Com. v. Alfaro-Rodriguez, E. ( 2018 )

J-S81018-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
EDGARDO YARIEL ALFARO-RODRIGUEZ
Appellant No. 497 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-36-CR-0000738-2016
BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MARCH 27, 2018
Appellant Edgardo Yariel Alfaro-Rodriguez appeals from the January 31,
2017 judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster
County (“trial court”), following his jury conviction for robbery (threatening
immediate serious bodily injury) under Section 3701(a)(1)(ii) of the Crimes
Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii). Upon review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this case are uncontroverted. As the
trial court aptly recounted:
On December 2, 2015, at approximately 4:15 p.m., an
individual with a partially covered face entered the Family Dollar
store on Duke Street, pointed what appeared to be a handgun at
an employee and demanded money. The individual fled when an
alarm sounded, but initially approached the entrance door and
appear[ed] to try and push it open with his ungloved hands. When
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S81018-17
the door did not open, the individual moved to the exit door and
fled the store. Responding officers retrieved video surveillance
footage and were able to process a latent writer’s palm print from
a sticker that was on the area of the door that the individual
appeared to have touched. It was later determined that the print
belonged to [Appellant].[1]
Detective Michael Gerace [(Lancaster City Bureau of Police)]
had the opportunity to interview [Appellant] on January 27, 2016
in the presence of Detective Stanley Roche. That interview was
recorded and played for the jury at trial pursuant to certain
stipulations by the parties. Immediately prior to the interview
beginning, Detective Gerace read [Appellant] his Miranda[2]
rights and [Appellant] signed a waiver of those rights. During the
interview, [Appellant] initially denied having been in the Family
Dollar store subsequent to March of 2015 and specifically denied
having been in the store in December 2015. However, when
[Appellant] was asked to explain how his print was recovered from
within the store, [Appellant] stated that he probably went into the
store and did not remember. Later, [Appellant] stated that he
was going to be honest and that he was in the store in November
2015 with a friend. Appellant repeatedly denied robbing the
Family Dollar store, but eventually admitted that he probably was
in the store on the same day of the robbery. Furthermore, despite
never having been told that the individual in the surveillance video
had his face covered, [Appellant] asked Detective Gerace
pointedly if his face could be seen in the video.
At some point during the interview, [Appellant] suddenly
stated “I don’t want to talk no more, because it really wasn’t me.
It really wasn’t me. I don’t want to talk no more.” Detective
Gerace confirmed, stating “ok” and then asked “why, why don’t
you want to talk?” [Appellant] responded by repeating that while
he probably went in the same day, he did not rob the store.
____________________________________________
1 Following his arrest on unrelated charges, Appellant was fingerprinted. His
fingerprints matched the fingerprints lifted from the front door of the Family
Dollar store.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that statements
obtained from defendants during interrogation in police-dominated
atmosphere, made without full warning of applicable constitutional rights,
were inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination).
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[Appellant] stated again that he did not want to speak, but the
interrogation continued.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/17, at 2-4 (internal citations and footnotes omitted)
(footnotes 1 and 2 added). On April 21, 2016, Appellant filed an omnibus
pretrial motion, which he amended on June 7, 2016. In the amended motion,
Appellant sought to suppress all statements obtained from him by Detective
Gerace following Appellant’s affirmative invocation of his right to remain silent.
On the day of, but prior to the start of, trial, the court held a hearing on
Appellant’s pretrial suppression motion, following which the trial court granted
in part and denied in part relief. Specifically, with respect to Appellant’s
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the trial court granted the
suppression of any statement Appellant made to Detective Gerace after he
invoked his right to remain silent for the second time. In other words, the
trial court allowed the Commonwealth to introduce Appellant’s statements to
Detective Gerace “up to and including the responses after the first invocation”
of his right against self-incrimination. N.T. Suppression, 11/28/16, at 38.
