C.O. v. N.G. ( 2016 )


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  • J-A06018-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    C.O. A/K/A C.G.                               IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    N.G.
    Appellant                 No. 808 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 8, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
    Domestic Relations at No(s): 824 DR 2011
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                         FILED APRIL 26, 2016
    N.G. (Father) appeals pro se from the order, entered in the Court of
    Common Pleas of Dauphin County, dismissing his petition for modification of
    child support which sought a reduction in his support obligation due to his
    chronic medical condition which makes him unable to work full-time. After
    careful review, we affirm based on the opinion authored by the Honorable
    Jeannine Turgeon.
    The parties were married in 2007 and separated in 2011; one child
    was born of the marriage (born 9/10).      C.O. (Mother) filed a complaint
    seeking child support in May 2011.     Mother maintained primary physical
    custody of Child.   On July 11, 2011, the court entered an order requiring
    Father to pay $780/month in child support, plus $2,086.18 in arrears. The
    court’s order was based on a determination that Father’s monthly net
    J-A06018-16
    income was $2,248.35.          On January 13, 2012, the court entered an order
    decreasing Father’s support payment to $670.80/month, plus $64/month in
    arrears.    Finally, on May 21, 2013, the court further decreased Father’s
    support payments to $642.82/month, plus $64.28 in arrears/month,
    effective April 24, 2013.
    On August 15, 2014, Father filed a petition to modify his support
    obligation, claiming that he is unemployed and unable to work full time due
    to a medical condition, Thalassemia Major,1 that makes him transfusion
    dependent.      A conference on the petition was held on October 20, 2014,
    after which an officer denied Father’s petition, and determined that Father’s
    earning capacity is $50,000/year.
    On November 5, 2014, Father filed a de novo appeal from the
    conference officer’s determination. On April 8, 2015, the trial court held a
    hearing, after which it dismissed Father’s appeal, noting that based on the
    evidence of record the court found him to be “certainly capable of working
    from home . . . to earn money” and that he could “do tax returns from home
    while [he is] getting transfusions.”           
    Id. at 19.
      The court also noted that
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Thalassemia is an inherited blood disorder in which the body makes an
    abnormal form of hemoglobin, the protein in red blood cells that carries
    oxygen. The disorder results in large numbers of red blood cells being
    destroyed,       which       leads       to      anemia.             See
    https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000587.htm (last visited
    March 28, 2016).     Father testified that both of his parents carry the
    Thalassemia trait which gave him a 25% chance of being born with the
    disease. N.T. Appeal De Novo, 4/8/15, at 8.
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    J-A06018-16
    when, and if, Father becomes unable to work, he can file for social security
    disability benefits which would go towards his support obligation. 
    Id. Father filed
    the instant pro se appeal which raises the following issues
    for our consideration:
    (1)   Did the trial court correctly deny the appeal even after
    hearing credible testimony from the Appellant and viewing
    Exhibits presented by Appellant’s counsel including but not
    limited to the duly completed and signed Physician
    Verification Form?
    (2)   Did the trial court judge correctly hold Appellant to a full
    time earning capacity of $50,000 ignoring the assertion by
    Appellant’s Hematologist on the Physician Verification Form
    that Appellant is unable to work and that it was
    undetermined when his health condition would allow him
    to return to work?
    (3)   Did the trial judge correctly hold Appellant to a full time
    earning capacity of $50,000 ignoring Appellant’s credible
    testimony that he was unable to work full time?
    (4)   Did the trial judge correctly hold Appellant to a full time
    earning capacity of $50,000 ignoring credible testimony
    that the Defendant was currently unemployed, was not
    receiving unemployment compensation and yet was being
    assessed    child  support    based    on   unemployment
    compensation that he last received in 2012?
    (5)   Was the trial judge correct in ignoring credible testimony
    that Appellant was sustaining himself with the help of
    programs such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance,
    LIHEAP and Medical Assistance, on a monthly pension of
    $189 per month and by parents, family and friend, and yet
    he was [sic] being assessed child support based on a
    national net monthly income of $2,200 (approximate)
    derived from unemployment compensation he last received
    in the year 2012?
    (6)   Was the trial court correct in assessing child support on
    the Appellant given that child support laws and regulations
    were created to ensure that the custodial parent does not
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    become a ward of the state yet in this case the custodial
    parent (obligee) who earns an income of $60,000 per year
    is awarded child support of $7,713.84 per year from a
    non-custodial parent (obligor) whose only income is
    $2,268 per year from a pension and who is dependent on
    federal and state benefits to sustain himself?
