Com. v. Lebron, B. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
BRAULIO LEBRON :
:
Appellant : No. 97 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 16, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0008590-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and RANSOM, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JUNE 27, 2018
Braulio Lebron appeals from the judgment of sentence of ten to twenty
years incarceration imposed following his non-jury trial convictions for inter
alia, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and burglary. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the facts underlying these convictions in its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, which we adopt herein:
On August 7, 2015, at about 8:12 p.m., Mr. Robert Hampton
entered his residence[.] As he did so, Appellant, who lived a
☺couple of houses away, was standing to the side of Mr.
Hampton's residence. Appellant followed Mr. Hampton inside his
☺residence, called him a rapist, and then punched him in the
face. Appellant then picked up a stick that was in Mr. Hampton's
living-room and struck Mr. Hampton with the stick, which had
nails protruding out of it, about three times. During the assault,
Appellant also bit Mr. Hampton. Mr. Hampton did not give
Appellant permission to enter his residence.
A second person entered Mr. Hampton's residence when he and
Appellant entered. The other male, who[m] Mr. Hampton knew
* Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court.
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by the name Chris, ran from the residence after hitting Mr.
Hampton in the face.
Mr. Hampton fought back against Appellant's assault. In doing
so, Appellant pulled him to the ground and kicked Mr. Hampton
in the ribs three or four times. At or about that time, a friend of
Mr. Hampton's named Megan Ross, who was present in the
residence when the incident began, tried to break up the fight. It
ended when Appellant fled the residence.
Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and Mr. Hampton pointed
out and identified Appellant, who was sitting on the steps of his
residence. Mr. Hampton went to a nearby hospital, was
admitted and spent seven days recuperating from the injuries
suffered during the attack, which included broken ribs and a
collapsed lung. Appellant was arrested and charged.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/25/17, at 2-3.
The trial court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory sentence of ten to
twenty years incarceration at the burglary conviction, due to Appellant’s
prior conviction for a crime of violence. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1).
Appellant filed post-sentence motions and a timely notice of appeal following
their denial, and complied with the order to file a concise statement of
matters complained of on appeal. The trial court penned an opinion in
response, and the matter is ready for review of Appellant’s two claims:
I. Is the evidence sufficient as a matter of law to sustain
[Appellant]’s conviction for the crime of aggravated assault
. . . where the evidence of record does not establish that
the item allegedly used by defendant; (i) caused bodily
injury, and/or, (ii) is a "deadly weapon" as that term is
defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301?
II. Should the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the
trial court with respect to the charge of burglary under 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 be vacated, and this matter remanded
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for a new sentencing hearing, due to the fact that § 9714
is unconstitutional as currently drafted?
Appellant’s brief at 5.
Appellant’s first claim challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the verdict of the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon. Our standard of review is well-settled:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the
fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt
may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so
weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test,
the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact while
passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(citation omitted).
The statutory language states that a person is guilty of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon if he “attempts to cause or intentionally or
knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon[.]” 18
Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4). “Deadly weapon” is defined as:
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Any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any device
designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or serious
bodily injury, or any other device or instrumentality which, in the
manner in which it is used or intended to be used, is calculated
or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.
Appellant’s argument is twofold. First, he notes that the trial court
acquitted him of the separate charge of aggravated assault under §
2702(a)(1), which required proof that Appellant attempted to cause serious
bodily injury or caused such injury intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.
According to Appellant, that finding definitively establishes for purposes of
our review that he neither attempted to cause nor caused serious bodily
injury for purposes of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under §
2702(a)(4).
In turn, Appellant emphasizes the following language of the deadly
weapon definition: “or any other device or instrumentality which, in the
manner in which it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury.” Appellant asserts that the acquittal
“constrains this reviewing court to find that [Appellant] did not use, attempt
to use, or intend to use, the stick in a manner that was calculated or likely to
produce serious bodily injury.” Appellant’s brief at 16-17.
Before examining the particulars of Appellant’s argument, we first note
that § 2702 defines deadly weapon in three discrete ways. The first
definition is: “Any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded[.]” Thus, a firearm
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qualifies as a deadly weapon per se, regardless of how the firearm was used.
Obviously, the stick does not fall under this definition. Therefore, the
Commonwealth was required to prove that the stick fell under one of the
remaining two definitions.
The second definition reads: “any device designed as a weapon and
capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.” Finally, the third
definition is: “any other device or instrumentality which, in the manner in
which it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury.”
Thus, for these two definitions, the first question is whether the
weapon was “designed as a weapon” and is “capable of producing death or
serious bodily injury.” If so, like a firearm, the weapon qualifies as a deadly
weapon per se without analyzing its actual or intended use. If not, the
weapon may fall under the generic “any other device or instrumentality”
description. That definition requires proof that “the manner in which it is
used or intended to be used is calculated or likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury.”