At trial, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to play the video
recording of Appellant’s interview by Detective Gerace. In so doing, and over
Appellant’s repeated objections, the jury was permitted to hear Appellant’s
invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, i.e.,
Appellant’s statements that he did not want to talk. See N.T. Trial, 11/29/16,
at 149-50, 157, 165. Appellant moved for a mistrial, which the trial court
denied. In addition, over Appellant’s objections again, the trial court
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permitted the Commonwealth’s witnesses to point out to the jury the exact
location on the video surveillance footage where Appellant touched the front
door. Id. at 109-10, 119-20. Following trial, the jury found Appellant guilty
of robbery. On January 31, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four
to ten years’ imprisonment. Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which the
trial court denied. Appellant timely appealed to this Court. The trial court
directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained
of on appeal. Appellant complied. In response, the trial court issued a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, concluding, among other things, that, even if
Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination were violated,
the error was harmless because “[t]he statements by [Appellant] after his first
invocation of silence merely repeated, almost word for word, what he had
previously stated.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/17, at 8.
On appeal, Appellant presents three issues for our review:
I. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion to
suppress his statement to police, from his first invocation of
his right to remain silent, and in allowing the jury to hear
that he told police he did not want to talk anymore?
II. Did the trial court err in finding that the jury’s verdict of
guilty of robbery was against the weight of the evidence,
where [Appellant] acknowledged that he had been in the
Family Dollar store before, there were other unidentifiable
prints recovered from the area of the door which the robber
had touched, and [Appellant] did not match the store clerk’s
description of the robber?
III. Did the trial court err in denying defense counsel’s repeated
objections to the police officers identifying the location
where the robbery suspect touched the “in” door of the
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Family Dollar store, where the best evidence of where the
suspect touched the door was the video itself?
Appellant’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). At the outset, we
note that Appellant’s first issue subsumes two distinct issues. First, he
challenges the trial court’s denial to suppress all statements solicited from him
by Detective Gerace after he invoked his right to remain silent. Second,
Appellant challenges the trial court’s discretion to allow the Commonwealth to
play to the jury the video recording of his interview with Detective Gerace
where he can be heard invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.
We first address his suppression issue. As stated, Appellant argues that
the trial court erred in failing to suppress all statements obtained from him by
Detective Gerace after he invoked his right to remain silent. We agree.
In reviewing appeals from an order denying suppression, our standard
of review is limited to determining
whether [the trial court’s] factual findings are supported by the
record and whether [its] legal conclusions drawn from those facts
are correct. When reviewing the rulings of a [trial] court, the
appellate court considers only the evidence of the prosecution and
so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole.
When the record supports the findings of the [trial] court, we are
bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions
drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 116 A.3d 1139, 1142 (Pa. Super. 2015). Our
scope of review is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression
hearing. In the interest of L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1088-89 (Pa. 2013).
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It is settled that a suspect is entitled to Miranda warnings prior to a
custodial interrogation.3 Commonwealth v. Boyer, 962 A.2d 1213, 1216
(Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that defendant’s statement, “I don’t want to talk to
you,” was an invocation of his Miranda rights). If a suspect “indicates, in any
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease.” Commonwealth v. Henry, 599 A.2d
1321, 1323 (Pa. Super. 1991) (internal citations omitted). The United States
Supreme Court, however, has held that the invocation of the right to remain
silent or the request for an attorney must be affirmative, clear and
unambiguous. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (noting
that mere silence in the face of police questioning after being given Miranda
warnings is insufficient to invoke Miranda rights).
In Commonwealth v. Lukach, 163 A.3d 1003 (Pa. Super. 2017), we
held that the trial court did not err in suppressing statements obtained from a
defendant after the defendant stated, “I don’t know, just, I’m done talking. I
don’t have nothing to talk about.” Lukach, 163 A.3d at 1009. We concluded
the defendant’s statement was “a clear and unequivocal invocation of his right
to remain silent[.]” Id. We explained that, “[a]lthough ineloquently phrased,
the [defendant’s] statements were not qualified. They were not ambiguous.
____________________________________________
3 Under Miranda, police officers are required to apprise suspects prior to
questioning that they have the right to remain silent, that any statement made
may be used against them, and that they have the right to an attorney.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. “The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”
Id.-6-
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They were not equivocal.” Id. We further explained that “[t]his was the sort
of statement that would lead a reasonable police officer . . . to understand the
statement to be a request to remain silent.” Id. at 1010.
Thus, consistent with Lukach, Appellant’s statement to Detective
Gerace that “I don’t want to talk no more” was a proper, clear and
unambiguous invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. As a
result, the trial court erred in failing to suppress all statements obtained from
Appellant by Detective Gerace after Appellant’s affirmative invocation of his
right to remain silent.
