Bank of America v. Iaboni, P. ( 2017 )

J-S79034-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., SUCCESSOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
BY MERGER TO BAC HOME LOANS : PENNSYLVANIA
SERVICING, LP, F/K/A COUNTRYWIDE :
HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, N/K/A :
CHRISTIANA TRUST, A DIVISION OF :
WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND :
SOCIETY, FSB, NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL :
CAPACITY BUT AS TRUSTEE OF ARLP :
TRUST 4 :
:
v. :
:
PETER IABONI AND CELINDA IABONI, :
H/W, AND PETER IABONI, JR., :
:
Appellants : No. 647 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order entered January 14, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County,
Civil Division at No(s): 656-2012
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JANUARY 10, 2017
Peter Iaboni and Celinda Iaboni, husband and wife, and Peter Iaboni,
Jr. (collectively “the Iabonis”), appeal from the Order entering a verdict in
favor of Bank of America, N.A., successor by merger to BAC Home Loans
Servicing, LP, f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, n/k/a Christiana
Trust, a division of Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, not in its
individual capacity but as Trustee of ARLP Trust 4 (collectively “Bank of
America”), and declaring that the refinance mortgage on the property in
Greene Township applied to both Peter and Celinda Iaboni on the basis of
the tenants by the entireties presumption. We affirm.
J-S79034-16
The trial court set forth an extensive recitation of the facts, which we
adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/16, at 1-6
(unnumbered).
On appeal, the Iabonis raise the following questions for our review:
1. Whether the [trial] court was incorrect in entering a verdict
in favor of [Bank of America] on the basis of the tenants
by the entireties presumption[,] and in finding that the
mortgage applied to both Peter Iaboni and Celinda
Iaboni[,] where the only evidence of this was the fact that
Celinda Iaboni referred several times in her testimony to
title as tenants in common, which testimony demonstrated
her intention that she hold title not as an entireties co-
tenant[,] but as a tenant in common[,] and which clearly
should have been sufficient to rebut the presumption[?]
2. Whether the [trial] court was incorrect in finding that Peter
Iaboni acted on behalf of himself and Celinda Iaboni when
he refinanced the loan on the property where it found that
Celinda Iaboni was not removed from the deed and
mortgage but[,] rather[,] was present at the refinance and
“was aware of the actions taken that day[,]” but neglected
to consider that Celinda Iaboni signed the deed the day
before the loan refinance closing and, although she was
present at the closing, took no part in the closing itself[?]
3. Whether the [trial] court was incorrect in reforming the
mortgage to add Celinda Iaboni[,] where there was no
mutual mistake in the preparation of the mortgage
document[,] but where the mistake was unilateral[?]
Brief for Appellants at 4.
Our standard of review is as follows:
Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts is
to determine whether the findings of the trial court are support-
ed by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed
error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the
trial judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal
as the verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light
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J-S79034-16
most favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial
court only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent
evidence in the record or if its findings are premised on an error
of law. However, [where] the issue ... concerns a question of
law, our scope of review is plenary.
The trial court’s conclusions of law on appeal originating from a
non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate court because it is
the appellate court’s duty to determine if the trial court correctly
applied the law to the facts of the case.
Stephan v. Waldron Elec. Heating & Cooling LLC, 100 A.3d 660, 664–65
(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
In their first claim, the Iabonis contend that Celinda Iaboni’s testimony
was sufficient to rebut the tenants by the entireties presumption. Brief for
Appellants at 6. The Iabonis argue that Celinda Iaboni stated that she had
obtained the property in question as a tenant in common. Id. The Iabonis
further point to Celinda Iaboni’s testimony, with regard to the 2006 deed
accompanying the subject mortgage, that she was present at the closing and
merely signed “what she was told to sign.” Id.The trial court set forth the relevant law, addressed the Iabonis’ claim
and determined it is without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/16, at 9-11
(unnumbered). Here, the Iabonis merely cite to testimony that supports
their position and ostensibly ask this Court to reweigh the evidence in their
favor, and reassess the credibility determinations made by the trial court.
See Kornfeld v. Atl. Fin. Fed., 856 A.2d 170, 173 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(stating that in a non-jury trial, “[i]t is not our role to pass on the credibility
of witnesses, as the trial court clearly is in the superior position to do so.”).
