Adoption of: C.J.H., Appeal of: A.M.H. ( 2023 )

J-S01035-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.J.H. A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: A.M.H., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1174 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered September 14, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Orphans' Court at
No(s): No. 2021-1175 IVT
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.C.H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: A.M.H., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1175 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered September 14, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2021-1174 IVT
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: D.O.H., JR., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: A.M.H., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1176 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered September 14, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2021-1176 IVT
J-S01035-23
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 7, 2023
A.M.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders entered September 14,
2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County, involuntarily
terminating her parental rights to her sons: D.O.H., Jr., born in July 2013;
A.C.H., born in April 2015; and C.J.H., born in April 2016 (collectively, “the
Children”).1 Upon careful review, we affirm.
The record reveals that Cambria County Children and Youth Services
(“CYS” or “the Agency”) first initiated in-home services for this family in May
2020, due to the poor condition of Mother’s home. CYS Exhibit 6, Child
Permanency Plan, 9/23/20. By August 2020, CYS had continuing concerns
about the deplorable state of Mother’s home, as well as Mother’s mental health
and parenting ability. Id. Pursuant to a safety plan implemented in August
2020, Children began residing with maternal grandparents. Id.; N.T.,
6/24/22, at 6. Nonetheless, due to the maternal grandparents being unable
to continue as a resource for the Children, the juvenile court placed the
Children in the physical custody of CYS on or around September 16, 2020.
N.T., 6/24/22, at 6.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 On January 19, 2022, the orphans’ court entered decrees involuntarily
terminating the parental rights of the Children’s father, D.O.H., Sr. (“Father”).
Father did not file separate appeals, and he is not a participating party to the
instant appeal.
-2-
J-S01035-23
Following a hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated the Children
dependent on September 25, 2020, and the permanency goal for the Children
was reunification.2 The court held permanency review hearings for the
Children at regular intervals.
Mother’s objectives in furtherance of the permanency goal included,
inter alia, (1) attending supervised visits with the Children; (2) completing a
psychological evaluation; (3) keeping all appointments with her mental health
professionals; (4) keeping all appointments and working with the social
worker, regarding parenting and mental health; (5) keeping her appointments
with the Independent Family Services (“IFS”) home management program;
(6) maintaining a clean and safe home; (7) submitting random drugs screens
and, if a screen returned positive, completing a drug and alcohol assessment;
and (8) allowing a CYS worker to inspect and photograph her home. N.T.,
6/24/22, at 20-21.
CYS referred Mother to Dennis M. Kashurba for a court-ordered
psychological evaluation. CYS Exhibit 11. Mother’s evaluation was initially
scheduled for August 27, 2020, but Mother failed to attend. N.T., 9/8/22, at
18. Her evaluation was rescheduled for December 4, 2020. Id. at 20. While
Mother appeared, she was “not willing to be engaged in formal assessment
____________________________________________
2 During the subject proceeding, CYS introduced the Children’s dependency
record as CYS Exhibit 7, which the orphans’ court admitted into evidence.
-3-
J-S01035-23
procedures” and participated in only the clinical interview. Id. at 20; CYS
Exhibit 11. A third evaluation was scheduled for April 29, 2021. Id. at 24.
Mother presented for the assessment, but she informed Mr. Kashurba that she
needed to leave early that day. Id. at 24-25.
On October 1, 2021, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8),
and (b), at which time the Children were eight, six, and five years old,
respectively. The orphans’ court appointed Suzann Lehmier, Esquire, as
counsel to represent the Children in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a).3
An evidentiary hearing on the petitions to terminate Mother’s parental
rights was held on June 24, 2022, and September 8, 2022. CYS presented
the testimony of: CYS caseworker, Barb Lusczek; the Bair Foundation family
advocate, Julia Bloom; psychologist, Mr. Kashurba; and IFS in-home worker,
Kathy Scaife. Mr. Kashurba was stipulated as an expert in psychology. Mother
testified on her own behalf, and she presented the testimony of: Alternative
Community Resource Program (“ACRP”) blended case management
supervisor, Lisa Weigel; and the Children’s maternal grandmother, S.T.
____________________________________________
3 By order entered January 19, 2022, the court found that no conflict existed
between the Children’s legal and best interests. See In re K.M.G., 240 A.3d
1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020) (“[W]here an orphans’ court has appointed a [guardian
ad litem]/Counsel to represent both the child's best interests and legal
interests, appellate courts should review sua sponte whether the orphans’
court made a determination that those interests did not conflict.”).
