Horizons at Seven Hills v. Ikon Holding , 2016 NV 35 ( 2016 )

132 Nev., Advance Opinion 35
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
HORIZONS AT SEVEN HILLS No. 63178
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
Appellant,
vs.
FILED
IKON HOLDINGS, LLC, A NEVADA APR 2 8 2016
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,
Respondent.
Appeal from a district court judgment in a real property
action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Mark R. Denton,
Judge.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Holland & Hart, LLP, and Patrick J. Reilly and Nicole E. Lovelock, Las
Vegas; Alverson, Taylor, Mortensen & Sanders and Kurt R. Bonds, Las
Vegas,
for Appellant.
Adams Law Group and James R. Adams, Las Vegas; Puoy K. Premsrirut,
Inc., and Puoy K. Premsrirut, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.
Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, and Michelle D. Briggs, Senior
Deputy Attorney General, Carson City,
for Amicus Curiae State, Department of Business and Industry.
Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP, and J. Randall Jones, Carol L. Harris,
and Nathanael R Rulis, Las Vegas,
for Amicus Curiae Community Association Management Executive
Officers, Inc.
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BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.'
OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:
In this appeal, we determine whether a superpriority lien for
common expense assessments pursuant to NRS 116.3116(2) 2 includes
collection fees and foreclosure costs incurred by a homeowners' association
(HOA). We conclude that it does not. Additionally, we consider whether
an HOA's covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) that purport to
create a superpriority lien covering certain fees and costs over six months
preceding foreclosure are superseded by the terms of the superpriority lien
created by NRS 116.3116(2). We conclude that the superpriority lien in
the CC&Rs is superseded by NRS 116.3116(2), thus affirming in part and
reversing in part the district court's decision.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The property at issue in this case is located in Horizons at
Seven Hills Ranch, a common-interest community as defined in NRS
Chapter 116, operated and managed by appellant Horizons at Seven Hills
Homeowners Association (Horizons). As a common-interest community,
Horizons has the ability to collect and charge assessments, and administer
and enforce the CC&Rs upon the unit owners, for the purpose of benefiting
the community. See NRS 116.3115.
"The Honorable Ron Parraguirre, Chief Justice, voluntarily recused
himself from participation in the decision of this matter.
2 1n 2015, the Legislature amended NRS 116.3116(5) to include
certain fees and costs in superpriority liens. 2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 266, § 1,
at 1333. Any discussion in this opinion related to this statute refers to the
statute in effect at the time the underlying cause of action arose.
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Horizons recorded its Declaration of CC&Rs in July 2005.
Later that year, Hawley McIntosh purchased a home located within the
common-interest community. In June 2009, McIntosh became delinquent
on his first mortgage payments, and his first mortgage lender, OneWest
Bank FSB, recorded a notice of default that same month. In August 2009,
Horizons recorded a notice of default against McIntosh for nonpayment of
association assessments and other costs in the amount of roughly $4,300.
Before Horizons could foreclose, OneWest foreclosed on McIntosh's home
in June 2010, holding a foreclosure auction on the same day, at which
Scott Ludwig purchased the property. Ludwig transferred the property by
quitclaim deed to respondent Ikon Holdings, LLC (Ikon) later that year.
Horizons contacted Ikon and explained that Ikon acquired the
property subject to Horizon's unexting -uished superpriority lien. Horizons
demanded roughly $6,000 to extinguish the lien, which, in addition to
unpaid assessments, included roughly $2,700 in collection fees and
foreclosure costs. In response, Ikon acknowledged that it acquired the
property subject to Horizon's superpriority lien, but it disagreed that the
lien included nine months rather than six months of unpaid assessments
or the collection fees and foreclosure costs that Horizons was seeking to
recoup.