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J-S79034-16
We decline to reweigh the evidence, and we adopt the sound reasoning of
the trial court for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion,
4/8/16, at 9-11. Thus, the Iabonis are not entitled to relief on this claim.
In their second claim, the Iabonis contend that the trial court failed to
consider the fact that the deed accompanying the subject mortgage was not
signed at the closing, but was signed the day before closing. Brief for
Appellants at 7. The Iabonis again point out Celinda Iaboni’s testimony that
she had signed what she was asked to sign, and that no one asked her to
sign the mortgage. Id. The Iabonis also assert that the mortgage broker
testified that Peter Iaboni was the intended borrower. Id. The Iabonis thus
argue that Celinda Iaboni was not aware of the actions that took place that
day. Id.The trial court addressed this claim and determined that it is without
merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/16, at 11-12 (unnumbered); see also
Stephan, 100 A.3d at 664 (noting that the trial judge’s findings of fact are
given the same weight as the verdict of a jury). Thus, we adopt the sound
reasoning of the trial court, and affirm on this basis with regard to the
Iabonis’ second claim. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/16, at 11-12
(unnumbered).
In their third claim, the Iabonis contend that the trial court incorrectly
ordered that the mortgage be reformed because there was no evidence of a
mutual mistake. Brief for Appellants at 8. The Iabonis argue that the
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J-S79034-16
mortgage company made the mistake as it failed to include Celinda Iaboni
on the mortgage. Id.1
The trial court addressed the Iabonis’ third claim and determined that
it is without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/16, at 15-18
(unnumbered). Because the Iabonis’ argument on appeal does not
demonstrate that the trial court erred in reforming the mortgage, we adopt
the sound reasoning of the trial court as to this claim. See id.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/10/2017
1
We note that the Iabonis cite to a single case, and do not include any
citations to the evidence of record to support their claim. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a) (stating that the argument section shall contain “such discussion
and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”); see also Pa.R.A.P.
2119(c) (noting that “[i]f reference is made to the pleadings, evidence,
charge, opinion or order, or any other matter appearing in the record, the
argument must set forth … a reference to the place in the record where the
matter referred to appears[.]”).
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Circulated 12/15/2016 03:35 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PIKE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL
BANK or AMERICA, N.A., ct al., N/K/A:
CHRISTIANA TRUST, a division of
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, VSB,
Not in its individual capacity but as
TRUSTEE OF AR.LP TRUST 4, r,,
·- .-,- ,. . .:,
e- .,
Plaintiff/ Appell cc No. 656~2012 CIVIL
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vs. .... ··,,
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PETER lABONI and CELINDA IABONI : ..... :.:
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h/w mid PETER IABONI, .TR. -, : .. 1·:
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Defendants/ Appellan ts
OPINION SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 1925
AND NOW, this _oJli. day of April, 2016, after careful review of the record, this
Court continues to stand by its decision and respectfully requests the Superior Court to
uphold its Order, dated January 14... , 2016, which entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff.
This Court also adds, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, the
following:
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action is in equity and concerns a claim for reformation of a mortgage dated
February 28, 2006. Plaintiff is Christiana Trust (hereinafter "Plaintiff") and is the proper
party to bring this action pursuant to an Assignment of Mortgage recorded on May 27,
2014. Defendants are Peter Iaboni and Celinda laboni (husband and wife) and Peterlaboni,
Jr. (hereinafter "Defendants").
APPENDIX I
The property at issue (hereinafter the "Aggregate Property") is located in Greene
Township, Pike County, Pennsylvania. Defendants Peter and Celinda laboni and niece's
husband, Daniel Hinton, obtained title to the Aggregate Property from Josephine and
Kenneth Wcidlich by a deed executed on April 1, 2005 . Joint Stipulation o]' Fact 1 1
(January 14, 2016). The Aggregate Property was conveyed in fee for the amount of
$260,000 to Peter and Celinda Iaboni and Daniel Hinton as co-grantees and as tenants in
common. Id This purchase and conveyance was made pursuant to an Agreement of Sale
executed by the Weidlichs and Daniel Hinton only. Joint Stipulation of Fact il 2, Trial
Exhibit 16. The Aggregate Property consisted of multiple tax parcels, including a lake, a
house, and a wooded area. Joint Stipulation of Fact ii 3, Trial Exhibit 16 i12.
