Com. v. Noll, S. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SCOTT A. NOLL :
:
Appellant : No. 925 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 21, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-MD-0000467-1988
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 2, 2023
Scott A. Noll appeals from the judgment of sentence of an aggregate
sentence of 45 years to life imprisonment imposed upon his resentencing. Noll
argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence without properly
accounting for his juvenile status at the time of the offenses and his
rehabilitative needs. We affirm.
In April 1987, the Commonwealth charged Noll with three counts of
criminal homicide, one count of arson, and one count of burglary, after Noll
set fire to a mobile home, and killed the three occupants of the home, Dawn
Leingang and her two young sons. Noll was 14 years old at the time he
committed the offenses. On August 1, 1988, Noll entered a plea of nolo
contendere to three counts of second-degree murder. The trial court
sentenced Noll to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without parole. This
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Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Noll, 564 A.2d 262 (Pa.
Super. 1989) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 569 A.2d 1365 (Pa.
1989).
In 2010, Noll filed a petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (“PCRA”), which the PCRA court denied. This Court affirmed the
denial. See Commonwealth v. Noll, 2001 MDA 2010 (Pa. Super. filed Jul.
27, 2011).
On August 8, 2012, Noll filed a PCRA petition, alleging that Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (holding that “the Eighth Amendment
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders.”), rendered his sentences unconstitutional.
Subsequently, in March 2016, Noll filed an amended PCRA petition, asserting
Miller applied retroactively to his case based upon Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016) (holding that Miller announced a new
substantive rule that applied retroactively on collateral review). In June 2017,
our Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa.
2017) (“Batts II”), which devised a procedure to implement Miller and
Montgomery. The Batts II Court held that Miller and Montgomery
“unambiguously permit the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence upon
a juvenile offender only if the crime committed is indicative of the offender’s
permanent incorrigibility; that the crime was not the result of the ‘unfortunate
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yet transient immaturity’ endemic of all juveniles.” Batts II, 163 A.3d at 435
(citation omitted).
On August 8, 2017, in light of Batts II, the PCRA court held a status
conference. Thereafter, Noll filed a motion for appointment of a forensic
evaluator for resentencing. The PCRA court granted the motion and appointed
Amy Taylor, Psy.D., to complete an evaluation on Noll’s behalf. The
Commonwealth retained the services of Frank Datillio, Ph.D., who also
evaluated Noll. Following several status conferences, the PCRA court
scheduled a resentencing hearing for August 30, 2021. However, in the
interim, the United States Supreme Court decided Jones v. Mississippi, 141
S. Ct. 1307 (2021). The Jones Court reaffirmed the holdings of Miller and
Montgomery but held that “a separate factual finding of permanent
incorrigibility is not required” by the Eighth Amendment, Miller, or
Montgomery “before a sentencer imposes a life-without-parole sentence on
a murderer under 18.” Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1318–19. Subsequently, our
Supreme Court issued Commonwealth v. Felder, 269 A.3d 1232 (Pa. 2022),
wherein it held that the Batts II procedural requirements are not
constitutionally required. See id. at 1244. The Felder Court concluded that
“sentencing courts are required to consider only the relevant sentencing
statutes, which will guarantee that the sentencer considers the juvenile’s
youth and attendant characteristics as required by Miller.” Id. at 1246; see
also id. (noting that “[s]o long as the sentence imposed is discretionary and
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takes into account the offender’s youth, even if it amounts to a de facto life
sentence, Miller is not violated.”). The Court further pronounced that
“permanent incorrigibility is not an eligibility criterion akin to sanity or a lack
of intellectual disability, rather it is a sentencing factor akin to a mitigating
circumstance.” Id. at 1245 (citation, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).
At the sentencing hearing for Noll, the trial court heard victim impact
testimony from Leingang’s brothers, and testimony from a police officer
regarding the crimes. Thereafter, the parties filed sentencing memoranda.
Ultimately, the trial court resentenced Noll to 22½ years to life imprisonment
for each of the three counts and ordered that two of the counts were to run
consecutively and the remaining count was to run concurrently. Noll filed a
post-sentence motion to modify the sentence, which the trial court denied.
This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Noll raises the following question for our review:
Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion when it re-
sentenced [] Noll in three counts of Second-Degree Murder to a
period of concurrent twenty-two and one-half years (22½ years)
to life in counts 1 and 2, and a consecutive sentence of twenty-
two and one-half years (22½ years) to life in count 3, where such
a sentence will have the [] Noll not reaching parole eligibility until
he is fifty-nine years (59 years) old, thereby depriving him of the
benefit of a years-to-life sentence?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
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Noll challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.1 “Challenges
to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review
as of right.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citation omitted). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing
issue, this Court conducts a four-part analysis:
(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has
a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation and brackets omitted).
Here, Noll filed a timely appeal and preserved his claim in his post-
sentence motion. Noll also included a separate Rule 2119(f) Statement in his
brief; accordingly, we will review his Rule 2119(f) statement to determine
whether he has raised a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.
