Greene, V. v. Sommer Law Group, P.C. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S42003-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    VICTORIA GREENE                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant               :
    :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    SOMMER LAW GROUP, P.C.                     :   No. 807 WDA 2022
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
    No(s): AR-20-003082,
    AR-20-003082
    BEFORE:      BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                           FILLED: FEBRUARY 15, 2023
    Victoria Greene (“Greene”) appeals pro se from the June 13, 2022 order
    sustaining preliminary objections filed by Sommer Law Group, P.C. (“SLG”)
    and dismissing Greene’s complaint with prejudice. We dismiss this appeal. 1
    From the certified record and trial court opinion, we glean that the
    underlying matter stems from a landlord-tenant dispute and a related escrow
    account. Briefly, Greene’s landlord, Crafton Holdings, initiated a suit against
    Greene in 2011 for unpaid rent and to recover possession of the unit occupied
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 We note that SLG filed an application with this Court to dismiss Greene’s
    appeal as frivolous because the description of the appeal and issues to be
    raised in her docketing statement were “incomprehensible and frivolous.”
    Application to Dismiss, 8/3/22. We denied the application without prejudice
    for SLG to re-raise the issue before the merits panel. SLG has not renewed
    its request for dismissal in its brief to this Court and our dismissal of the appeal
    is not based on this request.
    J-S42003-22
    by Greene. At that time, Elan Sokol served as the general partner of Crafton
    Holdings, which SLG represented in that particular case. A magisterial district
    judge granted Crafton Holdings possession of the unit and entered judgment
    in its favor for unpaid rent. Greene deposited a sum of money into an escrow
    account as a supersedeas while she appealed the decision.        Since Greene
    retained possession of the unit during the pendency of the appeal, the totality
    of the funds in the escrow account, upon motion by SLG, were released to
    Crafton Holdings. In February 2012, a non-jury verdict was entered in favor
    of Crafton Holdings and against Greene.
    Later in 2012, Greene filed a complaint against Sokol for, inter alia,
    fraud and conversion in relation to the funds that had been disbursed from
    the escrow account.      After preliminary objections were sustained, that
    complaint was dismissed. We note that SLG did not represent Sokol in that
    proceeding.
    In September 2020, Greene initiated the instant action against SLG,
    claiming that SLG had defrauded her and failed to return money from the
    escrow account. Ultimately, on June 13, 2022, the trial court sustained two
    of SLG’s preliminary objections and dismissed Greene’s complaint with
    prejudice. Specifically, the court determined that her complaint was legally
    -2-
    J-S42003-22
    insufficient due to res judicata and that Greene, proceeding in forma pauperis,
    was prohibited from pursuing a frivolous case. This timely appeal followed.2
    Preliminarily, we address Greene’s utter failure to comply with our Rules
    of Appellate Procedure in drafting her brief. Upon review, her brief lacks any
    relevant headings, a copy of her Rule 1925(b) statement, or certifications of
    compliance.     See Pa.R.A.P. 2111 (requiring the brief of the appellant to
    sequentially include the following relevant sections with accompanying titles:
    a statement of jurisdiction, the order in question, statement of the scope and
    standard of review, statement of the questions involved, statement of the
    case, summary of the argument, argument, conclusion, the opinion below, a
    copy of the Rule 1925(b) statement, and certificates of compliance). In fact,
    this Court is unable to discern where, if anywhere, the sections required by
    Rule 2111 are within her brief.          See Appellant’s brief at unnumbered 55
    (handwritten reference to “question involved” but provided in the middle of
    exhibits so it is unclear if it pertains to the instant appeal); 65 (handwritten
    reference to “question involved” but appears to be related to the 2012 case
    against Sokol); 77 (handwritten reference to “Statements of the Question
    ____________________________________________
    2 The trial court ordered Greene to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. The certified
    record does not contain such a statement. However, the trial court indicated
    in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that Greene’s “‘concise’ statement of errors
    complained of on appeal [went] beyond the scope of [the] order” and
    therefore, in its opinion, the court “simply explain[ed its] rationale related to
    the two preliminary objections [it] sustained.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/22,
    at 2. Thus, we discern that it is likely Greene filed some manner of concise
    statement in response to the trial court’s order. Nonetheless, in light of the
    dispositive deficiencies in Greene’s brief, we did not inquire further as to the
    nature of her purported Rule 1925(b) statement.
    -3-
    J-S42003-22
    Involved” but appears to pertain to the 2012 case against Sokol). See also
    Pa.R.A.P. 2114 (relating to the requirements for the statement of jurisdiction);
    Pa.R.A.P. 2115 (relating to the requirements for the order in question);
    Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (relating to the requirements for the statement of questions
    involved); Pa.R.A.P. 2117 (relating to the requirements for the statement of
    the case); Pa.R.A.P. 2118 (relating to the requirements for the summary of
    the argument); Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (relating to the requirements for the
    argument). Moreover, the brief, which is over 150 pages, is unnumbered,
    illegibly handwritten, and crammed full of exhibits that are annotated and
    slotted between handwritten discussions and/or notes that may or may not
    pertain to the surrounding exhibits. See Pa.R.A.P. 124 (setting forth the form
    of the brief, including that “[l]ettering shall be clear and legible”); Pa.R.A.P.
    2135 (mandating that, except as otherwise ordered by court, the brief shall
    not exceed 14,000 words and requiring a party to file a certificate of
    compliance with the word count limit if the brief is over thirty pages). What
    portions are legible barely amount to full sentences and do not set forth the
    issues Greene wishes to raise on appeal with particularity or develop any
    meaningful legal argument.
    Rule 2101 mandates that all briefs conform with the requirements of the
    Rules of Appellate Procedure discussed above.         Furthermore, where the
    defects are in the appellant’s brief and are substantial, this Court has the
    discretion to dismiss the appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101. We are cognizant that
    some of Greene’s non-compliance may be due to her pro se status. However,
    -4-
    J-S42003-22
    this Court has consistently held that such status does not excuse an appellant
    from compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure:
    Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed
    by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special
    benefit upon an appellant. A pro se litigant must comply with the
    procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court.
    Any layperson choosing to represent himself or herself in a legal
    proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that
    his or her lack of expertise and legal training will prove his or her
    undoing.
    Smithson v. Columbia Gas of PA/NiSource, 
    264 A.3d 755
    , 760 (Pa.Super.
    2021) (cleaned up). Moreover, this Court cannot act as Greene’s counsel. 
    Id.
    In sum, Greene’s brief violates nearly every Rule of Appellate Procedure
    concerning the formatting and content of briefs. More to the point, her failure
    to comply with the rules has irreparably hampered our ability to conduct an
    effective review as we are essentially left without any cognizant advocacy on
    Greene’s behalf. Were we to proceed to the merits of this matter, we would
    be forced to engage in guesswork and supposition, as the trial court
    apparently did, regarding what issues Greene sought to raise on appeal.
    Accordingly, we will exercise our discretion to dismiss the instant appeal due
    to Greene’s wholly defective brief. See 
    id. at 761
     (dismissing appeal where
    non-compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure deprived this Court of
    the ability to conduct effective review); Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
    Appeal dismissed.
    -5-
    J-S42003-22
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/15/2023
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 807 WDA 2022

Judges: Bowes, J.

Filed Date: 2/15/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/15/2023