Com. v. Satchell, D. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DAVID SATCHELL
Appellant No. 2005 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order June 5, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004687-2008
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 10, 2016
David Satchell appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia
County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the
Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 After careful consideration, we reverse
and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.
The PCRA court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history as
follows:
On May 20, 2007, at 2 p.m., 54-year-old Ronald Kennel (victim)
was shot at the intersection of 16th and York Streets in North
Philadelphia. While leaving the Red Top Bar, the victim was
caught in the crossfire of a gunfight. He died from a single
gunshot wound to the head. Charlene McDonald was also
injured during the incident. She was standing at the 16 th and
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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York Street bus stop when the gunshots were fired. As
McDonald tried to run, she was shot in her right leg. She spent
three days in the hospital and another two years in physical
therapy.
That afternoon, the residents of 16th and York Streets were
hosting a barbecue competition. Over 30 people were outside
preparing for the event. At 2 p.m., [Satchell] and two other
men were seen walking west on York Street towards 17 th Street.
Before the shooting occurred, a neighborhood resident phoned
911, and described a man whom the evidence indicated was
[Satchell]. “Young man walking with a gun . . . green shirt with
white shirt underneath, wearing blue jeans, light-skinned, just
scared half the neighborhood.” As Satchell passed by, people
yelled, “Get the kids in the house. They have guns.” Within
moments, gunshots were fired through the crowded area.
Satchell and his two friends fired shots on York Street towards
17th Street. Sixteen .40 millimeter fired cartridge casings were
recovered near the intersection of York and Bancroft Streets. A
second set of shooters, near 17th Street, fired shots towards 16th
Street. Four .9 millimeter fired cartridge cases were found on
the northeast corner of 17th and York Streets. The bullet
recovered from the victim’s head indicated that the bullet that
killed him was from a 38/9 millimeter firearm.
Derrick Williams saw Satchell fire his gun into the crowd.
Williams also saw Satchell with two guns: one was “chrome and
brown, then he had this automatic that was black, but it had this
long clip that looked like it would hold 40 rounds.” After the
exchange of gunfire, Satchell and his two friends ran towards
Bancroft Street.
Satchell tried unsuccessfully to enter two private homes on
Bancroft Street. First, he approached Tracy Lester’s home at
2402 Bancroft Street. Lester observed Satchell wearing a green
shirt with a white thermal top underneath and saw that he had a
gun in his hand as he tried to enter her home. Lester held her
door closed as [Satchell] tried to push his way in.
Satchell next tried to enter Daisy Coffey’s home at 2404 Bancroft
Street. Coffey lived next door to Lester. As Satchell tried to
enter Coffey’s house, she held her glass security door closed and
told him, “you not coming in here.” Satchell had a silver gun in
his hand. When he could not enter the premises, Satchell
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jumped over Coffey’s gate into her yard, but hopped right back
out after finding a pit bull in Coffey’s back yard.
Later that evening, at Temple University Hospital, Lester
identified Satchell as one of the shooters to Officer Nona Stokes
and described what he had been wearing. Satchell was not
arrested until December 19, 2007.
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/13/15, at 3-5.
Following a jury trial, Satchell was convicted of third-degree murder,
criminal conspiracy, aggravated assault, and possessing instruments of
crime (PIC), for which he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 29 to 62
years in prison. This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on September
10, 2010, and our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal
on June 6, 2011.
Satchell filed a pro se PCRA petition on September 16, 2011, alleging
ineffective assistance of both his trial and appellate counsel. His court-
appointed counsel filed an amended PCRA petition on December 19, 2014.
The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss on February 23, 2015. On May
4, 2015, the PCRA court sent Satchell notice of its intent to dismiss his PCRA
petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On June 5, 2015,
the court dismissed the petition, and this timely appeal follows.
Satchell raises the following issue for our review:
Did the PCRA Court err by holding, without having conducted an
evidentiary hearing, that trial and appellate counsel were not
ineffective for failing to present controlling authority on the issue
of the applicability of an involuntary manslaughter jury
instruction?
Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
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There has long been a presumption in the law that counsel is “within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Harrington v.
Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
set forth three elements which must all be proven in order to demonstrate
ineffective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v. Williams, 863 A.2d
505, 513 (Pa. 2004) (“Failure to satisfy any prong of the test will defeat an
ineffectiveness claim.”). A defendant must prove that: (1) the underlying
claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s performance lacked a reasonable
basis; and (3) the ineffective assistance of counsel caused him prejudice.
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001).
The PCRA court dismissed Satchell’s petition because it found that he
failed to meet the first prong of the Pierce test, since he did not prove that
the underlying claim of his right to an involuntary manslaughter instruction
was arguably meritorious. After reviewing the record and relevant case law,
we find that the PCRA court erred by failing to find arguable merit in
Satchell’s claim.
Defendants are generally entitled to instructions that they have
requested and that are supported by the whole of the evidence presented at
trial. Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1026 (Pa. Super.
2014); see also Commonwealth v. Browdie, 671 A.2d 668, 673-74 (Pa.
