Lesh, C. v. Erie International ( 2018 )

J-S82035-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
CHASTITY LESH, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
ERIE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT :
SERVICES, LLC, T/D/B/A ERIE :
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, AND ERIE :
REGIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY :
:
Appellees : No. 962 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered May 26, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Civil Division at No(s): Docket No. 14127-2012
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STEVENS, P.J.E.,* and STRASSBURGER, J. **
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MARCH 6, 2018
Chastity Lesh appeals from the order that granted summary judgment
to defendants Erie International Airport Services, LLC, t/d/b/a Erie
International Airport, and Erie Regional Airport Authority (Defendants or
ERAA, collectively1) in this slip-and-fall action. Because this action involves
questions of tort claims immunity against a government agency, we transfer
this appeal to the Commonwealth Court.
1 According to Lesh’s complaint, both defendants have the same business
address. Complaint, 12/24/2012, at ¶¶ 2-3. The same counsel represents
both entities, and refers to them collectively as ERAA. See, e.g., Motion for
Summary Judgment, 3/21/2017, at 1. Based upon our disposition of this
appeal, we do not deem it necessary to determine the precise nature and
relationship of the two defendant entities.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
** Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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After Lesh slipped and fell on ice near a jet way at Erie International
Airport in the course of her employment as a customer service agent for
Piedmont Airlines, she filed a complaint against Defendants to recover
damages for the injuries she sustained in the fall, alleging one count of
negligence. Complaint, 12/24/2012, at ¶¶ 11-13. Following discovery,
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming immunity under
the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541. Motion for
Summary Judgment, 3/21/2017, at 6-7. The trial court determined that
Defendants are entitled to immunity, Trial Court Opinion, 5/26/2017, at 8,
and granted them judgment as a matter of law. Order, 5/26/2017. Lesh
timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court, and argues that the trial court
erred, on several bases, in concluding that Defendants are entitled to
immunity.
We first consider the propriety of this Court exercising jurisdiction over
this appeal, an issue not raised by either party. This Court has “exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of all appeals from final orders of the courts of common
pleas, regardless of the nature of the controversy or the amount involved,
except such classes of appeals as are by any provision of this chapter within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or the Commonwealth Court.”
42 Pa.C.S. § 742. Except in situations not present here, “the Commonwealth
Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the courts
of common pleas in the following cases: … Immunity waiver matters.-- Matters
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conducted pursuant to Subchapter C of Chapter 85 (relating to actions against
local parties).” 42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a)(7). Chapter 85 contains the provisions
of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, including the general provision
that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall
be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property
caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other
person.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541.
“[P]ursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 762(a)(1)(i) and (7), the Commonwealth
Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction of appeals involving tort claims
against either a Commonwealth or local agency.” Flaxman v. Burnett, 574
A.2d 1061, 1064 n.4 (Pa. Super. 1990).
The obvious legislative intent in granting such exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to the Commonwealth Court is to ensure a uniform
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act. This jurisdiction also extends to all
parties and appears in a case as long as at least one party is a
local agency and the case is governed at least in part by Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act.
Brady Contracting Co. v. W. Manchester Twp. Sewer Auth., 487 A.2d
894, 897 (Pa. Super. 1985).
Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court has exclusive jurisdiction over
this appeal. However, Pa.R.A.P. 741(a) “allows this Court to accept
jurisdiction of an appeal that belongs in another appellate court when the
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parties do not object.”2 Gordon v. Philadelphia Cty. Democratic Exec.
Comm., 80 A.3d 464, 474 (Pa. Super. 2013) (retaining jurisdiction over
appeal argued before this Court where appellees did not object and issues
exclusive to Commonwealth Court were tangential to the decision).
“Nevertheless, this Court may, sua sponte, raise the issue of whether an
appeal should be transferred to the Commonwealth Court.” Smith v. Ivy Lee
Real Estate, LLC, 152 A.3d 1062, 1065 (Pa. Super. 2016).
In determining whether to retain jurisdiction or transfer an
appeal, we balance the interests of the parties and matters of
judicial economy against other factors, including: (1) whether the
case has already been transferred; (2) whether retaining
jurisdiction will disrupt the legislatively ordained division of labor
between the intermediate appellate courts; and (3) whether there
is a possibility of establishing two conflicting lines of authority on
a particular subject. We examine each potential transfer on a
case-by-case basis.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
While the parties’ interest in speedy resolution of the appeal weighs in
favor of our retaining it, we conclude that that interest is outweighed in the
instant case by the other relevant considerations. The instant case has not
been transferred previously. Judicial economy is not much impacted, as this
Court has not expended resources in entertaining argument on its merits.
More importantly, “the ‘obvious legislative intent in granting [] exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to the Commonwealth Court is to ensure a uniform
2 Neither party has questioned this Court’s jurisdiction over the appeal.
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interpretation and application of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.’”
Newman v. Thorn, 518 A.2d 1231, 1237 (Pa. Super. 1986) (quoting Brady
Contracting Co., 487 A.2d at 897). Finally, resolution of this appeal requires
interpretation and application of a statute with which the Commonwealth
Court has expertise that this Court lacks, and for which a uniform body of case
law is important. See Dynamic Sports Fitness Corp. of Am. v. Cmty.
YMCA of E. Delaware Cty., 751 A.2d 670, 673 (Pa. Super. 2000) (declining
to engage in an apparently straightforward application of the Institutions of
Purely Public Charity Act based upon “the legislature’s express intent to
establish uniform standards for determining eligibility for tax-exempt status
in all proceedings throughout this Commonwealth”); Newman, 518 A.2d at
1235 n.3 (“We have not hesitated to transfer cases in deference to our sister
court’s expertise.”).
Accordingly, we transfer this appeal to the Commonwealth Court for
disposition on the merits.
Appeal transferred.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/6/2018
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