-4-
J-S01035-23
The CYS caseworker, Ms. Lusczek, testified that she began working with
the family in September 2020, and she noted that Mother made false
statements on numerous occasions. N.T., 6/24/22, at 11, 30. Ms. Lusczek
testified that when CYS first became involved, Mother claimed she was
pregnant with twins. Id. at 30. Ms. Lusczek noted that Mother underwent an
ultrasound in October 2020, which revealed she was not pregnant. Id. 30-
31. Ms. Lusczek noted that, despite the ultrasound result, Mother continued
to insist that she was pregnant. Id. at 31. Ms. Lusczek testified that Mother
alleged that one of the Children presented at a visit with stitches, but Ms.
Lusczek verified that none of the Children had stitches. Id. at 32. Ms. Lusczek
also testified that Mother reported the Children had called her crying and
saying they wanted to go home and that Mother called the police because she
was upset. Id. Ms. Lusczek explained that she followed up with CYS and law
enforcement, and she learned that nobody was contacted by Mother. Id.
Mr. Kashurba testified that, upon reviewing Mother’s records, her
primary diagnosis was borderline personality disorder, and the “classic
presentations” of this disorder include “emotional dysregulation and
behavioral discontrol [sic].” N.T., 9/8/22, at 21-22. Mr. Kashurba testified
that “[c]omplaints of a hypochondrial nature appear to have blossomed,”
noting that Mother had reported to her caseworker that she was pregnant, but
“[i]t was verified that [Mother] had never been pregnant.” Id. at 23.
-5-
J-S01035-23
Mother testified that she is currently attending domestic violence
counseling once a month through the Domestic Violence Center. Id. at 55-
56, 93. She testified that she had been on a waitlist for therapy for over ten
months, and she just began seeing a therapist at Behavioral Health in August.4
Id. at 56, 93. Mother testified that she began attending parenting classes at
Justice Works in November and completed the program in February or March.5
Id. at 56-57.
Following the hearing, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b) by orders dated and
entered September 14, 2022. Mother timely filed notices of appeal and
concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated sua sponte. The orphans’
court issued a Rule 1925(b) statement, wherein it relies on its order and
opinion dated September 14, 2022.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for review:
Whether the [orphans’] [c]ourt committed reversible error in
finding that [CYS] met its burden by clear and convincing evidence
that the parental rights of Mother should be terminated with
respect to the minor [C]hildren[?]
Mother’s Brief at 4.
____________________________________________
4As best we can discern, Mother began her therapy sessions at Behavioral
Health in August 2022. See N.T., 9/8/22, at 56, 93.
5 Mother began the Justice Works parenting class in November 2021 and
completed the program in February or March 2022. Id. at 56-57.
-6-
J-S01035-23
“In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the
termination court is supported by competent evidence.” In re Adoption of
C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When applying this standard, the
appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
determinations if they are supported by the record. Interest of S.K.L.R.,
256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial court’s factual findings are
supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s
ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.” In re
Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021).
“[A]n abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion” or “the facts could support
an opposite result.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will.” Id. at 826. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to
trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.
Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123-24.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court must
balance the parent’s fundamental “right to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child’s essential needs
for a parent’s care, protection, and support.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 358.
-7-
J-S01035-23
Termination of parental rights has “significant and permanent consequences
for both the parent and child.” L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591. As such, the law of
this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory
grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear,
direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M.,
255 A.3d at 359 (citation omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act. “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds
describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary
termination.” Id.; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). In evaluating
whether the petitioner proved grounds under Section 2511(a), the trial court
must focus on the parent’s conduct and avoid using a “balancing or best
interest approach.” Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524 n.6 (Pa. Super.
2021). If the trial court determines the petitioner established grounds for
termination under Section 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, the court
then must assess the petition under Section 2511(b), which focuses on the
child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows.
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
-8-
J-S01035-23
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused
or failed to perform parental duties.
***
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
To prove Section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party must produce clear and
convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to
the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to
relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental
duties.” In re Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d 700, 706-07 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citation omitted). As our Supreme Court recently explained,
Parental duties are not defined in the Adoption Act, but our courts
long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the needs of a
child, such as love, protection, guidance and support. Parental
duties are carried out through affirmative actions that develop and
maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of such positive
actions undoubtedly includes communication and association. The
performance of parental duties requires that a parent exert
himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s
life.
