Com. v. Stoops, R. ( 2023 )

J-A27011-22
2023 PA Super 21COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
REX ALLEN STOOPS :
:
Appellant : No. 459 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered February 10, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-28-CR-0001017-2019
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 14, 2023
Appellant, Rex Allen Stoops, appeals from the order entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of Franklin County, which denied his request to vacate the
restitution portion of his sentence. Appellant argues that there was an
insufficient causal nexus between his criminal conduct, leading police on a car
chase, and his sentence of restitution, imposed for damage to police vehicles
sustained at the end of the chase. After review, we affirm.
The factual and procedural history of this case is not in dispute. On April
17, 2019, Appellant led police on a car chase through Waynesboro. Eventually,
Appellant pulled into an alleyway and came to a stop. As described by the trial
court, one “police vehicle entered the alley immediately after the defendant’s
vehicle and pulled to the left side of the defendant’s vehicle. [Another] cruiser
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A27011-22
pulled in immediately behind the defendant[, and a third] cruiser pulled into
the alley from the opposite end and stopped in front of the defendant’s
vehicle.”1
At this point, a passenger exited Appellant’s car. As she did so,
Appellant’s car “lurched forward,”2 and “the brake lights . . . came on and
went off more than once.”3 One of the police cruisers then struck Appellant’s
vehicle from behind, and Appellant’s vehicle “then struck the other patrol
vehicle” ahead of it.4
As a result of the chase, Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of Fleeing
and two counts of Recklessly Endangering Another Person.5 On September 23,
2021, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 4–8-year term of
incarceration. In addition, the court ordered Appellant to pay restitution for
the damage to the police vehicles, in the amount of $12,584.77. Appellant did
not file a direct appeal.
On October 25, 2021, Appellant filed a Motion for Restitution Hearing.
In his motion, Appellant challenged the causal nexus between his criminal
conduct and the imposition of restitution. He and the Commonwealth
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1 Trial Ct. Or., 2/10/22, at 1-2.
2 Appellant’s Br. at 13.
3 Trial Ct. Or. at 2.
4 Id.5 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a), 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
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stipulated, however, “that if restitution is determined to be properly awarded,
the amount of restitution should be amended to [$9,691.85].”6
On January 24, 2022, the court held a hearing on Appellant’s motion.
On February 10, 2022, the court issued an order denying Appellant’s request
to vacate the restitution portion of his sentence but amending the restitution
amount to $9,691.85.7
Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal and both he and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises a single issue for our review:
Did the trial court commit an error of law when it determined that
the damages to the Waynesboro Police Department’s vehicles was
a direct result of Stoops’ conduct when Stoops’ vehicle was
stopped, boxed in, a passenger exited[,] and he had ended his
flight prior to the police officer intentionally ramming his vehicle
Appellant’s Br. at 7.
Appellant claims that the trial court erred by finding a causal nexus
between his criminal conduct in fleeing from the police and the damage to the
police cruisers. Id. at 11-14. He argues that because he “came to a stop
voluntarily and was allowing his passenger[] to disembark[, and because] the
vehicle was boxed in[, t]here was no need to strike the vehicle to prevent
further flight.” Id. at 13. Therefore, according to Appellant, the cause of the
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6 Trial Ct. Or. at 1.
7 Appellant is to pay restitution in the amount of $9,191.85 to Select Way
Insurance and $500 to the Borough of Waynesboro. We note that restitution
is payable to “victims,” which include “an affected government agency[ and]
any insurance company that has compensated the victim for loss under an
insurance contract.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(h).
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damage to the police vehicles, for which he is paying restitution, was the
“separate, intervening[,] and unnecessary decision” by the police to ram his
vehicle. Id. at 14.
The trial court disagreed. It found that “the events the defendant set in
motion by his initial flight were [the “but-for” cause of] the damage to the
cruisers[.]” Trial Ct. Op., 2/10/22, at 3. The court recognized that the
defendant’s conduct does not need to be the “direct cause” of the damages.
Id. It, therefore, declined to “parse whether at the precise moment [the
police] cruiser struck the defendant’s vehicle the defendant was actively
fleeing.” Id.
Appellant’s claim concerns the legality of his restitution sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Stradley, 50 A.3d 769, 771-72 (Pa. Super. 2012). When
reviewing the legality of a sentence, we apply a plenary scope and de novo
standard of review. Commonwealth v. Lekka, 210 A.3d 343, 355 (Pa.
Super. 2019).8
Section 1106 of the Crimes Code governs the imposition of restitution.
It provides that “[u]pon conviction for any crime wherein [the value of
property of a victim has] substantially decreased as a direct result of the
crime[,] the offender shall be sentenced to make restitution in addition to the
punishment prescribed therefor.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a)(1).
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8Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(c)(3), “a defendant [may] seek a modification
or amendment of the restitution order at any time directly from the trial
court.” Stradley, 50 A.3d at 772. Thus, Appellant’s motion is timely.
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This Court has interpreted the phrase “as a direct result of the crime” to
require “a loss that flows from the conduct which forms the basis of the crime
for which a defendant is held criminally accountable.” Commonwealth v.
Zrncic, 167 A.3d 149, 152 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). There must
exist “a direct causal connection between the crime and the loss.”
Commonwealth v. Barger, 956 A.2d 458, 465 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts apply a “but for” test
to determine if a direct causal connection exists between the defendant’s
criminal conduct and a loss. Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 158 A.3d 671,
674 (Pa. Super. 2017). The test asks if the damages would “have occurred
but for the defendant’s criminal conduct.” Commonwealth v. Weir, 201 A.3d
163, 171 (Pa. Super. 2018), aff’d, 239 A.3d 25 (Pa. 2020).
In the instant case, we agree with the trial court’s cogent analysis and
finding that Appellant’s flight was the but-for cause of the damage to the police
vehicles. Without Appellant’s criminal conduct in fleeing from the police, the
police vehicles would not have suffered damage. Contrary to Appellant’s
assertion, but-for cause analysis requires only a determination that the
damages would not have occurred absent Appellant’s criminal conduct. It is,
therefore, irrelevant that the police, and not Appellant, initiated the contact
between the vehicles. Since Appellant’s criminal conduct was the but-for cause
of the damage, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to
vacate his restitution sentence.
Order affirmed.
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Judge McLaughlin joins the opinion.
Judge Colins files a concurring opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/14/2023
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