When the parties were unable to resolve the matter, Ikon filed
the underlying declaratory relief action. In particular, Ikon sought a
ruling that, under NRS 116.3116(2), the superpriority portion of an HOA's
lien consists of nine months' (or alternatively six months' based on the
CC&Rs) worth of assessments and does not include collection fees and
foreclosure costs. Horizons opposed the motion, arguing that NRS
116.3116(2)'s superpriority provision necessarily includes nine months of
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assessments and collection fees and foreclosure costs. The district court
granted Ikon partial declaratory relief, reasoning that Horizons' CC&Rs
limited its superpriority lien to an amount equal to six months of
assessments, which did not offend NRS 116.3116(2)'s superpriority
provision providing for nine months of assessments. Horizons now
appeals
On appeal, Horizons contends it is owed nine months of
unpaid assessments totaling $1,657.50 and $1,592 in collection fees and
foreclosure costs. 3 Although Ikon does not dispute that it owes six months
of unpaid HOA dues owed at the time of the foreclosure sale, it does
dispute whether Horizons is entitled to an additional three months of
HOA dues or the collection fees and foreclosure costs.
DISCUSSION
The superpriority lien under NRS 116.3116(2) does not include fees or
collection costs related to foreclosure
Horizons and amicus curiae Community Association
Management Executive Officers, Inc., argue that in addition to HOA dues,
the superpriority lien4 includes an additional amount for collection fees
and foreclosure costs incurred during the nine months prior to a
foreclosure sale. Horizons contends these collection fees and foreclosure
3 While Horizons did not foreclose on McIntosh, it expended money
preparing for such a foreclosure.
4 When an HOA forecloses on a property, the pre-2015 amendments
of NRS 116.31164(3)(c) and NRS 116.3116(8) allowed for the recoupment
of fees and costs. However, because Horizons did not foreclose on the
property, NRS 116.31164(3)(c) and NRS 116.3116(8) are not implicated in
this decision.
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costs encompass fees for collecting past due assessments, such as third-
party collection agency charges, and "trustee costs and publication costs in
advance of a foreclosure sale." Horizons further contends that canons of
statutory interpretation dictate that the superpriority lien includes these
fees and costs, and that NRS 116.3116(2) must be read in conjunction with
NAC 116.470. Ikon, along with amicus curiae Department of Business
and Industry, Real Estate Division (NRED), counter that these fees and
costs are not collectible under NRS 116.3116(2).
Standard of review
Questions of statutory construction are reviewed de novo.
Ransdell v. Clark Cty., 124 Nev. 847, 854, 192 P.3d 756, 761 (2008). When
interpreting an ambiguous statute, this court attempts to ascertain the
Legislature's intent. Chanos v. Nev. Tax Commin, 124 Nev. 232, 240, 181
P.3d 675, 681 (2008). To determine the Legislature's intent, we look to
"legislative history, reason, and considerations of public policy." Id.NRS 116.3116
NRS 116.3116(1) confers to an HOA a lien on a homeowner's
unit for unpaid assessments, construction penalties, and fines levied
against the unit. NRS 116.3116(2) establishes the priority of that lien,
splitting the lien into two pieces—"a superpriority piece and a subpriority
piece." SF]? Invs. Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 75, 334
P.3d 408, 411 (2014). The superpriority lien
is . . . prior to all security interests . . . to the
extent of any charges incurred by the association
on a unit pursuant to NRS 116.310312 and to the
extent of the assessments for common expenses
based on the periodic budget adopted by the
association pursuant to NRS 116.3115 which
would have become due in the absence of
acceleration during the 9 months immediately
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preceding institution of an action to enforce the
lien.
NRS 116.3116(2). SFR characterized the superpriority piece as including
"the last nine months of unpaid HOA dues and maintenance and
nuisance-abatement charges." 5 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 75, 334 P.3d at 411.
Horizons argues that based on persuasive caselaw and on
rules of statutory construction, NRS 116.3116(2) provides for a look-back
provision, designed to place it in the same position it would have been over
the previous nine months, but for the default. We are not persuaded by
this argument.
To support its position, Horizons argues that this court should
adopt the holding in Hudson House Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Brooks,
611 A.2d 862 (Conn 1992). In Hudson House, a condominium association
was "foreclos[ind a statutory lien for delinquent common expense
assessments due on a condominium unit owned by the named defendant."
Id. at 864. The association asserted that pursuant to the superpriority
lien, 6 it was owed an amount equal to the common expense assessments,
as well as interest, collection costs, and attorney fees. Id. at 864, 866. The
court concluded that the superpriority lien included interest, collection
costs, and attorney fees. It reasoned that a Connecticut statute stating
that "a judgment or decree in any action brought under this section shall
5 Pursuant to NRS 116.310312(4), "maintenance or abatement" costs
include "reasonable inspection fees, notification and collection costs and
interest." We note, however, that these are not the type of collection costs
relating to foreclosure that are in dispute here.