L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
-9-
J-S01035-23
Trial courts should consider the entire history of the case and avoid
applying the statutory six-month requirement mechanically. C.M., 255 A.3d
at 364. However, the General Assembly’s emphasis on the six months
immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition indicates this
timeframe is the “most critical period for evaluation” of a parent’s conduct.
L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592.
“[T]he question of whether a parent has failed or refused to perform
parental duties must be analyzed in relation to the particular circumstances of
the case.” In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 1977). To this end, if
competent evidence establishes the statutory criteria under Section
2511(a)(1), then trial courts must proceed to evaluate the totality of the
circumstances “under three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for
his or her absence; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and
child, including a parent’s efforts to re-establish contact; and (3) consideration
of the effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to
Subsection 2511(b).” C.M., 255 A.3d at 365. In evaluating the parent’s
explanation, the court should bear in mind that “[p]arental rights are not
preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s
parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her physical
and emotional needs.” Id. at 364 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
With respect to Section 2511(b), the court “shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
- 10 -
J-S01035-23
of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The “emotional needs and welfare of the
child have been properly interpreted to include intangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court has made clear that Section
2511(b) requires the trial court to consider the nature and status of the bond
between a parent and child. In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 484-85 (Pa. 1993).
Existence of a bond does not necessarily result in denial of a termination
petition. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Instead, the court must examine the effect
on the child of severing such bond. Id. “When examining the effect upon a
child of severing a bond, courts must examine whether termination of parental
rights will destroy a ‘necessary and beneficial relationship,’ thereby causing a
child to suffer ‘extreme emotional consequences.’” In re J.N.M., 177 A.3d
937, 944 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting E.M., 620 A.2d at 484-485).
“While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect
of the [s]ubsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one
of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the
best interest of the child.” In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa. Super. 2014).
“In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the
safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as
the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster
parent.” Id.- 11 -
J-S01035-23
Instantly, Mother argues that the orphans’ court erred or abused its
discretion in terminating her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1)
because “while the evidence presented may have mechanically supported
the termination, an examination of the whole[] does not.” Mother’s Brief at
11 (emphasis in original). Specifically, she claims the court did not adequately
consider the impact of the pandemic, as she had difficulty finding a therapist
due to insurance issues and waiting lists, and she was only able to reengage
in therapy in 2022. Id. at 10. Mother alleges that in 2022, she was employed,
rectified her housing issues, and completed a parenting class. Id. at 9-10.
Mother’s argument fails.
The record supports the orphans’ court’s termination of Mother’s
parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1). The Children have been in foster
care since September 2020. N.T., 6/24/22, at 34, 59. CYS filed petitions to
terminate Mother’s parental rights in October 2021, and Mother was served
with the petitions on December 15, 2021. CYS Exhibit 1. In turn, the critical
six-month period relevant to the Section 2511(a)(1) analysis is from June
2021 to December 2021. See L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591.
Though Mother asserts that the pandemic limited her ability to
cooperate with CYS or comply with the permanency plan, her assertion is
belied by the record. See Mother’s Brief at 9-10. The record shows that in
order to reunify with the Children, Mother had to address a number of
objectives, including but not limited to: completing a psychological evaluation;
- 12 -
J-S01035-23
keeping all appointments with the social worker, the mental health providers,
and the IFS home management worker; maintaining a clean and safe home;
allowing CYS to inspect and photograph her home; complying with random
drug screens; and attending supervised visits. N.T., 6/24/22, at 20-21.
At the outset, Mother expressly acknowledges her lack of compliance:
“Admittedly, Mother failed to comply with the permanency plan, and failed to
cooperate sufficiently to satisfy the [A]gency’s demands.” Mother’s Brief at
9. Mother similarly testified about her failure to cooperate with services. On
cross-examination, Mother testified:
Q. Do you think looking back over, you know, the case since
this started in 2020, do you think that you were cooperative
with CYS?
A. No. I was not. I take full responsibility for not being
cooperative, but in my defense[,] I didn’t trust really
anybody. I mean the one person who I was supposed to
trust, he violated so badly that I don’t know who to trust.
