Com. v. Monnett, R. ( 2022 )

J-A19034-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RICK JASON MONNETT :
:
Appellant : No. 1060 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 14, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-50-CR-0000420-2018
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 22, 2022
Appellant Rick Jason Monnett appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County following his conviction
at a bench trial on the charges of driving while under the influence (“DUI”)-
general impairment, DUI-highest rate, disregarding traffic lanes, careless
driving, and reckless driving.1 After a careful review, we affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: After a
motorcycle accident, Appellant was charged with various DUI and traffic
offenses, and on October 11, 2019, represented by counsel, he proceeded to
a bench trial.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), 3802(c), 3309(1), 3714(a), and 3736(a),
respectively.
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At the trial, Kristen Bittle testified that, on July 8, 2018, she was driving
on Route 850 towards Shermans Dale when she came upon a motorcycle lying
on the road. N.T., 10/11/19, at 4. As she approached the scene, she observed
Appellant was badly injured and lying on the road. Id. Ms. Bittle exited her
vehicle and discovered a nurse, who had arrived on the scene, as well as
Appellant’s paramour, who indicated she had been a passenger on the
motorcycle. Id. at 4-5. The three women attempted to comfort Appellant
and held his “head still” until emergency personnel arrived on the scene. Id.
While they were waiting for emergency personnel, Ms. Bittle noticed
Appellant and his paramour both smelled of alcohol, and neither person had
been wearing a helmet. Id. at 4, 6. Ms. Bittle indicated Appellant was “going
in and out” of consciousness; however, he told her that he had been driving
the motorcycle and lost control when he “looked down to avoid something[.]”
Id. at 7. She noted Appellant’s paramour, who was clearly upset, also told
her Appellant was driving the motorcycle at the time of the accident. Id. Ms.
Bittle testified the ambulance arrived, and Appellant was immediately
removed from the scene. Id. at 8.
Michelle McLaughlin testified she was Appellant’s paramour. On July 8,
2018, just before lunch, the two of them began riding on a motorcycle, and
they visited four bars between approximately noon and 2:00 p.m. Id. at 18-
20. Ms. McLaughlin testified she and Appellant each consumed “a couple [of]
beers and a couple [of] shots” at every bar. Id. at 19-20.
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When the couple left the fourth bar, Ms. McLaughlin expressed to
Appellant she was concerned about them traveling on the motorcycle because
they had been drinking. Id. at 21. Appellant told Ms. McLaughlin the “wind
would take care of it, that he would be sober.” Id. Ms. McLaughlin testified
they left the fourth bar with Appellant driving the motorcycle and her as a
passenger. Id. at 22. She testified she was concerned because they both
were intoxicated at this time. Id.
Ms. McLaughlin testified “we went riding, and we turned on [Route] 850;
and alongside the creek, we had a wreck. I am not sure how—I don’t know
what happened, how we—the bike dropped down, but I just know that both
of us were on the ground.” Id. at 21. She clarified they had traveled only a
“couple of miles” from the fourth bar when the motorcycle crashed. Id. at 22.
She remembers being “bounced off the pavement” and realizing Appellant was
badly injured with blood coming out of his ear, as well as a gash to the back
of his head. Id.
Ms. McLaughlin testified a woman stopped and called 911. Id. Then “it
just seemed like [she] blinked, and there was [sic] people everywhere.” Id.
She testified she sustained a concussion and has no memory of Appellant
saying anything at the scene other than “[t]hat he wanted [to stand] up[.]”
Id. at 23. She further indicated she has no memory of speaking to police
officers at the scene. Id. at 24.
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Ms. McLaughlin admitted that, on January 3, 2019, she gave a
handwritten notarized statement to the police wherein she indicated she was
driving the motorcycle at the time of the accident. Id. at 25-26. However,
Ms. McLaughlin testified the written statement was “false,” and she gave it to
the police because “[Appellant] talked [her] into it.” Id. at 27. She explained
they were engaged, and since Appellant already had numerous DUI
convictions prior to the accident, she agreed when he asked her to tell the
police she had been driving the motorcycle at the time of the accident. Id.
Ms. McLaughlin testified that, subsequently, in April or May of 2019, she
went to the police barracks and admitted to the police that her written
statement was false. Id. at 28. She testified no one forced her to recant her
written statement, and she regrets ever writing the false statement. Id. Ms.
McLaughlin admitted her romantic relationship with Appellant ended in late
March of 2019. Id. at 29.
Ms. McLaughlin admitted on cross-examination that, in September of
2018, while she was driving Appellant’s truck, she was in an accident and
charged with DUI offenses. Id. at 36-37. She later received one year of
probation and spent forty-eight hours in jail for the offenses. Id. at 48.
