Com. v. Rivera, E. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
EMILIO R. RIVERA
Appellant No. 1088 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered June 4, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001857-2009
BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED APRIL 15, 2016
Emilio R. Rivera appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing as
untimely his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.
In November 2011, Rivera entered a negotiated guilty plea on two
separate informations, 1366-2009 and 1857-2009. On information 1366-
2009, Rivera pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver (crack cocaine),
receiving stolen property, and various firearm offenses. On information
1857-2009, Rivera pled guilty to four counts of delivery of cocaine,
conspiracy to commit delivery of cocaine, and criminal use of a
communication facility. On November 10, 2011, the trial court sentenced
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Rivera to an aggregate term of 9 to 18 years’ imprisonment. Rivera’s
sentence included imposition of the Drug-Free School Zone mandatory
minimum statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317. No post-sentence motions or direct
appeal were filed.
On January 7, 2015, Rivera filed the instant pro se PCRA petition.
Counsel was appointed to represent him and to file an amended petition, if
appropriate. Counsel subsequently filed a Finley1 letter seeking to withdraw
from representing Rivera at the post-conviction phase. The court granted
counsel’s request to withdraw and, on April 28, 2015, issued its Pa.R.Crim.P.
907 notice of intent to dismiss Rivera’s petition. On May 22, 2015, Rivera
filed a pro se amended PCRA petition raising the issue of the legality of his
mandatory minimum sentence under the dictates of Alleyne v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). On June 4, 2015, the court dismissed
Rivera’s petition, determining that his petition was facially untimely and that
he failed to plead and prove any of the timeliness exceptions enumerated
under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), & (iii). This timely
pro se appeal follows.
On appeal, Rivera presents the following issues for our consideration:
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1
See Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). See also
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988).
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(1) Did the PCRA court err in not granting Appellant
permission to withdraw [his] guilty plea when the guilty
plea was not intelligent and knowing?
(2) Did the PCRA court err in not holding an evidentiary
hearing to address an issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel?
The standard of review of an order denying a PCRA petition is whether
that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal
error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
support for the findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v.
Johnston, 42 A.3d 1120, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2012).
Before we address the merits of Rivera’s claims on appeal, we must
determine whether his PCRA was timely filed. Generally, a petition for PCRA
relief, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one
year of the date the judgment is final. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); see
also Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054 (Pa. Super. 1997). There
are, however, exceptions to the time requirement, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b). Where the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an
exception to the time for filing the petition is met, the petition will be
considered timely. Id. These exceptions include interference by
government officials in the presentation of the claim, after-discovered facts
or evidence, and an after-recognized constitutional right. 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A PCRA petition invoking one of these exceptions must
“be filed within 60 days of the date the claims could have been presented.”
Id. at (b)(2). The timeliness requirements of the PCRA are jurisdictional in
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nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely petitions.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003).
Rivera’s judgment of sentence became final for purposes of the PCRA
on December 10, 2012, after the time expired for him to file a direct appeal
from his judgment of sentence. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Therefore, Rivera
had until December 10, 2013 to file his petition. However, Rivera did not file
his pro se PCRA petition until January 7, 2015. Rivera’s petition, therefore,
is facially untimely. Accordingly, we must now determine whether Rivera
has pled and proven an exception to the PCRA time bar.
Instantly, Rivera does not allege any section 9545(b)(1) exception.
Rather, he first claims that he is entitled to PCRA relief because he entered
an involuntary guilty plea where he was “neglect[ed of being] inform[ed] of
the change in the permissible range of sentencing precipitated by the ‘School
Enhancement.’” Appellant’s Brief, at 3. Specifically, Rivera asserts that the
government breached his plea agreement by not making him aware as to
what effect the enhancement would have on his overall sentence. Again,
because Rivera fails to plead or prove any exception to the timeliness
provisions of the PCRA, he is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Next, Rivera asserts his sentence is illegal based upon the holding of
the United States Supreme Court decision in Alleyne, supra. In Alleyne,
the Supreme Court held that “facts that increase mandatory minimum
sentences must be submitted to the jury” and must be found beyond a
reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2163. A challenge to a sentence
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premised upon Alleyne implicates the legality of the sentence.
Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc).
Moreover, while legality of sentence is always subject to review within the
PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the
exceptions thereto. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vii).
Despite the fact that section 6317 has been declared unconstitutional,2
Rivera is not entitled to relief in his untimely PCRA petition. In
Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 2014), the defendant
also filed an untimely PCRA petition raising the claim that his mandatory
minimum sentence was illegal. To overcome the untimeliness of his petition,
the defendant unsuccessfully argued that Alleyne announced a new
constitutional right under the PCRA that applies retroactively. Additionally,
the Court found meritless the defendant’s allegation that his illegal sentence
claim was not waivable on appeal where “in order for th[e] Court to review a
legality of sentence claim, there must be a basis for [its] jurisdiction.” Id. at
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2
In Commonwealth v. Bizzel, 107 A.3d 102 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc),
our Court relied on the dictates of Alleyne and found that the improper
sentencing practice under section 6317(b) was not severable from the
remainder of the statutory provisions. Thus, our Court deemed the statute
unconstitutional. In Bizzel, the defendant had been convicted of various
drug offenses and criminal conspiracy; Bizzel was sentenced pursuant to the
mandatory minimum. On direct appeal, our Court affirmed defendant’s
convictions, but held that Bizzel’s judgment of sentence based on section
6317 was unconstitutional and must be vacated.
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995. Finally, the Court held that Alleyne is not to be applied retroactively
to cases in which the judgment of sentence had become final. Id.Similar to the defendant in Miller, Rivera raises a legality of sentence
claim predicated on the holding of Alleyne and an unconstitutional
mandatory minimum statute. Because Rivera’s petition is facially untimely,
because he does not allege and prove an exception to the timeliness
requirements of the PCRA, and because Alleyne does not apply retroactively
to cases on collateral review, Miller, supra,3 he is not entitled to relief.
Finally, Rivera claims that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to
anticipate that section 6317 would ultimately be declared unconstitutional.
Because counsel’s ineffectiveness does not fit within a timeliness exception
under the PCRA, he is not entitled to relief. See Commonwealth v.
Pursell, 749 A.2d 911 (Pa. 2000).
Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that Rivera’s PCRA
untimely petition should be dismissed. Johnston, supra.Order affirmed.
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3
Although Alleyne was decided prior to Rivera’s judgment of sentence
becoming final, he is not entitled to relief because his case is not still
pending on direct review and, most importantly, his petition was untimely
filed, thus divesting the trial court of jurisdiction. Newman, supra; Miller,
supra.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/15/2016
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