Com. v. Gill, A. ( 2017 )


Menu:
  • J-S79037-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee              :
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    AARON GILL                              :
    :
    Appellant             :         No. 3654 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 24, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010593-2010
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                   FILED DECEMBER 19, 2017
    Appellant, Aaron Gill, appeals from the judgments of sentence entered
    in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following the revocation
    of his probation. We affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
    On November 4, 2010, [Appellant] entered into a
    negotiated guilty plea in CP-51-CR-0010593-2010 to (i)
    Robbery by Inflicting Threat of Imminent Bodily Injury in
    violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iv) and (ii) Criminal
    Conspiracy in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1).
    [Appellant] was sentenced to eleven and a half (11½) to
    twenty three (23) months’ confinement, and one (1) year
    of probation, with immediate parole.
    On June 14, 2012 [Appellant] entered into a
    non−negotiated guilty plea in MC-51-CR-0050330-2011, to
    Possessing an Offensive Weapon in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 908(a). [This] offense took place while on this [c]out’s
    probation. At a subsequent Violation of Probation “VOP”)
    hearing, this [c]ourt found [Appellant] to be in violation of
    J-S79037-17
    its probation and sentenced [Appellant] to a new eight (8)
    years of probation [at 10593-2010].
    On July 6, 2013, [Appellant] was again arrested while on
    this [c]ourt’s probation, and on June 7, 2016, [Appellant]
    was found guilty of: (i) Robbery by Inflicting Threat of
    Imminent Bodily Injury in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §
    3701(a)(1)(iv); (ii) Possession of a Firearm Prohibited in
    violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1); (iii) Theft by Unlawful
    Taking of Movable Property in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §
    3921(a); (iv) Possessing Instruments of a Crime in
    violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a); and (v) Simple Assault in
    violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a). The Honorable Judge
    Scott O'Keefe in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas
    sentenced [Appellant] to serve a total term of incarceration
    of two and a half (2½) to five (5) years, followed by five
    (5) years of probation.
    Following a VOP hearing on October 24, 2016, this [c]ourt
    found [Appellant] to be in violation of its probation,
    revoked [Appellant’s] probation, and sentenced him to a
    term of four (4) to eight (8) years of incarceration in
    [10593-2010] to be served consecutively to the two and a
    half (2½) to five (5) years imposed by Judge O'Keefe.
    On October 28, 2016, [Appellant] filed a Motion for
    Reconsideration of VOP Sentence. On November 23, 2016,
    [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of
    Pennsylvania. On January 3, 2017, this [c]ourt issued an
    order directing [Appellant] to file a Concise Statement of
    Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b). On January 23, 2017, [Appellant] filed a Concise
    Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal alleging that
    this [c]ourt erred by imposing a sentence that was
    manifestly excessive and unreasonable under Section 9721
    of the Sentencing Code and was disproportionate to the
    conduct at issue.
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed April 10, 2017, at (1-2).
    Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
    WAS NOT THE SENTENCE OF FOUR TO EIGHT YEARS
    -2-
    J-S79037-17
    INCARCERATION    FOR   [APPELLANT]’S  PROBATION
    VIOLATION EXCESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 4).
    Appellant argues his sentence following revocation is manifestly
    excessive and too severe. Appellant concedes his recent conduct deserves a
    punitive sanction, but it was simply insufficient to warrant an eight-year
    sentence for a second violation, especially when that new sentence runs
    consecutive to a previously imposed sentence.               Appellant claims his
    probation violation is unquestionably a serious matter, and he received an
    appropriate punishment for his new offense. Appellant asserts the additional
    four to eight years’ incarceration for the revocation sentence, however, is
    grossly disproportionate and inconsistent with the protection of the public,
    the gravity of the underlying offense and his rehabilitative needs. Appellant
    submits the court was certainly entitled to sentence Appellant for his
    probation violation, but it imposed a grossly excessive sentence that was
    unreasonable and an abuse of discretion.1 Appellant concludes, this Court
    should vacate and remand for a more appropriate and reasonable revocation
    sentence in accordance with the sentencing code of this Commonwealth. As
    argued, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See
    Commonwealth v. Lutes, 
    793 A.2d 949
    (Pa.Super. 2002) (stating claim
    ____________________________________________
    1  Appellant preserved his issue in              his   post-sentence   motion   for
    reconsideration, filed October 28, 2016.
