Com. v. Bryant, S. ( 2023 )

J-A27005-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
STUART WAYNE BRYANT :
:
Appellant : No. 1193 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 18, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-44-CR-0000471-2019
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JANUARY 19, 2023
Appellant, Stuart Wayne Bryant, appeals from the Judgment of
Sentence entered on June 18, 2021 in the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin
County, after a jury convicted him of, inter alia, Third-Degree Murder, Driving
Under the Influence (“DUI”), and Homicide by Vehicle While DUI. Appellant
challenges the trial court’s denial of two pretrial motions to suppress certain
evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review,
we affirm.
This case involves a DUI car crash on January 28, 2019, caused by
Appellant, that killed Harry Aultz. Evidence and testimony at the hearing on
Appellant’s omnibus pretrial motion established that shortly before the crash,
Appellant drove erratically, dangerously, and at speeds up to 114 miles per
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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hour.1 When his car collided with Mr. Aultz’s vehicle head-on, Appellant was
driving 94 miles per hour.
Granville Township Police Chief Craig Weston was the first emergency
responder to the scene of the crash. During investigation, Chief Weston found
a broken bottle of scotch whiskey on the front passenger-side floor of
Appellant’s vehicle.
Appellant was taken by helicopter to Geisinger Holy Spirit Hospital.
Hospital personnel drew Appellant’s blood for medical purposes shortly after
his arrival. Then, several hours later and at Chief Weston’s request,
Pennsylvania State Trooper Christina Fow went to the hospital to obtain
Appellant’s consent for a second blood draw. After reading Appellant the
Pennsylvania DL-26 form,2 Trooper Fow obtained Appellant’s consent. The
State Police blood draw revealed that Appellant’s blood-alcohol content
(“BAC”) was 0.283% several hours after the crash.
On September 18, 2019, police charged Appellant by criminal complaint
with, inter alia, Third-Degree Murder, Homicide by Vehicle While DUI, and
DUI. Police took Appellant into custody the following day.
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1 Witnesses testified that before he collided with Mr. Aultz, Appellant rear-
ended another vehicle, drove over three street signs, and made several illegal
and dangerous driving maneuvers. The crash occurred in a 35-mile-per-hour
zone.
2 The DL-26 form encompasses the warnings established pursuant to 75
Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(2), commonly referred to as the Implied Consent Law.
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On December 11, 2019, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion
seeking, inter alia, to suppress the State Police blood draw as the fruit of an
improper arrest conducted without a warrant or probable cause. After
conducting a hearing, the court denied Appellant’s motion.
On December 27, 2019, the Commonwealth issued a subpoena to
Geisinger Holy Spirit Hospital to obtain Appellant’s medical records, specific to
evidence of his BAC from the medical blood draw conducted on the night of
the crash.3 On January 7, 2020, the Commonwealth obtained the requested
records.
On March 31, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence of his
BAC obtained from his medical records, as the Commonwealth obtained the
records without a warrant. The same day, the court held a hearing on
Appellant’s motion. At the hearing, the court found that the Commonwealth
was required to obtain a warrant to seize Appellant’s medical records. The
parties agreed, however, that prevailing caselaw would allow the
Commonwealth to obtain a warrant to remedy its error in subpoenaing
Appellant’s records.4 As a result, and because Appellant’s trial was scheduled
to begin 6 days later, the parties agreed that the Commonwealth would make
an oral proffer on the record of the evidence that would support issuance of a
warrant. That proffer, if sufficient to establish probable cause, would serve in
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3 Supplemental Pretrial Motion, 3/31/21, at ¶ 8(e).
4N.T. Hr’g, 3/31/21, at 20 (citing Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 948 A.2d 875,
882 (Pa. Super. 2008)).
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lieu of a warrant to allow the Commonwealth to use evidence derived from
Appellant’s medical records at trial.
As discussed in detail infra, the court found that the Commonwealth’s
proffer established probable cause to support issuance of a warrant to seize
Appellant’s medical records. Following the Commonwealth’s proffer, Appellant
lodged an oral motion to suppress the evidence, challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a finding of probable cause. The court denied
Appellant’s motion.
