Com. v. Smith, J., Jr. ( 2016 )

J-S27042-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES WILLIAM SMITH, JR.,
Appellant No. 1565 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered September 9, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002949-2015
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 06, 2016
Appellant James William Smith, Jr. appeals from Order entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of York County by the Honorable Craig T. Trebilcock
on September 9, 2015, denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 110.1 Upon our review of the record, we affirm.2
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1
Known as the Compulsory Joinder Rule, Section 110 reads as follows:
§ 110. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for
different offense
Currentness
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision
of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different
facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following
circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a
conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when
prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense)
and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
(i) any offense of which the defendant could have been
convicted on the first prosecution;
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from
the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the
appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the
commencement of the first trial and occurred within the
same judicial district as the former prosecution unless the
court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense;
or
(iii) the same conduct, unless:
(A) the offense of which the defendant was formerly
convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is
subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not
required by the other and the law defining each of such
offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm
or evil; or
(B) the second offense was not consummated when the
former trial began.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the indictment
was found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for
the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated
and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required
a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be
established for conviction of the second offense.
(3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated, as
improper termination is defined in section 109 of this title
(relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for
the same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for an
offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had
the former prosecution not been improperly terminated.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110.
2
Where the trial court denies a double jeopardy motion but does not find it
to be frivolous, the court shall advise the defendant on the record that the
denial is immediately appealable as a collateral order. Pa.R.Crim.P.
587(B)(6). As such, the trial court’s September 9, 2015, Order is appealable
as a collateral order. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 120 A.3d 1017, 1021
(Pa.Super. 2015) (stating orders denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss on
double jeopardy grounds are appealable as collateral orders, so long as the
motion is not found to be frivolous).
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On June 16, 2014, Detective Ogden Dickerson III of the
Springettsbury Township Police Department charged Appellant with one
count of retail theft. In his Incident Report, Officer Dickerson indicated the
retail theft occurred at a Walmart located at 2801 East Market Street in
Springettsbury Township, York, PA on June 1, 2014, at approximately 2:20
p.m. (hereinafter “East York Walmart”). At that time, Appellant entered the
East York Walmart, removed two air conditioning units priced at $199.00
each from a display and placed them in a shopping cart. He proceeded to
push the shopping cart out of the store without paying for the units and
quickly loaded them into a green, 1997 Mercury Sable. Brenda Crumling, a
Walmart employee who had been sitting in her car in the parking lot,
thought it odd that Appellant was hurrying to place the two units in the car
and took a photograph of the Mercury Sable with her cell phone before
Appellant drove away. Upon receiving the information from Ms. Crumling,
Loss Prevention Officer Maria Harlacker discovered two air conditioning units
were missing and had not been paid for.
On June 23, 2014, Officer Jeffrey Leer also of the Springettsbury
Township Police Department charged Appellant with one count of retail theft
as result of an incident that occurred on June 5, 2014, at the East York
Walmart at approximately 5:02 p.m. In his Incident Report, Officer Leer
indicated that he had interviewed Ms. Harlacker and a Walmart employee,
Jonathan Lyttle. Mr. Lyttle recognized Appellant as the individual who had
stolen two air conditioners four days earlier. He observed that on this day,
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Appellant was accompanied by an adult female and a child, later identified as
Desiree Bange and Appellant’s three-year-old daughter. Mr. Lyttle followed
the trio to the hardware department, and Ms. Harlacker watched the couple
and child via video surveillance. They observed Appellant select two air
conditioners and place them in his cart. He then picked up the child and
carried her to the front of the store followed by Ms. Bange who pushed the
merchandise out of the store. Mr. Lyttle tried to stop Ms. Bange, but she
abandoned the merchandise and fled in a red Jeep Liberty. Appellant, still
holding the child, got into a green Mercury Sable and fled as well. On
October 15, 2014, Appellant pled guilty to both of these retail theft charges.
