Penn Waste, Inc. v. Neal, W. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S09003-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    PENN WASTE, INC.                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    WILLIAM C. NEAL                            :
    :
    Appellant               :       No. 1216 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered July 3, 2017
    in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Civil Division at No.: 2017-SU-000741
    BEFORE:      GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PLATT*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:                                 FILED MARCH 21, 2018
    Appellant, William C. Neal, appeals pro se from the default judgment
    entered against him on July 3, 2017.1 We affirm.
    We take the background facts and procedure in this matter from the
    trial court’s October 2, 2017 opinion and our independent review of the
    certified record. On February 22, 2017, the magisterial district judge entered
    ____________________________________________
    1 Appellant’s notice of appeal, filed on August 2, 2017, purports to be from
    the trial court’s June 6, 2017 entry of default judgment. (See Notice of
    Appeal, 8/02/17). However, the default judgment became final on July 3,
    2017, when the trial court denied his petition for relief from default judgment.
    See Estate of Considine v. Wachovia Bank, 
    966 A.2d 1148
    , 1152 (Pa.
    Super. 2009) (“When a default judgment is entered by the prothonotary, the
    judgment is not instantaneously final,” but becomes final after decision on
    aggrieved party’s petition pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 237.3.). We have changed
    the caption accordingly.
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S09003-18
    a judgment against Appellant and in favor of Appellee, Penn Waste, Inc., in
    its action for Appellant’s failure to pay for trash services required by
    Shrewsbury Township’s mandatory trash collection ordinance.
    On March 22, 2017, Appellant appealed to the trial court. On April 6,
    2017, Appellee filed a complaint with a notice to defend and a certificate of
    service that reflected that Appellee mailed the complaint to Appellant at the
    address he provided to the magisterial district justice.2    (See Complaint,
    4/06/17, at attached Notice; see 
    id. at attached
    Certificate of Service). The
    complaint alleged that Appellant owns a non-occupied structure in Shrewsbury
    Township, and that he failed to pay the amount due for mandatory trash
    collection services since May 7, 2014, with a total due of $1,010.52 as of
    January 2017. (See 
    id. at unnumbered
    page 2 ¶ 9). Appellant failed to file
    an answer. On May 17, 2017, Appellee served Appellant with a ten-day notice
    of default. (See Ten-Day Notice, 5/17/17). On June 6, 2017, on praecipe by
    Appellee, a default judgment was entered by the prothonotary, and Appellant
    was provided with notice. (See Notice of Judgment, 6/06/17). On June 14,
    2017, Appellant filed a petition for relief from the default judgment pursuant
    to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 237.3, alleging that Appellee failed to
    ____________________________________________
    2 “The party filing a complaint under Rule 1004 shall forthwith serve it upon
    the opposite party in the appeal by leaving a copy for or mailing a copy to him
    at his address as shown in the magisterial district judge records[.]”
    Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1005(D).
    -2-
    J-S09003-18
    serve the complaint and praecipe for entry of judgment in compliance with the
    Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. He did not file a proposed answer.
    On June 22, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s petition.
    It gave Appellant the opportunity to present testimony and any evidence he
    deemed necessary. Appellant repeated that he was not served, and did not
    wish to offer anything else. (See N.T. Hearing, 6/22/17, at 2). The trial court
    found Appellee properly served Appellant via U.S. mail at his current address,
    which is appropriate in an appeal from a magisterial district judge proceeding.
    (See id.).     The court also found that Appellant did not otherwise have a
    meritorious defense, and denied his petition. (See 
    id. at 3).
    Appellant timely
    appealed.3
    Appellant raises eleven issues for our review:
    1.    Did the trial court err by allowing case below to proceed
    where Appellee below did not serve a complaint pursuant to Pa.
    R.C.P. 1007(2), Pa. R.C.P. 403 and Pa. R.C.P. 401 or by any other
    manner?
    2.    Did the trial court err by allowing case below to proceed
    when Appellee below did not serve a [n]otice to [d]efend pursuant
    to Pa. R.C.P. 1018.1 in any manner?
    3.    Did the trial court err by allowing case below to proceed
    when Appellee below did not serve a [p]raecipe for [e]ntry of
    [j]udgment pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 237.1 (2)(ii) in any manner?
    4.    Did the trial court err in not entering [j]udgment [n]on
    [p]ros [p]ursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 237.3 against the Appellee below
    ____________________________________________
    3Appellant filed a timely court-ordered statement of errors complained of on
    appeal on August 25, 2017. The trial court filed an opinion on October 2,
    2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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    J-S09003-18
    and dismiss the case with prejudice for the Appellee’s failure to
    timely file and serve the aforementioned documents?
    5.     Did the trial court err in effectively not affording [A]ppellant
    the right to cross-examine writings pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule
    of Evidence 612 (a) and 612 (b)(1)?
    6.    Did the trial court err in permitting witnesses to not be made
    available to the [A]ppellant for cross-examination pursuant to
    Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 614 (a)?
    7.   Did the trial court err in permitting inadmissible hearsay
    pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 801 (a)(b)(c)?
    8.   Did the trial court err in permitting inadmissible hearsay
    pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 802?
    9.   Did the trial court err in not following the requirement of
    authentication and identification of evidence pursuant to
    Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901 (a)?