    -3-
    J-S79037-17
    that sentence is manifestly excessive challenges discretionary aspects of
    sentencing).
    When reviewing the outcome of a revocation proceeding, this Court is
    limited to determining the validity of the proceeding, the legality of the
    judgment of sentence imposed, and the discretionary aspects of sentencing.
    Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 
    83 A.3d 1031
    , 1033-34 (Pa.Super. 2013)
    (en banc) (explaining appellate review of revocation sentence includes
    discretionary sentencing challenges).      Challenges to the discretionary
    aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right.
    Commonwealth v. Sierra, 
    752 A.2d 910
    , 912 (Pa.Super. 2000). Prior to
    reaching the merits of a discretionary aspects of sentencing issue:
    [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
    whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
    Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
    preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
    modify sentence, see [Pa.R.Crim.P. 720]; (3) whether
    appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
    (4) whether there is a substantial question that the
    sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
    Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
    Commonwealth v. Evans, 
    901 A.2d 528
    , 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal
    denied, 
    589 Pa. 727
    , 
    909 A.2d 303
    (2006). Objections to the discretionary
    aspects of sentence are generally waived if they are not raised at the
    sentencing hearing or raised in a motion to modify the sentence imposed at
    that hearing.   Commonwealth v. Mann, 
    820 A.2d 788
    , 794 (Pa.Super.
    2003), appeal denied, 
    574 Pa. 759
    , 
    831 A.2d 599
    (2003).          “This failure
    -4-
    J-S79037-17
    cannot be cured by submitting the challenge in a Rule 1925(b) statement.”
    Commonwealth v. McAfee, 
    849 A.2d 270
    , 275, (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal
    denied, 
    580 Pa. 695
    , 
    860 A.2d 122
    (2004).
    When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant
    must invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a
    separate concise statement demonstrating that there is a substantial
    question as to the appropriateness of the sentence under the Sentencing
    Code.    Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 
    571 Pa. 419
    , 
    812 A.2d 617
    (2002);
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an appellant separately set forth
    the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal furthers the purpose evident
    in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any challenges to the trial
    court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging on the sentencing
    decision to exceptional cases.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 
    946 A.2d 103
    ,
    112 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 
    600 Pa. 745
    , 
    964 A.2d 895
    (2009),
    cert. denied, 
    556 U.S. 1264
    , 
    129 S. Ct. 2450
    , 
    174 L. Ed. 2d 240
    (2009).
    A substantial question exists “only when the appellant advances a
    colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)
    inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
    to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Sierra,
    supra at 913. A claim of excessiveness can raise a substantial question as
    to the appropriateness of a sentence under the Sentencing Code, even if the
    sentence is within the statutory limits. Mouzon, supra at 430, 812 A.2d at
    -5-
    J-S79037-17
    624. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Malovich, 
    903 A.2d 1247
    (Pa.Super.
    2006) (stating defendant raised substantial question with respect to claim
    that revocation sentence was excessive in light of underlying technical
    probation violations).   An allegation that the sentencing court failed to
    consider a specific mitigating factor, however, generally does not raise a
    substantial question. Commonwealth v. Berry, 
    785 A.2d 994
    (Pa.Super.
    2001) (holding claim that sentencing court ignored appellant’s rehabilitative
    needs failed to raise substantial question).
    “In general, the imposition of sentence following the revocation of
    probation is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, which,
    absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.”
    Commonwealth v. Hoover, 
    909 A.2d 321
    (Pa.Super. 2006). Following the
    revocation of probation, the court may impose a sentence of total
    confinement if any of the following conditions exist: the defendant has been
    convicted of another crime; the conduct of the defendant indicates it is likely
    he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or, such a sentence is
    essential to vindicate the authority of the court.       See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    9771(c).    The Sentencing Guidelines do not apply to sentences imposed
    following a revocation of probation.     Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 
    893 A.2d 735
    (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 
    588 Pa. 788
    , 
    906 A.2d 1196
    (2006).    “[U]pon sentencing following a revocation of probation, the trial
    court is limited only by the maximum sentence that it could have imposed
    -6-
    J-S79037-17
    originally at the time of the probationary sentence.”         Commonwealth v.
