In Re: C.S., a Minor ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: C.S., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: J.R.B. AND B.J.B. : No. 1401 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree, April 25, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
Domestic Relations Division at No. A2014-0002b
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 30, 2018
J.R.B and B.J.B. (“appellants”) appeal from the decree entered
April 25, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County by the
Honorable Craig A. Daily, vacating the adoption decree dated March 29,
2017, denying appellants’ petition for the adoption of C.S. (“the Child”), a
female born in July of 2009, and granting the adoption petition of A.S., the
Child’s maternal aunt.1 After careful review, we affirm.
By way of background, the Child is the natural child of R.F. (“Mother”)
and E.S. (“Father”). Mother struggled with drug addiction, and in
anticipation of being remanded to prison, Mother placed the Child with
1A.S. is Mother’s first cousin, and the adoptive mother of C.S.’s full-blooded
younger twin sisters, O.S. and G.S. (the “Twins”). The Twins were placed
with A.S. on August 2, 2012, when they were seven weeks old.
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appellants on September 6, 2012.2 Upon Mother’s release from prison, the
Child returned to Mother’s care but was once again voluntarily placed by
Mother with appellants on April 30, 2013, in anticipation of entering inpatient
drug rehabilitation. Mother was released from treatment on or about
May 30, 2013, and died of a drug overdose on May 31, 2013.
From the time of the Child’s birth through the time of Mother’s entry
into drug rehabilitation in April of 2013, A.S. had regular and routine contact
with Mother and the Child. The Child was adjudicated dependent in 2013,
and Northampton County Children, Youth, and Families Division (“CYF”)
assumed custody of the Child. CYF continued the Child’s placement with
appellants, and A.S. exercised weekend and holiday visits with the Child
through December 2014, which limited A.S.’s ability to perform parental
duties for the Child. In 2013, A.S. and other maternal family members
regularly had unsupervised weekend visits with the Child.
CYF ceased all contact between the Child and her maternal family,
including A.S., from the end of December 2014, following a Christmas visit,
until July 2015, when visits between A.S. and the Child were supervised by
CYF. Supervised visits continued through May 2016, and they were limited
to two-hour visits every two weeks. On or about May 20, 2016, maternal
2 Appellants are the adoptive parents of a daughter, G.B., age 9, and house
their niece, K.C., age 13.
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family, including A.S., were once again permitted unsupervised weekend
visits with the Child.
Father was incarcerated until January of 2015. During his
incarceration, Father engaged with the Child via Skype, and participated, via
telephone, with all juvenile court proceedings. Father participated with
services to the best of his ability, while complying with the terms of his
probation. On May 26, 2015, Father executed a “Consent for Adoption by
Father of Child.” On June 24, 2015, CYF filed a petition to confirm consent.
A hearing on the petition was held on July 28, 2015, at which time Father
indicated he wished to revoke his consent. On August 17, 2015, the trial
court entered a final decree, dated August 11, 2015, terminating Father’s
parental rights to the Child. Father did not appeal the termination of his
parental rights.
Appellants filed an adoption petition on December 30, 2016. A.S. filed
a competing adoption petition on January 5, 2016. On March 29, 2017, the
trial court entered an adoption decree granting A.S.’s adoption petition, and
denying appellants’ adoption decree. On April 25, 2017, the trial entered a
second decree, vacating its March 29, 2017 decree, in order to procedurally
address the Child’s adoption subsidy payment, and re-entered the adoption
decree in A.S.’ favor.
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On April 28, 2017, appellants timely filed this notice of appeal,
together with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), with regards to the decree.
On appeal, appellants raise three issues, as follow:
I. Did the trial court commit an error of law and
abuse its discretion in this contested adoption
matter by failing to consider and finding to be
relevant and pertinent all pleadings and
testimony regarding the best interests of the
Child in question including the placement of
the Child with the appellants for [three and
one-half] years prior thereto[?]