Appellant’s 3-day jury trial began on April 6, 2021. At the conclusion of
trial, the jury convicted Appellant of, inter alia, Third-Degree Murder, Homicide
by Vehicle While DUI, DUI—General Impairment, and DUI—Highest Rate.5 On
June 18, 2021, the court, aided by a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report,
sentenced Appellant to a standard range sentence of 20-40 years’
incarceration for the Third-Degree Murder conviction. The court imposed
concurrent terms of incarceration for Appellant’s other convictions.
Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion contesting the court’s
exercise of sentencing discretion. On August 10, 2021, the court denied
Appellant’s motion. Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal and both he and
the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
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5 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c); 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3735(a), 3802(a)(1), and 3802(c),
respectively.
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1. Whether the lower court erred in denying [Appellant’s] Motion
to Suppress Evidence because there was insufficient probable
cause to arrest [Appellant]?
2. Whether the lower court erred in denying [Appellant’s] Motion
to Suppress the seizure of [Appellant’s] medical records because
the search warrant was not supported by probable cause?
3. Whether the lower court abused the discretionary aspects of
sentencing when it sentenced [Appellant] to a de facto life
sentence of 20 to 40 years?
Appellant’s Br. at 7.
A.
Appellant’s first two issues challenge the trial court’s denial of his
motions to suppress evidence. “Once a motion to suppress evidence has been
filed, it is the Commonwealth's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the
defendant's rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047–1048
(Pa. 2012). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). “Our standard of review in
addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is
whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Evans,
153 A.3d 323, 327 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). We consider only the
evidence of the prosecution and uncontradicted evidence of the defense, as
presented at the suppression hearing. Id. “Where the record supports the
findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may
reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.”
Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007).
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B.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by not
suppressing the results of the State Police blood draw. Appellant’s Br. at 28-
31. He claims that when Trooper Fow read him the DL-26 form on the night
of the crash, she placed him under arrest.6 Immediately after, Appellant
consented to the blood draw. He alleges that Trooper Fow’s arrest was not
supported by probable cause and, therefore, the court should have suppressed
evidence of his BAC from the subsequent blood draw. Id.Appellant’s argument is based on the procedural misapprehension that
he was arrested on January 28, 2019. The record reveals, however, that police
arrested Appellant on September 19, 2019.7 Since the blood draw in question
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6The DL-26 form included the language: “You are under arrest for driving
under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance in violation of Section
3802 of the Vehicle Code.” N.T. Hr’g, 5/27/20, at 27.
7 Whether Trooper Fow arrested Appellant is a “question of law subject to
plenary review.” Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014). An
arrest exists where the police (1) intended to take the person into custody,
and (2) subjected the person to actual control. Commonwealth v.
Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 518 (Pa. 2017). That the police read the person
form DL-26 is but one factor for the court to consider. See Maletic v. Dept.
of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 819 A.2d 640, 643-44 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2003) (en banc) (finding arrest where police read form DL-26 to
appellant and testified to a clear intent to arrest appellant). See also Mason
v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, No.
2684 C.D. 2010, 2011 WL 10893865 at *3-5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (finding,
based on totality of circumstances, that police did not arrest appellee despite
reading her form DL-26).
Here, the record is devoid of any indication that Trooper Fow physically denied
Appellant’s freedom of action in any way. Additionally, aside from reading
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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occurred prior to Appellant’s arrest, the legality of Appellant’s arrest that
occurred nearly nine months later has no bearing on whether the evidence
derived from the blood draw should have been suppressed.8 Consequently,
we affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress the BAC
from the State Police blood draw.
C.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by
denying his oral motion to suppress evidence derived from his medical
records. Appellant’s Br. at 31-33. As stated supra, to remedy its error of
obtaining Appellant’s medical records without a warrant,9 the Commonwealth
provided an oral proffer on the record at the March 31, 2021 hearing of the
evidence to support a finding of probable cause. The Commonwealth asserted,
inter alia, that the State Police blood draw, which proved that Appellant’s BAC
was 0.283% after the crash, was sufficient to support issuance of a warrant
for Appellant’s medical records. N.T. Hr’g, 3/31/21, at 19.
