Com. v. Hartman, S. ( 2022 )

J-S16013-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SHAWN F. HARTMAN :
:
Appellant : No. 1385 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 27, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0000705-2020
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 21, 2022
Shawn F. Hartman appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in
the Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas on September 27, 2021,
after he was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal,
Hartman argues the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress
physical evidence and a statement he made to police. We affirm.
On July 10, 2020, a criminal complaint was filed against Hartman
charging him with possession of drug paraphernalia. The charge alleged that
Hartman had admitted to owning a glass pipe and using it to smoke
methamphetamine. Hartman subsequently filed a pretrial motion to suppress
the glass pipe as well as his admissions to owning and using the pipe.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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At the suppression hearing, Probation Officer Kacey Fisher testified that
on January 8, 2020, she and other officers from Northumberland County Adult
Probation and Parole arrived at Hartman’s residence looking for a female
probationer who had Hartman’s residence listed as her approved address.
Officer Fisher knocked on the door and Hartman answered. See N.T.,
Suppression Hearing, 5/20/2021, at 4. Officer Fisher asked Hartman if the
female probationer was present, to which Hartman responded she was not.
See id. Officer Fisher then asked if Hartman would allow them into the
residence to take a walk through of the house since they had been there
multiple times before with no one answering the door previously. See id.
Hartman allowed the officers inside the residence. See id.
The probation officers inquired if there were any other persons in the
home. See id. at 5. Hartman answered there was only one other person, his
nephew, there at the time. See id. However, upon walking through the home
the probation officers found a female and two additional males. See id. At
that point, the probation officers asked everyone to wait in the living room so
they could determine if anyone else was in the residence. See id. Due to the
number of people found in the home, the probation officers contacted local
law enforcement to come to the home for assistance. See id. at 6. Fisher then
continued to search the home to determine if there were any other persons
present and to continue a general walk-through of the residence. See id. Upon
entering the basement, Fisher found, in plain view, a mirror, a glass pipe -
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commonly used to smoke methamphetamine, and residue. See id. As the
police had arrived within a few minutes, Fisher called the police into the
basement to look at the items found. See id. at 7.
Coal Township Police Officer Joshua Wynn testified that he received a
call to respond to the residence to assist probation. See id. at 12. When he
arrived there were several people seated in the living room and probation
officers advised him they were looking for a probationer and wanted to check
the home. See id. The probation officers asked if he would just stand by while
they completed the search. See id. Officer Wynn waited in the living room
along with another probation officer, who explained what was going on. See
id. at 16. Shortly thereafter, Officer Wynn was called to the basement where
obvious drug paraphernalia was located in plain sight. See id. at 13. Officer
Wynn took possession of the glass pipe. See id. He then went back upstairs
and asked the group assembled in the living room who the pipe belonged to.
See id. Hartman answered that it was his and that he used the pipe in the
past to smoke methamphetamine but stated he does not use drugs anymore.
See id. at 13-14. At no point was Hartman handcuffed. See id.
Finally, Hartman testified on his own behalf, largely contradicting the
probation and police officer’s testimony. Relevantly, Hartman testified he lived
at the address searched with his girlfriend, and that he was aware of his
girlfriend’s probation conditions. See id. at 18-19. Hartman asserted he was
not asked for permission to enter his home, and he never gave permission for
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the officers to enter. See id. at 19. He was told to sit in the living room with
everyone else and at that point he did not feel he was free to leave. See id.
at 20. Hartman admitted to telling Officer Wynn that the pipe was his. See id.
at 21. However, he stated Officer Wynn did not ask everyone in the room who
the pipe belonged to, but instead asked Hartman directly if the pipe was his.
See id. at 22, 26. At the time, Hartman stated he was seated in his recliner
in his living room. See id. at 26.
After the hearing, the trial court denied the suppression motion. On July
13, 2021, after a jury trial, Hartman was found guilty of possession of drug
paraphernalia. Two months later, the trial court sentenced him to twelve
months’ probation. This timely appeal followed.
Hartman raises two issues for our review:
1. Did the [trial] court err when it denied [Hartman]’s motion to
suppress evidence based on an illegal search.
2. Did the [trial] court err when it denied [Hartman]’s motion to
suppress [Hartman]’s alleged admission due to a violation of his
Miranda rights.
Appellant's Brief, at 6.
“Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it is the
Commonwealth’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant’s
rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047-1048 (Pa. 2012)
(citations omitted).
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Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s
denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
from those facts are correct. When reviewing the ruling of the
suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the
prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the
suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse
only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007) (citations
omitted). “In appeals from suppression orders, our scope of review is limited
to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v.
Caple, 121 A.3d 511, 517 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
“It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass
on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their
testimony. The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v.
Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted).
Hartman first argues the probation officers’ visit to his residence
constituted a search that was not supported by reasonable suspicion and was
therefore unconstitutional. We find Hartman has misconstrued the probation
officers’ walkthrough of his residence as a “search”.
“[Probation] Officers are in a supervisory relationship with their
offenders. The purpose of this supervision is to assist the offenders in their
rehabilitation and reassimilation into the community and to protect the
public.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9912(a).
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The aim of probation and parole is to rehabilitate and reintegrate
a lawbreaker into society as a law-abiding citizen. The institution
of probation and parole assumes a probationer or parolee is more
likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law. Consequently,
probationers and parolees have limited Fourth Amendment rights
because of a diminished expectation of privacy. This Court
explained that probation officers, like parole officers:
[A]re in a supervisory relationship with their offenders. The
purpose of this supervision is to assist the offenders in their
rehabilitation and reassimilation into the community and to
protect the public. Supervision practices shall reflect the
balance of enforcement of the conditions of parole and case
management techniques to maximize successful parole
completion through effective reentry to society. As such,
probationers and parolees are subject to general and
individual rules of conduct and supervision described at
sentencing and/or in the parole agreement.