The instant matter arose out of an incident that occurred on June 1,
2014, at a Walmart located at 1800 Loucks Rd in West Manchester Township
in York at approximately 5:07 p.m. (hereinafter “West York Walmart”). In a
Criminal Complaint filed on March 11, 2015, Officer John P. Hanuska of the
West Manchester Township Police Department charged Appellant with one
count of retail theft graded as a felony.3 In his Affidavit of Probable Cause,
Officer Hanuska indicated that Appellant along with two female accomplices,
whom he stated Appellant referred to with what he believed to be the
fictitious names “Elizabeth” and “Banks,” entered the West York Walmart
and proceeded to select two air conditioners priced at $199.00 each.
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3
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3929(a)(1).
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Appellant placed them in a shopping cart and pushed the cart out of the
store without paying for the merchandise. Loss Prevention Officer Arunya
Harrison was unable to stop the trio, and they drove away in a teal Mercury
Sable. Upon further investigation by Officer Hanuska, Appellant was
identified and represented he unknowingly had stolen the air conditioners
because the two females told him they had been paid for. He further
indicated that each of his cohorts had taken an air conditioner and that he
would attempt to recover them and return them to police.
A pretrial conference was held on August 13, 2015, and the matter
was listed for trial during the September 2015 term; however, prior thereto,
on August 28, 2015, Appellant filed a pretrial motion wherein he requested
that the charge be dismissed and reasoned the prosecutor was barred from
prosecuting the offense under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110. The trial court heard
testimony and oral argument on the motion on September 9, 2015, and
entered an order denying the motion on that same day. Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal on September 11, 2015, and the trial court entered
its order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 on September 22, 2015. Appellant
timely filed his statement of matters complained of on appeal on October 13,
2015.
In its 1925(a) Order, the trial court incorporated for this Court’s review
its Findings and Order entered during the oral argument held on September
9, 2015. See Opinion in Support of Order Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) at
2 (citing N.T. Hearing, 9/9/15, at 33-40). Therein, the trial court initially
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found Appellant’s motion was not frivolous. It further held that the plain
meaning of the term prosecuting officer as it is used in Section 110 refers to
the District Attorney’s Office. N.T. Hearing, 9/9/15, at 33. In doing so, the
trial court reasoned that police officers cannot prosecute cases in the trial
court as such action would constitute practice of law without a license. Id.
at 33-34. The trial court thereafter offered the following explanation for
rejecting Appellant's compulsory joinder claim on the record:
The instant case that’s before this [c]ourt, 2949, occurred
on June 1, 2014, at approximately 5:02 p.m. at the Wal-Mart in
West Manchester Township, different police jurisdiction.
In this instance, [Appellant] is alleged to have committed
this crime with two other females. The police for West
Manchester did not file their case until March 23rd, [sic] 2015.
The [c]ourt has no credible evidence before it that the police in
West Manchester ever brought this case to the attention of the
prosecuting officer, that is, the District Attorney’s Office in York
County prior to filing the case in March 23, 2015. So [Appellant]
had already been found guilty in the first case by the time the
instant case was ever filed.
What we’ve been referencing as the third retail theft,
which has already been disposed of with a finding of guilt,
occurred on June 5, 2014, at 7:02 p.m. at the Wal-Mart in
Springettsbury Township, York County, Pennsylvania. Again,
Springettsbury Township being the same township as the first
alleged retail theft.
In that instance [Appellant] was committing the crime with
another female. And the criminal complaint was filed back on
June 23rd, 2014.
So the first retail theft and the third retail theft are the
ones that occurred in Springettsbury Township were disposed of,
both of them the prosecuting officer which the [c]ourt finds as
being the District Attorney’s Office, had notice and accordingly
disposed of them in a timely fashion. However, they did not
dispose of the West Manchester prosecution because they did
not have notice of it from the West Manchester Police.