Defendants and Hinton financed the purchase of the Aggregate Property through a
loan dated April 9, 2005 and issued by The New York Mortgage Company in the principal
amount of 221,000 (hereinafter the "Hinton/laboni Loan"). Joint Stipulation of Fact ir s,
Trial Exhibit 3. The Hinton/Iaboni Loan was secured by a Purchase Money Mortgage
jointly executed by Peter and Celinda Iaboni and Hinton in favor of The New York
Mortgage Company. Joint Stipulation of Fact~ 6, Trial Exhibit 3. The Purchase Money
Mortgage was recorded with the Recorder's Office in Pike County on May 6, 2005 as
Instrument No. 20050007738 in Book 2108, Page 83. Joint Stipulation of Fact~ 7, Trial
Exhibit 3. The Purchase Money Mortgage included a Legal Description of the tax parcels
contained in the Aggregate Property. Joint Stipulation of Fact ~ 8, Trial Exhibit 3. This
Description matched the Legal Description of the tax parcels contained in the Aggregate
Property that was put forth in the Hinton/laboni Deed. Joint Stipulation of Fact~ 9, Trial
Exhibits 2 and 3.
In 2006, the Iabonis and Hinton decided to remove Hinton as a co-owner of the
Aggregate Property. On February 28, 2006, Peter Iaboni applied for a new 101111 in his own
name in order to pay off the Purchase Money Mortgage .. Joint Stipulation 889 A.2d 39, 41 (Pa. 2005) (quoting
Vernon Twp. Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Connor, 855 A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 2004));
Kepple v. Fairman Drilling Co., 615 A.2d 1298, 1302 (Pa. 1992) (citation omitted). The
appellate court does not supplant its reasoning with that of the trial court but instead
determines whether the trial court could have reasonably reached the conclusions that it
reached. 615 A.2d 1298, 1302 (citation omitted). Therefore, an appellate court will not
reverse un equitable decree "unless it is unsupported by the evidence or demonstrably
capricious." 615 A.2d 1298, 1302 (quotation omitted) (citation omitted). In equity
matters, if supported by competent evidence, the trial court's factual findings arc binding.
Id at 1302. However, the trial court's conclusions of law arc not. Id. at 1302 ( citation
omitted).
Similarly, "in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts," the appellate court
"determinejs] whether" "competent evidence" supports the trial court's findings and
"whether the trial court committed" any error of law. Wyatt, Inc. v. Citizens Bank of Pa.,
976 A.2d 557, 564 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (quotations omitted) (citations omitted). The
appellate court gives the same weight and effect to the trial judge's findings of fact that it
gives to a jury's findings. Id. at 564. The appellate court "consider] s] the evidence in a light
most favorable to the verdict winner" and only reverses the trial court's decision if
competent evidence in the record does not support the trial court's findings of fact or the
trial court premised its findings on an error of law. Id at 564 (quotations omitted) (citation
omitted). At trial, the factfinder has the freedom to the determine 1) witness credibility,
including when witness's give conflicting testimony; 2) the weight of witness testimony;
and 3) how much, if any, of the evidence to believe. See Gunn v. Grossman, 748 A.2d
1235, 1240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (citing Gaydos v. Gaydos, 693 A.2d 1368 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1997) Flanagan v. Labe, 666 A.2d 333, 335 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)); Farmers Nat 'l Bank of
Bloomsburg v. Albertson, 199 A.2d 486, 487 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964). If issues involve
questions oflaw, the appellate court's scope of review is plenary. Wyatt, 976 A.2d at 564.
Because the appellate court must "determine if the trial court correctly applied the law to
the facts," non-jury trial conclusions of law do not bind the appellate court. Jd. al 564
(quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
n, DISCUSSION
Defendants present four issues for review upon appeal, and this Court will address
each issue individually below.
A. This Court's verdict was correct in finding for the Plaintiff because
Defendants did not present sufficient evidence to rebut the entireties presumption
that Peter Iaboni acted for the juint benefit of himself and his wife, Celinda Iaboui,
when he executed the Refinance Mortgage.