Provenzano, 50 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating that “we cannot
look beyond the statement of questions presented and the prefatory 2119(f)
statement to determine whether a substantial question exists.” (citation
omitted)).
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1 As noted above, under Felder, “the sentencing court’s consideration of the
factors of youth goes to its sentencing discretion and not to the legality.”
Commonwealth v. Schroat, 272 A.3d 523, 526 (Pa. Super. 2022).
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“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d
323, 330 (Pa. Super. 2013). “A substantial question [exists] only when the
appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions
were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code;
or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process.” Id. (citation omitted).
In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Noll argues that the trial court’s sentence
was excessive and did not give proper weight to evidence that he was a low
risk to the community and his rehabilitative needs. See Appellant’s Brief at
12-13. Noll’s claims raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.
Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042-43 (Pa. Super. 2013) (finding that a
substantial question was presented where appellant alleges sentence was
manifestly excessive because court did not consider all sentencing factors).
Our standard of review of a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a
sentence is well settled:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that
the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936-37 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(citation omitted).
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Sentencing is individualized in Pennsylvania and requires that the trial
court fashion a sentence that is consistent with the protection of the public,
the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim
and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). When sentencing to total confinement, the court must
consider “the history, character, and condition of the defendant[.]” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9725. “The balancing of the sentencing factors is the sole province
of the sentencing court.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 275 A.3d 530, 535 (Pa.
Super. 2022). Further, the trial court, which is present at the hearing and
observes all witnesses and the defendant firsthand, “is in the best position to
view a defendant’s character, displays of remorse, defiance, or indifference
and the overall effect and nature of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Harper,
273 A.3d 1089, 1097 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).
Noll contends that the trial court should have imposed an aggregate
sentence of 40 years to life in prison instead of 45 years to life in prison based
upon the facts in this case. See Appellant’s Brief at 22-23, 28. While conceding
that total confinement was proper and that the trial court did not have to
review the factors set at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 in fashioning his sentence,
Noll argues that more incarceration was not required to ensure that a juvenile
who was 14 years old at the time of the crimes has paid his debt to society.
See id. at 24. Noll acknowledges that he was solely responsible for the deaths
but asserts that he did not purposefully kill the three people because he
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believed that the home was empty. See id. Noll further claims that he was
amenable to treatment in the juvenile system at the time he entered his plea.
See id. at 24-25. Noll also notes that he obtained his GED and held
employment while in prison, his mental capacity was not negatively impacted
in prison, and he did not exhibit antisocial behavior. See id. at 13-14, 25-26.
Noll highlights that Dr. Taylor opined that he would not be served by serving
a longer prison sentence. See id. at 26-27. Noll argues that the trial court’s
reasoning of needing additional time (10 years from the time of resentencing)
in prison to participate in programs to prepare him for reintegration into the
community was not supported by the record. See id. at 27-28. Indeed, Noll
suggests that he could complete these programs in 5 years, which would result
in an aggregate sentence of 40 years to life in prison. See id. at 28.
As an initial matter, Section 1102.1(c) states that “[a] person who has
been convicted after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the second degree … and
… who at the time of the commission of the offense was under 15 years of age
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment the minimum of which shall be
at least 20 years to life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(c). Because Noll was convicted
of second-degree murder prior to June 24, 2012, the trial court was not
required to consider section 1102.1(c) when imposing the sentence. However,
a trial court may consider the factors set forth at Section 1102.1(d) for
guidance. See Miller, 275 A.3d at 535; Commonwealth v. Summers, 245
A.3d 686, 693 (Pa. Super. 2021).
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Section 1102.1(d) states the following:
In determining whether to impose a sentence of life without parole
under subsection (a),[2] the court shall consider and make
findings on the record regarding the following:
(1) The impact of the offense on each victim, including oral and
written victim impact statements made or submitted by
family members of the victim detailing the physical,
psychological and economic effects of the crime on the
victim and the victim’s family. A victim impact statement
may include comment on the sentence of the defendant.
(2) The impact of the offense on the community.
(3) The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed
by the defendant.
(4) The nature and circumstances of the offense committed by
the defendant.
(5) The degree of the defendant’s culpability.
(6) Guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.
(7) Age-related characteristics of the defendant, including:
(i) Age.
(ii) Mental capacity.
(iii) Maturity.
(iv) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the
defendant.
(v) The nature and extent of any prior delinquent or criminal
history, including the success or failure of any previous
attempts by the court to rehabilitate the defendant.
(vi) Probation or institutional reports.
(vii) Other relevant factors.
Id. § 1102.1(d) (footnote added).
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2 Subsection (a) relates to juvenile defendants who have been convicted of
first-degree murder after June 24, 2012.