II. Did the trial court commit an error of law and
abuse its discretion in this contested adoption
matter by failing to consider and apply
appropriate weight to the persuasive testimony
of the two (2) expert witnesses who presented
testimony at time of trial as to the best
interests of the Child in question[?]
III. Did the trial court committed an error of law
and abuse its discretion in this contested
adoption matter by not placing appropriate
weight on the findings and reports of the
guardian ad litem and the caseworkers and
agents of [CYF] as to the best interests of the
Child in question[?]
Appellants’ brief at 6 (capitalization omitted).
Once parental rights have been terminated, anyone may become an
adoptive parent, and the best interest of the child is the controlling factor by
which a court must be guided. In re Adoption of D.M.H., 682 A.2d 315
(Pa.Super. 1996). In an adoption proceeding, a trial court must base its
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conclusions upon all relevant information discerned with the full participation
of all interested parties. Id.
This court has the broadest discretion in reviewing appeals from
adoption decrees:
[A]ppellate review of child custody Orders is of the
broadest type, McMillen v. McMillen, 529 Pa. 198,
602 A.2d 845 (1992), and we may modify the trial
court’s custody determination where it is shown by
evidence of record to be manifestly unreasonable,
In re: David L.C., 376 Pa.Super. 615, 546 A.2d 694
(1988); see also Robinson v. Robinson, 538 Pa.
52, 645 A.2d 836 (1994) (appella[te] interference
warranted where custody Order is manifestly
unreasonable). Further, our review is not bound by
the trial court’s deductions, inferences and
interpretations of evidence and we will exercise
independent judgment to consider the merits of the
case and to enter an Order that is correct and just.
Bucci v. Bucci, 351 Pa.Super. 457, 506 A.2d 438
(1986).
In re Adoption of D.M.H., 682 A.2d 315, 318 (Pa.Super. 1996), quoting
In Interest of G.C., 673 A.2d 932, 943 (Pa.Super. 1996) (en banc).
The proceedings in an adoption hearing are unique and involve parties,
experts, investigators, and non-parties to a greater extent than in custody
hearings, but ultimately are subject to the same standard, “that being the
best interest of the child.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d at 1015, citing In re
Adoption of A.S.H., 674 A.2d 698 (Pa.Super. 1996).
As all of appellants’ issues arise out of the question of whether the trial
court considered the best interest of the Child, as defined by the Child
Custody Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328, we will address them together.
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Section 5328(a) of the Act provides as follows:
§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding
custody
(a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the
court shall determine the best interest of the
child by considering all relevant factors, giving
weighted consideration to those factors which
affect the safety of the child, including the
following:
(1) Which party is more likely to
encourage and permit frequent and
continuing contact between the
child and another party.
(2) The present and past abuse
committed by a party or member
of the party’s household, whether
there is a continued risk of harm to
the child or an abused party and
which party can better provide
adequate physical safeguards and
supervision of the child.
(2.1) The information set forth in
section 5329.1(a)(1) and (2)
(relating to consideration of
child abuse and involvement
with protective services).
(3) The parental duties performed by
each party on behalf of the child.
(4) The need for stability and
continuity in the child’s education,
family life and community life.
(5) The availability of extended family.
(6) The child’s sibling relationships.
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(7) The well-reasoned preference of
the child, based on the child’s
maturity and judgment.
(8) The attempts of a parent to turn
the child against the other parent,
except in cases of domestic
violence where reasonable safety
measures are necessary to protect
the child from harm.
(9) Which party is more likely to
maintain a loving, stable,
consistent and nurturing
relationship with the child adequate
for the child’s emotional needs.
(10) Which party is more likely to
attend to the daily physical,
emotional, developmental,
educational and special needs of
the child.
(11) The proximity of the residences of
the parties.
(12) Each party’s availability to care for
the child or ability to make
appropriate child-care
arrangements.