N.T., 9/8/22, at 88. CYS caseworker Ms. Lusczek also testified that Mother
was “fairly uncooperative throughout.” N.T., 6/24/22, at 20, 57.
The record shows that the appropriate services and programs were
available to Mother since the Children entered CYS custody in September
2020, but Mother failed to comply with the services. With respect to Mother’s
mental health, Mr. Kashurba, who conducted the psychological evaluation,
testified that he attempted to evaluate Mother on three separate occasions,
none of which were fully successful. N.T., 9/8/22, at 18-20, 24-25. Mother
failed to attend the evaluation on August 27, 2020. Id. at 19. On December
- 13 -
J-S01035-23
4, 2020, Mother appeared for the evaluation, but “she was not willing to be
engaged in formal assessment procedures.” Id. at 20. Mr. Kashurba testified
that he only spoke with Mother “in regard to her circumstances as she felt
comfortable.” Id. He testified that there appeared to be ongoing concerns
with her parenting ability, safety issues, and home management, and Mother
“continues to be in need of enhanced mental health services.” Id. at 21. Mr.
Kashurba’s recommendations for Mother at the time included, inter alia,
resumption and continuation of mental health services at ACRP; referral for
home management services to address domestic and financial issues; trauma
relationship counseling due to the history of domestic violence; and ongoing
CYS caseworker services. Id. at 23-24.
Mr. Kashurba testified that during his third attempt at an assessment
on April 29, 2021, he was unable to perform a full evaluation because Mother
informed him that she needed to leave early that day. Id. at 24-25. He
testified that Mother did complete shorter tasks, and he consulted with the
CYS caseworker, who noted Mother’s overall lack of progress suggesting that
reunification in the near future would not be an appropriate objective. Id. at
25-26. Mr. Kashurba concluded that Mother was given the appropriate
services necessary to give her the opportunity to demonstrate her capacity
for reunification with her Children. Id. at 27. He testified that “there appears
to be ongoing concern regarding her ability to be compliant with treatment
recommendations that would facilitate successful, sustained reunification with
- 14 -
J-S01035-23
the [C]hildren.” Id. When asked whether it was common for an individual
scheduled for an evaluation to not show up for the first assessment, not be
amenable for completing the second, and then leave early for the third, Mr.
Kashurba testified that “[it is] not normal.” Id. at 28-29. Mr. Kashurba
further explained, “She’s so self-centered that the interests of the [C]hildren
are clearly less of a priority than her agenda item of the moment.” Id. at 29.
Additionally, CYS caseworker, Ms. Lusczek, testified that Mother had
been receiving counseling through ACRP, but she was discharged from ACRP’s
counseling program on July 28, 2021, due to her noncompliance with their
attendance policy. N.T., 6/24/22, at 19, 28. On cross-examination, Mother
testified that she was discharged from therapy at ACRP due to her failure to
attend. N.T., 9/8/22, at 72. Mother provided the following explanation:
Q. You were discharged because you weren’t going, correct?
A. I was. They were only doing virtual visits, and when she
would call[,] it would show up as unavailable or restricted, and I
don’t answer those calls.
Id. Mother testified that she later was on a waitlist for therapy for over ten
months and was recently connected with a therapist at Behavioral Health in
August 2022. Id. at 56, 93.
With respect to the court-ordered random drug screens, Ms. Lusczek
testified that Mother refused the screen on March 5, 2021, when Mother
claimed that she was prescribed “THC gummies.” N.T., 6/24/22, at 22. Ms.
Lusczek noted Mother refused a second screen on July 22, 2021, because she
- 15 -
J-S01035-23
claimed that “her doctor gave her three Percocet to take home.” Id. Ms.
Lusczek testified that Mother refused a third screen on August 5, 2021, when
Mother stated that “the doctor put her on pain medication.” Id. Mother
agreed to submit one drug screen on August 12, 2021, because “she stated
that she would be clean.” Id. That screen result was negative. Id.
