Com. v. Kenjora, M. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MARLENE W. KENJORA
Appellant No. 564 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-17-CR-0000059-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 10, 2016
Appellant, Marlene W. Kenjora, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Clearfield County Court of Common Please, following her jury
trial convictions of criminal attempt (first degree murder), aggravated
assault, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person
(“REAP”).1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Appellant received inpatient treatment for depression and manic behavior
from November 22, 2012 to December 3, 2012. Upon her release, Appellant
returned home and obtained the services of a home-health psychiatric
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a) (§ 2502(a) related), 2702(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), and
2705, respectively.
_____________________________
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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agency. The victim, Erin Schaeffer, was a registered nurse who occasionally
went to Appellant’s home to assist her with her medications.
On December 6, 2012, Ms. Schaeffer went to Appellant’s home and
found her to be irate and non-compliant with Ms. Schaeffer’s attempts to
refill Appellant’s medications. Ms. Schaeffer called Appellant’s daughter but
was unable to reach her. Thereafter, Ms. Schaeffer contacted Kristen
Gamling, a crisis counselor, to request assistance or to have Appellant
evaluated for inpatient commitment. While Ms. Schaeffer was speaking to
Ms. Gamling, Appellant went upstairs, retrieved a handgun, returned, and
shot Ms. Schaeffer in the left temple. Ms. Gamling testified she heard Ms.
Schaeffer start screaming, “she shot me, she shot me,” to which Appellant
yelled, “you’re damn right I did.” Ms. Schaeffer fled the residence, got into
her vehicle, and traveled to the home of a neighbor who was also a home-
health nurse. The neighbor bandaged Ms. Schaeffer’s head and called the
police. Ms. Schaeffer was subsequently transported to a hospital where a
CAT scan determined she had a fractured skull with bleeding around her
brain. Ms. Schaeffer underwent surgery to stop the bleeding, remove bullet
fragments, and replace the bone in her skull. Ms. Schaeffer was released
from the hospital several days later but continues to suffer from headaches,
difficulty sleeping, and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Meanwhile, Appellant called another neighbor crying and stated, “I
shot my nurse.” The police arrived at Appellant’s home and told her to put
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down the gun and exit the residence with her hands up. Appellant complied
and told the police, “I’m sorry, I shot her, I snapped.” The police then
arrested Appellant.
A jury convicted Appellant on September 24, 2014, of criminal
attempt—first-degree murder, aggravated assault, simple assault, and REAP.
The jury found Appellant guilty of attempting to cause or causing serious
bodily injury. On November 4, 2014, the court sentenced Appellant to
twelve (12) to twenty-four (24) years’ imprisonment for attempted murder;
the remaining convictions merged with attempted murder for sentencing
purposes. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on November 14,
2014. The court conducted a hearing on December 9, 2014, and dismissed
the motion on March 2, 2015. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on
March 31, 2015. The court ordered Appellant on April 1, 2015, to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b), and Appellant timely complied on April 22, 2015.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
WHETHER THE [TRIAL COURT] ERRED IN REFUSING
[APPELLANT’S] REQUEST FOR A JURY INSTRUCTION ON
THE CONDITION OF INVOLUNTARY DRUGGED
(INTOXICATION) CONDITION; WHETHER, AS A MATTER
OF LAW, SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE HAD BEEN PRESENTED
TO SUPPORT A CONCLUSION THAT SERIOUS BODILY
INJURY HAD OCCURRED AND IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A
FINDING, WHETHER THE SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS
ILLEGAL; AND WHETHER THE COURT ADEQUATELY
CONSIDERED MITIGATING FACTORS IN IMPOSING
SENTENCE?
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(Appellant’s Brief at 7).
Appellant’s issue is composed of four sub-parts. Appellant initially
argues she was entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of involuntary
drugged condition. Appellant acknowledges there is no appellate case law in
which this instruction has been applied to any area other than driving under
the influence (“DUI”). Appellant claims she was not in control of her
faculties due to her required medication.
