In Re: Adoption of: D.R.W., Appeal of: K.A.S. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S01031-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF: D.R.W.             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: K.A.S., MOTHER                  :
    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 814 WDA 2022
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 27, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Orphans’ Court at
    No(s): No. 2021-190 IVT
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                            FILED: FEBRUARY 7, 2023
    K.A.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered April 27, 2022 that
    involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her daughter, D.R.W., born
    September 2019 (“Child”), pursuant to the Adoption Act.1 We affirm.
    On the date of Child’s birth, Cambria County Children and Youth Services
    (“CYS”) received a report that Mother had been using crack cocaine and heroin
    while on methadone maintenance treatment during her pregnancy; that she
    had failed to attend prenatal medical appointments; and that she failed to
    take prescribed medicine during the pregnancy. Upon investigating, CYS also
    discovered that Mother and Child’s father, D.F.W. (“Father,” collectively
    “Parents”), were unable to provide adequate housing for Child.           At the
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938.
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    hospital, Parents agreed to release Child to reside in a kinship foster home
    with Father’s brother and sister-in-law, pursuant to a safety plan.
    On December 5, 2019, Child was determined to be dependent and
    concurrent placement goals were established of return to Parents and
    adoption.   As part of the permanency plan, Parents were ordered by the
    juvenile court to abstain from the consumption of drugs and alcohol, submit
    to random drug testing, attend parenting classes, and cooperate with service
    providers. A permanency review hearing was held on May 11, 2020, at which
    Parents were determined to be minimally compliant with their permanency
    plan. After a second permanency review hearing on November 4, 2020, the
    court determined that Mother had no compliance with the permanency plan,
    while Father had only maintained limited compliance. The court changed the
    placement goal for Child to adoption and found that aggravated circumstances
    were established as to Parents based upon their failure to maintain substantial
    and continuing contact with Child.     See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6302, 6341(c.1)
    (providing that aggravated circumstances may be found where “the identity
    or whereabouts of the parents is known and the parents have failed to
    maintain substantial and continuing contact with the child for a period of six
    months”).
    CYS filed its petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of
    Parents to Child on February 11, 2021. On May 26, 2021, at the first hearing
    on the petition, CYS proceeded against Father, who did not appear despite
    being served with notice of the hearing.    Mother asked for a continuance,
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    which was granted, and CYS presented its case against Mother at hearings on
    September 13, 2021 and April 20, 2022.2 At the September 13, 2021 hearing,
    Abigail Kline, the CYS caseworker assigned to the case, testified that although
    Mother agreed to a family service plan with CYS that became the basis for the
    permanency plan in the dependency matter, Mother was not compliant with
    the plan and she did not show signs of progress towards remedying the issues
    that led to Child’s removal. N.T., 9/13/21, at 10-13. Ms. Kline stated that
    Mother had made only “[v]ery limited” use of the visitation with Child that was
    offered to her. Id. at 13. As of the date of the September 13, 2021 hearing,
    Mother had been offered a total of 51 supervised visits at the foster family
    home or the Bair Foundation Path House, but she had attended only 8 visits.3
    Id. at 15-16, 18.          Ms. Kline testified that the foster parents offered
    transportation to their home for visits, but Mother did not follow through and
    she also did not maintain contact with foster parents to schedule visits. Id.
    ____________________________________________
    2 Child was represented in the termination of parental rights proceeding by
    Suzann Lehmier, Esquire; the orphans’ court determined that there was no
    conflict between Child’s best interest and legal interest based on her young
    age and the representations of Attorney Lehmier. Order, 5/26/21; Order,
    4/27/22, ¶2; see also In re K.M.G., 
    240 A.3d 1218
    , 1235 (Pa. 2020)
    (“[W]here an orphans’ court has appointed a [guardian ad litem]/Counsel to
    represent both the child's best interests and legal interests, appellate courts
    should review sua sponte whether the orphans’ court made a determination
    that those interests did not conflict.”).