(13) The level of conflict between the
parties and the willingness and
ability of the parties to cooperate
with one another. A party’s effort
to protect a child from abuse by
another party is not evidence of
unwillingness or inability to
cooperate with that party.
(14) The history of drug or alcohol
abuse of a party or member of a
party’s household.
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(15) The mental and physical condition
of a party or member of a party’s
household.
(16) Any other relevant factor.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(1-16).
Citing A.S.H., appellants argue the trial court’s paramount concern in
both custody and adoption matters is the best interest of the child. In re
Adoption of A.S.H., 674 A.2d 698, 700 (Pa.Super. 1996). (Appellants’
brief at 10.) Appellants argue that, while A.S. is a blood relative to the Child
and the appellants are not, A.S. is not the parent of the Child, and as such,
the burden of proof should be allocated equally between appellants and A.S.
(Id. at 12).
We are mindful that, when possible, the preservation of the family is
the desired outcome in custody matters. However, “[t]he goal of preserving
the family unit cannot be elevated above all other factors when considering
the best interests of the children, but must be weighed in conjunction with
other factors.” In re Adoption of G.R.L., 26 A.3d 1124, 1127
(Pa.Super.2011) (citation omitted).
Additionally, the Orphans’ Court has the duty to consider the
statements and opinions of the guardian ad litem when making its
determination of which family would better serve the bests interests of the
child. Adoption of D.M.H., 682 A.2d 315, 322 (Pa.Super. 1996).
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Instantly, the trial court issued its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on May 1,
2017, and stated that the reasons of the trial court can be found in its
March 29, 2017 order, in which it considered all of the Section 5328(a) best
interest factors, and its April 25, 2017 adoption decree. (See trial court
opinion, 5/1/17.)
A review of the trial court’s March 29, 2017 order reveals that the trial
court performed a detailed analysis of the Section 5328(a) factors. (Trial
court order, 3/29/17 at 6-24.) The trial court concluded that it is in the
Child’s best interest to be adopted by A.S. (Id. at 28.)
When considering Section 5328(a)(1), the trial court concluded:
The [c]ourt is satisfied that both parties are
cognizant of the importance of the child maintaining
ties with the other, and with extended family
members on both sides. Moreover, their ability to
work together to date to ensure visits in accordance
with [CYF’s] instructions, coupled with their
willingness to offer one another Act 101 Agreements,
demonstrates that the parties are interested in
ensuring ongoing contact between the child and the
other party.
Finally, while [appellants] make much of the fact
that their Act 101 agreement offers [A.S.] more
contact that the agreement she offers, the [c]ourt is
not convinced that a greater amount of contact with
the non-adoptive party is necessarily in the [C]hild’s
best interests. Specifically, while the [c]ourt
believes that the adoptive party may need to be
flexible and willing to adjust visitation schedules to
meet the needs of the [C]hild, it is ultimately in the
[C]hild’s best interest to be well established in the
care and custody of the adoptive party, and that may
be best accomplished by regular, but not overly-
frequent contact with the non-adoptive party.
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Moreover, despite [CYF’s] position permitting contact
between the [C]hild and [Father] under the
supervision of [appellants], and the endorsement of
the same by permanency caseworker, Jose “Alex”
Carrillo, who offered no testimony that he has ever
observed the [C]hild with [Father], the [c]ourt is not
convinced that it is in the [C]hild’s best interests that
she visit or be exposed to him, or a number of the
people with whom [appellants] maintain ties. Nor is
the [c]ourt convinced that leaving such contact to
the judgment and supervision of [appellants] is in
the best interests of the [C]hild. In the [c]ourt’s
view, the questionable influence of the individuals
that the [C]hild is exposed to by [appellants]
presents a safety issue, and as such, the [c]ourt
accords greater weight to this factor, pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). However, in so doing, the
[c]ourt notes that the record is devoid of testimony
that the [C]hild has been placed in harms’ [sic] way
by contact with these individuals, and the weight
accorded is tempered by that fact.