Appellant next argues the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find
that Appellant had caused or attempted to cause “serious bodily injury” to
the victim. Appellant contends Ms. Schaeffer did not suffer any real injury to
her brain or other vital part of her body that created an actual risk of death.
As a companion complaint, Appellant further argues her sentence of twelve
to twenty-four years’ imprisonment is illegal, as it exceeds the maximum
penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment for attempted murder without
“serious bodily injury.”
Lastly, Appellant asserts the court failed to consider at sentencing
certain mitigating factors, including her lack of criminal history, that she was
under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, her inability to appreciate
the criminality of her behavior, and that she was sixty-nine years old at the
time of the incident. As presented, this final claim challenges the
discretionary aspects of sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Cruz-
Centeno, 668 A.2d 536 (Pa.Super. 1995) (explaining claim that court did
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not consider mitigating factors challenges discretionary aspects of
sentencing). Appellant concludes the court erred or abused its discretion on
the various grounds asserted. We disagree.
With respect to Appellant’s initial argument, we observe: “There is no
requirement for the trial judge to instruct the jury pursuant to every request
made to the court.” Commonwealth v. Newman, 555 A.2d 151, 158-59
(Pa.Super. 1989), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 580, 655 A.2d 512 (1995). “In
deciding whether a trial court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction, we
must determine whether the court abused its discretion or committed an
error of law.” Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 570 Pa. 263, 271, 809 A.2d
256, 260-61 (2002).
A jury charge is erroneous only if the charge as a whole is inadequate,
unclear, or has a tendency to mislead or confuse, rather than clarify, a
material issue. Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 507 (Pa.Super.
2008), appeal denied, 606 Pa. 644, 992 A.2d 885 (2010) (citation omitted).
A charge is considered adequate unless the jury was
palpably misled by what the trial judge said or there is an
omission which is tantamount to fundamental error.
Consequently, the trial court has wide discretion in
fashioning jury instructions.
Id. Moreover,
The trial court may use its own form of expression to
explain difficult legal concepts to the jury, as long as the
trial court’s instruction accurately conveys the law. A
verdict will not be set aside if the instructions of the trial
court, taken as a whole, and in context, accurately set
forth the applicable law.
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Commonwealth v. Jones, 858 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2004). “Jury
instructions must be supported by the evidence of record as instructions
regarding matters that are not before the court serve no purpose but to
confuse the jury.” Commonwealth v. Bruce, 717 A.2d 1033, 1037
(Pa.Super. 1998), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 643, 794 A.2d 359 (1999).
Regarding Appellant’s second and third arguments, the law states:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super.
2003)).
Under the Crimes Code, “[a] person commits an attempt
when with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any
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act which constitutes a substantial step towards the
commission of the crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a). A
person may be convicted of attempted murder if he takes
a substantial step toward the commission of a killing, with
the specific intent in mind to commit such an act. See 18
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 2502. The substantial step test
broadens the scope of attempt liability by concentrating on
the acts the defendant has done and does not any longer
focus on the acts remaining to be done before the actual
commission of the crime. The mens rea required for first-
degree murder, specific intent to kill, may be established
solely from circumstantial evidence. [T]he law permits the
fact finder to infer that one intends the natural and
probable consequences of his acts.
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 955 A.2d 441, 444 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal
denied, 600 Pa. 760, 967 A.2d 958 (2009) (most internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Additionally, this Court has observed:
A claim that implicates the fundamental legal authority of
the court to impose a particular sentence constitutes a
challenge to the legality of the sentence. If no statutory
authorization exists for a particular sentence, that
sentence is illegal and subject to correction. An illegal
sentence must be vacated. Likewise, a sentence that
exceeds the statutory maximum is illegal. If a court
imposes a sentence outside of the legal parameters
prescribed by the applicable statute, the sentence is illegal
and should be remanded for correction.
Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). The Pennsylvania Consolidated
Statutes define the sentence for attempted murder as follows:
§ 1102. Sentence for murder, murder of unborn
child and murder of law enforcement officer
* * *
(c) Attempt, solicitation and conspiracy.—
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Notwithstanding section 1103(1) (relating to sentence of
imprisonment for felony), a person who has been
convicted of attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit
murder, murder of an unborn child or murder of a law
enforcement officer where serious bodily injury results may
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which shall be
fixed by the court at not more than 40 years. Where
serious bodily injury does not result, the person may be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which shall be fixed
by the court at not more than 20 years.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(c).
With respect to Appellant’s final sentencing dispute, we note that
challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an
appellant to an appeal as of right. Id. Prior to reaching the merits of a
discretionary sentencing issue:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, See
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal
denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006). When appealing the
discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant must invoke the appellate
court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a separate concise statement
demonstrating that there is a substantial question as to the appropriateness
of the sentence under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon,
571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). The concise
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statement must indicate “where the sentence falls in relation to the
sentencing guidelines and what particular provision of the code it violates.”
Commonwealth v. Kiesel, 854 A.2d 530, 532 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 727 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal
denied, 563 Pa. 672, 759 A.2d 920 (2000)).
“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830
A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). A substantial question
exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the
sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific
provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms
which underlie the sentencing process.” Sierra, supra at 912-13.
Generally, “[a]n allegation that a sentencing court failed to consider or did
not adequately consider certain factors does not raise a substantial question
that the sentence was inappropriate.” Cruz-Centeno, supra at 545
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, the court disposed of Appellant’s arguments as follows:
[Appellant’s] first request is a Motion for New Trial,
alleging that the [c]ourt erred in denying [her] request for
jury instructions regarding the defense of involuntary
drugged condition. The Pennsylvania Suggested Standard
jury [i]nstruction for involuntary intoxication, specifically
states that the involuntary intoxication defense is only
applicable where the charge is under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802.
See Pa.S.S.J.I.Crim. 8.308C. Moreover, the parties and
this [c]ourt were unable to find any appellate case law in
Pennsylvania in regards to the involuntary intoxication
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defense being applicable for any matter except in a [DUI]
case. Since Pennsylvania does not recognize such a
defense in any case except for [DUI], the [c]ourt was
correct in denying [Appellant’s] request.
In addition, the evidence presented at trial did not warrant
the necessity for the [c]ourt to give the involuntary
intoxication jury instruction, even if it was applicable. The
evidence at trial clearly showed that [Appellant] had
mental health issues and she did not take her medication
as instructed as opposed to her involuntarily taking
medication that she was not supposed to be taking. The
facts and evidence presented at trial clearly do not support
the defense of involuntary intoxication, even if it were
available for the charges in [Appellant’s] case, and the
[c]ourt properly denied [her] request for the same. See
Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291 (Pa. 2011) (trial
court properly denied defendant’s requested jury
instruction where there was no evidence on the record to
support said jury instruction).
[Appellant’s] second claim is a Motion for Acquittal,
arguing that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to
establish as a matter of law that the victim suffered
serious bodily injury in order to be found guilty of the
offense of Aggravated Assault—caused serious bodily
injury.
A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction on a
particular charge, and is only granted in cases in which the
Commonwealth has failed to carry its burden regarding
that charge. Commonwealth v. Graham, 81 A.3d 137
([Pa.Super.] 2013). The standard to be applied in
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is:
whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. In applying the above test, we may not
weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
[that of] the fact-finder. In addition, we note that
the facts and circumstances established by the
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Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility
of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s
guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a
matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn
from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the trier of
fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Id. at 142 (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d
544, 559-560 ([Pa.Super.] 2011) (en banc)). In this
matter the jury found [Appellant] guilty [inter alia] of
Aggravated Assault—caused serious bodily injury,
therefore the [c]ourt should view all the evidence admitted
at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
Serious bodily injury is defined as “bodily injury which
creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment
of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.