"A tenancy by the entireties is a form of co-ownership of real or personal property
by husband and wife." In re Brannon, 476 FJd 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2007). "Where properly
is placed in the names of both the husband and wife, the creation of a tenancy by the
entireties is presumed." Gilliland v. Gilliland, 751 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Pa. Super. 2000)
citing Raiken v. Mellon, 582 A.2d 11, 14 (Pa. Super. 1990). In order to overcome the
presumption that an estate by the entireties exists ... there must be clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary." In re Holmes' Estate, 200 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. 1964).
The "entireties presumption" is well-established under Pennsylvania law. "It is
presumed that each tenant by the entirety may, without specific consent, act individually
on behalf of both." 476 F.3d 170, 173. The Pennsylvania courts have established, with
respect to entireties properties, a "presumption that during the term of a marriage either
spouse has the power to act for both, without specific authorization so long as the benefits
of such action inure to both." Kennedy v, Erkman, 133 A.2d 550, 554 (Pa. 1957). See also
Schweitzer v. Evans, 63 A.2d 39 (Pa. 1949) and Madden v. Gostztonyi Savings & Trust Co.
200 A. 624 (Pa. 1938). However, the non-acting spouse can offer rebuttal evidence that
"the spouse was not in fact authorized by the other spouse." 133 A.2d 550, 553 (entireties·
presumption applied because no evidence offered Chat lessor wife was not in accord with
termination of lease despite notice of termination only being signed by lessor husband.)
Defendants argue that the tenants by the entireties presumption should not apply
and that the Refinance Mortgage should not apply to both Peter and Celinda Iaboni.
Defendants argue that the only evidence supporting the entireties presumption was the fact
that Celinda Iahoni was identified on the deed as the wife of Peter Iaboni. Defendants argue
that. Celinda laboni's testimony demonstrated her intention to hold title not as a tenant by
the entireties but as a tenant in common.
Celinda laboni did refer lo title as tenants in common several times in her
testimony at trial. See Trial Testimony p. 119: 11-4, p.126: 13, p. 145: 15-18. However,
those references appear to concern the Wiedlich/Hinton/Iaboni Deed, pursuant to which
she did indeed hold title with Peter Iaboni and Daniel Hinton as tenants in common. In
fact, she testified that the term "tenants in common" on the Iaboni Deed referred to the
granter clause on that Deed. Trial Testimony p. 146: 13-16. Significantly, the Iaboni
Deed does not use the term "tenants in common" in the grantee clause; instead, the
grantees are identified as "Peter and Celinda Iaboni, his wife." Trial Exhibit 5.
Furthermore, this Court finds that there is additional evidence that is sufficient to
find for Plaintiff on the basis of the entireties presumption. Peter and Celinda Iaboni were
husband and wife at the time of the Refinance Closing. Joint Stipulation of Fact 1 15. Peter
and Celinda laboni both attended the Refinance Closing. Id. 115, Trial Transcript p. 141:
21-24. All parties agree that Celinda Iaboni knew about the Iaboni Loan and the Refinance
Mortgage and was not opposed to the Refinance Mortgage. Celinda Iaboni testified that
she supported the refinance loan. Trial Transcript p. 143: 6-8.
Defendants have not offered clear and convincing evidence that the labonis held
title as tenants in common rather than as tenants by the entireties. Consequently,
Defendants have not rebutted the entireties presumption, and this Court was correct in
finding thal Peter laboni acted for the joint benefit of himself and his wife, Celinda laboni,
when he executed the Refinance Mortgage.
B. This Court mis correct in finding that Peter Iaboni acted on behalf of himself
and Celinda Iaboui when he refinanced the loan on the Aggregate Property,
ln {heir Concise Statement, Defendants argue that this Court was incorrect in
finding that Peter Iaboni acted on behalf of himself and his wife during the Refinance
Closing. Defendants argue that this Court did not consider the fact that Celinda Iaboni
signed the deed the day before the Refinance Closing and did not take part in the
Refinance Closing itself.