5 TheConnecticut statutes in Hudson House are identical, for the
purposes of this analysis, to the Nevada statutes.
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include costs and reasonable attorney[ I fees for the prevailing party"
authorized these fees and costs to be within the superpriority lien because
the court believed this to be the only "reasonable and rational result." Id.
at 866 (internal quotations omitted).
We disagree with Hudson House's holding for three reasons.
First, the court did not conduct a statutory analysis of the superpriority
lien language. Neither NRS 116.3116(2) nor the Connecticut statute
creating the superpriority lien mention collection fees and foreclosure
costs, and the statutes specifically provide that the superpriority lien is
limited to "the extent of the assessments for common expenses." NRS
116.3116(2); see also Hudson House, 611 A.2d at 863 n.1 (quoting the
Connecticut statute: "to the extent of the common expense assessments").
Second, Hudson House relied on the policy concern that
because common expense assessments are often small, and the prioritized
portion of the lien is typically the only collectible portion for an HOA, "it
seems highly unlikely that the legislature would have authorized such
foreclosure proceedings without including the costs of collection in the sum
entitled to a priority." Id. at 866. Horizons makes similar arguments:
that limiting the superpriority lien to only nine months of unpaid
assessments leads to absurd results and renders the statute meaningless
because foreclosure will often be economically unfeasible for HOAs. We
are not persuaded by this line of reasoning. While we recognize that
collection fees and costs may be incurred in a foreclosure, the Legislature
has the authority to determine the definition of a superprioity lien and
may provide for the recovery of collection fees and costs under different
provisions of the statutory scheme. See, e.g., NRS 116.31164(3)(c) (2005)
(providing for priority to the selling party on certain fees and costs). But
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that legislative choice does not render the definition of a superpriority lien
absurd.
Third, in Hudson House, the association brought an action to
judicially foreclose on the property, entitling it to a "judgment or decree."
611 A.2d at 864. In effect, the court found that the association was the
prevailing party and, on that basis, was entitled to the recovery of the
costs and fees under the Connecticut statute.
NAG 116.470
Horizons further contends that NAC 116.470 must be read in
conjunction with NRS 116.3116(2). NAG 116.470 sets a cap of $1,950 that
applies in most foreclosure sales. Horizons argues that if NRS 116.3116(2)
is interpreted to not include collection fees and foreclosure costs, it will
contradict NAG 116.470 by removing the need for a cap. We interpret
"statutes within a statutory scheme harmoniously with one another to
avoid an unreasonable or absurd result." Nev. Attorney for Injured
Workers v. Nev. Self-Insurers Ass'n, 126 Nev. 74, 84, 225 P.3d 1265, 1271
(2010) (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, "administrative
regulations cannot contradict the statute they are designed to implement."
Id. at 83, 225 P.3d at 1271 (internal quotations omitted).
We conclude that NAG 116.470 and NRS 116.3116(2) can
easily be reconciled. Interpreting the superpriority lien to exclude
collection fees and foreclosure costs does not preclude fees and costs from
being incurred, up to the cap. Such an interpretation of NRS 116.3116(2)
only speaks to the priority in which those fees and costs can be collected.
NAG 116.470 simply provides for a cap on fees and costs but does not
speak to priority.
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Legislative history
A review of the legislative history further demonstrates that
the Legislature did not intend for collection fees and foreclosure costs
incurred to be included in MRS 116.3116(2)'s superpriority lien. NRS
116.3116 comes from the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act
(UCIOA) of 1982, which is codified in the Nevada Revised Statutes as NRS
Chapter 116. See NRS 116.001. Section 3-116 of the UCIOA is
substantially similar to NRS 116.3116. Compare UCIOA § 3-116, 7 U.L.A.