    3 This included 2 of 14 visits offered at the foster parent’s home, and 6 of 37
    visits through Path House, including 1 virtual visit, 1 phone call, and 4 in-
    person visits. N.T., 9/13/21, at 15. The foster parents requested the
    cessation of the visits at their home based upon their belief that Mother was
    under the influence at one of the visits. Id. at 51.
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    at 16, 31-32. Path House also offered transportation to parents for visits, as
    well as use of a smart phone for video visits while in-person visitation was
    suspended during the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 36, 49. Mother was not
    offered parenting classes by Path House as a result of the fact that she failed
    to keep up with visitation. Id. at 13, 30.
    Ms. Kline testified that Mother had been residing in public housing for
    approximately one year, and that the housing was appropriate for a child;
    however, Ms. Kline expressed concern that Mother had allowed people who
    are not named on the lease, including Father, to stay at her residence for long
    periods, a fact that could result in her eviction if discovered. Id. at 18, 25-
    26, 29. Mother has not cooperated with CYS’s designated service providers.
    Id. at 12. While Mother received a psychological evaluation as required by
    the permanency plan, she did not follow through with the recommendations
    made during the evaluation. Id. at 13.
    Ms. Kline stated that Mother has at times submitted to drug screens;
    however, she has only maintained minimal contact with the agency and
    therefore it was difficult for CYS to schedule the screens. Id. at 12, 54-55.
    Mother did complete an in-patient recovery program in December 2020, but
    she subsequently began using drugs again afterwards. Id. at 13, 23. On
    March 16, 2021, Mother tested positive for ecstasy, ethyl glucuronide, and 6-
    AM, which is a heroin mixture. Id. at 13-14. In addition, CYS received a
    report that, on September 2, 2021, Mother had overdosed on heroin, Narcan
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    was administered by emergency personnel, and heroin needles were found
    throughout her apartment. Id. at 42-43; CYS Exhibit 18.
    Ms. Kline stated that Mother has no bond with Child and therefore
    termination of Mother’s parental rights will not cause any harm to Child. N.T.,
    9/13/21, at 18-19, 22. On the other hand, Child is “extremely bonded” with
    her foster parents, as well as their adult son who lives in the home. Id. at
    17, 22, 24.   Furthermore, Child is doing “extremely well” with the foster
    family, with whom she has resided since birth.     Id. at 16, 20. The foster
    parents are able to provide for Child’s special needs, which includes
    attendance at occupational therapy, physical therapy, and speech therapy
    sessions.   Id. at 17, 50.   In addition, the foster parents are an adoptive
    resource for Child. Id. at 22, 50.
    Ms. Kline opined that it would be in Child’s best interests for Mother’s
    parental rights to be terminated to allow for Child’s adoption by a family that
    has cared for her and met her needs beginning when she was a few days’ old.
    Id. at 20. Ms. Kline stated that Child has never been in the full-time care and
    custody of Mother, and Mother has either failed or refused to perform parental
    duties on Child’s behalf throughout the duration of the case. Id. at 10, 17.
    Moreover, Ms. Kline had seen no signs that Mother would be able to remedy
    the issues that led to Child’s placement and become a suitable caregiver for
    Child. Id. at 18-19.
    Julia Bloom, a family advocate at the Bair Foundation, testified that she
    began working with Mother on March 6, 2020, when Parents attended the
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    intake visit with Child at Path House. Id. at 57-59. After COVID-19 began
    spreading throughout the nation in mid-March 2020, Path House began virtual
    visits; however, Mother remained largely out of contact and refused Ms.
    Bloom’s offer to drive over to Mother’s house and pass a smart phone through
    the door to conduct virtual visits. Id. at 59-60, 67, 70. Mother participated
    in one telephone call with Child in June 2020; although face-to-face visits
    resumed in July 2020 and Path House offered parents transportation, Mother
    did not attend any more visits for the remainder of the year, although she was
    suffering from pneumonia for several weeks during this period and then stayed
    at a rehabilitation facility in December. Id. at 60-63, 66-67.