Nonetheless, even though the trial court erred in failing to suppress
Appellant’s statements made following the invocation of his Fifth Amendment
right, such error was harmless.
Harmless error exists where: (1) the error did not prejudice the
defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; (2) the erroneously
admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted
evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously
admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and
uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the
prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison
that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.
Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 811 A.2d 556, 561 (Pa. 2002) (citation
omitted). As the trial court reasoned, “The statements by [Appellant] after
his first invocation of silence merely repeated, almost word for word, what he
had previously stated. Those statements were in no way inculpatory or
incriminating and, in fact, were denials of guilt.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/17,
at 8. As noted earlier, during the interview, Appellant invoked his Fifth
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Amendment right to remain silent by stating, “I don’t want to talk no more,
because it really wasn’t me. It really wasn’t me. I don’t want to talk no
more.” In response, Detective Gerace stated, “ok,” and proceeded to ask
Appellant, “[W]hy, why don’t you want to talk?” Appellant responded by
repeating what he said previously (prior to invoking his Fifth Amendment
right) to Detective Gerace during the interview: that while he probably went
into the Family Dollar store on the same day of the armed robbery, he did not
rob the store. Accordingly, because the statements given by Appellant
following the invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights were cumulative of
near-identical statements he had given to Detective Gerace earlier during the
interview, the trial court correctly concluded that its error was harmless. See
Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 63 A.3d 294, 301 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[I]f
the record supports the result reached by the suppression court, we may
affirm on any ground.”) (en banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Lewis, 39 A.3d
341, 345 (Pa. Super. 2012)).
Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing the Commonwealth to play to the jury the video recording of his
interview by Detective Gerace insofar as the jury was permitted to hear his
invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In support,
Appellant argues that his statements invoking his right to remain silent “were
admitted for no purpose other than to incriminate [him].” Appellant’s Brief at
17.
It is settled:
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[a]dmission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court
clearly abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely
an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication
of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality,
as shown by the evidence of record.
Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 357-58 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal
citations omitted). Moreover, an appellant bears a “heavy burden” to show
that the trial court has abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Christine,
125 A.3d 394, 398 (Pa. 2015). “[A]n appellate court may affirm a valid
judgment based on any reason appearing as of record, regardless of whether
it is raised by appellee.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 937 A.2d 1062, 1073
(Pa. 2007) (citation omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Holloman, 621 A.2d 1046 (Pa. Super. 1993),
we held that “[i]t is a clear violation of the accused’s constitutional right
against self-incrimination to make a reference at trial to his silence while in
police custody.” Holloman, 621 A.2d at 1048. We, however, cautioned that
a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent is not violated when “[a]
witness’s remark about [a defendant’s] post-arrest silence was brief[,]”
unintentionally “solicited by the prosecuting attorney,” who does not “make
any attempt to exploit the remark.” Id. at 1049.
In Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. 2010), we
concluded that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated
when, at trial, a Commonwealth witness referenced the defendant’s invocation
of his right to remain silent during a post-arrest interview because the
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Commonwealth did not “seek to exploit the reference.” Moury, 992 A.2d at
177. We also noted that the Commonwealth did not have “any improper
purpose in asking the question.” Id.In Commonwealth v. Molina, 104 A.3d 430 (Pa. 2014) (plurality), the
investigating detective testified that while the defendant reluctantly answered
several questions on the telephone and ended the call, he refused to go to the
police station for further questioning. In closing arguments, the
Commonwealth relied on this silence as constituting evidence of guilt.
Molina, 104 A.3d at 438. Discounting the defendant’s reluctance to talk to
police on the telephone, the Molina Court found that the defendant’s “actions
in affirmatively and definitively refusing to come to the police station” were
sufficient to invoke his right against self-incrimination. Id. at 438. Thus, the
Court cautioned that the right against self-incrimination “prohibits use of a
defendant’s pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilty, unless it falls
within an exception such as impeachment of a testifying defendant or fair
response to an argument of the defense.” Id. at 451.