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Although it occurred on June 1, 2014, same date as the
first retail theft, it occurred at a different Wal-Mart store. It
involved different police force, it involved different witnesses, it
would have involved different store security. I believe in Wal-
Mart retail theft cases you are going to have video evidence. We
don’t know if that exists in this case. That’s not dispositive of
the [c]ourt’s ruling in this matter. It’s just noting that that is
often the case. The witnesses are not the same. The
jurisdiction is not the same. The fact that there is the same
corporate name is not dispositive. The fact that it occurred the
same day is not dispositive under the law. The Commonwealth
cited case authority on that point.
They may have the same corporate parent, but two stores
were different victims and there were different factual scenarios
involving both the number of perpetrators.
So this Court finds that Prong 2 of the four-prong test
would fail.[4]
The third prong fails with regard to prosecution, the
reasons previously stated. The York County District Attorney’s
Office were [sic] not aware of the instant charges for the
commencement of trial on the former charges. The instant
charge was filed approximately five months after [Appellant]
entered guilty pleas on 5208 of 2014 and 5209 of 2014.
Because Prongs 2 and 3 failed, the Commonwealth is entitled to
proceed in the prosecution of the instant matter.
Id. at 36-38.
In his appellate brief, Appellant presents the following questions for
our review:
ISSUE#1: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
FOUND THAT THE TERM “PROSECUTING OFFICER” IN 18
PA.C.S. § 110 IS LIMITED TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE WHEN THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE IS BROAD
ENOUGH TO INCLUDE POLICE OFFICERS ACTING IN THE
CAPACITY OF A PROSECUTOR AT A PRELIMINARY
HEARING?
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4
We expound upon the trial court’s reference to a multi-prong test, infra.
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ISSUE #2: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
FOUND THAT THE OFFENSES REQUIRING COMPULSORY
JOINDER OCCURRED IN DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS
WHEN THE TERM “JUDICIAL DISTRICT” IN 18 PA. C.S. §
110(1)(II) IS DEFINED AS THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
ESTABLISHED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN WHICH A
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS IS LOCATED?
ISSUE #3: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
FOUND THAT THE FORMER OFFENSE AND THE CURRENT
OFFENSE WERE NOT BASED ON THE SAME CRIMINAL
CONDUCT OR DID NOT ARISE FROM THE SAME CRIMINAL
EPISODE FOR PURPOSES OF DISMISSAL UNDER 18
PA.C.S. § 110?
ISSUE #4: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
FOUND THAT [ ] THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE WAS
NOT AWARE OF THE INSTANT CHARGES AT THE TIME [OF]
PROSECUTION ON THE FORMER OFFENSE COMMENCED.
At the outset, we note that this Court’s standard of review of issues
concerning 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 is plenary. Commonwealth v. George, 38
A.3d 893, 896 (Pa.Super. 2012). Section 110 is a legislative mandate that
provides a subsequent prosecution for a violation of a statutory provision
which differs from a former prosecution or is based upon independent facts
will be barred in certain circumstances. Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961
A.2d 66, 71 (Pa. 2008). Our Supreme Court has developed a four-pronged
test which must be satisfied when determining whether Section 110 bars a
subsequent prosecution as follows:
(1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or
conviction; (2) the current prosecution was based on the
same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal
episode; (3) the prosecutor in the subsequent trial was
aware of the charges before the first trial; and (4) all
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charges [are] within the same judicial district as the
former prosecution.
Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
Herein, the Commonwealth does not dispute that the first and fourth
prongs of the compulsory joinder test have been satisfied. See Brief of the
Appellee at 12. Indeed, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 109 indicates one has been
convicted where a plea of guilty has been accepted by the court. 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 109(3). Herein, Appellant pled guilty to the retail theft charges
arising out of the two incidents that occurred at the East York Walmart.