    Mother attended one visit in January 2021 and a second one in March
    2021; the latter was the visit where she tested positive for ecstasy, ethyl
    glucuronide, and 6-AM. Id. at 63-64. Mother only attended two more visits
    between the date of her positive test and the September 13, 2021 hearing,
    leaving her attendance record at 6 out of a total of 37 scheduled visits with
    Path House. Id. at 58, 65, 67. Ms. Bloom described Mother as “very difficult
    to get ahold of” throughout the time she worked with her, with Mother
    regularly offering different reasons for why she was unreachable. Id. at 71.
    Ms. Bloom stated that Mother attempted to play with Child during the visits,
    but Child played independently and always wanted to know where her foster
    father or mother was. Id. at 65. Ms. Bloom stated that Child is “[a]bsolutely”
    bonded to her foster parents, but she has not observed any bond developing
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    between Mother and Child during the handful of visits they had together. Id.
    at 65-68.
    When recalled at the April 20, 2022 hearing, Ms. Bloom stated that
    Mother had attended five of the seven visits offered since the last hearing;
    she missed one visit without explanation and called to cancel one of the visits
    she could not attend based upon illness. N.T., 4/20/22, at 7-9. However,
    Mother tested positive for cocaine, morphine, and her prescribed methadone
    when given a random screen at the November 15, 2021 visit. Id. at 5. Ms.
    Bloom also requested a drug screen at the March 21, 2022 visit, but Mother
    was unable to provide a sample, which is treated as a positive result. Id. at
    6-7.    Ms. Bloom stated that Mother behaves appropriately with Child and
    attempts to play during the visits, but that Child is focused on her foster parent
    during the visits and does not hug or kiss Mother when Mother asks. Id. at
    7-9. Ms. Bloom repeated her earlier opinion that she does not see a bond
    between Mother and Child but that a bond exists with the foster parents. Id.
    at 8.
    Dennis Kashurba, a child psychologist, testified that he performed a
    clinical interview and personality evaluation of Mother on June 10, 2020. Id.
    at 17-19.    Mother’s lone area of significant evaluation on the personality
    inventory was for denial, “where high scores typically are obtained from
    individuals who lack insight into their feelings and the causes of their own
    behavior.” Id. at 19. Mother provided Mr. Kashurba with a detailed personal
    history, including the fact that her four prior children were removed from her
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    care and placed with the in-laws of the father of those children and that her
    former partner died of a drug overdose in 2017. Id. at 20; CYS Exhibit 17, at
    1.   Mr. Kashurba’s recommendations for Mother included hands-on parent
    training and family engagement services, supervised visits with Child,
    continued opioid treatment and drug screens, continued mental health
    treatment, and home management services to address domestic and financial
    issues.    N.T., 4/20/22, at 21-22.            He opined that Mother had adequate
    intellectual capacity to learn to be a better parent and the appropriateness of
    her reunification with Child could be evaluated based upon how she performed
    over time in the recommended areas of improvement. Id. at 22-24.
    Mother testified at the April 20, 2022 hearing that she has been residing
    for close to two years in a two-bedroom apartment in public housing in
    Johnstown, for which she pays approximately $150 to $200 in rent. Id. at
    26-27. She stated that she has everything she needs in her home to parent
    Child, including diapers, wipes, clothing, and a crib. Id. at 66-67. Mother has
    worked part-time for the past two years as a cleaner at a barbershop and
    earns approximately $160 every two weeks in addition to $200 of food stamps
    she receives every month.4           Id. at 27, 53, 64.     Mother stated that she
    regularly takes medicine to treat anxiety, depression, diabetes, and asthma;
    she had also been in methadone treatment from approximately September
    ____________________________________________
    4 The owner of the barbershop, who described himself as a surrogate father
    to Mother, testified and confirmed her employment. N.T., 4/20/22, at 78-81.
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    2020, and she attended counseling services through the methadone clinic.
    Id. at 28-31, 46-47, 49-50.      Mother also completed a parenting class in
    February 2020, but she admitted that it was not the hands-on parenting class
    that CYS asked her to attend. Id. at 47-48, 63.
    Mother stated that she attended approximately seven or eight visits with
    Child at the foster family’s home in the first two months of her life, but the
    foster family then decided they did not want her in their home. Id. at 33-37.