The date of Celinda Iaboni's signature on the Iaboni Deed is February 27, 2006,
which is one day before the date on the Refinance Mortgage. However, there was·
testimony at trial which tends to show that Celinda Iaboni did participate, perhaps even
more so than her husband, in the Refinance Closing. Peter Iaboni testified that he was not
really involved in the process and that he was counting on his wife to make sure
everything was done correctly. Trial Testimony p. 62: 22-25, p. 63: 1. Erin Steppacher
testified that it appeared that Celinda Iaboni was more involved in making sure that
everything was done right. Trial Testimony p. 100: 22-25. Finally, Jason Wiggins
testified that Celinda Iaboni was reviewing each of the documents presented before Peter
Iaboni signed them during the Refinance Closing. Trial Testimony p. 194: 14-19
Even if Celinda laboni did sign the laboni Deed the day before the Refinance
Closing, the record was sufficient lo establish that she still participated in the Refinance
Closing and was aware of the events of that proceeding. Therefore, this Court did not en
in finding that Peter Iaboni acted on behalf of himself and Celinda when he refinanced
the loan on the property.
C. This Court did not err in foiling to distinguish between the three parcels in its
verdict' and in finding that the Refinance Mortgage encumbered all three
parcels because the record was established through testimony and
documentary evidence and therefore is sufficient to support such a finding.
In their Concise Statement, Defendants argue that the record shows that only the
house parcel tax map number was encumbered by the Refinance Mortgage and that,
therefore, this Court's verdict was incorrect in failing lo distinguish between parcels I (the
lake), ll (the house), and llI (the wooded area).
At trial, Defendants argued that the labonis only ever intended to mortgage the
house parcel, which was tax map number 128.04-02-01. Trial Exhibit 32. Celinda Iaboni
testified that she attended the closing to sign the original mortgage, the Purchase Money
Mortgage, on the Aggregate Property. Trial Testimony p. 125: I. Celinda testified that the
"closing was done for everything." Trial Testimony p. 126: 11. Therefore, the same closing
was conducted for parcels of property that she thought they were paying cash for and the
parcel that she thought they were mortgaging. Furthermore, Celinda testified that she only
looked at the papers that were given to her during the closing. Trial Testimony p. 129: 8-9.
However, she also testified that she believed that she would have looked at the mortgage
to make sure it included only the house parcel. Trial Testimony p. 129: 14, p. 130: 7-15.
She further testified that Attorney Spall, who was present at the closing, could testify that
only the parcel with the house was being mortgaged; however, Attorney Spall did not
testily and was not deposed. Trial Transcript p, l32: 15-19. Significantly, although Celinda
testified she believed she would have the documents regarding the 2005 luan and mortgage
which would support her argument, she did not produce any documents at trial.
Celinda laboni also testified that the Refinance Mortgage was done only for the
house parcel. Trial Testimony p. 120, 19-20, p. 125, 13-14. The Refinance Mortgage listed
only the tax parcel map number for the house parcel on the first page of the document.
Trial Exhibit 5. However, the legal description that was attached to the Refinance Mortgage
includes all three parcels. Trial Exhibit 5. Celinda testified that she noticed that the legal
description included all three parcels. Trial Testimony p. 154, 23-25. Furthermore, she
testified that she did not object to the fact that all three parcels were included in the legal
description. Trial Testimony p. 154, 1-4.
Additionally, third-party witnesses provided rebuttal testimony to Defendants'
argument. Jason Wiggins, a loan officer, was involved in both the original purchase in 2005
and the Refinance in 2006. In regards to the 2005 transaction, Mr. Wiggins testified that
the labonis were financing "everything including the lake." Trial Testimony p. 189: 15-22.
Mr. Wiggins testified that the Iabonis subsequently contacted him in order to refinance.
Trial Testimony p. 190: 24-25. Mr. Wiggins testified that his understanding of the Jabonis'
intention in refinancing was not to "get any portion of the property they had purchased
released from the original mortgage." Trial Testimony p. 192: 25, p. I 94: 1-4. Finally, Mr.
Wiggins testified that Celinda Iaboni was reviewing each of the documents presented
before Peter Iaboni signed them during the Refinance Closing. Trial Testimony p. 194: 14-
19.