Commonwealth v. Parker, 152 A.3d 309, 316-17 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9912(a). Accordingly, this Court has previously held that probation or parole
officers performing a walkthrough or homevisit to ensure compliance with a
probationer’s conditions of probation, consistent with their supervisory duties,
does not constitute a search. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 85 A.3d 530,
537 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Here, Hartman’s girlfriend was on probation at the time Fisher and her
colleagues arrived at the residence. Hartman admitted that he had previously
spoken to someone when his girlfriend was put on probation to give
permission for her to live with him during probation. See N.T., Suppression
Hearing, 5/20/2021, at 22. He acknowledged that he understood her
probation officers would be coming to see her every so often, and that her
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supervision would include home visits and walk-throughs. See id. While he
stated that probation officers had never been there before, he conceded he
had agreed to those conditions when he agreed to allow his girlfriend to live
at his residence while she was on probation. See id. at 23.
In performing their lawful duty to supervise their probationer, Fisher and
other probation officers visited the residence listed as their probationer’s
approved address. The visit was conducted because the probation officers had
attempted to view the residence numerous times before and had never been
able to get someone to answer the door.
Upon arriving at Hartman’s residence this time, Fisher identified herself
and her associates to Hartman. She then asked if Hartman’s girlfriend was
present and stated her intention of doing a walk-through of the residence.
Fisher testified that they were checking to see the layout of the home and who
was in the home, especially after discovering more people were in the home
than Hartman had originally indicated. The probation officers only checked
common areas for anyone and anything in plain sight.
We conclude the probation officer's actions in walking through the
residence did not constitute a search. Rather, the probation officers were
performing their lawful supervisory duties by attempting to visit their
probationer at her registered home to ensure her compliance with the
conditions of her probation. The visit never progressed beyond visual
inspection, as the glass pipe was found in plain sight. It is clear from the record
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that the walk-through was fairly brief, as the probation officers called the
police shortly after getting there, and Officer Wynn arrived within minutes of
receiving the dispatch call. Additionally, the record does not indicate that the
probation officers did anything more than walk through a few rooms looking
for anything and anyone in plain sight. During this lawful visit, Fisher observed
a glass pipe typically used for methamphetamine in plain view in Hartman’s
basement.
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's denial of Hartman’s
motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his residence.
Hartman next argues that his subsequent confession to police should
have been suppressed since he was not given Miranda warnings. Notably,
Hartman does not contest the voluntariness of his confession. Rather, he
asserts that he was the subject of a custodial interrogation and therefore
Miranda warnings were required prior to any questioning.
Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of [his] freedom of action in any significant way. The
Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody
is subjected to either express questioning or its functional
equivalent. Thus, [i]nterrogation occurs where the police should
know that their words or actions are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect. In evaluating whether
Miranda warnings were necessary, a court must consider the
totality of the circumstances....
Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes depends on
whether the person is physically denied of [his] freedom of action
in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which [he]
reasonably believes that [his] freedom of action or movement is
restricted by the interrogation. Moreover, the test for custodial
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interrogation does not depend upon the subjective intent of the
law enforcement officer interrogator. Rather, the test focuses on
whether the individual being interrogated reasonably believes
[his] freedom of action is being restricted.
Said another way, police detentions become custodial when,
under the totality of the circumstances, the conditions and/or
duration of the detention become so coercive as to constitute the
functional equivalent of arrest.
Thus, the ultimate inquiry for determining whether an individual
is in custody for Miranda purposes is whether there was a formal
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 887-888 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court determined Hartman voluntarily allowed the
probation officers into the home. While Hartman was in his own home, and
therefore his ability to leave was somewhat hindered, see Gonzalez, 979
A.2d at 889, he voluntarily stayed in the living room along with the numerous
other people who were at the residence that day. None of the individuals in
the living room, including Hartman, were restrained in any manner. Hartman
was not the subject of the home visit. The pipe was found while officers were
performing lawful supervisory duties and not pursuant to any criminal
investigation. Accordingly, there were no “suspects” at the time the pipe was
found, nor at the time of Officer Wynn’s question which occurred immediately
thereafter.
We reiterate that we are bound by the trial court’s credibility
determinations. The trial court specifically credited Officer Wynn’s testimony
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that the blanket question was made to everyone in the living room and not to
any one person specifically. There is no evidence of record that Officer Wynn
intended to link any specific person in the room to a crime. While Hartman is
the subject of this appeal, he was not the subject of the visit to the home, nor
was he the subject of any investigation, criminal or otherwise.
Instead of remaining quiet, as everyone else in the room did, Hartman
voluntarily responded to Officer Wynn’s question posed to the group regarding
if the glass pipe belonged to anyone. There is no evidence that the officer
threatened anyone in the room, including Hartman, or otherwise made any
impermissible inducements in exchange for a confession. No one in the room,
including Hartman, was handcuffed or arrested at any point.
Under the totality of the circumstances, we do not find Miranda
warnings were required in this instance. Hartman’s freedom of action was not
so restricted, and he was never asked a pointed question, that would cause
him to reasonably believe he was not free to choose not to respond to
questioning. Because we find he was not subject to a custodial interrogation,
no Miranda warnings were required.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Hartman’s motion to
suppress his confession.
As we find the trial court did not err in denying Hartman’s motion to
suppress, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/21/2022
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