    After visitation shifted to Path House and then moved online in spring 2020,
    Mother stated that she was not able to access Zoom on her phone and Ms.
    Bloom never offered to bring a phone to her home. Id. at 38-39, 62. Mother
    also attributed her inability to attend visits to her battle with pneumonia from
    August to October 2020 and then her 30-day rehab stay in December 2020.
    Id. at 41-44.
    Mother testified that the last time she used opioids was a few days
    before the September 13, 2021 hearing when she overdosed and that she had
    not used crack cocaine since her completion of rehab. Id. at 31-32. She
    presented evidence of four negative drug screens through the methadone
    clinic in February and March of 2022. Id. at 51; Mother’s Exhibit 5. Mother
    also denied her positive screens at Path House for opioids in March 2021 and
    cocaine and morphine in November 2021 and claims that after both of these
    results she had her methadone clinic retest her and she had no illicit drugs in
    her system. N.T., 4/20/22, at 52, 58.
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    Mother admitted that she tested positive for drugs during her pregnancy
    with Child, including a positive test for cocaine on the date of delivery, but she
    denied that Child was addicted at birth. Id. at 65-66, 77. Mother stated that
    her drug use was in large part triggered by grief at her prior partner’s passing
    in 2017 from a heroin overdose and that these events also led to the removal
    and termination of the parental rights as to her other four children. Id. at 53-
    55, 63, 69, 72-73. Mother stated that she is in a better emotional place at
    the time of the hearing. Id. at 54.
    Following the hearings, the orphans’ court entered its order terminating
    Mother’s parental rights on April 27, 2022.5       Mother then filed this timely
    appeal.6 She raises the following issue on appeal:
    Whether the [orphans’ c]ourt either abused its discretion or
    committed an error of law when it granted the Petition for
    Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, thereby terminating
    the parental rights of [Mother] to [Child].
    Mother’s Brief at 2.
    We apply the following standard of review in this appeal:
    ____________________________________________
    5The orphans’ court also terminated Father’s parental rights in its April 27,
    2022 order. Father did not file an appeal from this order. According to CYS,
    Father died on October 22, 2022. CYS Brief at 2 n.1.
    6 Mother filed a pro se notice of appeal on May 26, 2022, as well as a
    concurrent concise statement of errors, as required by Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(a)(2)(i). On August 2, 2022, this Court filed a per curiam order directing
    Mother’s counsel to file an amended concise statement by August 12, 2022.
    Counsel filed the amended concise statement on that date, and on August 24,
    2022, the orphans’ court filed an order stating that it was relying on the
    reasoning set forth in its April 27, 2022 order.
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    The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
    requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
    credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
    by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
    courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
    or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
    of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
    court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
    the record would support a different result. We have previously
    emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
    observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
    In the Interest of J.R.R., 
    229 A.3d 8
    , 11 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation
    omitted).
    The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
    evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
    rights are valid. In the Interest of L.W., 
    267 A.3d 517
    , 522 (Pa. Super.
    2021). The clear and convincing evidence standard is defined as “testimony
    that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to
    come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts
    in issue.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
    Adoption Act.      “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds
    describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary
    termination[.]” In re Adoption of C.M., 
    255 A.3d 343
    , 359 (Pa. 2021); see
    23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). If the orphans’ court determines the petitioner
    established grounds for termination under subsection 2511(a) by clear and
    convincing evidence, the court then must assess the petition under subsection
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    (b), which focuses on the child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013).
    Here, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant
    to Sections 2511(a)(1) and (2), and subsection (b). However, this Court may
    affirm the court’s decision to terminate if we agree with its determination
    concerning any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b).
    See In re B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We focus
    our analysis on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
    (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
    be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
    grounds:
    *     *     *
    (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
    or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
    essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
    his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
    causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
    will not be remedied by the parent.
    *     *     *
    (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
    of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
    of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
    environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
    income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
    control of the parent. . . .
    23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
    Under Section 2511(a)(2), “the moving party must prove by clear and
    convincing evidence that there is (1) repeated and continued incapacity,
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    abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
    caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence;
    and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
    will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 
    265 A.3d 580
    , 600 (Pa.