In contrast, in Commonwealth v. Adams, 104 A.3d 511 (Pa. 2014)
(plurality), the detective testified over objection that he attempted to
interview the defendant about a homicide, but the defendant responded that
he had nothing to say. Adams, 104 A.3d at 513. No further reference was
made to the defendant’s pre-arrest silence. The plurality in Adams noted that
mere reference to a defendant’s silence does not necessarily impinge
constitutional rights when guilt is not implied. Id. at 517 (citation omitted).
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“While we have interpreted the constitutional right against self-incrimination
generally to prohibit prosecutors from referencing a defendant’s silence as
substantive evidence of guilty,” the plurality continues, “this Court has also
concluded that the right against self-incrimination is not burdened when the
reference to silence is ‘circumspect’ and does not ‘create an inference of an
admission of guilt.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, consistent with the foregoing cases,4 we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to play the
video surveillance recording to the jury where Appellant can be heard invoking
his right against self-incrimination during the interview. The Commonwealth
here did not call to the stand any witnesses who testified that Appellant had
invoked his right to remain silent during the interview. Stated differently, no
witnesses referenced Appellant’s invocation of his right to remain silent.
Similarly, at no point during trial, including closing arguments, did the
Commonwealth exploit, emphasize, or use as substantive evidence of guilt
Appellant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
On the contrary, as the trial court noted, to the extent the jury heard
____________________________________________
4 Even though Molina and Adams concerned pre-arrest silence, their
rationale is equally applicable to cases involving post-arrest invocation of
Miranda rights. Molina, 104 A.3d at 449-50 (noting that “the timing of the
silence, whether it be pre or post-arrest, or pre or post-Miranda warnings, is
not relevant to the question of whether a prosecutor’s use of the silence as
substantive evidence of guilt violates an individual’s right against self-
incrimination.”).
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Appellant’s invocation of his right against self-incrimination, it was “in the
context of a denial of guilt.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/17, at 8. Specifically,
the jury heard Appellant state to Detective Gerace, “I don’t want to talk no
more, because it really wasn’t me. It really wasn’t me. I don’t want to talk
no more.” Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.5
With respect to Appellant’s remaining two issues, we conclude, after
careful review of the record and the relevant case law, that the trial court
accurately and thoroughly addressed the merits of Appellant’s claims. See
Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/17, at 8-16. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s
January 31, 2017 judgment of sentence. We further direct that a copy of the
trial court’s May 2, 2017 opinion be attached to any future filings in this case.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/27/2018
____________________________________________
5 We observe that Appellant’s trial counsel did not request a curative
instruction regarding the effect of Appellant’s invocation of his right to remain
silent as shown to the jury on the video recording.
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Circulated 02/28/2018 03:49 PM
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
VS. No. 0738-2016 r-
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Appellant/Defendant, Edgardo Alfaro-Rodriguez, appeals from the jW:Jgrffent
of sentence imposed on January 31, 2017. Defendant claims reversible error
occurred in the admission of certain non-inculpatory statements made by Defendant
in response to a neutral, clarifying question concerning Defendant's right to remain
silent and in the admission of testimony by investigating officers concerning their
observations of video and physical evidence as it related to the course of their
investigation. Defendant also asserts that the jury's verdict is against the weight of
the evidence. The record demonstrates that Defendant's right to remain silent was
scrupulously honored, that the testimony of the officers did not cause unfair
prejudice or mislead the jury where the jury viewed the video and physical evidence
and was free to draw their own conclusions and that the preponderance of the
evidence supports the jury's verdict. Therefore, the January 31, 2017 Judgment of
Sentence should not be disturbed.
BACKGROUND
On December 2, 2015, at approximately 4:15 p.m., an individual with a
partially covered face entered the Family Dollar store on Duke Street, pointed what
appeared to be a handgun at an employee and demanded money.1 The individual fled
when an alarm sounded, but initially approached the entrance door and appears to
try and push it open with his ungloved hands.2 When the door did not open, the
individual moved to the exit door and fled the store. 3 Responding officers retrieved
video surveillance footage and were able to process a latent writer's palm print from
a sticker that was on the area of the door that the individual appeared to have
touched.4 It was later determined that the print belonged to Defendant.5
Detective Michael Gerace had the opportunity to interview Defendant on
January 27, 2016 in the presence of Detective Stanley Roche.6 That interview was
recorded and played for the jury at trial pursuant to certain stipulations by the
parties.7 Immediately prior to the interview beginning, Detective Gerace read
Defendant his Miranda rights and Defendant signed a waiver of those rights.8 During
I
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/l 7, pp. 96-99; Com. Ex. 2.