Id. at 9-10 (internal citations and footnote omitted).
The trial court considered, pursuant to Section 5328(a)(2) and
(a)(2.1), whether there has been past or present abuse committed by a
party, or a member of the party’s household, whether there is a continued
risk of harm to the child or an abused party, and which party can better
provide physical safeguards and supervision of the child. The trial court
stated:
In this case, no evidence was presented regarding
abuse of the [C]hild, or any abuse committed by any
party or member of their household. However, we
note that [J.R.B.] has been arrested five times, and
the two most recent arrests, in 2005 and 2006,
relate to Simple Assault charges. The 2005 charges
were withdrawn, and the 2006 charges, which arose
from an incident with [B.R.B.’s] adult son, who was
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also charged, resulted in a guilty plea. By contrast,
[A.S.] has no arrest record, and presents as a calm
and peaceful individual.
Id. at 11.
Next the trial court examined the performance of parental duties by
each party on behalf of the child pursuant to Section 5328(a)(3). The trial
court considered the testimony of A.S., as well as the testimony of B.J.B. in
concluding:
[T]he [c]ourt is satisfied that to date, [appellants]
have successfully provided for the [C]hild’s daily
needs, performing all necessary activities of daily
living with and/or for the [C]hild as necessary, and
providing her love and support. Likewise, the [c]ourt
is satisfied that A.S. has done the same for the
[C]hild during her custodial periods. However, as
previously noted, the [c]ourt has concerns that
[appellants] may fail to recognize situations that
may not be in the best interests of the [C]hild, and
they may be ill-equipped to protect her from
exposure to potentially harmful or otherwise
inappropriate circumstances.
Id. at 12.
Turning to Section 5328(a)(4), the trial court considered the stability
and continuity of the Child’s education, family, and community life. The trial
court noted:
[T]he [C]hild, who is presently seven (7) years old,
has been residing continually in [appellants’] home
for the last three and one-half (3 ½) years, and she
is closely bonded with [appellants], and with her nine
year-old half-sister, G.B. She is a second grader at
Washington Elementary School in Bangor,
Pennsylvania. She is a cheerleader for the Bangor
Slaters, but is not otherwise engaged in any
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community activities. [The Child] has had a lifelong
bond with [A.S.], and she has siblings in both
homes. The [C]hild’s own testimony indicates that
she is bonded to all of these siblings and that she
enjoys the time she spends in both homes. While
the grant of [A.S.’] adoption petition would require
that the [C]hild change communities and schools,
the [c]ourt finds that given the child’s young age,
her limited involvement in activities, and the promise
of continuing contact with G.B. and [appellants], the
challenges that would be presented by such a
change are not so insurmountable as to weigh
against [A.S.’] petition.
Id. at 12 (internal citations omitted).
The trial court’s analysis of Section 5328(a)(5), the availability of
extended family, is as follows:
The [C]hild is deeply loved by family members
associated with both parties. She has a strong bond
to [appellants] and . . . G.B., and she has close
associations to their other family members. She also
has a close bond to [A.S.], [the Twins], and all of her
maternal family members, including her two older
brothers. Through [appellants], the [C]hild also has
contact with [Father] . . . . While [CYF] does not
preclude this contact, the [c]ourt does not believe
that it is in the [C]hild’s best interests.
....
Consequently, the [C]hild has a great number of
people who are interested in her well-being.
However, [A.S.’] status as a blood relative and her
familial connection to a greater number of the
[C]hild’s blood relatives, which includes her older
brothers and family interested in and involved with
her . . . causes the [c]ourt to weigh this factor in
favor of [A.S.] It should be noted however, that the
weight of this factor is tempered by each party’s
willingness to execute Act 101 agreements in favor
of the other party.
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Id. at 12-13.