    2021).
    [S]ubsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a parent’s refusal or
    failure to perform parental duties, but instead emphasizes the
    child’s present and future need for essential parental care,
    control[,] or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
    being. Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2) should not be
    read to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home
    and strong, continuous parental ties, which the policy of restraint
    in state intervention is intended to protect. This is particularly so
    where disruption of the family has already occurred and there is
    no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.
    In re S.C., 
    247 A.3d 1097
    , 1104-05 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).
    The grounds for termination under Section 2511(a)(2) are not limited
    to affirmative misconduct, but also include refusal and parental incapacity that
    cannot be remedied. Id. at 1104; In re Adoption of A.H., 
    247 A.3d 439
    ,
    443 (Pa. Super. 2021). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward
    the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” A.H., 247 A.3d at
    443; see also In re Adoption of K.M.G., 
    219 A.3d 662
    , 672 (Pa. Super.
    2019) (en banc), affirmed, 
    240 A.3d 1218
     (Pa. 2020) (noting that a parent
    has an “affirmative duty” to work towards the return of her children, which
    requires, at a minimum, that she “cooperate with the Child and Youth Agencies
    and complete the rehabilitative services necessary so that the parent can
    perform [her] parental duties and responsibilities”).       “A parent’s vow to
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    cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity
    or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
    disingenuous.” S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105 (citation omitted). “[W]hen a parent
    has demonstrated a continued inability to conduct [her] life in a fashion that
    would provide a safe environment for a child, whether that child is living with
    the parent or not, and the behavior of the parent is irremediable as supported
    by clear and competent evidence, the termination of parental rights is
    justified.” Id. (citation omitted).
    Mother argues that even to the extent that CYS showed that she
    exhibited a repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal to
    provide essential parental care for Child, the evidence was not sufficient to
    show that these issues cannot or will be remedied. Mother refers to various
    efforts she has taken to remedy the issues that led to Child’s removal from
    her care, including distancing herself from Father and obtaining a job and
    adequate housing.      Mother notes that she has made great strides in
    addressing her drug abuse issues, including regular methadone treatment and
    attendance at an in-patient rehab program. She further contends that she
    attempted to maintain contact with Child but her efforts to attend the
    scheduled visits were stymied for various reasons, including the actions of the
    foster family, COVID-19 and her inability to attend Zoom visits, her bout with
    pneumonia, and her completion of rehab.
    Upon our review of the record, we find that the record supports the
    orphans’ court’s conclusion that CYS met its burden of showing by clear and
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    convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child was
    appropriate under Section 2511(a)(2). Mother concedes that CYS satisfied
    the first two components of the Section 2511(a)(2) analysis.       The agency
    presented ample evidence to show that Mother demonstrated a continuing
    incapacity to parent Child, who was removed from Mother shortly after birth
    and not returned throughout the over two-and-one-half-year duration of this
    case. Mother also failed to consistently attend scheduled visitation to maintain
    a steady relationship with Child in furtherance of a potential future
    reunification.   Furthermore, Mother’s incapacity led to Child being without
    essential parental care, control, or subsistence, as Child has been in the care
    of the kinship foster family since leaving the hospital.
    Nevertheless, Mother argues that CYS did not prove that her incapacity
    “will not be remedied,” L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 600, pointing to her testimony
    regarding efforts to address her housing, employment, visitation attendance,
    and drug abuse. We agree with the orphans’ court’s finding that Mother’s did
    not demonstrate that she had overcome her failure as a parent. See Order,
    4/27/22, ¶12. While Mother has made strides, particularly with respect to
    suitable housing and employment, the primary issue that led to Child’s
    removal is her drug abuse, and she has failed to maintain a consistent period
    of sobriety to demonstrate her fitness as a parent to the court. Following the
    filing of the termination petition in February 2021, Mother tested positive for
    illicit drugs on two occasions at Path House in March and November 2021 and
    she also failed to provide a sample on a third occasion in March 2022, which
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    is treated as a positive result. Mother also overdosed on opioids in September
    2021, days prior to a hearing on the termination petition.        While Mother
    testified that she had not used cocaine since her December 2020 rehab stint
    and any opioids beside methadone since her September 2021 overdose, this
    was belied by her November 2021 drug screen at Path House showing
    morphine and cocaine in her system. Even to the extent Mother submitted
    evidence of negative drug screens at her methadone clinic in February and
    March of 2022, this was called into question by her failure to provide a sample
    at the March 21, 2022 visit with Child at Path House.
