanimous verdict finding that
    a contract existed between the parties, Appellee satisfied his obligations
    under the contract, and Appellant breached his obligations.       (See id. at
    170). The jury awarded Appellee damages of $60,000.00. (See id. at 171).
    On June 25, 2015, Appellant filed a motion for post-trial relief, in
    which he sought a new trial or alternatively, entry of judgment in his favor.
    He argued that the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s motion in limine.
    In his brief, Appellant also attempted to obtain a directed verdict pursuant to
    Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 226.     See Pa.R.C.P. 226(b) (“At the
    close of all the evidence, the trial judge may direct a verdict upon the oral
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    J-S51044-16
    or written motion of any party.”) (emphasis added). On August 26, 2015,
    the trial court denied Appellant’s motion and entered judgment in favor of
    Appellee.
    This timely appeal followed. Pursuant to the trial court’s order,
    Appellant filed his timely statement of errors complained of on appeal on
    December 24, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court entered its opinion
    on December 15, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
    Appellant raises two questions on appeal:
    1. Whether the trial court’s August 26, 2015, order was an
    abuse of discretion and error of law when it denied [Appellant’s]
    [p]ost-trial motion seeking a new trial due to the trial court’s
    granting of [Appellee’s] [m]otion in [l]imine which precluded the
    entry at trial of various text messages exchanged between the
    parties which were germane to the underlying transaction at
    issue[?]
    2. Whether the trial court’s August 26, 2015, order was an
    abuse of discretion and error of law when it denied Appellant’s
    [p]ost-trial motion seeking entry of judgment pursuant to
    Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(a)(2) because had the various text messages
    been admitted at trial, the jury would have likely returned a
    verdict in favor of Appellee [sic] [?]
    (Appellant’s Brief, at 4).3
    ____________________________________________
    3
    We note that Appellant attempts to raise an additional issue in his brief
    challenging the denial of an alleged motion for a directed verdict. (See
    Appellant’s Brief, at 13).   However, this issue was not raised in his
    statement of questions presented, nor can it be inferred therefrom. See
    Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Appellant also failed to raise it in his statement of errors
    complained of on appeal.      Accordingly, it is waived.         See Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b)(4)(vii).
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    J-S51044-16
    Our standard of review concerning denial of a post-trial motion is well-
    settled.
    [O]ur standard of review when faced with an appeal from
    the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is whether the
    trial court clearly and palpably committed an error of law that
    controlled the outcome of the case or constituted an abuse of
    discretion. In examining the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the verdict winner, to reverse the trial court, we must
    conclude that the verdict would change if another trial were
    granted. Further, if the basis of the request for a new trial is the
    trial court’s rulings on evidence, then such rulings must be
    shown to have been not only erroneous but also harmful to the
    complaining parties. Evidentiary rulings which did not affect the
    verdict will not provide a basis for disturbing the jury’s
    judgment. . . .
    Moreover, the admission or exclusion of evidence is within
    the sound discretion of the trial court. In reviewing a challenge
    to the admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling by
    the trial court upon a showing that it abused its discretion or
    committed an error of law.
    Blumer v. Ford Motor Co., 
    20 A.3d 1222
    , 1226 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal
    denied, 
    49 A.3d 441
     (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).
    Our standard of review when considering motions for a directed
    verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are identical.
    We will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a judgment
    notwithstanding the verdict only when we find an abuse of
    discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    Moreover, after careful review of the certified record, we find that
    Appellant failed to make an oral or written motion for a directed verdict at
    the close of the evidence. See Pa.R.C.P. 226(b); Haan v. Wells, 
    103 A.3d 60
    , 68 (Pa. Super. 2014) (reasoning that failure to move for directed verdict
    results in waiver of right to seek judgment n.o.v.); (see also N.T. Trial,
    6/15/15, at 98-101). Accordingly, this issue is waived.
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    J-S51044-16
    case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is
    the same as that for a trial court.
    Drake Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Polyflow, Inc., 
    109 A.3d 250
    , 258–59 (Pa. Super.
    2015) (citations omitted). Furthermore, “post-trial relief may not be granted
    unless the grounds therefor, (1) if then available, were raised in pre-trial
    proceedings or by motion, objection, point for charge, request for findings of
    fact or conclusions of law, offer of proof or other appropriate method at
    trial[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b).
    In both of Appellant’s issues, he argues that the trial court erred and
    abused its discretion when it granted Appellee’s motion in limine because
    Appellant failed to respond to the motion.4 (See Appellant’s Brief, at 7-12).
    Although he alleges the trial court’s error prejudiced him at trial because it
    resulted in the jury not viewing all of the evidence, he does not provide any
    pertinent discussion concerning whether such error controlled the outcome
    of the case. (See id. at 9-11). Accordingly, Appellant has failed to develop
    any pertinent argument that invokes the applicable standard of review. See
    Drake Mfg. Co., Inc., supra at 258–59; Blumer, 
    supra at 1226
    .
    Appellant’s issues are waived and would not merit relief.
    ____________________________________________
    4
    Appellant failed to comply with our Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring
    the argument section in his brief to be divided into as many parts as there
    are questions to be argued, with pertinent discussion and citation of
    authority concerning each point. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Accordingly, and
    because his questions both concern the trial court’s abuse of discretion in
    granting Appellee’s motion, we discuss Appellant’s issues together.
    -8-
    J-S51044-16
    A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine is
    subject to an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review.
    Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie
    within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will
    not reverse the court’s decision absent a clear abuse of
    discretion.   An abuse of discretion may not be found
    merely because an appellate court might have reached a
    different   conclusion,    but     requires     a   manifest
    unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will,
    or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.
    In addition, to constitute reversible error, an evidentiary
    ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or
    prejudicial to the complaining party.
    Parr v. Ford Motor Co., 
    109 A.3d 682
    , 690–91 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
    banc), appeal denied, 
    123 A.3d 331
     (Pa. 2015), cert. denied, 
    136 S.Ct. 557
    (2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Here, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion in limine after Appellant
    did not file a response objecting to the motion within the ten days provided
    by the court’s order. (See Order, 5/04/15). In fact, Appellant failed to file
    any response to the motion within the nearly one-month period after the
    motion was filed before the court heard argument, and “could provide no
    reason for [his] failure to respond at the trial [c]ourt hearing on [m]otions in
    [l]imine.” (Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/15, at 2). As such, the trial court’s
    decision to grant Appellee’s unopposed motion in limine was not manifestly
    unreasonable, or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.   See
    Parr, supra at 690–91.
    Furthermore, the record is clear that “[Appellant] offered ample
    testimony in his own behalf, and evidence in his own behalf. The jury, as
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    J-S51044-16
    fact finder, did not believe him.” (Trial Ct. Op., at 4). Rather, “[s]ufficient
    evidence was adduced at trial that [Appellant] had the Porsche on which
    [Appellee] had put a down payment of $60,000.00 repossessed without
    consent or knowledge of [Appellee], had converted money [Appellee] had
    given [him] to pay off the car loan, and had sold [Appellee’s] car without
    remunerating [him].” (Id. at 6).
    Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s
    motion for post-trial relief where Appellant has failed to demonstrate an
    abuse of discretion or error of law, which controlled the outcome of the case.
    See Drake Mfg. Co., Inc., supra at 258–59; Blumer, 
    supra at 1226
    .
    Appellant’s issues do not merit relief.
    Judgment affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/12/2016
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3000 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 8/12/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/13/2016