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Appellant the DL-26 form, Trooper Fow expressed no intent to take Appellant
into custody. Except for “minor conversation” about “how he was feeling,”
Trooper Fow exchanged no other words with Appellant. N.T. Hr’g, 5/27/20, at
25-28. Trooper Fow knew nothing about Appellant’s case, did not interview
Appellant, and was otherwise not involved in the investigation. Id. at 20, 22-
25, 28. Thus, the record demonstrates that an objective person in Appellant’s
position would not believe that he was under arrest in January 2019.
8 Appellant does not contest the voluntariness of the blood draw.
9When hospital personnel perform a blood draw for medical purposes, police
must obtain a warrant to seize the associated medical records.
Commonwealth v. Shaw, 770 A.2d 295, 299 (Pa. 2001).
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The court found, based on the proffer, that probable cause existed to
support issuance of a warrant to seize Appellant’s medical records. Id. at 20-
21. Appellant then lodged an oral motion to suppress, objecting to the
sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence to establish probable cause. Id.The court denied the motion to suppress. Id. at 21. See also Trial Ct. Op.,
9/28/21, at 3-4.
The record supports the court’s finding. The Commonwealth provided
probable cause for police to believe that Appellant was DUI by virtue of the
State Police blood test results. This would have been sufficient to allow the
Commonwealth to obtain a warrant for Appellant’s medical records. We
discern no trial court error.
D.
In his final issue, Appellant challenges the court’s exercise of sentencing
discretion. An appellant raising such a challenge is not entitled to review as of
right; rather, a challenge in this regard is properly viewed as a petition for
allowance of appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b); Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki,
522 A.2d 17, 18-19 (Pa. 1987); Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d
1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc).
To obtain this Court’s review, an appellant challenging the discretionary
aspects of his sentence must comply with the following requirements: (1) file
a timely notice of appeal; (2) preserve the issue at sentencing or in a motion
to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) include within his brief a concise
statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal as required by
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Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) raise a substantial question that the sentence is
inappropriate under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz,
64 A.3d 722, 725 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Here, Appellant timely filed his appeal, preserved his claim in a post-
sentence motion, and included in his brief a Rule 2119(f) Statement. In the
statement, Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing upon Appellant an “unreasonable” and excessive sentence, which
will expire when he is 100 years old, without due consideration of his age and
lack of need for rehabilitation. Appellant’s Br. at 25-27. This raises a
substantial question for our review. Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599,
602 (Pa. Super. 2005). We will review Appellant’s claim.
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing
judge, and we will not disturb a sentence on appeal absent a manifest abuse
of discretion. Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super.
2006). In this context, “the appellant must establish, by reference to the
record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a
manifestly unreasonable decision.” Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, since
the court sentenced Appellant to a standard-range sentence,10 we may only
vacate Appellant’s sentence if we find that “the case involves circumstances
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10See Commonwealth v. Haynes, 125 A.3d 800, 809 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(explaining that a “sentence of twenty to forty years of incarceration for third-
degree murder [is] a standard-range sentence”).
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where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2).
When imposing sentence, “the sentencing court must consider the
factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), that is, the protection of the public,
gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant[.]” Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34
A.3d 135, 144 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “Where the sentencing
court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report (‘PSI’), we can
assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding the
defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating
statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super.
2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Before imposing the instant sentence, the court indicated that it had
read the PSI report, victim impact statements, and Appellant’s sentencing
memorandum, and reviewed the guidelines and verdict slip. N.T. Sentencing,
6/18/21, at 3. The court also heard argument by counsel for Appellant and
the Commonwealth and testimony from multiple witnesses. Id. at 4-63. The
court then heard from Appellant. Id. at 64-69.
By reviewing the PSI report before imposing sentence, the court
satisfied the requirement that it consider and weigh all sentencing factors,
including Appellant’s age and rehabilitative needs. The court then imposed a
standard-range sentence for Third-Degree Murder. Nothing in the record gives
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us reason to conclude that imposition of the standard range sentence was
unreasonable.11 We, thus, discern no abuse of sentencing discretion.
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motions to
suppress, and we discern no abuse of sentencing discretion.
Judgment of Sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/19/2023
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11Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, there is nothing inherently unreasonable
about the fact that Appellant’s maximum sentence will expire when he is 100
years old. Appellant, who was 62 years old at the time of sentencing, is not
entitled to a sentencing discount due to his age.
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