Ms. McLaughlin also admitted on cross-examination that she recanted
her written statement approximately one week after she and Appellant ended
their romantic relationship. Id. at 42. She admitted that, after the motorcycle
accident at issue, she told several people she had been driving the motorcycle
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when it crashed. Id. at 46. However, she explained she did so because
Appellant indicated if she “took the rap” she would only get “ARD.” Id. at 47.
On re-direct examination, Ms. McLaughlin testified she neither has a
license to drive a motorcycle nor does she own a motorcycle. Id. at 50. She
testified that, after the motorcycle accident but before the truck accident, she
told a few of her co-workers at a restaurant she had been the driver of the
motorcycle so that, if the police asked around, they would not think Appellant
was the driver. Id. at 53. Ms. McLaughlin testified it was wrong for her to do
this, and she was “sorry.” Id.
At this point, the parties stipulated Appellant’s blood alcohol content at
the time of the accident was .242%. Pennsylvania State Police Trooper
Brandon Haney testified he was on duty and dispatched to the motorcycle
accident at 3:39 p.m. on July 8, 2018. Id. at 60-61. He indicated that, by
the time he arrived at the scene, Appellant had been taken to the hospital by
ambulance, but Ms. McLaughlin remained behind. Id. at 63. The trooper
testified Ms. McLaughlin provided basic information at the scene, including
“that [Appellant], Mr. Monnett, was the operator of the [motorcycle] and that
she was the passenger.” Id.
The trooper further testified that, at the scene, Ms. Bittle related to him
that she had not witnessed the crash; however, she was one of the first people
on the scene, and she assisted Appellant. Id. at 64. Ms. Bittle told the trooper
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Appellant “related to her that he was the operator.” Id. Ms. Bittle also told
the trooper Appellant smelled of alcohol. Id. at 65.
Trooper Haney testified the motorcycle was registered to Appellant. Id.
He noted there were no skid marks at the scene of the accident. Id. at 73.
He further noted there were no adverse weather conditions or obstacles found
in the road to explain why the motorcycle may have crashed. Id. at 76.
Trooper Haney testified he traveled to the hospital to interview
Appellant, but he was denied access because Appellant “wasn’t taking…any
visitors.” Id. Trooper Haney secured a search warrant for Appellant’s hospital
records, which revealed a medical blood sample had been taken from
Appellant at 4:22 p.m. on July 8, 2018, and Appellant’s blood alcohol content
was .242%. Id. at 66.
The defense called Charlotte Lindsey, who is Appellant’s sister, as a
witness. Ms. Lindsey testified she was notified on July 8, 2018, that Appellant
had been in an accident, and she notified his daughter, who is Ms. Lindsey’s
niece. Id. at 79. Ms. Lindsey and her niece traveled to the hospital where
they saw Ms. McLaughlin. Id. at 80.
Ms. Lindsey testified that, at this time, Ms. McLaughlin said nothing
about who had been driving the motorcycle; however, approximately two or
three weeks later, Ms. McLaughlin told Ms. Lindsey she had been driving the
motorcycle at the time of the accident. Id. at 82. Ms. Lindsey indicated Ms.
McLaughlin volunteered this information without being prompted. Id. She
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specifically testified Ms. McLaughlin said, “I was the operator of the
motorcycle; I was trying to take your brother’s life because I wanted his
belongings.” Id. Ms. Lindsey testified that, on four separate occasions
thereafter, Ms. McLaughlin told her she had been driving the motorcycle at
the time of the accident. Id. at 83.
Ms. Lindsey admitted she never saw Ms. McLaughlin driving the
motorcycle; however, she saw her “pushing it around the yard…or sitting on
it.” Id. at 84. She admitted that every time she saw Appellant and Ms.
McLaughlin on the motorcycle Appellant was the one driving. Id. at 93. She
indicated that, in February or March of 2019, Ms. McLaughlin assaulted
Appellant, who was still recovering from brain injuries. Id. at 85.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of the
offenses indicated supra. On October 14, 2020, the trial court sentenced
Appellant, and on October 20, 2020, Appellant filed a timely counseled post-
sentence motion wherein he presented sufficiency and weight of the evidence
claims.2
On January 21, 2021, the trial court filed an order indicating “upon
consideration of the Defendant’s Post-Sentence Motion and Supplemental
Post-Sentence Motion, it is hereby ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the
____________________________________________
2 Thereafter, the trial court permitted Appellant to supplement his post-
sentence motion upon receipt of the trial transcripts, and Appellant again
presented sufficiency and weight of the evidence claims.