2
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17, pp. 98, 100; Com. Ex. 2.
3
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17, pp. 98, 100; Com. Ex. 2.
4
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17, pp. 105, 108-111, 118-122; Com. Ex. 7; Com. Ex. 8.
5
N.T. Criminal Trial, l l/28/17-11/29/17, pp. 124-125, 144-149, 151; Com. Ex. 7; Com. Ex. 8.
6N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17,pp.151-152
7N.T. Criminal Trial, ll/28/17-11/29/17,pp.152-153, 156-157.
8
N.T. Criminal Trial, 1 l/28/17-11/29/17, pp. 153-154; Com. Ex. 5; Com. Ex. 6, clip 2 at 00:33-
2:47.
2
the interview, Defendant initially denied having been in the Family Dollar store
subsequent to March of 2015 and specifically denied having been in the store in
December 2015.9 However, when Defendant was asked to explain how his print was
recovered from within the store, Defendant stated that he probably went into the
store and did not remember.I? Later, Defendant stated that he was going to be honest
and that he was in the store in November 2015 with a friend. 11 Defendant repeatedly
denied robbing the Family Dollar store, 12 but eventually admitted that he probably
was in the store on the same day of the robbery.13 Furthermore, despite never having
been told that the individual in the surveillance video had his face covered,
Defendant asked Detective Gerace pointedly if his face could be seen in the video.14
At some point during the interview, Defendant suddenly stated "I don't want
to talk no more, because it really wasn't me. It really wasn't me. I don't want to talk
no more."15 Detective Gerace confirmed, stating "ok" and then asked "well why
don't you want to talk?"16 Defendant responded by repeating that while he probably
9 Com. Ex. 6, clip 3 at 2:43-4:34.
°
1
11
Com. Ex. 6, clip 3 at 4:33-4:48.
Com. Ex. 6, clip 3 at 4:57-5:00, clip 4 at 00:00-00:27.
12 Com. Ex. 6,
clip 4 at 2:36-2:45, clip 5 at 00:14-00:28, 1:16-1:31; 1:49-2:18, 3:21-3:25, 3:28-
3:48.
13
Com. Ex. 6, clip 5 at 3 :08-3: 11, 3 :28-3 :48.
14
N.T. Criminal Trial, l 1/28/17-11/29/17, pp. 152; Com. Ex. 6, clip 5 at 2:58-3:01.
15
Com. Ex. 6, clip 5 at 3:21-3:25.
16
Com. Ex. 6, clip 5 at 3:26-3:28.
3
went in the same day, he did not rob the store.17 Defendant stated again that he did
not want to speak, but the interrogation continued.18
Prior to and during trial, Defendant moved to suppress and objected to the
admission of Defendant's initial statement that he did not want to speak anymore
and everything thereafter.19 It was found that Defendant's right to remain silent was
scrupulously honored following his initial statement that he no longer wished to
speak and that Detective Gerace's clarifying question following Defendant's
statement was neutral and not meant to entice Defendant into abandoning his right."
However, it was also found that following Defendant's second statement that he did
not wish to speak anymore, that Defendant's right to remain silent was not
scrupulously honored.21 Therefore, it was ruled that the video would be suppressed
from the point where Defendant states for the second time that he does not wish to
speak any longer. 22
Following trial on November 28 and 29, 2017, a jury found Defendant guilty
of robbery.23 Following the completion of a presentence investigation, Defendant
was sentenced on January 31, 2017 to four (4) to ten (10) years of incarceration.
17
Com. Ex. 6, clip 5 at 3 :28-3 :48.
18
Com. Ex. 6, clip 5 at 3:49-5:00, clip 6 at 00:00-4:50.
19
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/l 7, pp. 4, 30-32, 149-150, 157.
20
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/l 7, pp. 38, 150.
21
N.T. Criminal Trial, ll/28/17-11/29/17,pp. 38, 150.
22
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11 /29/17, pp. 38, 150.
23
18 Pa.C.S.A. 3701(a)(l)(ii).
4
Defendant filed a post-sentence motion on February 8, 2017, which was denied by
Order dated February 17, 2017. Defendant filed his notice of appeal on March 20,
2017.
Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal
On April 11, 201 7, Defendant filed a Statement of Errors Complained of on
Appeal asserting the following:
1. It was error to deny Defendant's motion to suppress Defendant's
recorded statements beginning with Defendant's first assertion that he
did not wish to speak anymore;
2. It was error to overrule Defendant's objections to testimony from
officers indicating the area of the door they observed the suspect touch
in the video because the best evidence of such was the video; and
3. The jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence where there
were multiple prints recovered from the entrance door and where the
eyewitness' estimate of the suspect height and weight differed from
Defendant's height and weight.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant's Miranda Rights
Statements obtained from a person after they have decided to remain silent
may be admissible if the "right to cut off questioning" was scrupulously honored.
5
Com. v. Harris, 972 A.2d 1196, 1203 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citing Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96, 103-104 (1975)). While certain factors have been recognized as
instructive in determining whether the right has been scrupulously honored, the
pivotal question is the purpose of the resumed questioning as shown by the
circumstances. Id. at 1203-05. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) bars only
"words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect." Com. v. Henry, 599 A.2d 1321, 1325
(Pa.Super. 1991) (quoting Rhode Islandv. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)) (internal
citations omitted). Therefore, the appropriate test is whether the purpose of resuming
the questions was to entice the person to abandon that right. Harris, 972 A.2d at
1203-05. If the circumstances do not indicate that the police acted coercively to force
the person to change their mind, then the invocation of the right to remain silent was
scrupulously honored. Id. at 1204.
It has been specifically noted that clarifying questions following a suspect's
attempt to invoke certain rights during custodial interrogation may help to protect
the rights of a suspect. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994). For
instance, it may be helpful to both the police and the suspect to clarify whether the
suspect wishes to remain silent because he desires the assistance of counsel. See,
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. at 461-62 (noting that such clarification helps
6
protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney ifhe wants one).
Therefore, questions that are merely for purposes of clarification, have been found
to be proper. Id.During questioning in the instant case, Defendant suddenly stated that he did
not want to talk anymore.24 Detective Gerace first acknowledged Defendant's
statement and then asked what could only be described as a question seeking
clarification and an explanation of the prior statement. 25 The circumstances do not
indicate coercion, an attempt to entice Defendant into abandoning his right or
knowledge that the question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response. In fact, the question did not elicit an incriminating response from
Defendant because he merely repeated what was previously said and reaffirmed that
he did not wish to speak anymore. 26 All further statements were suppressed. 27
Even if it were found that Defendant's right to remain silent was not
scrupulously honored or that it was error to permit the jury to hear Defendant's
invocation of silence, it does, alone, mean that Defendant is entitled to a new trial.
See, e.g., Com. v. DiNicola, 866 A.2d 329, 336-37 (Pa. 2005) (holding that the mere
revelation of silence, or even an explicit reference to it, does not establish innate
24
Com. Ex. 6, clip 5 at 3:21-3:25.
25
Com. Ex. 6, clip 5 at 3:26-3:28.
26
Com. Ex. 6, clip 5 at 3 :28-3 :48.
27
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17, pp. 38, 150.
7
prejudice); Henry, 599 A.2d at 1326-27 (1991) (holding that even the erroneous
admission of a coerced confession can be constitutionally harmless). The statements
by Defendant after his first invocation of silence merely repeated, almost word for
word, what he had previously stated. Those statements were in no way inculpatory
or incriminating and, in fact, were denials of guilt. As for the admission of
Defendant's invocation of silence, there is no indication in the record that the
admission of such in any way suggested to the jury that Defendant's wish to remain
silent was the equivalent of a tacit admission of guilt. If fact, it was offered by
Defendant in the context of a denial of guilt. It was never referenced by the
Commonwealth and was not presented in any way that burdened Defendant's Fifth
Amendment right. The record fails to demonstrate that the outcome of the case
would have been any different absent the admission Defendant's non-incriminating
statements. Therefore, admission of such, even if in error, was constitutionally
harmless and does not warrant relief.
II. Testimony Concerning the Officers' Observations
During the second showing of the surveillance video at trial, Officer Jonathan
Caple identified the point in the surveillance video where the suspect can be seen
touching the inside of the entrance door in the store and made a brief indication of
the general area in which he observed the suspect make contact.28 Defendant's
28
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/l 7, pp. 109-110.
