Doyle, M. v. Doyle, J. ( 2016 )

J-A04021-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MARY JANE DOYLE, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES T. DOYLE,
Appellant No. 617 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Decree April 9, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): FD-98-009613-2004
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and SHOGAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 26, 2016
Mary Jane Doyle (“Wife”) appeals from the Divorce Decree entered on
April 9, 2015. The issues raised by Wife relate back to the December 30,
2013 order, which denied her request for declaratory judgment and upheld
the marriage settlement agreement (“MSA”) entered between James T.
Doyle (“Husband”) and Wife. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case were
summarized by the trial court as follows:
The within matter comes before the court on [Wife’s]
request for declaratory judgment with respect to the validity of
the Marriage Settlement Agreement (MSA) entered into by the
[p]arties on June 3, 2009. [Wife] requests declaratory judgment
that the MSA is void, invalid, and non-binding. A trial on [Wife’s]
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment was held on October 16,
2013.
The [p]arties were married in November[ of] 1981[,] and
had three children, one of whom is deceased. [Husband] worked
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as a pharmacist throughout the marriage while [Wife] worked as
a real estate agent beginning in 1993. Wife filed for divorce on
four (4) separate occasions, the first filing occurring on August
21, 1998. However, the complaint was never served on
Husband as the couple reconciled. Wife filed an Amended
Complaint in Divorce on August 27, 1999[,] but Wife did not
pursue this second attempt at divorce as the couple agreed to
reconcile again. Wife filed a Second Amended Complaint in
Divorce on September 21, 2006, at which time she was
represented by Attorney Lisa Petruzzi for a period of
approximately six (6) weeks. On June 4, 2009, Wife filed her
last Complaint in Divorce.
During the pendency of Wife’s representation by Attorney
Petruzzi, Wife provided a list of marital assets to [A]ttorney
Petruzzi and, at trial, Wife testified that she was aware of certain
marital assets which were valued at $360,869.51. Attorney
Petruzzi, on October 11, 2006, wrote a letter to Husband setting
forth, in pertinent part, that “[Wife] indicates that the two of you
have discussed some manner of settling your marital property,
and I will be preparing a Settlement Agreement along those lines
and forwarding it to you for your review.”
The relationship with Attorney Petruzzi ended after
Attorney Petruzzi had forwarded to Husband a copy of the
Second Amended Complaint in Divorce, an Acceptance of
Service, and the letter referred to above. The [p]arties
thereafter met with Attorney Richard Malesky, a business
acquaintance of Wife, to memorialize a comprehensive
agreement that they had reached. Wife acknowledged that a
consensus regarding the division of the marital property had
been reached with Husband at that time. She also
acknowledged that she entered into the agreement with
Husband knowing that she lacked full knowledge of the marital
estate. She testified that she simply wanted to get out of the
marriage, and that she knew that she had gotten a raw deal
although she just did not know how bad it was.
Wife then sought the services of Attorney Mark Joseph and,
on April 29, 2009, both she and Husband executed a fee
agreement with Attorney Joseph with the expectation that he
would represent both [p]arties in a no-fault divorce. Soon
thereafter, Wife sent emails to Attorney Joseph outlining the
terms she would like the MSA to contain. She also gave
deadlines and set forth clear expectations of how she would like
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the [p]arties’ accounts to be divided. Furthermore, Wife
advised in these emails that she was reneging on the deal that
she and Husband had purportedly previously reached and
demanded an increase of $15,000.00 with respect to Husband’s
proposed cash payment to her. Specifically, Wife stated in one
of her emails the following:
I am asking for a settlement of $100,000 and that I will
remove my name from Husband’s TD Ameritrade account
and release myself from all his checking accounts, savings
accounts, pension account, retirement, IRAs, stocks and
any other investments. In turn he will release himself
from my checking account, savings accounts, pension
account, 401(K) account, stocks, SEP and IRAs. At the
time he gives me a certified check for $100,000 we will
transfer the title and deed of our current home at 111
Magnolia Dr., Glenshaw, PA to James T. Doyle and
remove my name from his Ameritrade account.
Finally, at trial, Wife acknowledged that the MSA
accomplished exactly what she demanded in her emails to
Attorneys Maleski and Joseph.
Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 1/30/14, at 1-3.
After the hearing on Wife’s complaint for declaratory judgment, the
court entered an order finding that Husband and Wife’s June 3, 2009 MSA
was valid, binding, and enforceable against the parties. See Order of Court,
12/30/13. Wife initially filed a notice of appeal on January 23, 2014,
followed by a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal. However, this Court determined that the subject
order was not final and appealable and, thus, we quashed the appeal as
interlocutory. The case was remanded to the trial court.
On April 9, 2015, the lower court entered a divorce decree, rendering
the December 30, 2013 order final and appealable. See Sneeringer v.
Sneeringer, 876 A.2d 1036, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating “[t]his Court
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has … determined that interim matters in divorce actions do not become
final until a divorce decree is entered”). Wife immediately thereafter
proceeded with filing notice of the instant appeal. The trial court adopted its
January 30, 2014 opinion (TCO) as its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Order of
Court, 4/15/15.