Examining the Child’s relationship with her siblings, pursuant to
Section 5328(a)(5), the trial court found:
The [C]hild has two full-blooded siblings, [the
Twins], who are the adoptive children of [A.S.,] G.B.,
who is the adoptive daughter of [appellants], is the
natural child of Father, and [the Child’s] half-sibling.
[The Child] also has two half-brothers, who are the
natural children of Mother. . . .
There was considerable testimony offered during trial
with respect to the fact that [A.S.] has not fostered a
relationship between her daughters [the Twins], with
their half-sister, G.B.[,] and the distress this has
caused [the Child.] If the Court were to grant [A.S.’]
adoption petition, it would clearly be in the best
interests of the [C]hild to maintain her relationship
with G.B., and if the [c]ourt were to grant
[appellants’] petition, it would be in the best
interests of the [C]hild to maintain a relationship
with [the Twins] and the rest of her maternal family.
In this regard, the [c]ourt is satisfied that the
Act 101 Agreements offered by the parties are
sufficient to foster the familial bonds between the
sisters. However, the [c]ourt notes that the grant of
[A.S.’] adoption petition would also afford the [C]hild
a full opportunity to rebuild a bond with her
half-brothers, with whom [appellants] have no
contact. The [C]hild has a half-brother who is in the
primary care of his paternal grandmother, and in the
care of the children’s maternal grandmother every
other weekend, and the [C]hild has another
half-brother, who has previously been in the care of
maternal grandmother, but was in a residential
placement to address behavioral issues at the time
of trial, and has remained connected to his maternal
family since Mother’s passing. In the absence of any
countervailing concerns, the [c]ourt believes that
fostering the [C]hild’s consanguineous relationships,
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or her blood ties, is paramount to her longterm [sic]
welfare.
Id. at 12-14 (internal citations omitted).
Next, the trial court turned to Section 5328(a)(6), the Child’s
preference, and concluded:
The [C]hild has been in [appellants’] home for
approximately half her lifetime to date, she feels
loved and supported there, and she is comfortable in
that situation. Notably, however, the [C]hild clearly
feels loved, comfortable, and safe in the homes of
both parties, and she is bonded in both homes.
While the [c]ourt believes that a change in her living
arrangements attendant with an adoption would be a
major adjustment, the [c]ourt is satisfied that given
her young age, her ability to articulate her feelings,
and the promise of continuing contact with all
parties, the [C]hild could make the adjustment
successfully.
Id. at 16.
The trial court examined whether there was any attempt by one party
to turn the Child against the other, pursuant to Section 5328(a)(7). The
trial court noted:
Given that the [c]ourt is ruling on competing
adoption petitions and not deciding custody as
between parents, the relationship between the
parties is not as critical. However, because the
[c]ourt believes that it is in the [C]hild’s best
interests to maintain contact with the family that is
not permitted to adopt, it is important that the
parties are able to get along sufficiently to honor and
effectuate an Act 101 agreement, and during the
testimony of both parties, they indicated that they
are so prepared. Upon consideration, the [c]ourt
finds the testimony credible.
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Id. at 17.
Section 5328(a)(9) requires that the trial court consider the Child’s
emotional needs to determine which party is more likely to maintain a
loving, stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship with the Child,
adequate for the Child’s emotional needs. The trial court acknowledged that
the Child has experienced significant trauma in her life, and opined:
While [appellants] are unquestionably loving toward
the [C]hild, and they do their best to care for her,
the [c]ourt is concerned that [B.J.B.] in particular, as
the primary caregiver, is ill-equipped to make
decisions contrary to what she believes the [C]hild’s
wishes, when required to assure her best interests.
Further, the [c]ourt is concerned that [appellants]
may not be equipped to identify and address the
[C]hild’s emotional needs in a timely and effective
manner.
Id. at 18.