At the trial in this matter, the Commonwealth presented
the expert testimony of Dr. Jeannette Capella, who
testified that she was the trauma surgeon who conducted
the initial evaluation of the victim. Dr. Capella testified
that the victim had been shot in the left temple area, that
a CAT scan was performed and it showed bullet fragments
in the victim’s head, bone fragments where the skull had
been fractured and blood in and around the victim’s brain
in that area. Dr. Capella stated that the victim’s injuries
necessitated surgery in order to put the bone back in place
and to remove the bullet fragments. Dr. Capella also
testified that a shot in the head can cause damage to the
brain, and the middle meningeal artery is located in the
particular area where the victim was shot. This is a major
artery that if damaged can cause quite a lot of bleeding.
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Lastly, Dr. Capella testified that there is a danger of death
from being shot precisely where the victim had been shot
in the head.
Viewing it in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
the testimony of Dr. Capella was sufficient for the jury to
find that [Appellant’s] actions caused serious bodily injury.
[Appellant’s] act of shooting the victim in the left temple
area, which caused the victim’s skull to fracture, was
clearly bodily injury[,] which creates a substantial risk of
death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ. See Commonwealth v. Philips, 410
A.2d 832, 834 (Pa.Super. 1979) (gunshot wound to the leg
requiring a two week stay in hospital and resulting inability
to walk for one month, considered serious bodily injury).
Commonwealth v. Caterino, 678 A.2d 389 (Pa.Super.
1996) (victim’s broken nose and severed artery, which
required over three hours of emergency medical attention,
constituted “serious bodily injury,” for purposes of
determining proper sentencing offense score for defendant
convicted of aggravated assault).
[Appellant’s] third claim is a Motion for Re-Sentencing,
arguing that there was no serious bodily injury inflicted
upon the victim, thus the maximum allowable sentence for
Criminal Attempt Murder in First Degree is 20 years
pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(c) and the [c]ourt’s
sentence of 12-24 years is therefore illegal. This Motion
must be dismissed due to the [c]ourt’s finding above.[2]
[Appellant’s] final claim is a Motion for Reconsideration of
Sentence, requesting that the [c]ourt impose a lesser
sentence. [Appellant] argues that the [c]ourt did not
adequately consider certain mitigating factors at the time
of sentencing, including: [Appellant’s] age; the fact that
she was at the time under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance; the capacity of [Appellant] at
the time to fully appreciate the criminality of her conduct;
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2
We discuss this issue in further detail following our summary of the trial
court’s decision.
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that [Appellant] was at the time under extreme duress;
and that [Appellant] has no significant history of prior
criminal convictions. However, the [c]ourt did take all
mitigating factors and evidence into account and the
sentence imposed by the Court was appropriate
considering the nature of the offense, the protection of the
public, and the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant].
Sentencing is a matter vested within the discretion of the
court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. [Evans, supra]. To find an abuse of discretion
in this respect, there must be more than a mere error in
judgment; a sentencing court [will not] be found to have
abused its discretion unless “the record discloses that the
judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the
result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.”
Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007).
Furthermore, a sentencing court must examine the
circumstances of the crime and individual background of
the defendant as the sentence imposed must be the
minimum punishment consistent with the protection of the
public, the gravity of the offense and the rehabilitative
needs of the defendant. Commonwealth v. Johnson,
481 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa.Super. 1984).
The standard guideline range for the offense of Criminal
Attempt Murder of First Degree is 72 months to 240
months. The sentence imposed by the [c]ourt is within
that standard guideline range, and that sentence is not
manifestly unreasonable simply because it was not at the
minimum of that standard range. Additionally, the
sentence recommendation provided by the Probation Office
was for 20-40 years. The [c]ourt did take into account the
mitigating factors in this matter, and the best evidence of
the same would be that the [c]ourt imposed a sentence
which was considerably lower than that recommended by
the Probation Office.
(Trial Court’s Opinion, filed March 2, 2015, at 1-5). We accept the court’s
analysis.