8
objection to this testimony was overruled.29 Officer Caple then indicated, without
objection, where the suspect was observed touching the inside of the door in a still
photograph. 30 Officer Caple explained that it was his observation of the surveillance
video, specifically the area of the door touched by the suspect, that led him to contact
Detective Gerace about looking for fingerprints in that particular area.31
Detective Gerace then testified, without objection, that he was able to
determine, from his observation of the surveillance video, that the suspect touched a
sticker located on the inside of the entrance door.32 Like Officer Caple, Detective
Gerace was asked to indicate where in the still photograph of the entrance door that
he observed the suspect touch the door in the surveillance video.33 Defendant
objected to this line of questioning arguing that the video is the best evidence of
where the suspect touched the door.34 Defendant's objection was overruled, but the
question was reworded anyway and Detective Gerace was asked to indicate where
in the photograph of the door the suspect was observed to have touched the door and
where Detective Gerace ultimately performed the latent print processing.35 Detective
Gerace did not indicate the area he observed the suspect touch, but did describe how
29N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17,p. 110.
30N.T.Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17,pp.110-lll.
31
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17, p. 111.
32N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17,pp. 118-119.
33
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17, p. 119.
34
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17, p. 119.
35
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/l 7, p. 119.
9
the sticker was affixed to the door and how he performed the latent print processing
before removing the sticker from the door.36
Pennsylvania's best evidence rule requires that an original recording or
photograph be produced in order to prove its content. Com. v. Loughnane, 128 A.3d
806, 813 (Pa. Super. 2015), reargument denied (Feb. 1, 2016), appeal granted in part
sub nom. Com. v. Loughnane, No. 164 MAL 2016, 2016 WL 5819328 (Pa. July 19,
2016). See, also, Pa.R.E. 1002. The purpose of the rule, similar to the common law
rule, include: ensuring the exact words of certain documents are used for
interpretation of those documents; avoiding the inaccuracies to which secondary
evidence is susceptible; inhibiting fraud by allowing the examination of the original
content; and furnishing authenticating information that may only be present with the
original. Pa.R.E. 1002 (Comment). The best evidence rule has been applied to bar
testimony relaying the contents of a videotape when the tape itself was never
admitted into evidence to prevent misleading the jury. Com. v. Lewis, 623 A.2d 355,
358 (Pa.Super. 1993). The best evidence rule does not bar testimony concerning an
officer's observations of the content, his personal knowledge or that which might
assist the jury in understanding the content where the original is admitted into
evidence. Com. v. Brown, 134 A.3d 1097, 1106 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal denied,
36N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17,p. 120.
10
145 A.3d 161 (Pa. 2016); Com. v. Cole, 135 A.3d 191, 196 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal
denied, 145 A.3d 162 (Pa. 2016).
In the instant case, Officer Caple and Detective Gerace gave limited testimony
after the presentation of the surveillance video, to explain the course of their
investigation, specifically, the reason prints were processed from that particular area
of the door, and to direct the jury's attention to specific portions of the surveillance
video and still photograph. The testimony of the officers was based upon their
experience, observations and personal knowledge of where and how the sticker was
located on the inside of the entrance door. Furthermore, both the video and the
photograph were admitted into evidence, they were viewed by the jury multiple
times without narration" and the jury was specifically instructed that they were the
sole judges of the facts, had the sole responsibility of weighing the evidence, and all
inferences therefrom, and were free to disregard any evidence which they found to
be not credible.38 Because the jury watched the video and saw the photograph, they
were free to disregard the officers' conclusions or use them as guides to examine the
photograph and video more closely. The record specifically demonstrates that the
jury did not simply rely upon the testimony of Officer Caple and Detective Gerace,
but instead sought to thoroughly examine that portion of video themselves to reach
37
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17, pp. 204-206.
38N.T. Criminal Trial, ll/28/17-11/29/17,pp. 188-190.
11
a determination. The testimony of the officers was, therefore, not unfairly prejudicial
and not in violation of the rules of evidence.