Moreover, the instant matter would be prosecuted in the Court of Common
Pleas of York County, Pennsylvania. Therefore, this Court agrees that the
first and fourth elements required for compulsory joinder have been
satisfied.5 Notwithstanding, all four prongs must be satisfied to mandate
joinder. Reid, supra. As such, we must next determine whether the
current prosecution is based on the same criminal conduct or arose from the
same criminal episode as the charges to which Appellant pled guilty in
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5
In raising his second question for our review, Appellant seems to
misconstrue the trial court’s holding to be that the crimes occurred within
two, distinct judicial districts. To the contrary, the trial court stated that the
police jurisdiction was not the same in the context of its examination of the
element requiring that the prosecution be based upon the same criminal
conduct or arising out of the same criminal episode. See N.T., 9/9/15, at 38
(noting that the two prior retail thefts that previously resulted in convictions
were in a police jurisdiction different from that involved in the pending
matter).
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October of 2014 and/or whether the prosecutor was aware of the instant
matter prior to that time.
The second prong of the compulsory joinder test, known as the “logical
relationship prong,” requires joinder when the current prosecution involves
the same criminal conduct or arises from the same criminal episode.
George, supra at 897. In the seminal case of Commonwealth v. Hude,
458 A.2d 177 (Pa. 1983), our Supreme Court instructed courts to analyze
the “temporal” and “logical” relationship between the charges to determine
whether they arise out of the same criminal episode. Id. at 181. More
recently, in Reid, the Supreme Court expounded upon this directive as
follows:
Generally, charges against a defendant are clearly related in
time and require little analysis to determine that a single
criminal episode exists. However, in defining what acts
constitute a single criminal episode, not only is the temporal
sequence of events important, but also the logical relationship
between the acts must be considered.
With regard to the logical relationship, [our Supreme Court]
noted:
In ascertaining whether a number of statutory offenses are
“logically related” to one another, the court should initially
inquire as to whether there is a substantial duplication of factual,
and/or legal issues presented by the offenses. If there is
duplication, then the offenses are logically related and must be
prosecuted at one trial. The mere fact that the additional
statutory offenses involve additional issues of law or fact is not
sufficient to create a separate criminal episode since the logical
relationship test does not require “an absolute identity of factual
backgrounds.”
...
[I]n determining if the “logical relationship” prong of the test has
been met, we must ... be aware that a mere de minimis
duplication of factual and legal issues is insufficient to establish a
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logical relationship between offenses. Rather[,] what is required
is a substantial duplication of issues of law and fact.
...
In our consideration of the temporal and logical relationship
between the criminal acts, we are guided by the policy
considerations that § 110 was designed to serve:
(1) to protect a person accused of crimes from governmental
harassment of being forced to undergo successive trials for
offenses stemming from the same criminal episode; and (2) as a
matter of judicial administration and economy, to assure finality
without unduly burdening the judicial process by repetitious
litigation.
...
[T]he “same criminal episode” analysis cannot be made by
merely cataloguing simple factual similarities or differences
between the various offenses with which the defendant was
charged[,] even if the offenses at issue constitute an enterprise.
A proper analysis requires courts to determine whether there is a
substantial duplication of issues of fact and law.
Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582–583, 586 (Pa. 2013) (internal
quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted).
In his brief, Appellant argues the crimes are both temporally and
logically related for purposes of Section 110 in that the retail theft at issue in
the matter sub judice occurred on the same day as one of the other two
charges to which Appellant pled guilty and requires the same elements of
proof and involves the same modus operandi, co-defendants and vehicle.
Appellant maintains the fact the crimes occurred at two different Walmart
stores and involved separate police forces is not dispositive. Brief in Support
of Appeal at 25-27.
Applying Reid to the facts of the matter before us, we conclude the
Commonwealth is not barred from prosecuting Appellant under 18 Pa.C.S.A.
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§ 110. In doing so, we find the retail theft charges to which Appellant pled
guilty on October 15, 2014, did not arise as part of the same criminal
episode as the conduct which gave rise to the retail theft charge that is the
subject of the instant case.