Erin Steppucher also testified about the purpose of the Refinance and the events of
the Refinance Closing. Ms. Steppacher testified that the labonis were seeking to mortgage
all of the parcels that they had purchased in 2005. Trial Testimony p. 97 :21. She also
testified that she did not recall either Peter or Celinda laboni requesting that only one or
some of the parcels be encumbered by the Refinance Mortgage. Id. 22-25. Ms. Steppachcr
did not recall questions from either Peter or Celinda Iaboni about which parcels would be
encumbered by the Refinance Mortgage. Trial Testimony p. JO I :6-10.
Initially, it must be noted that Daniel Hinton testified that he was not independently
interested in the Aggregate Property. Trial Testimony p. 203, 11-13. Hinton testified that
he became involved with the transaction because he believed that the Iabonis could not
secure financing, and he was willing to put the property in his name. Trial Testimony p.
203 :5-10. Hinton testified that he applied for a loan to finance the property and that the
loan was to finance the whole property rather than only certain parcels. Trial Testimony p.
204: 15. Hinton also testified that he did not recall the labonis claiming that they were only
mortgaging the house parcel. id. 5-9.
The testimony of Peter Jaboni also rebuts Defendants' argument. When Hinton was
removed from the title in 2006, Peter testified that he and his wife kept the entire property
that they had purchased in 2005. Trial Testimony p. 34:18-20. Peter testified that the legal
description in the Refinance Mortgage appeared to describe the three parcels of property
purchased in 2005. id. p. 36:3-20.
Finally, the documentary evidence provided rebuts the Defendants' argument. 111e
2005 Purchase Money Mortgage and the 2006 Refinance Mortgage both contain legal
descriptions for three parcels of property. Trial Exhibits 3 and 5. The 2006 title
commitment issued to the mortgagee contains a legal description for the same three parcels
of property as the Refinance Mortgage. Trial Exhibit 24.
This Court's findings or fact were based on competent evidence. The testimony
presented and the documentary evidence provided established a record that was sufficient
to support the finding that the Refinance Mortgage encumbered all three parcels of the
property. Therefore, this Court did not err in failing to distinguish between the three parcels
in its verdict.
D. This Court was correct in reforming the Refinance Mortgage to add Celinda
I aboni and to hold her responsible for the full amount of the loan in this matter
as an owner by the entireties.
It is well established under Pennsylvania law that "courts of equity have the
power to reform a written instrument where there has been a showing of fraud, accident
or mistake." Evans v. Marks, 218 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. 1966). "When a mortgagee fails to
properly secure a loan, the mortgagee may seek "the equitable remedy of reformation" by
showing bad faith, accident, mutual mistake, or unilateral mistake." Regions Mortgage,
Inc. v. Muthler, 889 A.2d 39, 42-42 (Pa. 2005). Although the Muthler Court held that no
evidence presented in the case before it supported a finding of mutual or unilateral
mistake, the Muthler Court reaffirmed that under certain proven circumstances, a
mortgage may be reformed to add a non-signatory party, 889 A.2d 39, 42.
Defendants argue that this Court was incorrect in reforming the Refinance
Mortgage to add Celinda laboni when it did not find as a fact that there was a mutual
mistake in the preparation of the mortgage documents. However, Defendants
mischaracterize the nature of this Court's verdict in which the grounds for reformation
are based upon evidence of bad faith by the Iabonis,
Ms. Stcppachcr testified that she never asked Celinda Iaboni to sign the Refinance
Mortgage and that Celinda never refused lo sign the Mortgage. Trial Transcript J). I 04: 11-
14. Ms. Steppacher did testify that it was clue to a mistake on her part that Celinda did not
sign the Refinance Mortgage. Trial Transcript p. I 01 :25, J). I 02: 1-4. However, Ms.
Stcppachcr also testified that Celinda was more "on top of making sure the transaction was
done right" than Peter laboni. Trial Transcript p. I 00:22-25. Ms. Steppacher emphasized
throughout her testimony that Celinda was fully aware of the proceedings and how the
transaction was completed.
This Court also heard testimony from Celinda Iaboni that supports a finding of bad
faith. She testified that she assisted her husband with the Iaboni Refinance loan application.