In Commonwealth v. Blake, 605 A.2d 427 (Pa.Super. 1992), we
examined the § 2301 language to determine if a knife qualified as a deadly
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weapon for purposes of the deadly weapon enhancement.1 Therein, Blake,
while committing a burglary, encountered the homeowners. During the
ensuing struggle, the victim was stabbed in the thigh by an open pocket
knife, which was in Blake’s pocket. That knife had been used to cut through
a screen door to gain access to the home; however, there was no evidence
that Blake wielded the knife as a weapon, nor did the record contain a
description of the knife. We stated:
Our first inquiry is to determine whether the pocket knife was
designed as a weapon. If the pocket knife is designed as a
weapon, then the mere possession of the knife during the crime
is sufficient to apply the deadly weapon enhancement. The word
designed is defined as “contrived or taken to be employed for a
particular purpose.” Blacks Law Dictionary 533 (4th ed. 1968).
Since there is no evidence of record that the pocket knife was
extraordinary in any way, we find that there is insufficient
evidence to find that it was designed as a weapon.[fn] 1 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the
pretext of pursuing its spirit”). To hold otherwise would mandate
the application of the weapon enhancement for the commission
of any crime while the perpetrator was in possession of nearly
any instrument capable of producing serious bodily injury. This
result permits an unreasonable interpretation of the
phrase, designed as a weapon. Commonwealth v. Gatto, 236
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1 At the time, the deadly weapon enhancement statute referred to 18
Pa.C.S. § 2301 for definition of that term. See Commonwealth v. Blake,
605 A.2d 427, 428 (Pa.Super. 1992) (“When the court determines that the
defendant . . . possessed a deadly weapon, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2301 . . .”) (quoting former 204 Pa.Code § 303.4(a)). The definition of
deadly weapon for the enhancement was later modified. See
Commonwealth v. Brougher, 978 A.2d 373, 379 (Pa.Super. 2009) (“[T]he
deadly weapons enhancement has been modified, and now defines deadly
weapon differently than section 2301[.]”).
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Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (all statutory law must be
given a reasonable interpretation).
[fn]We do not hold that a pocket knife can never be considered
to be designed as a weapon under all circumstances. However,
in the present case, the prosecution does not provide a
description of the size and shape of the knife or blade to enable
the court to make a determination. See Annot. 100 A.L.R.3d 287(discussing whether a pocket knife is a deadly weapon).
Id. at 428 (emphasis in original).
Arguably, there was sufficient evidence to find that the stick qualified
under the “designed as a weapon” possibility. We think that a stick with
nails protruding from it is clearly capable of producing death or serious
bodily injury. Moreover, the stick appears to have been designed as a
weapon. Unlike a pocket knife, which has obvious utility for a “particular
purpose,” id., beyond weaponry, there is no readily discernible use for the
stick except as an instrument of violence. In any event, we find that the
evidence suffices to warrant a finding that “the manner in which [the stick]
[was] used or intended to be used, [was] calculated or likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.
Our standard of review asks whether there is sufficient evidence to
enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. We find that standard met, as the evidence establishes
that Appellant initially attacked Mr. Hampton by punching him in the face,
then kicking him in the ribs after Mr. Hampton fell to the ground. Appellant
then elected to continue the attack by picking up the stick and striking Mr.
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Hampton three times. The fact-finder could determine that Appellant used
the stick in a manner that was calculated or likely to produce serious bodily
injury. Blake, supra at 428 (“While there is no requirement that the victim
actually be in immediate danger of serious injury, the device or
instrumentality must be used in a manner that could cause serious bodily
injury.”).
In response, Appellant emphasizes that the trial court acquitted him of
the additional charge of aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).
That crime required proof that Appellant “attempt[ed] to cause serious
bodily injury to another” or caused such injury intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly. Appellant submits that the finding of not guilty means, in the
language of § 2301, that his employment of the stick was not calculated or
likely to produce serious bodily injury. Accordingly, he is not guilty of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under § 2702(a)(4).
We reject Appellant’s attempt to attach significance to the acquittal.
As our Supreme Court has observed, inconsistent verdicts are permissible.
Commonwealth v. Moore, 103 A.3d 1240, 1242 n.3 (Pa. 2014). In
Moore, our High Court reiterated that “Federal and Pennsylvania courts
alike have long recognized that jury acquittals may not be interpreted as
specific factual findings with regard to the evidence, as an acquittal does not
definitively establish that the jury was not convinced of a defendant's guilt.”
Id. at 1246. Moore references jury acquittals; however, our precedents
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apply the same rule to bench trials. See Commonwealth v. Yachymiak,
505 A.2d 1024, 1026 (Pa.Super. 1986) (citing Commonwealth v. Harris,
360 A.2d 728 (Pa.Super. 1976)).2 Therefore, to the extent that the trial
court’s acquittal of aggravated assault at 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) is
inconsistent with its verdict at the separate charge of aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon at § 2702(a)(4), we agree with the Commonwealth
that the inconsistency does not preclude affirmance.
Additionally, we note that the verdicts are not necessarily inconsistent.