374-81 (2008), with NRS 116.3116. The 1994 version of section 3-116 of
the UCIOA included only "common expense assessments based on the
periodic budget" as part of the superpriority lien. UCIOA § 3-116(b), 7
U.L.A. 569 (1994). In 2008, amendments were made to section 3-116 to
also include "reasonable attorney [ ] fees and costs incurred by the
association in foreclosing the association's lien" as part of the superpriority
lien. UCIOA § 3-116(c), 7 U.L.A. 374-75 (2008). These are exactly the
type of collection costs sought by Horizons. However, while a similar
amendment to NRS 116.3116 to add collection costs relating to foreclosure
to the superpriority lien was considered by the Legislature in both 2009
and 2011, no such amendment was adopted.
Specifically, in 2009, the Legislature amended MRS Chapter
116 by adding a new section, NRS 116.310313, permitting HOAs to charge
homeowners collection costs in advance of foreclosure. A.B. 350, 75th Leg.
(Nev. 2009); 2009 Nev. Stat., ch. 485, § 1.7, at 2795. However, NRS
116.3116 was not amended at that time to reflect the addition of NRS
116.310313. In 2011, Senate Bill (S.B.) 174 was introduced in an attempt
to change NRS 116.3116(1) and (2) by adding language allowing the
collection costs permitted under MRS 116.310313 to become part of the
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HOA's lien and the superpriority lien. S.B. 174, 76th Leg. (Nev. 2011) (as
introduced). The bill was amended during the session, removing the
collection costs permitted under NRS 116.310313 from NRS 116.3116(1)
and adding language that set a dollar limit for the collection costs as part
of the superpriority lien under NRS 116.3116(2), S.B. 174, 76th Leg.,
(Nev. 2011) (first reprint). Although the Senate Judiciary Committee
approved the amended bill, the Assembly Judiciary Committee took no
action, leaving NRS 116.3116(1) and (2) unchanged. S.B. 174, 76th Leg.
(Nev. 2011) (Bill Summary).
Because the "[c]osts of collecting" as set forth in NRS
116.310313 was omitted from NRS 116.3116(2), we must presume the
Legislature did not intend for such costs to be included as part of an
HOA's superpriority lien. 7 See Dep't of Taxation v. DaimlerChrysler Servs.
N. Am., LLC, 121 Nev. 541, 548, 119 P.3d 135, 139 (2005) ("[Olmissions of
subject matters from statutory provisions are presumed to have been
intentional."); see also Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26, 422 P.2d 237,
246 (1967); 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes &
Statutory Constr. § 47:23 (7th ed. 2014) ("The maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius . . . instructs that, where a statute designates a form of
conduct, the manner of its performance and operation, and the persons
7Bolstering this conclusion, the legislative history regarding the
2015 amendment to the statute indicates on many occasions that the
change was a revision, not simply a clarification. See, e.g., S.B. 306, 78th
Leg. (Nev. 2015) (as introduced); Hearing on S.B. 306 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 78th Leg. (Nev. April 7, 2015) (statement by Senator
Aaron D. Ford discussing proposed amendments to the statutory
provisions governing HOA liens).
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and things to which it refers, courts should infer that all omissions were
intentional exclusions.").
Advisory opinions
Horizons urges this court to give deference to an advisory
opinion from the Commission for Common Interest Communities and
Condominium Hotels (CCICCH), in which it determined that "Nevada law
authorizes the collection of 'charges for late payment of assessments' as a
portion of the super lien amount." 10-01 Op. CCICCH 1, 12-13 (2010).
Horizons advocates that this is the correct interpretation of the statute.
In contrast, Ikon argues the CCICCH has no legal authority to publish
advisory opinions because such authority is strictly reserved by statute for
NRED. As such, Ikon asserts this court should follow the advisory opinion
issued by NRED in December 2012. See 13-01 Op. NRED (2012).
As we noted in SFR, NRED "is charged with administering
Chapter 116." 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 75, 334 P.3d at 416; see also NRS
116.615. That administration includes issuing "advisory opinions as to the
applicability or interpretation of. . . [a]ny provision of this chapter." NRS
116.623(1)(a).