1996) (“[W]e hold that a trial court shall only instruct on an offense where
the offense has been made an issue in the case and where the trial evidence
reasonably would support such a verdict.”). Additionally, “if any version of
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the evidence in a homicide trial, from whatever source, supports a verdict of
involuntary manslaughter, then the offense has been made an issue in the
case, and a charge on involuntary manslaughter must be given if
requested.” Commonwealth v. Draxinger, 498 A.2d 963, 965 (Pa. Super.
1985); see also Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 656 A.2d 1369, 1372 (Pa.
Super. 1995).
Involuntary manslaughter is found where “as a direct result of the
doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the
doing of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, [the
defendant] causes the death of another person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504. At
trial, the Commonwealth called Derrick Williams, a close acquaintance of
Satchell, who testified that he saw Satchell, with two other men, firing at
another group of men through a crowded street. As such, there was
evidence in the record that Satchell fired his gun in a reckless or grossly
negligent manner, causing the death of the victim. The Commonwealth
argues that because Satchell himself testified that he never fired his gun, no
evidence was produced on record by Satchell that would justify an
involuntary manslaughter instruction. It asserts that the two cases raised by
Satchell in his brief, Draxinger and McCloskey, are both distinguishable
because, in those cases, the defendant admitted to a version of the events
in which he perpetuated a reckless or grossly negligent act.
The Commonwealth misreads the application of evidence in the record
to involuntary manslaughter instructions laid out in Draxinger. In that
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case, this Court held that evidence “from whatever source” would support
the instruction. Draxinger, supra (emphasis added). Here, the
Commonwealth called witnesses who testified that Satchell was in the area
of the gunfight with a loaded firearm, with at least one witness testifying
that he saw Satchell shooting the weapon in a crowded street. Satchell’s
testimony alone cannot be dispositive, as the evidence in the record
supporting the instruction can come from any witness. Therefore, based on
the evidence in the record, the jury could reasonably have found Satchell
guilty of involuntary manslaughter. As such, there is arguable merit to
Satchell’s claim that the trial court erred by not giving this instruction.
Given the arguable merit of the underlying claim, we must now
determine if Satchell’s claim satisfies the other two prongs of the Pierce
test: that there was no reasonable basis for counsel’s decision, and that the
ineffectiveness resulted in prejudice to Satchell. With regard to trial counsel,
we find that he cannot be deemed ineffective because, at trial, he argued for
an involuntary manslaughter instruction and objected when the court
declined to give one:
The Court: Mr. Lammendola, I’m not giving manslaughter.
Mr. Lammendola: I would ask for involuntary, Judge, also.
Involuntary is applicable if there’s sufficient facts in the case to
suggest that if it just may be involuntary. . . . I think the fact
pattern or at least factual nature of the case would suggest that
I- it would warrant an involuntary manslaughter charge.
The Court: How is the defendant’s conduct reckless or grossly
negligent?
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Mr. Lammendola: By the fact of having a gun to begin with.
The Court: The mere fact of possession of the gun?
Mr. Lammendola: Well, under the circumstances –
The Court: Would make his conduct reckless or grossly
negligent?
Mr. Lammendola: Well –
The Court: He claimed he didn’t do anything else but get shot
at. He ran. He never fired his gun, so that’s why I looked at it.
I put a Post-it on there that says requested, not given.
Mr. Lammendola: Note my exception, Judge.
N.T. Trial, 6/17/09, at 64-66.
As the above exchange indicates, trial counsel requested the
instruction, but the court did not give it. Satchell argues that counsel should
have, essentially, lectured the judge on Draxinger and its progeny in an
attempt to sway the court’s decision. However, we find that trial counsel’s
actions of asking for an instruction, explaining his basis for requesting it, and
noting his exception when it was denied were inherently reasonable. As
such, the actions of trial counsel cannot form the basis for PCRA relief.
We now turn to Satchell’s claim that appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise the issue of the involuntary manslaughter instruction on
direct appeal. As discussed, the involuntary manslaughter instruction was
arguably meritorious, and the issue of its denial was preserved by trial
counsel. However, the record as it currently exists is insufficient to enable
us to determine whether appellate counsel had a reasonable basis for failing
to raise the claim or whether Satchell suffered prejudice as a result thereof.
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The PCRA court dismissed Satchell’s petition without a hearing, at which
appellate counsel could have testified regarding any strategic reasons he
may have had for omitting the claim on appeal.2 Moreover, the PCRA court
did not address the reasonableness and prejudice prongs of the
ineffectiveness analysis in its opinion, as it concluded (incorrectly, as we
have determined) that Satchell’s claim lacked arguable merit.
Accordingly, we remand the case to the PCRA court so that it may hold
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Satchell’s appellate counsel had
a reasonable basis for failing to raise the involuntary manslaughter claim on
appeal and whether Satchell suffered prejudice as a result of that failure.
Order reversed. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this
memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Dubow joins the Memorandum.
PJE Stevens files a Dissenting Memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/10/2016
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2
We concede that we can think of no reasonable basis for counsel’s omission
of an arguably meritorious claim from an appellate brief. However, our duty
is not to speculate based on an incomplete record.
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