The trial court then considered the daily needs of the Child, pursuant
to Section 5328(a)(10) to determine “which party is more likely to attend to
the daily physical, emotional, developmental, educational, and special needs
of the Child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5328(a)(10). After considering the evidence
presented, the trial court concluded:
To date, [appellants] have provided satisfactory care
for the [C]hild. However, the [c]ourt is concerned
about their somewhat lackadaisical attitude toward
addressing the death of the [C]hild’s mother and the
resulting trauma to her. The [c]ourt also has
concerns about the ability of [appellants] to put the
needs of the [C]hild above the wishes of the [C]hild
when it is necessary to do so.
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It was also noted at trial that [B.J.B.] has some
learning difficulties and is sometimes unable to help
the [C]hild with her homework. While this, in and of
itself is not a concern, the [c]ourt’s concern
regarding [appellants’] judgment and [B.J.B.’s] own
expressed tendency to cater to the wishes of the
children in her home give the [c]ourt pause as to
whether [appellants] are sufficiently equipped to
identify the [C]hild’s need for additional supports and
to initiate and facilitate the [C]hild’s access to the
same as necessary.
By contrast, [A.S.] appears, by virtue of what
appears to be a very deliberate and attentive nature,
more than adequately motivated and capable of
identifying the [C]hild’s needs and ensuring the
timely provision of appropriate supports
Trial court order, 3/29/17 at 18-19.
Noting that Section 5328(a)(11) has limited application in this matter,
the trial court nevertheless considered the proximity of residences of the
parties. The trial court stated it “has no concerns that the proximity of the
parties’ residences will impinge in any way on the custodial care of the
[C]hild in the long run.” (Id. at 19.)
Reviewing Section 5328(a)(12) for each party’s ability to care for the
Child, or make appropriate child-care arrangements, the trial court again
stated that it “has no concerns in this regard,” as neither party alleges that
the other is unable to provide child-care. (Id.)
Next, the trial court gave limited weight to Section 5328(a)(13), which
directs the trial court to evaluate the level of conflict between the parties
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because this is an adoption matter, not a custody matter. The trial court
found:
it is in the best interests of the [C]hild that there be
an Act 101 agreement in place, it is essential that
the parties be able to work together to see that
through. Given their current practice, the [c]ourt is
satisfied in this regard.
Id. at 20.
Section 5328(a)(14) requires the trial court to consider “the history of
drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member of a party’s household.”
Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(14). The trial court noted that there were no
allegations of drug or alcohol abuse by any party, or member of a party’s
household, that both parties have family members in recovery, and that
appellants have a family member in early recovery living next door. The
trial court stated:
[w]hile this fact does not bear on the [c]ourt’s
determination, because both parties will continue to
have contact with the [C]hild after the [c]ourt’s
ruling on the adoption petitions, they are reminded
to be vigilant in protecting the [C]hild from exposure
to situations where an individual’s substance use
could put her in harm’s way.
Trial court order, 3/29/17 at 20-21.
Next, the trial court considered the mental and physical conditions of
the parties and any members of their household pursuant to
Section 5328(a)(15). The trial court determined that while appellants have
health issues, it did not “believe that their health issues, which are controlled
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by physician-prescribed medication, are of any consequence to the [c]ourt’s
determination in this case.” (Id. at 21.)
Finally, Section 5328(a)(16) requires the trial court to consider “any
other factor.” Pa.C.S.A. §5328(a)(16). In its evaluation of the Child’s best
interest, the trial court considered the opinion of the Child’s guardian
ad litem (“GAL”). The trial court concluded:
Pursuant to Rule 1154, it is a Guardian Ad Litem’s
obligation to fully evaluate the factors affecting the
best interests of the [C]hild, not to simply follow the
path dictated for the child by the Agency. In this
case, it is apparent from the record that the GAL did
not fully exhaust his investigative duties under
subsections (4) and (5) of the Rule, failing to
investigate [A.S.] or any other interested party as an
adoptive resource for the [C]hild, choosing instead to
limit the scope of his involvement in this matter to
an endorsement of [appellants] as [CYF’s] chosen
adoptive resource from early on in this case. With
this in mind, the [c]ourt accords less weight to the
GAL’s recommendation that it would had he engaged
in a complete and thorough undertaking of his
duties.