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Here, the trial court considered the factors set forth at subsection (d)
and took into account, inter alia, the pre-sentence memoranda by both
parties; the initial incident report and supplemental reports; depositions of
investigators; the transcript of the nolo contendere plea hearing and original
sentencing hearing; work history for Noll; GED and Certificates of Completion;
juvenile lifer packet; the August 30, 2021 resentencing hearing transcript;
Noll’s evaluations by Dr. Taylor and Dr. Datillio; and victim impact statements
from Leingang’s brothers and parents. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/22, at 5-
9; see also N.T., 8/30/21, at 35-48 (wherein Leingang’s brothers testified at
the sentencing hearing). More specifically, the trial court noted that Noll was
14 years old at the time of the offenses, and that he was 49 years old at
resentencing. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/22, at 7. The trial court highlighted
that Noll was the sole perpetrator of the offenses and was responsible for the
death of a young mother and her children. See id. at 7, 8. The trial court
noted that Noll denied knowing the victims were in the home when he burned
it down. See id. at 8. Nevertheless, the trial court observed that the murders
had a serious impact on the community with respect to the community’s sense
of safety and security in their homes. See id. at 7. Further, the trial court
considered that Noll had previously been diagnosed with conduct disorder with
aggressive tendencies, but Dr. Taylor had found Noll obtained his GED and
held employment in prison, and that he had matured during his time in prison
and there were no concerns about his mental capacity. See id. at 8, 9; see
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also Taylor Report, 5/17/19, at 24, 26. The trial court also stated that Dr.
Taylor found that Noll had expressed genuine remorse and that in her opinion,
public interest would not be served by keeping Noll in prison for decades. See
Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/22, at 9; see also Taylor Report, 5/17/19, at 28.
Additionally, the trial court noted Dr. Datillio’s concern regarding Noll’s
apathetic attitude toward therapeutic intervention and lack of emotional
content underlying his remorse; Dr. Datillio felt the best time to address these
concerns was in prison to take advantage of treatment by the Department of
Corrections. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/22, at 9; see also Datillio Report,
10/16/19, at 29, 30.
In addressing Noll’s claims, the trial court concluded as follows:
Based upon the foregoing, [the trial court] found the facts and
circumstances of [Noll’s] offenses necessitated a lengthy
sentence. We weighed the differing reports and opinions the two
evaluators provided in this case, specifically, Dr. Taylor’s opinion
that it is not in the public interest to keep [Noll] in prison for
decades to come, and Dr. Datillio’s opinion that there are
significant concerns for which [Noll] requires additional time in
prison to allow him to take advantage of treatment options
available through the Department of Corrections prior to being
considered for release into the community. Significantly, [the trial
court] determined that all of the information available …
suggested, rather than be released now, [Noll] and the public
would be best served by [Noll] serving a minimum of ten more
years during which he will have the opportunity to participate in
programs intended to prepare him for reintegration into the
community. We explicitly made as a special condition of sentence
participation in any program deemed necessary to reentry or
rehabilitation, and further recommended anger management and
mental health evaluation and/or treatment. As the discussion
above further reveals, we took due consideration of the relevant
mitigating factors as well, and the unfortunate history of this case
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through the court system, and accordingly decided an opportunity
for parole was warranted.
It is [the trial court’s] belief that the sentence imposed reflects an
appropriate balance between these findings, as well as the
remainder of the facts and concerns raised in this matter. [The
trial court] note[s] that there is no contention or indication that
we failed to consider any relevant information or that we did not
give any relevant factor its due weight. Rather, [Noll] makes clear
he is simply dissatisfied with the result. However, for the reasons
[the trial court] put on the record and set forth here, [the trial
court] continue[s] to find the sentence appropriate and see no
compelling reason to alter it now.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/22, at 9-10.
Here, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing the aggregate sentence, as it considered and weighed all the
relevant sentencing factors. Indeed, the trial court considered the protection
of the public, the gravity of the murders and the impact on the community,
and the rehabilitative needs of Noll. Moreover, the trial court acknowledged
Noll’s age at the time he committed the murders, Noll’s belief that there was
no one in the home when he set it on fire, and Noll’s efforts at rehabilitation
and that fact he received his GED and was employed while in prison. However,
the trial court found that Noll’s rehabilitative needs and his potential reentry
and reintegration into society required the services provided by the
Department of Corrections and a longer sentence. Accordingly, because it is
within the trial court’s province to weigh the evidence and sentencing factors,
we conclude that Noll’s aggregate sentence of 45 years to life in prison is not
manifestly unreasonable and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See
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Miller, 275 A.3d at 536 (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing a sentence of 55 years to life in prison on a juvenile
offender who killed a person, as the trial court considered and weighed the
relevant sentencing factors); Harper, 273 A.3d at 1098 (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of 35 years to life in
prison on a juvenile defendant, where the trial court gave full consideration of
the sentencing factors, including defendant’s personal and criminal history,
his rehabilitative needs, and his positive rehabilitation performance during his
incarceration).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 02/02/2023
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