While we note that in all three cases, two of which occurred on June
1, 2014, and the other on June 5, 2014, Appellant was charged with one
count of retail theft of two air conditioners from a Walmart, we must also
consider the logical relationship of the offenses. Reid, 77 A.3d at 585. As
the trial court noted, Appellant’s prior convictions and the instant matter
required proof of different facts through the testimony of distinct witnesses
to establish Appellant committed a retail theft. Specifically, in the instant
matter Appellant was observed to be acting with two female accomplices at
the West York Walmart all of whom Loss Prevention Officer Arunya Harrison
attempted to stop. As such, Ms. Harrison’s testimony would be required to
establish the charged offense herein.
To the contrary, the East York Walmart thefts shared more than a
setting. Loss Prevention Specialist Maria Harlacker and eyewitness Brenda
Crumling would have been involved in the investigation of the June 1, 2014,
incident as would Jonathan Lyttle who on June 5, 2014, recognized Appellant
as the perpetrator four days earlier. He, along with Ms. Harlacker,
witnessed Appellant’s second theft in the East York Walmart at which time
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Appellant was accompanied by a female accomplice and child, though he had
acted alone previously.
Also, additional physical evidence in the form of a photograph and
surveillance footage depicting Appellant either alone or with a female and a
child at the East York Walmart was available for the prior convictions. The
video surveillance from the West York Walmart referenced by Officer
Hanuska is said to depict Appellant with two females. This evidence is
relevant only to the retail theft charge in the instant matter.
Moreover, the West York Walmart and the East York Walmart are
separate facilities and are located in different police jurisdictions. Three
officers from two different township police forces were the primary
investigating officers, and neither Detective Dickerson nor Officer Leer of the
Springettsbury Township Police Department who filed the charges to which
Appellant pled guilty in October of 2014 participated in the investigation of
the current charge brought against Appellant by Officer Hanuska of the West
Manchester Police Department. It is clear that neither police report filed in
the Springettsbury Township Police Department references a retail theft
occurring at the West York Walmart in June of 2014. Indeed, Appellant was
not charged in the instant matter until March 11, 2015, nearly five months
after he had pled guilty in the other two cases.
Thus, while Appellant’s thefts may be temporally related, we find there
is not a substantial duplication of factual and legal issues presented by the
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instant offense and the prior convictions, for any testimony that would have
been presented at the first trial would not necessarily be repeated in a trial
herein. As such, we conclude they are not logically related. (Compare
Commonwealth v. Anthony, 717 A.2d 1015, 1019 (Pa. 1998) (finding
prosecutions were temporally related as they covered the same period of
time and a substantial duplication of issues of fact and law because “a high
percentage of the testimony from the first trial [had to] be repeated in the
second trial”)).
Although failure to satisfy one of the elements of the aforementioned
test is fatal to a claim that Section 110 bars a subsequent prosecution, we
find the trial court correctly determined that the appropriate prosecuting
officer for purposes of Section 110 is the district attorney who, herein, had
not been aware of Appellant’s conduct in the instant case prior to his first
convictions.
Appellant urges that the prosecuting officer should be viewed broadly
to include not only the district attorney but also a police officer for purposes
of the knowledge element of Section 110(1)(ii). Appellant notes that the
General Assembly’s decision not to use the term “prosecuting attorney”
evinces its intention that both prosecuting attorneys and police officers bear
responsibility under Section 110. Appellant posits this interpretation is
consistent with the Statute’s purpose to ensure an accused is protected from
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governmental harassment through successive prosecutions. Brief in Support
of Appeal at 15-23.
Appellant stresses that police officers are permitted to and, in fact,
conduct preliminary hearings in York County. Appellant concludes
“prosecuting officers,” in both Springettsbury Township and in West
Manchester Township, were aware Appellant had committed retail thefts and
the latter failed to take timely action to join the instant matter with the
pending retail theft cases and notify the district attorney’s office so it could
act in compliance with Section 110. Id. at 22. Appellant asserts the
relevant inquiry herein is not whether the prosecutor knew about all offenses
but whether he or she should have had such knowledge. Id. at 28.