Moreover, Ms. Lusczek noted that Mother did not follow through with
CYS social worker, Ashley Shaffer, who provided parenting sessions. N.T.,
6/24/22, at 23-25; CYS Exhibit 8, Court Summary, 8/18/21. Ms. Shaffer
scheduled thirteen parenting sessions with Mother, but Mother attended eight,
failed to attend four, and canceled one. N.T., 6/24/22, at 25. Ms. Lusczek
testified that Mother “refused to meet with the social worker after April of
2021.” Id. Subsequently, Ms. Shaffer provided Mother with additional
“hands-on parenting sessions” during four of Mother’s visits with the Children
at the Bair Foundation Path House. Id.; CYS Exhibit 8, Court Summary,
8/18/21. Ms. Lusczek testified that Mother did not demonstrate good or
sufficient parenting skills. N.T., 6/24/22, at 25. Mother, ultimately, did not
complete a full session of the parenting program provided by the CYS social
worker due to Mother’s refusal to participate and cooperate. CYS Exhibit 8,
Court Summary, 8/18/21.
With respect to her housing condition, the record fails to show consistent
or sustained improvement in the condition of Mother’s home from 2020
through 2021. At the hearing, Ms. Lusczek described the condition of Mother’s
- 16 -
J-S01035-23
home as depicted in the photographs taken between October 2021 and
January 2022. N.T., 6/24/22, at 15-16. Ms. Lusczek testified that in October
2021, while she could not get into Mother’s home, she observed pans, leftover
shrimp, a box of debris, and garbage laid out on the porch and porch steps of
Mother’s home. Id. at 15. Ms. Lusczek testified that much of the same
garbage remained on the porch of Mother’s home in November 2021, and she
saw the same garbage and debris on the porch in December 2021 and January
2022. Id. at 16. Ms. Lusczek testified that there “was an awful smell”
emanating from Mother’s home as well. Id. Ms. Lusczek testified that on
August 6, 2022, she returned to Mother’s home and observed maternal
grandfather cleaning the garbage on the porch. Id.
Notably, Mother was offered IFS Home Management services to alleviate
the deplorable condition of her home. N.T., 6/24/22, at 18, 21. Kathy Scaife,
an IFS in-home worker, testified that she worked with Mother from July 2020
to August 2021. N.T., 9/8/22, at 36. She testified that IFS scheduled fifty-
four appointments, Mother kept thirty-nine of them, and fifteen were canceled
due to either Mother or the IFS worker. Id. at 39. Ms. Scaife testified that,
even though Mother was provided with extensive in-home services, she was
incapable of learning from those services, and there was no consistency over
the course of at least a year. Id. at 41. Ms. Scaife testified that she was
unable to recommend that the Children return home to Mother because “she
remains ignorant of her own actions that led to the removal of her [C]hildren
- 17 -
J-S01035-23
and made little effort to address and resolve those issues to facilitate the
possible return home of her [C]hildren.” Id.
Mother asserts that she was able to change her compliance level in
2022, as she is currently employed, rectified the issues within the home,
completed a parenting class, and restarted therapy in 2022. Mother’s Brief at
10. However, when evaluating a parent’s conduct for purposes of Section
2511(a)(1), “the most critical period for evaluation is the six months
immediately preceding the filing of the termination period.” L.A.K., 265 A.3d
at 591; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) (“With respect to any petition filed
pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6), or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are
first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.”).
Moreover, “a parent must act with ‘reasonable firmness’ to overcome
obstacles that stand in the way of preserving a parent-child relationship and
may not wait for a more suitable time to perform parental duties.” L.A.K.,
265 A.3d at 591.
Based on the foregoing, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the
orphans’ court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(1). Mother refused to comply with the psychological
evaluation on multiple occasions, refused to submit multiple drugs screens,
refused or failed to cooperate with the CYS social worker after April 2021, and
failed to continue with her mental health services due to nonattendance. By
- 18 -
J-S01035-23
Mother’s own admission, she “failed to comply with the permanency plan, and
[she] failed to cooperate sufficiently. . .” Mother’s Brief at 9. The record
amply demonstrates that services and programs were available to Mother
since the time the Children entered CYS custody, but Mother refused or failed
to perform her parental duties of engaging in the appropriate services to
reunify with the Children.
Proceeding to Section 2511(b), Mother waived any claim that the
orphans’ court erred by concluding that termination served the Children’s
needs and welfare because Mother fails to develop this claim. In re
M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“It is well-settled that this
Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the argument section of
an appellant’s brief, and supported by citations to relevant authority.”).
Mother makes no reference to the Children’s needs or welfare, and she fails
to cite to relevant statutory and case authority in the argument section of her
brief. See Mother’s Brief at 7-11.