    Coolbaugh, 
    770 A.2d 788
    , 792 (Pa.Super. 2001).
    Pursuant to Section 9721(b), “the court shall follow the general
    principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is
    consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it
    relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
    rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”       42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).       “[T]he
    court shall make as part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time
    of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence
    imposed.”    
    Id. Nevertheless, “[a]
    sentencing court need not undertake a
    lengthy     discourse   for   its   reasons   for     imposing    a   sentence….”
    Commonwealth v. Crump, 
    995 A.2d 1280
    , 1283 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal
    denied, 
    608 Pa. 661
    , 
    13 A.3d 475
    (2010). Rather, “the record as a whole
    must reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts of the crime
    and character of the offender.” 
    Id. After a
    thorough of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable
    law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Rayford A. Means, we
    conclude Appellant’s issue merits no relief.        In its opinion, the trial court
    comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the question presented.
    (See Trial Court Opinion at 1-7) (finding: in 2010, Appellant was originally
    convicted of robbery and criminal conspiracy; robbery and conspiracy
    offenses both carried maximum sentences of 10 years’ imprisonment;
    -7-
    J-S79037-17
    court’s recent resentence of 4-8 years’ imprisonment is within statutory
    limits; since Appellant’s original conviction in 2010, he has further engaged
    in unlawful behavior and was convicted of new, more serious offenses;
    Appellant’s continued criminal conduct and progression toward more violent
    offenses indicates lenient sentence would fail to ensure Appellant received
    rehabilitation he needs; while on probation, Appellant participated in another
    robbery, brandished gun, and severely beat victim; Appellant’s commission
    of increasingly violent offenses while on probation shows he is danger to
    community; confinement is necessary to vindicate authority of revocation
    court and protect public; before imposing new sentence, revocation court
    considered need to protect public, gravity of Appellant’s conduct, and
    Appellant’s   rehabilitative     needs;   court   considered    ample     information
    concerning Appellant’s background; Appellant has been on revocation court’s
    probation since 2010; revocation court is aware of unique facts of
    Appellant’s case; court’s familiarity with Appellant’s past criminal conduct
    and progression of criminal behavior rendered court sufficiently informed;
    court’s   sentence    reflects     unique   nature    of    Appellant’s    character,
    rehabilitative needs, and probation violations).           The record supports the
    courts rationale. Therefore, Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary
    aspects of his sentence merits no relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    -8-
    J-S79037-17
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/19/2017
    -9-
    Circulated 11/30/2017 03:29 PM
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
    FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
    COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA                               CP-:51-CR-0010593-2010                 Fl LED
    v.                                                                           APR 10 20�
    3654 EDA 2016                    Criminal Appeals Unit
    First Judicial District of PA
    AARON GILL
    MEANS,J.                                                    April 7, 2017
    OPINION           CP-!11-CR-0010593-2010 Comm. v. GWI, Aaron
    Opinion
    HISTORY
    II lI IIIIIII II I IIIII II II
    7931183401
    On November 4th, 2010, Aaron Gill, Defendant, entered into a negotiated guilty plea in CP-
    51-CR-0010593-2010 to (i) Robbery by Inflicting Threat oflmminent Bodily Injury in violation
    of 18 Pa. C.S. § 3701 §§ (a)(l)(iv) and (ii) Criminal Conspiracy in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 903
    §§ (a)(l). Defendant was sentenced to eleven and a half (11 �) to twenty three (23) months
    confinement, and one (1) year of probation, with immediate parole. Dkt. CP-51-CR-0010593-
    2010, at 4.
    On June 141h, 2012 the Defendant entered into a non-negotiated guilty plea in MC-51-CR-
    0050330-2011, to (i) Possessing an Offensive Weapon in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 908 §§ (a).
    These offenses took place while on this Court's probation. At a subsequent Violation of Probation
    ("VOP") hearing, this Court found Defendant to be in violation of its probation and sentenced
    Defendant to a new eight (8) years of probation. Dkt. CP-51-CR-0010593-2010, at 2.