We now take a closer look at Appellant’s claim that her sentence of 12
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to 24 years’ incarceration for attempted murder was improper under Section
1102(c) because no serious bodily injury occurred in this case. Section 1102
allows for a maximum sentence of 40 years, unless serious injury did not
result from the attempted murder; in the event of no serious bodily injury,
the maximum sentence is not more than 20 years. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
1102(c) (emphasis added). Although not identified or argued as such,
Appellant’s issue appears to implicate Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000) (stating any fact that
increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory maximum, other
than fact of prior conviction, must be submitted to jury and proved beyond
reasonable doubt). A true Apprendi issue involves the legality of the
sentence, which cannot be waived on appeal, as long as we have proper
jurisdiction to address it. See Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86
(Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Roney, 581 Pa. 587,
866 A.2d 351 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 860, 126 S. Ct. 139, 163
L. Ed. 2d 141 (2005)).
Two cases come to light in the context of serious bodily injury and
sentencing under Section 1102(c). The first case is Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 910 A.2d 60 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 592 Pa. 766, 923
A.2d 1173 (2007). In Johnson, the Commonwealth charged and the jury
convicted the defendant of attempted murder, aggravated assault, recklessly
endangering another person and related offenses arising from the
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defendant’s ambush and shooting of the victim who had previously testified
for the Commonwealth against the defendant’s brother in an unrelated first
degree murder case. During the subsequent attack on the victim, the
defendant pointed a handgun at the victim’s head and fired but missed. The
defendant then pursued the victim and fired several more rounds at her, one
of which struck the victim in the heel of her foot. At sentencing, the court
imposed a term of imprisonment of 17½ to 40 years for the attempted
murder conviction.
In addition to other issues on appeal, the defendant challenged the
attempted murder sentence on the ground of insufficient evidence of serious
bodily injury. The trial court proposed that the defendant’s conviction for
the companion offense of aggravated assault was enough to establish
serious bodily harm. In response, this Court said:
[I]t was not the prerogative of the trial court, but solely
the responsibility of the jury in this case to find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, whether a serious bodily injury resulted
from the instant attempted murder.
* * *
Here, however, (1) appellant was not charged with
attempted murder resulting in serious bodily injury, (2)
appellant was not on notice that the Commonwealth
sought either to prove that a serious bodily injury resulted
from the attempted murder or to invoke the greater
maximum sentence, and (3) the jury was never presented
with, nor rendered a decision on, the question of whether a
serious bodily injury resulted from the attempted murder.
Thus, the jury verdict here was limited to a finding of guilt
on the crime of attempted murder generally, for which the
maximum sentence is twenty years.
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Id. at 67-68. Essentially, the Johnson decision can be interpreted to
suggest that the “serious bodily injury” factor must be attached to the
attempted murder charge, even in a multi-count prosecution. Id.
Importantly, nothing in the Johnson decision indicated that any of the
defendant’s crimes had been charged with causing serious bodily injury or if
that matter was presented to the factfinder at trial.
The second case to draw our attention is Commonwealth v. Reid,
867 A.2d 1280 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 725, 890 A.2d
1058 (2005), in which the Commonwealth charged the defendant with
criminal attempt (homicide), aggravated assault, burglary and criminal
trespass. The charges arose when the defendant entered the victim’s home
and stabbed her eleven times with a knife before slashing her throat. The
victim endured several surgeries and remained under treatment when the
defendant struck a plea deal with the Commonwealth. In exchange for the
defendant’s nolo contendere plea to one count of criminal attempt
(homicide), the Commonwealth agreed not to pursue the other charges
stemming from the assault on the victim in this case as well as in
satisfaction of the charges pending against the defendant at three additional
docket numbers. The prosecutor presented the parties’ agreement to the
court as a nolo contendere plea to one count of attempted criminal
(homicide) graded as a first degree felony carrying a maximum penalty of
forty years and a $50,000.00 fine, to be in full satisfaction of all charges
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filed at four separate docket numbers. Upon the trial court’s request, the
prosecutor recited the factual predicate of the case. The prosecutor
described the defendant’s attack on the victim, including the eleven stab
wounds and slashed throat; and how, despite her wounds, the victim was
able to stagger across the street to a neighbor’s house for help. At
sentencing, the court imposed a term of imprisonment of 18 to 40 years for
the attempted murder offense.