Specifically, Appellant claims Officer Hanuska refrained from filing a criminal
complaint for six months, although West Manchester and Springsburry
Townships were aware he had committed multiple retail theft offenses. As
such, Appellant posits Officer Hanuska bore the responsibility to file the
charges timely and not require Appellant to advise the prosecution of other
crimes he may have committed. Id. at 29.
Assuming, arguendo, that the prosecuting officer is limited to a district
attorney, Appellant maintains that our Supreme Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Muffley, 425 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1981), while not entirely
analogous, is instructive herein. Appellant urges in light of Muffley, our
inquiry herein should pertain not only to whether the prosecutor knew of
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both offenses but also to whether he should have had such knowledge,
because a defendant is not responsible for failing to move to consolidate two
separate informations. Brief in Support of Appeal at 29.
To the contrary, the duties of a district attorney have been defined
generally as follows:
(a) The district attorney shall sign all bills of indictment and
conduct in court all criminal and other prosecutions, in the
name of the Commonwealth, or, when the Commonwealth
is a party, which arise in the county, and perform all the
duties which now by law are to be performed by deputy
attorneys general, and receive the same fees or
emoluments of office.
16 Pa.C.S.A. § 4402(a). See also Commonwealth v. Thornton, 371 A.2d
1343, 1345 (Pa.Super. 1977) (citing 16 Pa.C.S.A. § 4402(a) for the
proposition that “[i]n court cases the district attorney is the appropriate
prosecuting officer.”). The Thornton Court recognized that Section 110
“allows for circumstances where ‘the [a]ppropriate prosecuting officer’ is
unaware of one or more criminal acts which in fact were part of a criminal
episode for which the defendant is being prosecuted. Hence, a second
prosecution is permissible under those circumstances.” Id. at 1345.
With regard to Appellant’s reliance upon Muffley, it is noteworthy that
while processing the defendant following his arrest for possession of
marijuana, police officers discovered LSD in his pockets. As an outside
laboratory analysis was required for the LSD, two separate criminal
complaints were filed. On June 17, 1977, the defendant pled guilty to
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possession of marijuana, and on July 18, 1977, a criminal information for
possession of LSD was filed. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which
the lower courts denied. The Supreme Court reversed and in doing so found
the offenses arose from the same criminal facts. While it noted there was no
proof the prosecutor was aware of both offenses, it held that under the facts
before it, the prosecutor should have had such knowledge. Id. at 352.
Herein, On September 9, 2015, Caleb Enerson testified that he is an
assistant district attorney for the County of York, Pennsylvania, and that he
served in that capacity in October of 2014. While he could not remember
the docket numbers of the matters to which Appellant pled guilty on October
15, 2014, Attorney Enerson explained he had no reason to doubt them and
stated that in October of 2014 if there were a retail theft in a Walmart in
Springettsbury Township, he would have been assigned the case. Id. at 21.
He was not aware that Appellant had been involved in any other retail thefts
when he prosecuted the two matters in October of 2014. Id. at 22. Indeed,
unlike the situation presented in Muffley, as previously stated, Officer
Hanuska did not file the complaint until five months after Appellant plead
guilty to and was sentenced in the other matters which arose in different
Walmart store located in a different township; therefore, the District
Attorney’s Office had no way of knowing Appellant was facing an
investigation in a second police jurisdiction.
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Based upon the foregoing, the trial court's determinations are
consistent with the principles underlying the compulsory joinder statute,
which we have stated above. As such, we find there was no substantial
duplication of issues of fact or law between the two matters. Reid, supra at
586. Thus, after careful review of the certified record and the submissions
of the parties, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief on his
compulsory joinder claim
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/6/2016
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