    (7)   Did the trial court correctly ignore credible testimony from
    Defendant and Plaintiff exhibits identified 12, 13, and 14
    which show that he was looking for ways to generate
    whatever income he could given his medical condition and
    instead assessed him a full-time earning capacity of
    $50,000?
    (8)   Was the trial court correct in not reducing Appellant’s child
    support burden based on his actual earnings until he
    applied for and was approved for Social Security Disability?
    (9)   Was the trial court judge correct in ignoring the trier of
    fact [sic] compiled by the conference officer and presented
    at the hearing by Kim Robinson, Director of the Domestic
    Relations Office?
    The amount of a child support order is largely within the discretion of
    the trial court, whose judgment should not be disturbed on appeal absent a
    clear abuse of discretion. Isralsky v. Isralsky, 
    824 A.2d 1178
    , 1187 (Pa.
    Super. 2003) (citation omitted).    An abuse of discretion is not merely an
    error of judgment, but rather a misapplication of the law or an unreasonable
    exercise of judgment. 
    Id. A finding
    that the trial court abused its discretion
    must rest upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial
    court will be upheld on any valid ground. 
    Id. While Father’s
    brief lists nine separate issues, the essence of his claims
    boils down to the single contention that the court improperly attributed him
    a $50,000 earning capacity and failed to reduce his support obligation where
    his medical condition prevents him from working full-time.
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    A person’s support obligation is determined primarily by the parties’
    actual financial resources and their earning capacity. Baehr v. Baehr, 
    889 A.2d 1240
    (Pa. Super. 2005). Earning capacity is the amount that a person
    realistically could earn under the circumstances, considering his age, health,
    mental and physical condition, training, earnings history, and child care
    responsibilities.   Woskob v. Woskob, 
    843 A.2d 1247
    (Pa. Super. 2004).
    See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4).
    “A provision of an agreement regarding child support, visitation or
    custody shall be subject to modification by the court upon a showing of
    changed circumstances.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3105(b).      When a party petitions to
    modify support, due to a substantial change in circumstances, a court may
    modify the amount, as follows:
    (c) Pursuant to a petition for modification, the trier of fact may
    modify or terminate the existing support order in any
    appropriate manner based upon the evidence presented without
    regard to which party filed the petition for modification. If the
    trier of fact finds that there has been a material and substantial
    change in circumstances, the order may be increased or
    decreased depending upon the respective incomes of the parties,
    consistent with the support guidelines and existing law, and each
    party's custodial time with the child at the time the modification
    petition is heard.
    Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(c) (emphasis added).      Father’s claim that a downward
    deviation of his support obligation and earning capacity is appropriate and
    necessary is based on the following provision:
    Involuntary Reduction of, and Fluctuations in, Income. No
    adjustments in support payments will be made for normal
    fluctuations in earnings. However, appropriate adjustments will
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    J-A06018-16
    be made for substantial continuing involuntary decreases in
    income, including but not limited to the result of illness, lay-off,
    termination, job elimination or some other employment situation
    over which the party has no control unless the trier of fact finds
    that such a reduction in income was willfully undertaken in an
    attempt to avoid or reduce the support obligation.
    Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(2) (emphasis added). It is the obligor’s burden to
    prove that any income reduction was involuntary. Grimes v. Grimes, 
    596 A.2d 240
    , 242 (Pa. Super. 1991).
    Father has a master’s degree in business administration and is a
    licensed, certified public accountant.    From August 2003 to 2009, Father
    earned approximately $52,000 to $54,000/year. At the time of the de novo
    appeal in April 2015, Father testified that he had been unemployed for the
    past   eight   months.     Father   receives   medical   benefits   through   the
    Department of Public Welfare, receives food stamps and carries secondary
    insurance. At the hearing, Father presented a November 2014 physician’s
    verification form, see Pa.R.C.P. 1910.29(b)(2), stating that he is unable to
    work due to his medical condition and that the doctor could not determine
    when he could return to work. N.T. Appeal De Novo, 4/8/15, at 7. At the
    hearing, Mother’s attorney produced evidence that Father’s LinkedIn account
    showed Father has been the owner of an accounting business from May
    2011 to present, that he is also employed as a real estate agent with Keller
    Williams, and that he advertises his services as a private credit counselor on
    Facebook. 
    Id. at 12-14.
    Mother’s counsel also pointed out that according to
    records in the parties’ pending custody action, Father’s Twitter account
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    indicates that he extensively traveled to India (12/2014 to 2/2015; 10/2013
    to 3/2014; and 12/2012 to 2/2013).