    Accordingly, we agree with the orphans’ court that CYS demonstrated
    by clear and convincing evidence that Mother did not demonstrate that she
    remedied her incapacity to provide parental care to Child by achieving a
    sustained period of sobriety. As this Court has explained, “a child’s life cannot
    be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary
    to assume parenting responsibilities.” In the Matter of M.P., 
    204 A.3d 976
    ,
    983 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).      “The court cannot and will not
    subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
    parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    We thus conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in finding
    that termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child was warranted under
    Section 2511(a)(2).
    We next consider whether termination was proper under Section
    2511(b), which requires the court to “give primary consideration to the
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    development, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.”         23
    Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been
    properly interpreted to include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
    stability.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
    The orphans’ court “must also discern the nature and status of the parent-
    child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently
    severing that bond.”    A.H., 247 A.3d at 445 (citation omitted); see also
    T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “However, in cases where there is no evidence of a
    bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.”
    A.H., 247 A.3d at 445 (citation omitted).     “Accordingly, the extent of the
    bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the
    particular case.” Id. (citation omitted).
    While a parent’s emotional bond with the child is a major aspect of the
    Section 2511(b) analysis, “it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be
    considered by the [orphans’] court when determining what is in the best
    interest of the child.” S.C., 247 A.3d at 1110 (citation and emphasis omitted).
    Our Supreme Court has instructed that “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts
    considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-
    adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”
    T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.
    In finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best meet
    the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of Child, the
    orphans’ court noted that Child has never been in Mother’s care and Mother
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    J-S01031-23
    has never performed parental responsibilities for Child who was two-and-one-
    half years’ old at the time of the court’s ruling. Order, 4/27/22, ¶¶15-16. The
    court observed that Mother has not maintained meaningful contact with Child
    as she had only attended 13 out of 58 total visits since Child’s removal. Id.
    ¶15. The court thus found that no bond presently exists between Mother and
    Child. Id. This conclusion is supported by the testimony of Ms. Kline, the CYS
    caseworker, and Ms. Bloom, the Bair Foundation family advocate, at the
    September 13, 2021 hearing that they observed no bond between Mother and
    Child during their interactions together. Further, Ms. Bloom opined at the
    April 20, 2022 hearing that, even after five additional visits, Child did not
    appear to be attached to Mother and there was no apparent bond between the
    two.
    The orphans’ court contrasted the absence of a Mother-Child bond with
    the care and support provided to Child by the kinship foster family who have
    been providing for Child’s needs and welfare for essentially her entire life,
    including Child’s special needs resulting from her pre-natal drug exposure.
    The court explained that Child “is thriving in her placement” with the foster
    family, who “love[] her and are providing for all of her needs.” Id. The court
    stated that, with the termination of Parents’ parental rights and Child’s
    planned adoption by the foster family, Child “will have the opportunity to be
    raised by a family who is capable of meeting all of her physical, mental,
    emotional, moral, social, educational, safety, and medical needs.” Id.
    - 18 -
    J-S01031-23
    We discern no abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s Section
    2511(b) analysis. The testimony of the CYS witnesses established that no
    meaningful bond exists between Mother and Child, while there is a very strong
    bond between Child and her foster parents, who love and care for her and
    provide for all of her needs. Clear and convincing evidence thus supports the
    court’s determination that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would
    be in the best interests of Child under Section 2511(b). Accordingly, we affirm
    the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to
    Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b).
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/7/2023
    - 19 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 814 WDA 2022

Judges: Colins, J.

Filed Date: 2/7/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/7/2023