III. Weight of the Evidence
A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight
of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, but "should not be
granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
facts would have arrived at a different conclusion." Com. v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049,
1054-55 (Pa. 2013). A challenge to the weight of the evidence "concedes that there
is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict" and, therefore, does not require that the
trial court view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Com.
v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). However, the role of the trial judge is not
to sit as another juror, but "to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain
facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight
with all the facts is to deny justice." Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751-52 (internal citation
omitted). Previously, it was held that a new trial is warranted if"the jury's verdict is
so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award of a new
trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail." Clay,
64 A.3d at 1055 (internal citation omitted).
12
Appellate review of a decision concerning the weight of the evidence is well
settled:
An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a weight
of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by
the trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence. Brown, 648 A.2d at 1189. Because
the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence
presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the
findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
court's determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 354 A.2d 545(Pa.1976). One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a
new trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was not
against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted
in the interest of justice.
Widmer, 560 Pa. at 321-22, 744 A.2d at 753 (emphasis added).
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial court in
granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a challenge to the
weight of the evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a trial
court's discretion, we have explained:
The term 'discretion' imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and
skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion within the framework of
the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will
of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason,
as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary
actions. Discretion is abused where the course pursued represents not
merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly
unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows
that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Widmer, 560 Pa. at 322, 744 A.2d at 753 (quoting Coker v. S.M
Flickinger Co., 533 Pa. 441, 447, 625 A.2d 1181, 1184-85 (1993)).
13
Id. An appellate court cannot "invade the trial judge's discretion any more than a
trial judge may invade the province of a jury, unless both or either have palpably
abused their function." Id. at 1056.
Here, Defendant claims that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence, in part, because other prints, though not usable for identification purposes,
were also recovered from the door.39 It has been recognized that "the probative value
of fingerprint evidence 'depends entirely on the circumstances of each case.:" In re
MJ.H, 988 A.2d 694, 697 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citing Com. v. Cichy, 323 A.2d 817,
818 (Pa.Super. 1974)). In the instant matter, the verdict is not supported by the mere
existence of Defendant's prints among many others. Defendant left a clear palm print
on the inside of a door that was not intended to be used from the inside of the store.
Furthermore, Defendant's print was directly linked to the suspect because
surveillance video showed the suspect touching the door in the same area that
Defendant's print was recovered. The existence of the surveillance video permitted
the jury to do more than merely speculate, but allowed them to determine, in their
role as the sole fact finders, whether the print recovered from the door was placed
there by the suspect in the video. While Defendant admitted that he was present in
the store on prior occasions, Detective Gerace explained that prints will lose their
39
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17, pp. 129-130.
14
value over time and that the heat from inside the store would have an effect on the
quality of any prints on the inside of the door over time." Additionally, Defendant's
statements concerning his presence in the store was inconsistent and contradictory.
In fact, Defendant only admitted to possibly having been in the store on the day of
the robbery when he was confronted with the evidence. Considering the record as a
whole, especially the surveillance video, Defendant's clear print, the testimony of
the responding officer and detectives and Defendant's contrary and inconsistent
statements, the existence of unidentifiable prints and smudges on the door to the
store is not so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal
weight with all the facts is to deny justice. Therefore, the verdict cannot be found to
be against the weight of the evidence.
Defendant also asserts that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
because the eye witness estimated that the suspect weighed approximately one
hundred eighty-five (185) pounds and stood approximately six (6) feet tall,41 while
Detective Gerace stated in his report that Defendant weighs one hundred fifty ( 150)
pounds and stands five (5) feet and seven (7) inches tall.42 The slight difference in
Defendant's physical characteristics as compared to the eye witness' estimate is
clearly outweighed by the positive print identification directly linking Defendant to
40
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17, pp. 130-131.
41
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17, pp. 99, 102
42
N.T. Criminal Trial, 11/28/17-11/29/17, pp. 161-162.
15
) )
the robbery and the video surveillance of the suspect. The video permitted the jury,
as the sole fact finders in the case, to determine if Defendant indeed matched the
physical characteristics of the suspect in the video. Considering the record as a
whole, the eye witness' erroneous estimate is not so clearly of greater weight that to
ignore it or to give it equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. Therefore, the
verdict cannot be found to be against the weight of the evidence.
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of sentence imposed on January
31, 201 7 should not be disturbed.
BY THE COURT:
HOWARD F. KNISE
JUDGE
ATTEST:
Copies to:
r-
MaryJean Glick, Senior Assistant Public Defender
Office of the District Attorney
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