    1
    On July 6th, 2013, Defendant was again arrested while on this Court's probation, and on
    June 7t11, 2016, the Defendant was found guilty of: (i) Robbery by Inflicting Threat of Imminent
    Bodily Injury in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701 §§ (a)(l )(iv); (ii) Possession of a Firearm Prohibited
    in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §6105 §§ (a)(l); (iii) Theft by Unlawful Taking of Movable Property in
    violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §3921 §§ (a); (iv) Possessing Instruments of a Crime in violation of 18
    Pa.C.S. § 907 §§ (a); and (v) Simple Assault in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701 §§ (a). The
    Honorable Judge Scott O'Keefe in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas sentenced the
    Defendant to serve a total term of incarceration of two and a half (2 Y2) to five (5) years, followed
    by five (5) years of probation. Dkt. C P-51-CR-009451-2013, at 1·2.
    Following a VOP hearing on October 24th, 2016, this Court found Defendant to be in
    violation of its probation, revoked Defendant's probation, and sentenced him to a term of four (4)
    to eight (8) years of incarceration in CP-51-CR-0010593-2010 to be served consecutively to the
    two and a half (2 Yi) to five (5) years imposed by Judge O'Keefe: N.T. 10/24/2016, at 5:14-21.
    On October 28th, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of VOP Sentence.
    Def.'s Motion for Reconsideration of VOP Sentence. On November 23rd, 2016, the Defendant
    filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Def.'s Notice of Appeal. On
    January 3rd, 2017 this Court issued an order directing the Defendant to file a Concise Statement of
    Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On January 23rd, 2017 Defendant
    filed a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal alleging that this Court erred by
    imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive' and unreasonable under Section 9721 of the
    sentencing code and was disproportionate to the conduct at issue. Def.'s Stmnt. of Errors
    Complained of on Appeal.
    2
    I.      LEGAL ISSUES
    Because this case involves a Violation of Probation, the only grounds for appeal are that:
    (i) the Court lacked jurisdiction to impose a sentence, or (ii) that the sentence imposed was illegal
    or excessive. Commonwealth v. Infante, 
    585 Pa. 408
    , 419, 
    888 A.2d 783
    , 790 (Pa. 2005) (holding
    that "the scope of review in an appeal following a sentence imposed after probation revocation is
    limited to the validity of the revocation proceedings and the legality of the sentence imposed
    following revocation").
    A. Jurisdiction
    It is clear that this Court had jurisdiction to impose a sentence upon the Defendant. The
    original charges were felony matters, which occurred in the City of Philadelphia, and were tried
    before a duly elected judge. The subsequent Violations of Probation also occurred in the city of
    Philadelphia. Dkt. .CP-51-CR-0025523.;2010. Therefore, lack- of jurisdiction cannot serve as
    grounds for appeal in this matter. See generally, Commonwealth v. Bethea, 
    574 Pa. 100
    , 
    828 A.2d 1066
    (2003).
    B. Legality ofSentencing
    The imposition of sentence following the revocation of probation "is vested within the
    sound discretion of the trial court, which, absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed
    on appeal."    Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    669 A.2d 1008
    , 1011 (Pa. Super. 1996); see also
    Commonwealth v. Clarke, 
    70 A.3d 1281
    , 1287 (Pa. Super. 2013).           A sentencing court has not
    · abused its discretion "unless the record· discloses that · the judgment exercised was manifestly
    3
    unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will." Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    673 A.2d 893
    , 895 (Pa. 1996); see also Commonwealth v. Wallace, 
    870 A.2d 838
    (Pa. 2005).
    In sentencing the Defendant, a trial Court is required to "consider the general principles
    and standards of the Sentencing Code." Commonwealth v. Russell, 
    460 A.2d 316
    , 322 (Pa. Super.
    1983); Commonwealth v. Forbes, No. 3671.EDA 2015, 
    2017 WL 87144
    (Pa. Super. Ct Jan 10,
    2017). Section 9721 expresses these general principles in the following manner:
    the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the
    protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the
    life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the
    defendant.
    42 Pa.C.S. A. § 9721(b). In addition, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9771(c) permits the trial court to impose a
    sentence of total confinement in order to vindicate its authority.