While the Court recognizes [appellants’] efforts to
provide a caring, loving environment for the [C]hild,
it acknowledges that they are prepared to allow
[A.S.] more post-adoption contact than she is
prepared to offer them, and it further acknowledges
that the grant of [A.S.’] adoption petition would
signal a large and impactful change in the [C]hild’s
life, the [c]ourt is confident that the award of [A.S.’]
adoption petition is soundly in the [C]hild’s best
interests.
Trial court order, 3/29/17 at 23-24.
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After considering all of the best interest factors pursuant to
Section 5328(a), the trial court ultimately concluded:
6. Since the inception of the [C]hild’s
dependency, she has never been placed with
[A.S.]
7. Accordingly, [A.S.] is unable to satisfy the
foregoing requirements of the Adoption Act.
8. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2901, and case law interpreting
the same, establish that the failure to satisfy
certain requirements of the Adoption Act are
not fatal to a petition.
9. As set forth supra, § 2901 provides for judicial
waiver of the requirements of the Adoption Act
for ‘cause shown.’ 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2901.
10. Case law provides that “there is no reasonable
construction of the Section 2901 ‘cause shown’
language other than to conclude that it permits
a petition[er] to demonstrate why, in a
particular case, he or she cannot meet the
statutory requirements. Upon a showing of
cause, the trial court is afforded discretion to
determine whether the adoption petition
should, nevertheless, be granted.” In re:
Adoption of R.B.F., 569 Pa. 269, 280, 803
A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002).
11. In this case, the [c]ourt is satisfied that [A.S.]
has shown sufficient cause for her inability to
satisfy the foregoing requirements of the
Adoption Act, and she has further
demonstrated notwithstanding the technical
deficiencies of her petition, it is in the best
interests of [the Child] that she be adopted by
[A.S.]
12. It is in the best interests of the [C]hild that her
ties to her blood relatives be maintained and
fostered.
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13. It is in the best interests of the [C]hild that her
connection with [appellants] and with her
half[-]sister[,] G.B.[,] be maintained and
fostered.
14. It is in the best interests of the [C]hild that she
be adopted by [A.S.] and that she maintain
contact with [appellants] and G.B. pursuant to
the Act 101 agreement offered by [A.S.] and
presented to the Court as Exhibit B-2.
15. Weekend visitation with [appellants] twice per
month in the first three months and once a
month thereafter will help the [C]hild to
acclimate to the change in her family structure,
and allow her to establish firm roots in [A.S.’]
family.
Trial court order, 3/29/17 at 27-28.
We find that the competent evidence in the record supports the trial
court’s conclusion that it is in the Child’s best interest that she be adopted
by A.S. The trial court heard testimony from Richard Small, Ph.D., ABPP,
who performed a forensic bonding assessment to evaluate bonds between
the Child, appellants, A.S., as well as G.B., and the Twins. (Id. at 7.) When
considering Dr. Small’s testimony, the trial court noted that Dr. Small spent
limited time with the parties, and did not accord great weight to Dr. Small’s
findings. (Id.)
The trial court also heard testimony from Rutvi Kapadia, Psy.D., LPC,
NCC, who performed a trauma assessment to determine the impact of the
Child’s being removed from appellants’ home. (Id.) Dr. Kapadia did not
interview the Child or either of the parties together, and the trial court
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surmises that while Dr. Kapadia may not have found it necessary to do so,
the lack of such interviews goes to the weight to be given to her report.
(Id. at 8.)
Based on the foregoing, we will not disturb the adoption decree. The
trial court’s determination that it would be in the Child’s best interest to
grant A.S. the right to adopt her is supported by the record. Accordingly, we
affirm the decree.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/29/17
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