    Instantly, the trial court concluded that Father is capable of working
    from home and earning a full-time wage over the course of a seven-day
    work week. Under such conditions, the court reasoned that Father would be
    able to rest and accommodate his need for scheduled medical treatments,
    required as a result of his blood condition.     In coming to its decision, the
    court also took into account Father’s own testimony at the 2014 custody
    hearing that his health was improving, as well as Mother’s testimony that
    Father had extensively traveled internationally from December 2014 to
    March 2015, again from October 2013 to March 2014, and finally again from
    December 2012 to February 2013, without medical complications.             See
    Mackay v. Mackay, 
    984 A.2d 529
    , 533 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“[w]hen the trial
    court sits as fact finder, the weight to be assigned the testimony of the
    witnesses is within its exclusive province, as are credibility determinations,
    [and] the court is free to choose to believe all, part of none of the evidence
    presented.”).
    While Father produced a form from his physician attesting to his
    medical condition and inability to work, the court found that information
    stale, inadmissible under the rules of procedure,2 and contradicted based on
    ____________________________________________
    2
    We note that under Rule 1910.29(b)(2), Father was required to serve the
    physician verification form on Mother not later than 20 days after the
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    J-A06018-16
    the other evidence of record. Accordingly, the court concluded that Father
    did not prove that his medical condition resulted in a substantial continuing
    involuntary decrease in his income.              See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(2).   Our
    review of the hearing transcript supports the trial court's factual findings and
    legal conclusions; therefore, the court properly denied his petition. 
    Grimes, supra
    .
    We rely upon Judge Turgeon’s opinion to affirm the court’s underlying
    order. We advise the parties to attach a copy of that decision in the event of
    further proceedings in the matter.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/26/2016
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    conference with the conference officer. This, in turn, would have given
    Mother the opportunity to file and serve an objection to the introduction of
    the form within 10 days. Instantly, Father did not comply with the service
    requirements under the rule, thus preventing Mother from objecting to or
    rebutting his medical testimony. For this reason, the trial court did not
    permit the form to be formally admitted into evidence at the hearing.
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    Circulated 03/29/2016 03:33 PM
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    : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
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    MEMORANDUM OPINION                                             ::! ~           oo
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    Before the court is the appeal filed by Niilil9 ·1<.._./       from an order directffig him~
    . pay child support, This opinion is written in support of the order, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. I 925(a).
    Background
    The parties, mother Cllli I'm and father N......-0· J I        I, were married in 2007 and
    separated in 2011.    Following their separation, mother maintained primary physical custody of
    the parties' daughter, currently foul' years old (DOB 9/10). Mother flied a complaint                     seeking
    child support under this docket in 2011 ultimately resulting in an order requiring father pay child
    support of $665 per month plus $66 per month on arrears.' The order was decreased to $642 per
    month plus $64 per month on arrears, effective April 24, 2013. On August 15, 2014, father filed
    a petition to decrease his support obligation claiming he had no source of income and was unable
    to pay any support. (N.T. 3-4) Following an office conference> I issued an order denying his
    petition October 20, 2014, upon the conference officer's recommendation, Father filed a timely
    request for de novo review which hearing was eventually held April 8, 201 S, due to requests for
    continuances by the parties.
    In determining    father's child support obligation, the conference officer assigned him a
    gross yearly earning capacity of $50,000. (N.T. 5) This earning capacity was assigned based
    I
    Father also initiated his own action at the time seeking spousal support. l denied father's request
    following a hearing December I, 20 JI. ~....._.)' v. c. G1 _....:, 850 DR 2011 (Mem, Opn. March I,
    2012). Father appealed my ruling on that issue and on child support, The Superior Court quashed father's
    child support appeal Rs interlocutory because I had directed the case be remanded to collect income and
    day care cost information from mother. C. Gl...-, v. N. Glisl 1!1P6 MDA 2012 (Feb, 24, 2012).
    rather later tiled to discontinue his spousal support appeal. N. G· ·   _:. ,;. C. Gr_~    4 MDA 2012
    (June 5, 2012).                                                    .              ·.7..-,
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    .ftr\'£.RED ·BY ..
    (   \
    upon father's educational background and earnings history. Father, currently 41 years of age, has
    a Master's Degree in Business Administration       and has been licensed as a CPA. (N.T. 5, 9) He ·
    was employed between 2003 and 2009 as an auditor manager with the Commonwealth earning
    approximately $52,000 to $54,000. (N.T. 6) This court also takes judicial notice from the 2011
    hearing in this matter, that as recently as 2011, father had been employed by the Navy where he
    had been making more than $80,000 per year, N. Gc~:.[.i,::_-,   v. C. 0,,:~1.:1,,·::,   850 DR 201 l (Mem.