Wife now presents the following issues for our review on appeal:
I. Whether the trial court committed an error of law in
holding that the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement
could only be invalidated for lack of full and fair disclosure
(which by itself has no “reliance” requirement) if Wife
could prove misrepresentation (as to which reliance is
required), when as a matter of law, nondisclosure and
misrepresentation are separate and independent grounds
for invalidating the [MSA].
II. Whether the trial court committed an error of law in
holding that a waiver of disclosure need not be in writing.
III. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or abuse
of discretion in holding that [Wife] waived her right to full
and fair disclosure.
Wife’s Brief at 4.
To begin, we note our standard of review:
The determination of marital property rights through prenuptial,
postnuptial and settlement agreements has long been permitted,
and even encouraged. Both prenuptial and post-nuptial
agreements are contracts and are governed by contract law.
Moreover, a court’s order upholding the agreement in divorce
proceedings is subject to an abuse of discretion or error of law
standard of review. An abuse of discretion is not lightly found,
as it requires clear and convincing evidence that the trial court
misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal procedures.
We will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding function.
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Paroly v. Paroly, 876 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Wife asserts that the trial court committed an error of law in holding
that the MSA could only be invalidated by proving both a lack of full and fair
disclosure and fraud or misrepresentation. Wife’s Brief at 13. However,
after careful review, we conclude that the trial court properly applied the
controlling law.
We previously reviewed the seminal decision of Simeone v. Simeone,
581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990), regarding the standards for determining the
validity of marital settlement agreements:
Under Simeone, we are not permitted to review the
reasonableness of a marital settlement agreement to determine
its validity, and the fact that the parties did not have separate
representation is not relevant. That case abolished prior,
paternalistic approaches to enforcing such agreements and
announced, “Absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress,
spouses should be bound by the terms of their agreements.”
[Simeone,] 581 A.2d at 165.
The Simeone Court reaffirmed the “longstanding principle that a
full and fair disclosure of the financial positions of the parties is
required….” Id. [at 165].
Paroly, 876 A.2d at 1065. See also Stoner v. Stoner, 819 A.2d 529, 533
(Pa. 2003) (reaffirming “the principle in Simeone that full disclosure of the
parties’ financial resources is a mandatory requirement”).
Wife asserted in her declaratory judgment action that the MSA is
invalid due to a lack of full and fair disclosure and as a result of fraud and
misrepresentation. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, 6/9/10,
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at 2, ¶¶ 6-7 (unpaginated). However, the MSA contains the following
disclosure language: “The parties hereto acknowledge and agree that each
has provided to the other and received from the other a full, fair, and frank
disclosure of the parties’ and each of the party’s financial condition and
position.” MSA, 6/3/09, at 5, ¶ 11 (unpaginated). “If an agreement
provides that full disclosure has been made, a presumption of full disclosure
arises. If a spouse attempts to rebut this presumption through an assertion
of fraud or misrepresentation then this presumption can be rebutted if it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Paroly, 876 A.2d at 1066
(quoting Simeone, 581 A.2d at 167).
The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are well settled.
In order to void a contract due to a fraudulent
misrepresentation, the party alleging fraud must prove, by clear
and convincing evidence: (1) a representation; (2) which is
material to the transaction at hand; (3) made falsely with
knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or
false; (4) with the intent of misleading another into relying on it;
(5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6)
resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance. All of these
elements must be present to warrant the extreme sanction of
voiding the contract.
Porreco v. Porreco, 811 A.2d 566, 570 (Pa. 2002) (internal citations
omitted).
Clearly, there is a presumption of full disclosure in the present case,
based on the disclosure language expressly stated in the MSA. Because of
Wife’s attempt to rebut this presumption with an assertion of fraud and
misrepresentation, the trial court properly applied the aforementioned
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elements outlined in Porecco, and concluded that there was no fraudulent
misrepresentation involved in the execution of the MSA. The trial court’s
conclusion is well-supported by the following:
The court does not find that Husband made any material
representation to Wife that Wife relied on when entering into the
MSA. On the contrary, Wife made numerous representations to
Attorneys Maleski and Joseph prior to the execution of the MSA
that show that she essentially initiated and controlled the
negotiations relative to the division of the marital assets. She
understood that Husband’s assets had a much greater value
than hers and acknowledged, when making her settlement
proposal some three (3) weeks before signing the MSA, in her
May 5th, 2009 email to attorneys Maleski and Joseph that “what
she is asking for is far less than what she is entitled to.”
Furthermore, Wife testified at trial that she was “being more
than fair with this settlement offer. If you total up Husband’s
savings against hers, what she is asking for is far less than what
she is entitled to…”
TCO at 5-6.
We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court, as its decision to
validate the MSA is based on facts well supported by the record. Moreover,
the MSA expressly states that a full and fair disclosure was made and Wife’s
testimony is indicative that she had knowledge of the value of Husband’s
assets. “Case law provides that where the circumstances indicate that a
spouse has knowledge of the general value of the couples’ assets, an
agreement will be upheld especially where … the agreement recites that full
and fair disclosure was made.” Paroly, 876 A.2d at 1067.
Based on the presumption of a full and fair disclosure in the MSA and
Wife’s failure to rebut this presumption, we deem Wife’s second and third
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issues regarding waiver of disclosure to be moot. For the reasons provided
above, we affirm the court’s order denying Wife’s request for declaratory
judgment and upholding the MSA dated June 3, 2009.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/26/2016
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