    Upon revocation of probation, a sentencing court possesses the same sentencing options that it
    had at the time of initial sentencing. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9771(b); Rg. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 
    441 A.2d 1218
    (Pa.,1982); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 
    870 A.2d 838
    (Pa. 2005). The trial court may
    impose total confinement if one of three conditions is met:
    1. defendant has been convicted of another crime;
    n. the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely
    that he will commit another crime if he is not
    imprisoned; or
    iii. such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority
    of the court.
    42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9771(c).
    In the instant case, Defendant was originally convicted in CP-51-CR�OOI0593�2010 of (i)
    Robbery by Inflicting Threat of Imminent bodily Injury in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701 §§
    4
    (a)(l)(iv) and (ii) Criminal Conspiracy of Engaging in Robbery by Inflicting Threat oflmminent
    bodily Injury in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 903 §§ (a)(l). Under the Robbery provision, any person
    who " inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear
    of immediate bodily injury" is "guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be sentenced
    to imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) years, or to pay a fine not exceeding twenty five thousand
    dollars ($25,000), or both ... " Id.; and 18 Pa.C.S. § 1101 (2), 1103. The charge of Conspiracy is of
    the same grade and degree as the underlying Robbery offense. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 905. As such, this
    Court's sentence of four (4) to eight (8) years of confinement falls within the statutory limits.
    The facts are clear that since his original conviction, Defendant engaged in further unlawful
    behavior and was convicted of new, and more serious, offenses. Defendant's continued
    involvement with criminal activity and his progression toward more violent offenses shows that a
    more lenient sentence would fail to ensure that Defendant receives the rehabilitative programming
    he needs. Commonwealth v. Forbes, No. 3671 EDA 2015, 
    2017 WL 87144
    (Pa. Super. Ct Jan 10,
    2017). While on probation for CP-51-CR-0010593-2010, Defendant participated in another
    robbery, this time brandishing a gun. N.T. 10/24/2016, at 3:14-17. Defendant chased the victim
    "into a library and beat him to a pulp, and then went through his pockets and robbed him." N.T.
    10/24/2016. at 3: 11- 14. This Court is deeply unsettled by the fact that Defendant's criminal
    conduct has escalated to include deadly weapons. The fact that the Defendant has been wholly
    unable to behave within the confines of the law, and that he committed new, increasingly violent
    offenses, while on probation, evidences that he is a danger to the community and that a period of
    confinement is necessary both to vindicate the authority of this Court and to protect the public.
    Before imposing a sentence of total confinement, this Court carefully considered the need to
    5
    protect the public, the gravity of the Defendant's conduct and its potential impact of the
    community, and the Defendant's rehabilitative needs. 
    Id. Although this
    Court's comments a sentencing were brief, it's clear from the record that this
    Court received and considered ample information regarding Defendant's background.
    Section 9721 (b) directs the trial court to consider certain factors and place the
    reason for its sentence on the record, Our Supreme Court recently held, following
    revocation, a sentencing court need not undertake lengthy discourse regarding its
    punishment or specifically mention the statutes in question.
    
    Id. (citing Commonwealth
    v. Pasture, 
    107 A.3d 21
    , 28 (Pa. 2014)).
    Our case law requires the sentencing court [be] informed of comprehensive information to
    make the punishment fit not only the crime but also the person who committed it. Commonwealth
    v. Carillo-Diaz, 
    64 A.3d 722
    , 726 (Pa. Super. 2013). Here, Defendant has been on this Court's
    probation since 2010. This Court is sufficiently aware of the unique facts of the case, as Defendant
    has appeared for multiple violations of probation for matters involving violent conduct with deadly
    weapons, during that time formulated an individually tailored punishment within the statutory
    maximum. This Court's familiarity with Defendant's past criminal conduct and the progression of
    his criminal behavior rendered the Court sufficiently informed such that its sentence reflected the
    unique nature of the Defendant's character and his direct probation violations. Commonwealth v.
    Forbes, No. 3671 EDA 2015, 
    2017 WL 87144
    (Pa. Super. Ct Jan 10, 2017).
    Accordingly, because this Court imposed a sentence within the statutory maximum and
    considered Defendant's background, rehabilitative needs, and new offenses, it did not impose an
    illegal or excessive sentence.
    6
    II.      CONCLUSION
    Based on the above reasons, the judgment of this Court should not be disturbed.
    BY THE COURT:
    �{/.�
    MEANS, J
    7