Cooper, S. v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. ( 2016 )

J-A03033-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
SANDRA COOPER, IN HER OWN RIGHT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
ESTATE OF GENE M. COOPER
Appellant
v.
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC.,
ALAN J. HAY, M.D.
Appellees No. 632 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered February 2, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): August Term, 2013, No. 02452
SANDRA COOPER, IN HER OWN RIGHT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
ESTATE OF GENE M. COOPER
Appellant
v.
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC.,
ALAN J. HAY, M.D.
Appellees No. 633 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered February 2, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): 2452 August Term, 2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 17, 2016
Appellant, Sandra Cooper, in her own right and as administratrix of the
J-A03033-16
Estate of Gene M. Cooper, appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia
County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment in favor
of Appellees, Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (Appellee AWI) and Alan J.
Hay, M.D. (“Appellee Hay”). For the reasons that follow, we quash the
appeal.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
In September 2003, a chemical spill occurred at Appellee AWI’s plant in
Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Gene M. Cooper (“Mr. Cooper”) was an employee
of Appellee AWI and one of the workers assigned to clean up the spill. Mr.
Cooper developed a cough and severe sinus pain immediately after his
involvement in the cleanup. Within several months of the cleanup, Mr.
Cooper began to be cognitively impaired.
When his cognitive issues became a problem at work, Appellee AWI
referred Mr. Cooper to Appellee Hay for an evaluation. After evaluating Mr.
Cooper, Appellee Hay contacted Mr. Cooper’s primary physician, who
ordered neurological testing to diagnose Mr. Cooper’s condition. Due to Mr.
Cooper’s substantial cognitive issues, Appellee AWI placed Mr. Cooper on
disability in May 2004. Over the next several years, Mr. Cooper’s condition
rapidly declined, and the court deemed Mr. Cooper a totally incapacitated
person in June 2006. Appellant, who was then Mr. Cooper’s court-appointed
legal guardian, subsequently placed Mr. Cooper in a full-time assisted living
facility. After multiple evaluations of Mr. Cooper by many different doctors,
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Mr. Cooper was diagnosed with work-related encephalopathy with
subsequent dementia in November 2007.
In December 2007, Appellant filed a worker’s compensation claim on
Mr. Cooper’s behalf, which asserted that Mr. Cooper had developed
encephalopathy with dementia after toxic overexposure at work. During the
course of the worker’s compensation case, Appellant requested Mr. Cooper’s
chemical exposure documentation from Appellee AWI. Appellee AWI
supplied some of the pertinent information, but it claimed the rest of Mr.
Cooper’s relevant chemical exposure documentation had been inadvertently
lost or destroyed during a move to a new building. In October 2011,
however, Appellant learned from an employee of Appellee AWI that Mr.
Cooper’s chemical exposure documentation was stored on Appellee AWI’s
computer system.
In 2009, Appellant learned for the first time of Appellee Hay’s
evaluation of Mr. Cooper in 2004. After numerous additional evaluations of
Mr. Cooper by doctors, Appellant learned that Mr. Cooper’s prognosis was
poor and his injury was the result of “occupational solvent exposure.”
Meanwhile, in the worker’s compensation action, the court determined Mr.
Cooper suffered from toxic encephalopathy caused by chronic solvent and
chemical exposure and acute exposure to toxic chemicals while working at
Appellee AWI’s manufacturing plant. As a result, in 2012, the court awarded
Mr. Cooper compensation benefits, interest, attorney’s fees, litigation costs,
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and medical expenses incurred for the treatment of his toxic
encephalopathy.
On August 22, 2013, Appellant filed a tort action against Appellees.
On October 9, 2013, Appellant filed an amended complaint, which raised
claims of fraud, conspiracy, recklessness, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Appellee AWI and
Appellee Hays filed preliminary objections on October 28, 2013, and October
29, 2013, respectively. The court overruled both Appellees’ preliminary
objections on November 29, 2013. Appellee Hays then filed an answer and
new matter to Appellant’s complaint on December 30, 2013, and Appellee
AWI filed an answer and new matter on January 8, 2014. Mr. Cooper died
on February 5, 2014.
On October 22, 2014, Appellant, along with her children, filed a
wrongful death and survival action against Appellees, which raised claims
related to the ones in the current action. On October 25, 2014, Appellant
filed a motion to consolidate the 2013 tort action with the wrongful death
and survival action pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 213(e)(1), which the court granted
by order dated November 26, 2014.