    Opn, March l , 2012). He was later laid off from that job and was unemployed much of 2013
    during which he collected unemployment compensation. That source of income has since been
    exhausted. (N.T. 4-5) Father was last employed with Algomod Technologies between May and
    August 2014. (N.T. 5)
    Father testified at the hearing that he should be assigned a reduced earning capacity
    because he suffers from Thalassemia Major and is unable to work full time. (N.T. 7, 18) His
    condition      causes anemia and requires blood transfusions every two to three weeks. The
    transfusions have resulted in an iron overload which has resulted in Type 2 Diabetes and
    Hepatitis C. (N.T. 8) He claimed his condition renders him weak and unable to work. (N.T. 9)
    He submitted a physician's verification from November 2014 in which his physician indicated
    that father is unable to work and that it was "undetermined" when he could return to work.2 (N.T.
    7) He has been placed on a list to receive a bone marrow transplant                   but has been told there is
    little chance for a match due to bis Indian ancestry, (N.T. 9-10) As of the de novo hearing, father
    had not applied for Social Security disability benefits. (N.T. l 0)
    Mother presented evidence that at the parties' custody hearing before the Hon. Scott
    Evans on September 24, 2014, father sought shared physical custody of the parties' daughter,
    representing to the court that he was in «better physical health now." (N.T. 12-13) (citing N.
    Gp' '         v. C. G ' I   \, No. 2011 CV 4775 CU (at N._T. 162-63)) Father testified at the current
    hearing that he was able to take care of his young daughter but that he could not work the long
    hours expected of auditors. (N. T. 11)
    Mother also presented evidence of father's work history as reflected on a number of
    media sites used by father as of April 7, 2015. (Exbts. P-1 - P-4))                  In an entry posted on his
    2
    The Physician Verification Form was presented at the hearing but not admitted into evidence.
    2
    (
    Linkedln account, father includes a detailed work history since July 1994. (N.T. 12-13) His most
    recent work listing includes an entry that he has been the owner of "NWS. Gal I            /, CPN'
    since May 2011. (N.T. 12; Exbt. P-1) He summarizes his experience as "[fjourteen years of
    finance, accounting and audit experience. Eleven years of experience leading audit engagements
    and managing accounting function." (Exbt, P-1) Father also actively advertised and identified
    himself on his Facebook page as offering private credit counseling and other financial services.
    (N.T. 14; Exbt. P-4) In addition, father was listed as an agent on the website of the
    KellerWilliams, a global real estate firm. (N.T. 13; Exbt. P-2) Father also identified himself on
    his Twitter account as a realtor dealing global properties and offering advice on tax free sales.
    (N.T. 13-14; Bxbt, P-3)
    Mother also presented evidence that father has the resources to travel extensively, noting
    he was in India from December 31, 2014 until March 9, 2015, from October I, 2013 until March
    2014 and from December I, 2012 until sometime in February 2013. (N.T. 15, 17) Father
    additionally planned to travel with the parties' child to Florida within a month following the de
    novo hearing in this matter, (N.T. 15)
    Father's response to his social media postings were that they accurately reflected his
    attempts to find employment. (N.T. 16) He further indicated that he had not made any income
    from his real estate brokerage position. (N.T. 16)
    At the conclusion of the hearing, I held that father was capable of working from home
    and earning a full time wage over the course of a seven-day work week, which he would need to
    accommodate whatever limitations he claimed and his need for transfusions. (N.T. I 9) I .
    additionally noted that the extent of father's health claims were questionable given his recent
    statement in the custody action that his health was improving and given the evidence of his
    extensive traveling, reflective of improved health and financial resources. (N.T. 19) I later issued
    an order denying father's de novo appeal and directing that the order remain at $642 per month
    plus $64 per month on arrears, which order was based upon father being assigned a $50,000
    earning capacity. Father filed an appeal lo that ruling, currently pending.
    3
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    i
    Legal Discussion
    Father has filed a lengthy statement of errors raised on appeal, which this court
    necessarily distills to the following issue: the court erred by ignoring credible evidence that
    father is not capable of a foll-time earning capacity due to his medical condition. Father
    specifically complains that the court ignored evidence he presented from his physician
    concerning his inability to work, that he is currently unemployed and has been actively seeking
    part-time employment.' Father suggests that he is only capable of working twenty (20) hours per
    week making $15 per hour, or a yearly gross earning capacity of approximately $14,400.