First, the trial court could have determined that the weapon qualified under
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2 Harris rejected the view expressed in United States v. Maybury, 274
F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1960), which criticized extending the rationale for
accepting inconsistent verdicts in jury trials to non-jury trials. In
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 892 N.E. 2d 255 (Ma. 2008), the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts cited and discussed the differing approaches to this
issue, and highlighted that “A common concern expressed by courts
adopting the Maybury rule is the fear that inconsistent findings on separate
charges by a judge might represent confusion or mistake on the part of the
judge, and thus call into question the soundness of the guilty finding.” Id.
at 152-53.
At any rate, the wisdom of accepting or rejecting Maybury has been viewed
as an exercise of supervisory powers over the administration of criminal
justice. See Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1981) (“[T]he Court
of Appeals erred when it directed the state trial judge to provide an
explanation of the apparent inconsistency . . . without first determining
whether an inexplicably inconsistent verdict would be unconstitutional.”)
(footnotes omitted). Thus, the ultimate question of whether our courts
should tolerate inconsistent verdicts is reserved to our Supreme Court.
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the “designed as a weapon” standard examined by Blake, supra.3 Second,
the crime of aggravated assault under § 2702(a)(1) required proof that
Appellant specifically attempted to cause serious bodily injury, or, caused
such actual injury, inter alia, intentionally. While it would seem that Mr.
Hampton suffered serious bodily injury, we note that Appellant argued to the
trial court in a motion for judgment of acquittal that Mr. Hampton had a
preexisting medical condition, and that the Commonwealth failed to establish
causation. “There is no proof that [the attack] actually caused what
happened to Mr. Hampton, especially when the medics transported him and
noted that everything with his breathing sounded clear. The Commonwealth
has some burden of showing a causal connection, especially when there is a
preexisting medical condition.” N.T., 10/6/16, at 57. Thus, the trial court
could have simply accepted Appellant’s argument and determined that he
did not specifically intend to inflict serious bodily injury, nor actually caused
such injury.
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3 We note that the trial court’s opinion is unclear on this point, as the writing
refers to precedents interpreting the definition of deadly weapon for
purposes of the sentencing enhancement as currently enacted. That statute
supplies a separate definition of the term “deadly weapon” that is met by a
lesser degree of “use.” See 204 Pa.Code § 303.10(a)(2)(iii) (an offender
has used a deadly weapon where the weapon was employed “in a way that
threatened or injured another individual”).
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Appellant’s remaining claim concerns the mandatory minimum
sentence of ten to twenty years incarceration, imposed at the burglary
charge. That statute reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Mandatory sentence.--
(1) Any person who is convicted in any court of this
Commonwealth of a crime of violence shall, if at the
time of the commission of the current offense the
person had previously been convicted of a crime of
violence, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at
least ten years of total confinement, notwithstanding
any other provision of this title or other statute to
the contrary. . . .
....
(d) Proof at sentencing.--Provisions of this section shall not
be an element of the crime and notice thereof to the defendant
shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of
the Commonwealth's intention to proceed under this section
shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing. The
applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing.
The sentencing court, prior to imposing sentence on an offender
under subsection (a), shall have a complete record of the
previous convictions of the offender, copies of which shall be
furnished to the offender. If the offender or the attorney for the
Commonwealth contests the accuracy of the record, the court
shall schedule a hearing and direct the offender and the attorney
for the Commonwealth to submit evidence regarding the
previous convictions of the offender. The court shall then
determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, the previous
convictions of the offender and, if this section is applicable, shall
impose sentence in accordance with this section. Should a
previous conviction be vacated and an acquittal or final
discharge entered subsequent to imposition of sentence under
this section, the offender shall have the right to petition the
sentencing court for reconsideration of sentence if this section
would not have been applicable except for the conviction which
was vacated.
....
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9714.
Appellant conceded that he had previously been convicted of a crime
of violence, and likewise did not dispute that the conviction for burglary
qualified as a crime of violence. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(g) (defining crime of
violence as, inter alia, burglary as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1)).
Appellant argues, however, that the statute is unconstitutional under
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), which held that any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime is considered an element of the crime,
and must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by the factfinder. The
existence of a prior conviction, however, has been understood as an
exception. In Commonwealth v. Bragg, 133 A.3d 328 (Pa.Super. 2016),
we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has recognized a narrow exception to this
rule for prior convictions. [Alleyne, supra at 111 n. 1]
(citing Almendarez–Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,
118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998)). In Commonwealth
v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 785 (Pa.Super.2015), this Court
specifically found that Section 9714 is not rendered
unconstitutional under Alleyne as it provides for mandatory
minimum sentences based on prior convictions.
Id. at 332–33. On August 22, 2017, our Supreme Court affirmed our order.
Commonwealth v. Bragg, 169 A.3d 1024 (Pa. 2017).4 See also
Commonwealth v. Resto, 179 A.3d 18, 21 (Pa. 2018) (OAJC) (“This case
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4Appellant filed his brief one week after our Supreme Court affirmed Bragg,
and his brief acknowledges our decision in Bragg.
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does not concern previous convictions considered as aggravation at
sentencing. Notably, under prevailing federal jurisprudence, such prior
convictions are not treated as a type of fact implicating Alleyne.) (citation
omitted). Therefore, we reject Appellant’s challenge to his sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/27/18
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