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Defendant’s Post-Sentence Motion and Supplemental Post-Sentence Motion
are DENIED.” Trial Court Order, filed 1/21/21 (capitalization in original).
Notably, the trial court’s order failed to inform Appellant of his appellate rights.
On June 14, 2021, Appellant filed a counseled notice of appeal.3 The
trial court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and
Appellant timely complied raising sufficiency and weight of the evidence
claims. The trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues in his “Statement of
the Questions Involved” (verbatim):
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s finding of guilt as to DUI: General Impairment, and DUI:
Highest Rate, because the Commonwealth failed to present
sufficient evidence that Monnett was the operator and driver of
the motorcycle before the accident[?]
2. Whether the trial court’s verdict of guilt as to DUI: General
Impairment and DUI: Highest Rate, was against the weight of
the evidence where the Commonwealth’s evidence did not
establish that Monnett was the operator and driver of the
motorcycle before the accident[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 1 (suggested answers omitted).
Initially, before examining the issues presented by Appellant, we must
determine whether this appeal was timely filed. Where a criminal defendant
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3 On this same date, Appellant filed in the trial court a petition to file a notice
of appeal nunc pro tunc. On August 4, 2021, the trial court filed an order
indicating “the Petition for Nunc Pro Tunc Filing of a Notice of Appeal is
GRANTED. The Defendant is given 30 days within which to perfect an appeal
in this case.” Trial Court Order, filed 8/4/21. Appellant did not file a second
notice of appeal.
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files a timely post-sentence motion, a notice of appeal must be filed within
thirty days from the order denying that motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
720(A)(2)(a). In the case sub judice, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence
motion,4 which the trial court denied on January 21, 2021. Thus, Appellant
had thirty days, until Monday February 22, 2021, to file a timely notice of
appeal.5 Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed on June 14, 2021, which was
clearly late.
However, this Court has excused an untimely notice of appeal where
there has been a breakdown in the trial court’s operations. See
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 499 (Pa.Super. 2007) (holding
despite the general rule that “an appellate court cannot extend the time for
filing an appeal,” this “does not affect the power of courts to grant relief in the
case of fraud or breakdown in the processes of the court”). We have held that
such a breakdown occurs where the trial court fails to abide by Pennsylvania
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4 A written post-sentence motion must generally be filed within ten days after
the imposition of sentence. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1). Here, Appellant was
sentenced on October 14, 2020, and Appellant filed a counseled post-sentence
motion on October 20, 2020. Thus, Appellant’s post-sentence motion was
timely. See id.5Since the thirtieth day fell on a Saturday, February 20, 2021, Appellant would
have had until Monday, February 22, 2021, to file a timely notice of appeal. 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (regarding the computation of time “[w]henever the last
day…shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday by
the laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be
omitted from the computation.”).
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(B)(4)(a), which provides that “[a]n order
denying a post-sentence motion…shall include notice to the defendant of the
following: (a) the right to appeal and the time limits within which the appeal
must be filed[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(4)(a). See Patterson, supra. See
also Commonwealth v. Lehman, No. 379 WDA 2021, 2022 WL 366881(Pa.Super. filed 2/8/22) (unpublished memorandum) (holding that, where the
defendant filed a timely post-sentence motion and the trial court denied the
motion without explaining the defendant’s appeal rights in the order denying
the post-sentence motion under Rule 720(B)(4)(a), a breakdown in the trial
court’s operations occurred such that the defendant’s untimely appeal was
excused); Commonwealth v. Heard, No. 1517 EDA 2019, 2020 WL 7353808(Pa.Super. filed 12/15/20) (unpublished memorandum) (same).6
In the case sub judice, the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s post-
sentence motion did not contain notice to Appellant of the right to appeal or
the time limits within which the appeal must be filed. Thus, we conclude there
was a breakdown in the trial court’s operations such that we shall excuse the
otherwise untimely-filed appeal. See id. Accordingly, we turn to an
examination of the merits of Appellant’s issues.
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6 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of the
Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive
value).
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In his first issue, Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his convictions for DUI-general impairment and DUI-highest rate.7
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the
fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 856-57 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations
omitted).
In this case, Appellant’s sufficiency argument is specific in nature; to
wit, he avers the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was the driver or
operator of the motorcycle at the time the accident occurred. In light of
Appellant’s specific sufficiency claim, we need not conduct a thorough review
of the evidence to determine whether it can support a finding that all of the
elements for DUI-general impairment or DUI-highest rate have been met.
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7 Appellant raises no specific issue as to his remaining convictions.