    Generally, parents have an absolute obligation to support their children and this obligation
    "must be discharged by the parents even if it causes them some hardship." Mcneer v. Ruch, 
    928 A.2d 294
    , 297 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "[IJn
    Pennsylvania, a person's income must include his earning capacity, and a voluntary reduction in
    earned income will not be countenanced].]"               
    Id. "Where a
    party willfully fails to obtain
    appropriate employment, his      01·   her income will be considered to be equal to his or her earning
    capacltyj.]" not equal to his or her actual earnings. Ney v. Ney, 
    917 A.2d 863
    , 866 (Pa. Super.
    2007) (citation omitted).
    The applicable Support Guidelines addressing earning capacity are as follows:
    Ruic 1910.16-2. Support Guidelines. Calculation of Net Income.
    (d) Reduced or Fluctuating Income.
    *            *
    (4) Earning Capacity. If the trier of fact determines that a patty to a support
    action has willfully failed to obtain or maintain appropriate employment, the trier
    of fact may impute to that party an income equal to the party's earning capacity.
    Age; education, training, health, work experience> earnings history and child care
    responsibilities are factors which shall be considered in determining earning
    capacity. In order for an earning capacity to be assessed> the trier of fact must
    state the reasons for the assessment in writing or on the record. Generally, the
    trier of fact should not impute an earning capacity that is greater than the amount
    the patty would earn from one full-time position. Determination of what
    constitutes a reasonable work regimen depends upon all relevant circumstances
    including the choice of jobs available within a particular occupation, working
    3
    Father also raised in his statement of errors issues concerning child care costs and mother's income.
    However, none of these issues were raised at the de novo hearing are thus waived. See E.D. v, fvf.P,, 
    33 A.3d 73
    , 80 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Pn.R.A.P. 302).
    4
    (
    hours, working conditions and whether a party has exerted substantial good faith
    efforts to find employment.
    Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4).4
    "[A) person's support obligation is determined primarily by the parties' actual financial
    resources and their earning capacity. Although a person's actual earnings usually reflect his
    earning capacity, where there is a divergence, the obligation is determined                       more by earning
    capacity than actual earnings." Baehr v. Baehr, 
    889 A.2d 1240
    , 1244-45 (Pa. Super, 2005) (citing
    Woskob v. Woskob, 
    843 A.2d 1247
    , 1251 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omittedj). 0[A] person's
    earning capacity is defined not as an amount which the person could theoretically earn, but as
    that amount which the person could realistically earn under the circumstances, considering his or
    her age, health, mental and physical condition and training." Haselrig v. Haselrig, 
    840 A.2d 338
    ,
    340 (Pa. Super, 2003) (quoting Strawn v. Strawn, 
    664 A.2d 129
    , 132 (Pa. Super. 1995)).
    In deciding upon father's earning capacity, this court takes into consideration                 the totality
    of his circumstances,    including his age ( 41 ). health, work experience, earnings history and child
    care responsibilities.   Pa.R.C.P.      19 JO. I 6-2(d)(4). With regard to father's health, he claims this
    court erred by ignoring credible evidence presented from his physician, With regard to the
    physician 's verification     form, it asserted that father was unable to work. Father himself
    represented     to the court that he is at least capable of part-time                   employment.     (N.T. 18)
    Furthermore,     the form was submitted        in November 2014, five months prior to the de novo
    hearing. This evidence       was thus of limited value. Additional                evidence   revealed that father
    recently claimed in the custody action that his health was Improving and that he has not been
    limited by his condition from either the expense          01· exertion   of extensive traveling.
    The evidence         presented    otherwise   revealed father          has a significant        educational
    background, including an MBA degree and is licensed as a CPA. He earned an average gross
    annual income of around $50,000 during the 2000's, which increased to $80,000 as recently as
    20 I I. This earnings history reflects that father is capable of working from home and earning a
    foll-time wage over the course of a seven-day work week, taking rest breaks as needed to
    4
    The Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court, have the force of statute. Maddas v.
    Dehaas, 
    816 A.2d 234
    , 238 (Pa, Super. 2003), nppenl clcnied, 827 A.2cl 1202 (Pa. 2003).
    5
    .   .   ..
    accommodate his medical condition. Finally, father presented no evidence that child care
    responsibilities hinder his ability to work.
    Accordingly, I denied father's request to reduce his child support obligation.
    Jul)1 8, 2015
    Date
    Distribution:
    .                                           -
    Nik.hitS,oklaney-;     30 Snddk Ridge Drive, Harrisburg Pa. 17110
    Nichole M. Walters, Esq. - YWCA Legal Center, 112 Market St Fl. 4, Harrisburg, PA 17101-2024
    6