Even if Mother preserved a claim with respect to Section 2511(b), we
would conclude that the record supports the orphans’ court’s determination
that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the Children’s
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. Family advocate,
Ms. Bloom, testified that Mother attended approximately forty out of forty-
four scheduled supervised visits, which Ms. Bloom had supervised. N.T.,
9/8/22, at 5-6, 11. Ms. Bloom testified that Mother struggled with managing
- 19 -
J-S01035-23
the Children’s behaviors, noting that D.O.H., Jr., had “meltdowns,” and the
Children frequently “absconded” from the visitation room. Id. at 7-9. Ms.
Bloom testified that Mother did not supervise the Children appropriately, and
she believed that the Children would not be safe with Mother in an
unsupervised environment. Id. at 9-10.
Ms. Bloom further noted that over the course of forty visits, Mother did
not demonstrate any interest in what the Children wanted or needed. Id. at
13. Ms. Bloom noted that Mother did not talk about anything that the Children
were interested in, and Mother “had nothing but bad things to say” about the
Children’s foster home, which “really impacted” the Children because “[t]hey
wanted [Mother] to get along with the foster home.” Id. at 7. Ms. Bloom
testified Mother constantly sought validation from the Children, which
impacted the Children greatly to the point that “they no longer wanted to
attend visits.” Id. Ms. Bloom testified she spoke with D.O.H., Jr., and A.C.H.,
and both told her they no longer wanted visits with Mother.6 Id. at 7. Ms.
Bloom testified that no bond existed between Mother and the Children, and
she believed it was in the Children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s
parental rights. Id. at 11-12.
____________________________________________
6 Following a permanency hearing on February 16, 2022, the juvenile court
suspended Mother’s visitation with the Children by orders dated March 1,
2022. This was more than two months prior to the subject proceeding.
- 20 -
J-S01035-23
Ms. Lusczek also testified that there currently is no bond between the
Children and Mother, noting that the “two older boys requested not to visit or
even to go home with her.” N.T., 6/24/22, at 36. Ms. Lusczek testified that
initially, there “probably” was a bond between Mother and the Children. Id.
However, Ms. Lusczek noted that Mother “drove the wedge through that bond
by not embracing the [C]hildren’s interests and growth” and Mother has not
placed the Children’s needs, wants, and desires before her own. Id. at 36,
40. Ms. Lusczek testified that the visits with Mother were having a detrimental
effect on the Children. Id. at 60. Ms. Lusczek testified that terminating
Mother’s parental rights would be in the Children’s best interest because
Mother has not taken the necessary steps to address her mental health and
to maintain a stable and clean home consistently on her own. Id. at 40. Ms.
Lusczek testified that the Children will not be negatively impacted if Mother’s
parental rights are terminated. Id. at 42.
Moreover, Ms. Lusczek testified that the Children have been with the
same foster parents since September 2020, and “each have a strong and
unique bond” with their foster parents. Id. at 34, 41, 59. Ms. Lusczek stated
that the Children refer to the foster parents as “[m]om and dad,” and the
foster parents are an adoptive resource for the Children. Id. at 59-60.
Similarly, Ms. Bloom testified that the Children were bonded to the foster
parents, and that they were very happy in the foster home. N.T., 9/8/22, at
11.
- 21 -
J-S01035-23
Ms. Lusczek noted that each child has his own individual needs, wants,
and interests, and both foster parents have taken the time with each child to
help them “grow and live out those interests and really make them a priority.”
N.T., 6/24/22, at 41. Ms. Lusczek testified that all of D.O.H., Jr.’s, needs are
being addressed by the foster parents. Id. at 35-36. She testified that
D.O.H., Jr., has displayed “negative behaviors” and continues to receive
counseling. Id. at 35. She noted that when D.O.H., Jr., first came into care,
he was on medication. But he currently does not present any need for
medication. Id. Ms. Lusczek noted A.C.H. displayed only minor behavior
issues, and all of his needs are being adequately addressed by his foster
parents. Id. at 37. Ms. Lusczek testified that C.J.H. had a difficult time
adjusting to kindergarten, and he displayed behaviors that were difficult to
manage. Id. at 38. She noted, however, that C.J.H. received counseling in
school and has “done well” throughout the school year. Id. She testified that
his foster parents have adequately addressed all of his issues as well. Id.
Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law by the
orphans’ court in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(1) and (b).
Orders affirmed.
- 22 -
J-S01035-23
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/7/2023
- 23 -