Among the questions NRED was asked to address concerning
NRS 116.3116 in its December 2012 opinion was whether "the portion of
the association's lien which is superior to a unit's first security interest
(referred to as the 'super priority lien') contain[s] 'costs of collecting'
defined by NRS 116.310313[J" 13-01 Op. NEED 1 (2012). NRED
answered this question in the negative and initially stated that
Mlle association's lien does not include "costs of
collecting" defined by NRS 116.310313, so the
super priority portion of the lien may not include
such costs. NRS 116.310313 does not say such
charges are a lien on the unit, and NRS 116.3116
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does not make such charges part of the
association's lien.
Id. After conducting a thorough analysis of the legislative history behind
NRS 116.3116, NEED concluded the "Legislature's actions in the 2009 and
2011 sessions are indicative of its intent not to make costs of collecting
part of the lien," and thus, "the association's lien does not include 'costs of
collecting' as defined by NRS 116.310313." Id. at 7. We find NRED's
interpretation of NRS 116.3116, including its legislative history analysis,
persuasive. 8
8The parties also dispute whether the superpriority lien statute
includes late fees, or charges and/or interest. NEED also considered this
issue in its advisory opinion and determined that,
while the association's lien may include any
penalties, fees, charges, late charges, fines and
interest charged pursuant to NRS 116.3102(1)(j) to
(n), inclusive, the total amount of the super
priority lien attributed to assessments is no more
than 9 months of the monthly assessment
reflected in the association's budget. Association
budgets do not reflect late charges or interest
attributed to an anticipated delinquent owner, so
there is no basis to conclude that such charges
could be included in the super priority lien or in
addition to the assessments. Such extraneous
charges are not included in the association's super
priority lien.
13-01 Op. NEED 12 (2012) (third emphasis added). We further note there
is no mention in NRS 116.3116, or the other provisions of NRS Chapter
116 to which that statute refers, that late fees or interest relating to
foreclosure collection costs may be included as part of the HOA's
superpriority lien. Thus, we must presume the Legislature intentionally
excluded late fees and interest from thefl superpriority lien statute. See
DaimlerChrysler, 121 Nev. at 548, 119 P.3d at 139 (stating that "omissions
continued on next page...
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Taking into consideration the legislative intent, the statute's
text, and statutory construction principles, we conclude the superpriority
lien granted by NRS 116.3116(2) does not include an amount for collection
fees and foreclosure costs incurred; rather it is limited to an amount equal
to the common expense assessments due during the nine months before
foreclosure. 9
Horizons' CC&Rs are superseded by NRS 116.3116
Horizons contends that there are two separate liens—a
statutory lien under NRS 116.3116 and a contractual lien derived from
Horizons' CC&Rs. Horizons argues the contractual lien created in the
...continued
of subject matters from statutory provisions are presumed to have been
intentional").
°In Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. New York Community
Bancorp, Inc., we noted "that the district court erred in limiting the BOA
lien amount to nine months of common expense assessments." 132 Nev.,
Adv. Op. 5, 366 P.3d 1105, 1107 (2016). In the context of Shadow Wood,
we were determining the extent of an BOA lien when a bank foreclosed its
first security interest and became the owner of the foreclosed property. Id.The superpriority lien included nine months of pre-foreclosure past due
common expense assessments. Id. at 1113; see also NRS 116.3116(2)
(stating that the superpriority lien is "prior to all security interests,"
including "[a] first security interest on the unit"). After the bank
purchased the property, it failed to pay common expense assessments due
(at which time the BOA foreclosed on the property). Shadow Wood, 132
Nev., Adv. Op 5, 366 P.3d at 1113. NRS 116.3116(2)'s nine-month
superpriority lien did not affect the amount the bank owed the HOA after
the bank foreclosed because the "first security interest" was extinguished,
and the superpriority lien does not limit amounts due from a property
owner to an BOA. Accordingly, in Shadow Wood, the HOA was entitled to
recover the superpriority lien amounts accrued for nine months prior to
the bank's foreclosure, and it was entitled to assessments, fees, and costs
accrued after the bank purchased the property. Id.
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Irk
CC&Rs allows it to have superpriority on collection fees and foreclosure
costs, regardless of NRS 116.3116(2). Ikon counters that NRS 116.1206
supersedes the CC&Rs as to costs and fees, capping the superpriority lien
to the amount allowed under NRS 116.3116, but argues that the time
frame provided in the CC&Rs—six months—overcomes NRS 116.3116(2)'s
allowance of nine months of common expense assessments. The district
court concluded that there was only one superpriority lien, which included
"interest, costs and other fees. . . as long as the prioritized portion of the
lien does not exceed an amount equal to [six] months of assessments as
noted in Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the CC&R[s]."