    10. Did the trial court err in causing and permitting [A]ppellant’s
    right to the Confrontation Clause under Article 1 Section 9 of the
    Pennsylvania Constitution to be denied?
    11. Did the trial court err in causing in permitting [A]ppellant’s
    right to the Confrontation Clause under Amendment Six of the
    United States Constitution to be denied?
    (Appellant’s Brief, at unnumbered page 4).4
    We begin our review by observing it is well-settled that “[a]n appellant’s
    failure to include an issue in his [Rule] 1925(b) statement waives that issue
    for purposes of appellate review.” Lineberger v. Wyeth, 
    894 A.2d 141
    , 148
    ____________________________________________
    4 Because the ground for relief in Appellant’s petition sounds in a petition to
    strike, our standard of review “is limited to whether the trial court manifestly
    abused its discretion or committed an error of law.” Reco Equipment, Inc.
    v. John T. Subrick Contracting, Inc., 
    780 A.2d 684
    , 686 (Pa. Super. 2001),
    appeal denied, 
    790 A.2d 1018
    (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted).
    -4-
    J-S09003-18
    (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Here, in his Rule 1925(b) statement,
    Appellant failed to raise his first four issues, which involve allegations of trial
    court error in finding Appellee did not violate the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
    Procedure. (See Appellant’s Brief, at unnumbered page 4; Concise Statement
    of [Errors] Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 8/25/17).
    Therefore, they are waived.5 See Lineberger, supra at 148.
    Additionally, the trial court was unable to review the issues that
    Appellant did raise in his 1925(b) statement because they were impermissibly
    vague. (See Trial Court Opinion, 10/02/17, at 3).
    Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in identifying and
    focusing upon those issues which the parties plan to raise on
    appeal. Rule 1925 is thus a crucial component of the appellate
    process. When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is
    appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review. When an
    appellant fails [to] adequately [] identify in a concise manner the
    issues sought to be pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded
    in its preparation of a legal analysis which is pertinent to those
    issues. In other words, a [c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague
    to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the
    functional equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all.
    Barnes v. Alcoa, Inc., 
    145 A.3d 730
    , 734 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
    omitted).6
    ____________________________________________
    5 Moreover, the record establishes that the trial court did not commit a
    manifest abuse of discretion or error of law in finding that Appellee properly
    conformed to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
    where it complied with all applicable rules. See Reco, supra at 686.
    6 In fact, Appellant failed to raise any of these issues in the trial court, and
    they are waived for our review on this basis, as well. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
    -5-
    J-S09003-18
    Instantly, the trial court observed that, although Appellant’s Rule
    1925(b) statement contains general claims regarding cross-examination,
    hearsay, and his right of confrontation:
    Appellant fails to detail what writings he was allegedly not
    permitted to examine. Appellant also fails to identify what
    witnesses he was allegedly denied the right to cross-examine.
    Appellant fails to identify what inadmissible hearsay was allegedly
    improperly permitted by th[e c]ourt. Appellant fails to specify how
    his right to confrontation was allegedly denied under both the
    United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Th[e c]ourt is
    without sufficient information to address Appellant’s claims[.]
    (Trial Ct. Op., at 3). Therefore, issues five through eleven are waived for our
    review. See Barnes, supra at 734.
    Similarly, in his brief, Appellant fails to provide references to the record
    or pertinent law and discussion thereof in support of his fifth through eleventh
    issues.   See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c); (see also Appellant’s Brief, at
    unnumbered pages 4, 8-9). In fact, the argument section of Appellant’s brief
    suffers from the same issues of vagueness as his Rule 1925(b) statement.
    Specifically, he fails to identify what witnesses and evidence he was not
    given the opportunity to cross-examine, what inadmissible hearsay the court
    allegedly admitted, what documents were not properly authenticated, or how
    he was denied his right to confrontation.           (See Appellant’s Brief, at
    unnumbered     pages    8-9;   Appellant’s   Concise   Statement     of   [Errors]
    Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)). Therefore, we are
    unable to conduct meaningful review of Appellant’s claims; and issues five
    -6-
    J-S09003-18
    through eleven are waived on this basis as well.7 See Pa.R.A.P. 2101; J.J.
    DeLuca Co., Inc. v. Toll Naval Assoc., 
    56 A.3d 402
    , 411 (Pa. Super. 2012)
    (deeming claim waived where appellant failed to provide references to the
    record or develop argument in support of claim); Siculietano v. K & B
    Amusements Corp., 
    915 A.2d 130
    , 135 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2006) (issues waived
    where, “aside from making passing references to [] two rules, [a]ppellants
    have developed no appellate argument regarding the claim[.]”).
    Judgment affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 03/21/2018
    ____________________________________________
    7   Additionally, we briefly note the trial court’s observation that:
    . . . Appellant was permitted to present any testimony and
    evidence at the hearing held on his [p]etition on June 22, 2017.
    [He] had the opportunity to call any witnesses that he believed
    supported his position at the hearing. [He] had the ability to
    speak with counsel for Appellee and examine any writings
    submitted by Appellee. . . . Appellant elected not to present any
    more argument aside from what was contained in his [p]etition
    but he was certainly afforded that opportunity.
    (Trial Ct. Op., at 3-4). Therefore, his claims would lack merit, even if properly
    preserved below, and not waived on appeal.
    -7-