Byers, S. v. Liggett, E. ( 2016 )

J-S20006-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
STEPHEN J. BYERS IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
ERNEST E. LIGGETT AND MARILYN
KOSTIK LIGGETT
No. 361 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered February 5, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): gd09-013539
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 29, 2016
Appellant, Stephen J. Byers, appeals from the order directing him to
mark a judgment satisfied and denying, as moot, his petition to set fair
market value for the purpose of a deficiency judgment. Byers challenges the
trial court’s determination that the six month statute of limitations on filing
for a deficiency judgment starts when the sheriff first attempts to file the
deed for recording. We agree that the clear language of the statute comports
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S20006-16
with Byers’s interpretation, and therefore, vacate and remand for further
proceedings.1
By our count, this is the fifth time this case has been before this Court
on appeal. As such, we note that this case appears to be coming to a close,
despite a long line of attempts by the Liggetts to postpone a sheriff’s sale of
real property located in Allegheny County. In the fall of 2006, the Liggetts
obtained short-term loans from Byers, along with an agreement to purchase
additional parcels of real property located in Brownsville, Fayette County for
use in real estate development. When the Liggetts failed to repay the loans
____________________________________________
1
The Liggetts, in response to this appeal, have filed a motion, pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 2188, to dismiss or quash this appeal for failure of Byers to file a
designation of reproduced record. Pursuant to the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, this Court has the discretion to quash or dismiss an appeal when
the defects in an appellant’s brief or reproduced record are substantial. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2188 states, in
relevant part:
If an appellant fails to file his designation of reproduced record,
brief or any required reproduced record within the time
prescribed by these rules, or within the time as extended, an
appellee may move for dismissal of the matter. …
Pa.R.A.P. 2188.
Here, the Liggets have failed to demonstrate any hindrance to our review of
this case or other prejudice resulting from Byers’s failure to file a designation
of reproduced record. As such, we decline to dismiss or quash Byers’s
appeal. See Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. Mowl,
705 A.2d 923, 924 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1998) (excusing infractions of rules of
appellate procedure where the failure to file a timely designation was a
minor infraction and which did not hinder meaningful appellate review).
Accordingly, we deny the motion to dismiss or quash the appeal.
-2-
J-S20006-16
or purchase the additional property, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County that required
the Liggetts to either pay Byers a specified sum of money within 45 days or
have judgment entered against them. When the Liggetts did not pay the
money within the agreed upon timeframe, Byers entered judgment against
them in Fayette County for $145,000.00.
In July 2009, Byers transferred the judgment to Allegheny County, and
issued a Writ of Execution for the sale of personalty and realty located at 43
Brownstone Road, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15235. Over the following years,
the Liggetts filed various motions to stay or obviate the proceedings, all of
which have been denied by the trial court and affirmed by this Court. On
January 7, 2014, Byers was the successful bidder on the property at a
sheriff’s sale. Byers asserts that following the sale, the recording office
refused to file the deed due to a dispute over realty transfer taxes and the
legal effect of pending appeals filed by the Liggetts. Byers further asserts
that he received the deed in July or August 2015.
After this Court quashed the Liggetts’ fifth appeal, the Liggetts filed a
motion to compel Byers to mark the judgment as satisfied. Byers responded
to the Liggetts’ motion, and also filed a petition to set fair market value for
purposes of a deficiency judgment on December 2, 2014. The Liggetts
argued that Byers’s petition to set fair market value was untimely, and the
-3-
J-S20006-16
trial court agreed, granting the Liggetts’ motion to compel and dismissing
Byers’s petition. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Byers contends that the trial court misconstrued the
applicable statute regarding the limitations period. We review claims arising
from deficiency judgment proceedings to determine if the evidence is
sufficient to support the trial court’s determination, or whether the trial court
committed an error of law. See Bryn Mawr Trust Co. v. Healy, 667 A.2d
719, 721 (Pa. Super. 1995). In the present case, the issue is one of
statutory interpretation, which is a matter of law. Thus, our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth
v. Spence, 91 A.3d 44, 46 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
When construing a [statutory provision] utilized by the General
Assembly in a statute, our primary goal is “to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. §
1921(a). “Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give
effect to all its provisions.” Id. However, “[w]hen the words of a
statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is
not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Id.
§ 1921(b). “Words and phrases shall be construed according to
rules of grammar and according to their common and approved
usage.” Id. § 1903(a). In other words, if a term is clear and
unambiguous, we are prohibited from assigning a meaning to
that term that differs from its common everyday usage for the
purpose of effectuating the legislature’s intent.
Commonwealth v. Cahill, 95 A.3d 298, 301 (Pa. Super. 2014).
The statute at issue here is 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5522(b)(2), which provides,
in relevant part, for a six month limitation on “[a] petition for the
establishment of a deficiency judgment following execution and delivery of
-4-
J-S20006-16
the sheriff’s deed for the property sold in connection with … execution
proceedings.” In particular, we are concerned with the term “delivery,” as
construction of this term forms the basis of the trial court’s decision.
The trial court concluded that this term references the date that the
sheriff’s office initially files the deed for recording. In support of this
interpretation, the trial court correctly observed that the statutes dealing
with deficiency judgments are to be liberally construed in favor of debtors.
See Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Bourger, 663 A.2d 213, 215 (Pa. Super. 1995).
However, even the most liberal of constructions in favor of debtors such as
the Liggetts cannot support the trial court’s conclusion in this matter.
Previous versions of Section 5522(b)(2) provided that the six month
limitation period began “following the sale of the collateral of the debtor…”
Pennsylvania courts consistently construed this provision to mean that the
limitation period did not begin until the deed was delivered to the successful
bidder. See Marx Realty & Improvement Co. v. Boulevard Center,
Inc., 156 A.2d 827, 830 (Pa. 1959); Delaware Valley Factors v. G.B.
Echenhoffer Co., Inc., 313 A.2d 318, 321 (Pa. Super. 1973); Fidelity
Bank, N.A., 663 A.2d at 216. The trial court concludes that when Section
-5-
J-S20006-16
5522(b)(2) was amended in 2005,2 the established precedent was no longer
controlling.
In reviewing the language chosen by the legislature, we can divine no
intent to overrule the existing precedent. In fact, the legislature added the
term “delivery” in apparent recognition of the courts’ construction of the
term “sale” to include a requirement of “delivery.” Furthermore, neither the
Liggetts nor the trial court have identified any legislative history that would
support a conclusion that the legislature intended to overrule Marx and its
progeny. We therefore conclude that Marx and its progeny are controlling,
and that therefore the trial court erred in holding that the limitations period
began running when the sheriff’s office initially filed the deed for recording.
As there is no indication in the record of when Byers received the deed,
other than Byers’s own assertions in his affidavit, we vacate and remand for
such proceedings as are necessary for the trial court to determine this date
and then proceed according to law.
Order vacated. Motion to dismiss or quash denied. Case remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
____________________________________________
2
The 2005 amendments were subsequently stricken as unconstitutional for
violating the single subject rule. See Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d
603 (Pa. 2013). The Pennsylvania legislature reinstated a substantially
similar amendment in 2014, and made it retroactive to 2005. For ease of
reading, we will refer to the amendment as the 2005 amendment.
-6-
J-S20006-16
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/29/2016
-7-