On appeal, the defendant challenged his sentence “on the grounds that
(1) a jury did not make the factual determination that the victim suffered
serious bodily injury, (2) the information filed by the Commonwealth did not
explicitly state that the victim suffered “serious bodily injury” using those
precise words, and (3) the Commonwealth failed to apprise Appellant that it
was asserting that the victim suffered serious bodily injury thereby
implicating a maximum term of imprisonment of forty years.” Id. at 1281.
This Court identified the defendant’s issue as one challenging the legality of
the sentence under Apprendi. In response, this Court concluded the
defendant was sufficiently apprised that his charges involved serious bodily
injury, and the facts underlying the charge did not need to be spelled out
explicitly in the criminal information. Instead, the Court reiterated the
principle that the court “is not bound to sentence according to an error in an
information, but may sentence in accordance with the true grading of the
crimes as alleged and proven.” Reid, supra at 1284. Although the
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defendant had not been expressly charged with attempt to commit criminal
homicide (serious bodily injury), the defendant agreed with the
Commonwealth’s recitation of the facts underlying the charge, including the
extent of the victim’s injuries. This Court, therefore, concluded the record
contained no support for either the defendant’s assertion of “surprise” at
sentencing or his claim of a sentence in violation of Apprendi.
In the present case, Appellant was not specifically charged with
Criminal Attempt/Murder of the First Degree (serious bodily injury) on the
criminal information. Curiously, Appellant does not argue that point
precisely.3 On the other hand, the Criminal Complaint includes and recites
the acts of Appellant which were associated with the particular offense of
attempted criminal homicide as: “The Defendant did on or about 12/05/2012
at approx. 1600 hrs. commit an attempt, with the intent to commit Criminal
Homicide by shooting a .22 Caliber Revolver Handgun at a known victim.
When doing so the said victim was struck in the left side of her head with a
.22 Caliber bullet causing serious bodily injury to the victim.” (See
Criminal Complaint, filed 12/6/12, at 2.)
Here, Appellant only challenges the jury’s finding of serious bodily
injury. The facts of the victim’s serious bodily injury, however, were fully
charged, prosecuted and defended at trial, argued at closing, and found by
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3
Appellant, however, was expressly charged with aggravated assault
(serious bodily injury) on that document.
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the jury. Appellant was on notice from the outset of her case to defend
against serious bodily injury arising from the shooting, and the jury found
serious bodily injury resulted from the incident giving rise to the charges.
Therefore, Appellant cannot reasonably claim she was “surprised” at
sentencing or that she received a sentence in violation of Apprendi.
Granted, neither Johnson nor Reid is readily dispositive of the
present case. Nevertheless, Appellant was on notice to defend the attempt
to cause or caused serious bodily injury aspect in her case and did so
unsuccessfully. Therefore, the record fails to support Appellant’s Apprendi
issue. Moreover, we cannot tell from the Johnson decision whether the
defendant in that case was ever on notice to defend against serious bodily
injury. So, we cannot say definitively that Johnson, supra calls into
question Appellant’s attempted murder sentence simply because “serious
bodily injury” was not expressly mentioned in conjunction with that
particular charge on the criminal information document.4 Given the
theoretical difficulties potentially arising from the prevailing case law, and to
avoid the current problem, we think the better course of action is for the
Commonwealth to include or attach “serious bodily injury” to all relevant
charges on all of the charging and other important record documents
____________________________________________
4
As an aside, query how Appellant’s other convictions, most of which
included serious bodily injury, could have merged for sentencing if her
conviction for attempted murder did not include serious bodily injury.
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throughout the case. Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellant’s
issues merit no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/10/2016
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