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Rather, we will focus on the specific issue raised by Appellant: whether the
evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant was operating or driving the
motorcycle when it crashed on July 8, 2018.8
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, as verdict winner, we conclude the evidence sufficiently
establishes Appellant was driving or operating the motorcycle. Specifically,
Ms. Bittle, who came upon the motorcycle crash shortly after it occurred on
July 8, 2018, testified she assisted Appellant, who was badly injured. While
they were waiting for emergency personnel to arrive, Appellant and Ms.
McLaughlin informed Ms. Bittle that Appellant had been driving the motorcycle
at the time the crash occurred. N.T., 10/11/19, at 4-8.
Further, Ms. McLaughlin testified during trial that Appellant was driving
the motorcycle when it suddenly “wreck[ed].” Id. at 21. Also, Trooper Haney
testified he arrived on the scene shortly after Appellant was taken by
ambulance. He testified Ms. McLaughlin provided basic information, including
that Appellant was the operator of the motorcycle and she was a passenger.
Id. at 63.
Based on the aforementioned, and applying our standard of review, we
conclude the evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant was driving or
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8 As Appellant correctly indicates, under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1) and (c),
the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, inter
alia, that Appellant was driving, operating or in actual physical control of the
movement of the motorcycle. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1), (c).
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operating the motorcycle so as to sustain his DUI convictions. See Brooks,
supra.We note we reject Appellant’s claim the evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate that he, as opposed to Ms. McLaughlin, was the driver of the
motorcycle at the time it crashed. In developing his argument, Appellant
points to Ms. McLaughlin’s admission that she provided the police with a signed
notarized written statement indicating she was driving the motorcycle at the
time of the crash, Ms. McLaughlin’s admission that she told people she was
driving the motorcycle, and Appellant’s sister’s testimony that Ms. McLaughlin
told her she was driving the motorcycle at the time of the crash.
We note the trial court, as the finder of fact, was free to weigh the
testimony, and viewing the entire record, the evidence was sufficient to
establish Appellant’s identity as the driver or operator of the motorcycle. See
Brooks, supra. That is, the trial court was free to believe Ms. McLaughlin’s
explanation, and subsequent recantation, of her written statement, as well as
her explanation for why she falsely told people that she, and not Appellant,
had been driving the motorcycle. Simply put, there was sufficient evidence
supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant, as opposed to Ms.
McLaughlin, was the driver or operator of the motorcycle. See Brooks,
supra.- 13 -
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In his final claim, Appellant contends the trial court’s verdict as to the
DUI offenses is against the weight of the evidence.9 Specifically, Appellant
argues the trial court’s finding that he was driving or operating the motorcycle
on July 8, 2018, when it crashed shocks one’s sense of justice in light of the
evidence Ms. McLaughlin was driving or operating the motorcycle. In this
vein, Appellant contends “Ms. McLaughlin’s testimony that [Appellant] was the
operator of the motorcycle is not credible.” Appellant’s Brief at 23. He notes
“Ms. McLaughlin has lied numerous times along with signing a written
statement admitting that she was the operator and telling several people that
she was in fact the operator of the motorcycle, not [Appellant].” Id.When considering challenges to the weight of the evidence, we apply
the following precepts. “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the
finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none[,] or some of the evidence and
to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Talbert,
129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quotation marks and quotation
omitted). Resolving contradictory testimony and questions of credibility are
matters for the finder of fact. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910,
917 (Pa.Super. 2000). It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our
judgment for that of the trier of fact. Talbert, supra.
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9Appellant adequately preserved his weight of the evidence claim as to his
DUI convictions in the lower court. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607. Appellant presents
no challenge to the weight of the evidence as to his remaining convictions.
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Moreover, appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the trial
court’s exercise of discretion in denying the weight challenge raised in the
post-sentence motion; this Court does not review the underlying question of
whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. See id.
Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see
the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable
reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of
the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest
of justice.
Id. at 546 (quotation omitted). Furthermore, “[i]n order for a defendant to
prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so
tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the
court.” Id. (quotation marks and quotation omitted).
Here, the trial court rejected Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim,
and we find no abuse of discretion in this regard. Talbert, supra. We note
the trial court was free to determine the weight and inferences to be drawn
from Ms. McLaughlin’s written statement, as well as her recantation of the
statement. Also, the trial court was free to weigh the evidence pertaining to
Ms. McLaughlin telling various people that she was the driver of the
motorcycle, as well as her explanation that she lied to protect Appellant.
To the extent Appellant requests that we re-weigh the evidence and
assess the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial, we decline to do so
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as it is a task that is beyond our scope of review. See Commonwealth v.
Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1251 (Pa.Super. 2013) (stating that “[a]n appellate
court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact”).
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 09/22/2022
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