Trial Testimony, p. 143 :2. She helped Jason Wiggins gather documentation to proceed with
the loan. Id. at S. She testified that she was not the kind of person who would sign a
mortgage for real estate without reading it. Trial Testimony, J). 14 7: 11-14. She testified that
she was not asked to sign the mortgage. Trial Testimony, p. 148:3. Significantly, despite
having reviewed the relevant documents and having participate in the Refinance Closing,
she testified that she was not aware of the fact that she would be asked to sign the mortgage
document since she was remaining on the title with her husband. Trial Testimony, p. 149:7.
In his deposition of May 1, 20 l3, Peter Iaboni stated that his wife handles most of
the financial matters in their household. Transcript of Peter laboni 's Deposition p. 73: 15-
18. Furthermore, Peter testified at trial that Celinda was handling the family's finances in
2006. Trial Transcript p. 41 :22-24. Consequently, Peter provided a handwritten letter to
the New York Mortgage Company that read: "I, Peter Iaboni, living rent free with no
obligation to any bills." Trial Exhibit 37. This letter was dated February 22, 2006 - right
before the Refinance Closing on February 28, 2006. Peter testified 1Jrnt they were going
through "very dark years" and that he "kind of wanted for her to control and take
everything." Trial Testimony, p. 42: 12-16. He also tcsti fied that Ccl ind a was paying more
attention to the loan and purchase documents throughout the refinancing process. Id. at t-
i I. He testified that he did not do anything with regard to the properties, the purchasing,
or the financing without Celinda's knowledge. Id. at 12-15.
Furthermore, Celinda executed a "gift letter" to the New York Mortgage Company
on February 27, 2006. Trial Exhibit 38. This letter provided that Celinda would give or had
given a gift of $100,000.00 to her husband in February of 2006. Peter testified and
confirmed that she did give him that gift of $100,000. Trial Testimony p. 43:9-12. Peter
also testified that Celinda gifted him $100,000.00 so that he would have enough assets to
obtain the loan because he was applying for it in his name. Trial Testimony p, 44: 1-4.
Significantly, Peter was then asked: "So, your wife, apparently had a hundred thousand
dollars, but you wouldn't tel1 New York Mortgage Company that she was giving it to you?"
id. at 5-8. Peter responded: "I wanted to tell - I don't remember." Id. at 9. Finally, despite
having $100,000.00 to gift to her husband in order for him to secure the loan, Jason
Wiggins testified that Peter was the bon·ower on the loan because he qualified and Celinda
did not. Trial Testimony p. 192:18-21.
The Iaboni Refinance loan proceeds were applied to pay off the original mortgage
(the Purchase Money Mortgage) on the property. Join/ Stipulation of Fact 1 27.
Subsequently, the Purchase Money Mortgage was marked as satisfied pursuant to a
Satisfaction of Mortgage dated March 22, 2006. Id. at 128. Celinda Iaboni benefited from
this transaction because she was a co-obligor under the Purchase Money Mortgage. Celinda
testified that she was not aware of any financial harm or injury that resulted from her
husband's execution of the Refinance Mortgage. Trial Testimony p. 159: 19-22.
The record is sufficient to support this Court's finding that Celinda Iaboni did not
sign the Refinance Mortgage because of some bad faith on the part of the Iabonis, Celinda
was handling the family finances during the period of refinancing. She was involved in the
events leading up lo the Refinance Closing, was fully aware of the proceedings, and
participated al length in the Closing itself. Finally, Celinda benefited from the transaction
because the Purchase Money Mortgage was satisfied with the loan proceeds. Therefore,
this Court did not err in reforming the Refinance Mortgage to add Celinda Iaboni's name
in order to hold her equally responsible for the foll amount of the loan in this matter as an
owner by entireties.
111. CONCLUSION
After thorough review of the record in this case, Ibis court did not com mil any error of
law or override or misapply any law. This Court's judgment was not manifestly
unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. As this decision was a
sound application of the law and clearly supported by the facts, circumstances, and
evidence in the case, this Court respectfully requests that the Superior Court uphold its
Verdict rendered January 14, 2016.
cc:
I
Scott M. Rothman, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiff
Lawrence J. Avallone, Esq., At1orneyfo1· Defendants
er /Jd/11/.
JLM