On December 1, 2014, both Appellees filed motions for summary
judgment in the 2013 tort action, alleging, inter alia, that the relevant
statutes of limitation barred Appellant’s claims. After Appellant filed answers
to Appellees’ motions for summary judgment, the court granted summary
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judgment on January 21, 2015, in favor of Appellees on Appellant’s
negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims. The court then granted summary judgment in
favor of Appellees on Appellant’s remaining claims in the 2013 tort action by
order dated January 30, 2015, and docketed February 2, 2015. On February
10, 2015, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the court’s orders granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellees. On February 11, 2015, the court
ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant complied on March 2,
2015.
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
DID THE [TRIAL] COURT IMPROPERLY INTRUDE UPON THE
PROVINCE OF THE FACT-FINDER BY CONCLUDING THAT
THE COOPERS HAD NOT EXERCISED REASONABLE
DILIGENCE AND THUS RENDERING THE DISCOVERY RULE
INAPPLICABLE TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR
FRAUD AND CONSPIRACY?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
Preliminarily, we observe “[t]he appealability of an order directly
implicates the jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order.” Estate of
Considine v. Wachovia Bank, 966 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa.Super. 2009).
“[T]his Court has the power to inquire at any time, sua sponte, whether an
order is appealable.” In re Estate of Cella, 12 A.3d 374, 377 (Pa.Super.
2010). “Generally, only appeals from final orders are eligible for appellate
review.” Malanchuk v. Sivchuk, 106 A.3d 789, 792 (Pa.Super. 2014),
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appeal granted, ___ Pa. ___, 115 A.3d 310 (2015). Significantly:
[An] appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an
order certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an
interlocutory order as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an
interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P. 312, 1311, 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b)); or (4) a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P.
313).
In re Estate of Cella, supra (quoting Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478, 485
(Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 704, 918 A.2d 747 (2007)).
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 defines a final order as,
inter alia, any order that disposes of all claims and all parties. Pa.R.A.P.
341(b)(1). Rule 341 further provides in pertinent part:
Rule 341. Final Orders; Generally
(a) General rule.—Except as prescribed in paragraphs
(d), and (e) of this rule, an appeal may be taken as of
right from any final order of a government unit or trial
court.
(b) Definition of final order.—A final order is any
order that:
(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or
* * *
(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to paragraph
(c) of this rule.
(c) Determination of finality.—When more than one
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim or
when multiple parties are involved, the trial court or other
government unit may enter a final order as to one or more
but fewer than all of the claims and parties only upon an
express determination that an immediate appeal would
facilitate resolution of the entire case. Such an order
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becomes appealable when entered. In the absence of such
a determination and entry of a final order, any order or
other form of decision that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims and parties shall not constitute a final order.
Pa.R.A.P. 341(a), (b), and (c).
The relevant portion of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213
states:
Rule 213. Consolidation, Severance and Transfer of
Actions and Issues within a County. Actions for
Wrongful Death and Survival Actions
* * *
(e) A cause of action for the wrongful death of a
decedent and a cause of action for the injuries of the
decedent which survives his or her death may be enforced
in one action, but if independent actions are commenced
they shall be consolidated for trial.
(1) If independent actions are commenced or are
pending in the same court, the court, on its own
motion or the motion of any party, shall order the
actions consolidated for trial.
* * *
Pa.R.C.P. 213(e)(1). Importantly, when cases are consolidated under Rule
213, an appealable order does not emerge until all claims against all parties
in all consolidated actions have been resolved. Malanchuk, supra at 795.
Instantly, Appellant filed the 2013 tort action on August 22, 2013.
After Mr. Cooper’s death on February 5, 2014, Appellant and her children
filed a wrongful death and survival action on October 22, 2014, which raised
claims related to the claims raised in the earlier action. On October 25,
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2014, Appellant filed a motion to consolidate the 2013 tort action with the
wrongful death and survival action pursuant to Rule 213(e)(1), and the court
granted Appellant’s motion on November 26, 2014. A few days later,
Appellees filed separate motions for summary judgment in the 2013 tort
action, which the court granted. While the court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellees disposed of all claims in the 2013 tort action,
it did not dispose of the claims in the wrongful death and survival action
consolidated with the 2013 tort action. Because those related claims remain
outstanding, we decline to review the summary judgment orders in favor of
Appellees at this time. See Malanchuk, supra; Pa.R.A.P. 341.1 Therefore,
we hold that the best resolution is to quash this appeal. Appellant can
challenge those orders on appeal at the appropriate time, but no earlier than
the resolution of the consolidated wrongful death and survival action. 2
Accordingly, we quash this appeal.
Appeal quashed.
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1
We note that Malanchuk, supra is currently pending before our Supreme
Court.
2
We further qualify our resolution of Appellant’s case because the record
also suggests the court consolidated the 2013 tort action with a products
liability action, which is still pending in the Lancaster County Court of
Common Pleas.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/17/2016
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