"The rules of construction governing the interpretation of
contracts apply to the interpretation of restrictive covenants for real
property. When there is no dispute of fact, a contract's interpretation is a
legal question subject to de novo review." Diaz v. Ferne, 120 Nev. 70, 73,
84 P.3d 664, 665-66 (2004).
Horizons' CC&Rs state, in pertinent part, as follows:
Section 7.8 . . . The lien of the assessments,
including interest and costs, shall be subordinate
to the lien of any [f]irst [m]ortgage upon the [u] nit
(except to the extent of [a]nnual [a]ssessments
which would have become due in the absence of
acceleration during the six (6) months
immediately preceding institution of an action to
enforce the lien).
Section 7.9 ... A lien for assessments, including
interest, costs, and attorney[ 1 fees, as provided for
herein, shall be prior to all other liens and
encumbrances on a Unit, except for: (a) liens and
encumbrances [r] ecorded before the fdleclaration
was Hecorded; (b) a first [m]ortgage Hecorded
before the delinquency of the assessment sought to
be enforced (except to the extent of [a]nnual
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[a]ssessments which would have become due in
the absence of acceleration during the six (6)
months immediately preceding institution of an
action to enforce the lien) ] and (c) liens for real
estate taxes and other governmental charges, and
is otherwise subject to NRS § 116.3116. ... Where
the [b]eneficiary of a [flirst [m]ortgage of [r]ecord
or other purchaser of a [u]nit obtains title
pursuant to a judicial or non-judicial
foreclosure . . . the [p]erson who obtains title and
his or her successors and assigns shall not be
liable for the share of the [c]ommon [e]xpenses or
assessments by the [HO.A] chargeable to such
[u]nit which became due prior to the acquisition of
title to such [ulnit by such [p]erson (except to the
extent of fainnual [a]ssessments which would have
become due in the absence of acceleration during
the six (6) months immediately preceding
institution of an action to enforce the lien).
This language indicates that a lien is created covering certain fees and
costs over six months preceding foreclosure. However, NRS 116.1206(1)
provides:
Any provision contained in a declaration, bylaw or
other governing document of a common-interest
community that violates the provisions of this
chapter:
(a) Shall be deemed to conform with those
provisions by operation of law, and any such
declaration, bylaw or other governing document is
not required to be amended to conform to those
provisions.
(b)Is superseded by the provisions of this
chapter, regardless of whether the provision
contained in the declaration, bylaw or other
governing document became effective before the
enactment of the provision of this chapter that is
being violated.
(Emphasis added.)
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While we do not comment on the validity of the CC&Rs' lien in
general, to the extent that Horizons' CC&Rs purport to create a six-month
superpriority lien that certain includes fees and costs, we conclude that
NRS 116.1206(1) negates the effect of those provisions because they
violate NRS 116.3116(2)'s plain language by (1) limiting the prioritized
portion to six months when the statute allows for nine months, and
(2) including certain fees and costs. Accordingly, we conclude that the
district court's limitation of the superpriority lien to six months of common
expense assessments and its inclusion of certain fees and costs in the
superpriority lien was error.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that a
superpriority lien pursuant to NRS 116.3116(2) does not include an
additional amount for the collection fees and foreclosure costs that an HOA
incurs preceding a foreclosure sale; rather, it is limited to an amount equal
to nine months of common expense assessments. We further conclude that,
to the extent that Horizons' CC&R provisions can be read as creating a
superpriority lien covering certain fees and costs and a six month time
frame, those provisions are superseded by statute and are thus negated.
Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the district court's order granting
partial declaratory relief in favor of Ikon to the extent that it can be
construed as prohibiting Horizons from including fees and costs in its
superpriority lien. But we reverse that portion of the district court's order
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that limited the superpriority lien to six months of common expense
assessments and allowed fees and costs to be included if the outstanding
monthly assessments did not exceed six months.
/-it4 ■11.c.,LAI , J.
Hardesty
We concur:
Douglas
, J.
Gibbons
J.
Pickering
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