Com. v. Lynn, C. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S16038-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    CHRISTOPHER WOLF LYNN                      :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1367 MDA 2021
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 13, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-19-CR-0001244-2019
    BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                      FILED: SEPTEMBER 22, 2022
    Appellant, Christopher Wolf Lynn, appeals from the aggregate judgment
    of sentence of 30 to 60 years’ incarceration, imposed after he pled guilty to
    third-degree murder and robbery.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
    On September 8, 2021, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to third-
    degree murder and robbery for beating a woman to death in a home invasion
    robbery. N.T. Guilty Plea at 6-10. For defendants with Appellant’s prior record
    score, the sentencing guidelines provided standard range minimum sentences
    of 10-20 years for third-degree murder and standard range minimum
    sentences of 66 to 84 months and aggravated range minimum sentences of
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c) and 3701(a)(1)(i), respectively.
    J-S16038-22
    78-96 months for the robbery conviction. 
    204 Pa. Code §§ 303.15
    , 303.16(a);
    Pre-Sentence Report & Guideline Sentence Forms.
    On September 13, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 20 to 40
    years’ incarceration for third-degree murder, which is within the sentencing
    guidelines, to run consecutive to another sentence that Appellant was serving,
    and 10 to 20 years’ incarceration for robbery, to run consecutive to the third-
    degree murder sentence. N.T. Sentencing at 47, 52-54; Sentencing Orders.
    At his sentencing hearing, Appellant presented an expert testimony of a
    psychologist and testimony from Appellant’s mother concerning abuse and
    trauma that Appellant suffered in his childhood, but Appellant chose not to
    speak and did not express any remorse for his crimes. N.T. Sentencing at 5-
    29.     In sentencing Appellant, the trial court stated that it had reviewed the
    pre-sentence report and noted that the robbery sentence was outside the
    sentencing guidelines but explained that departure from the guidelines was
    warranted because of the aggravating factors concerning the crime, the
    extreme violence inflicted on the victim and the killing of the victim, and
    because those aggravating factors far outweighed the mitigation evidence
    presented by Appellant. N.T. Sentencing at 46-54; Robbery Sentencing Order
    at 2.
    Appellant filed a timely petition for reconsideration of sentence.   On
    September 24, 2021, the trial court denied the petition for reconsideration of
    sentence. This timely appeal followed. In this appeal, Appellant argues that
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    the trial court abused its discretion 1) in imposing a sentence for robbery that
    was outside the sentencing guidelines without considering mitigating factors
    and 2) in imposing sentences that are consecutive to each other and
    consecutive to a sentence that Appellant was serving in another case.
    Appellant’s Brief at 7.
    These issues are challenges to the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s
    sentence.   Challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are not
    appealable as of right and may be considered only where the following
    requirements are satisfied: 1) the appellant has preserved the issue in the
    trial court at sentencing or in a motion for reconsideration of sentence; 2) the
    appellant has included in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied
    on for his challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence in accordance
    with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), and 3) the challenge to the sentence raises a
    substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
    the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Dempster, 
    187 A.3d 266
    , 272
    (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Radecki, 
    180 A.3d 441
    ,
    467 (Pa. Super. 2018).
    Appellant has satisfied the first two of these requirements with respect
    to both of his issues. Appellant raised the issues that the robbery sentence
    deviated from the sentencing guidelines, that the trial court failed to consider
    mitigating factors, and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive
    sentences in his petition for reconsideration of sentence.         Petition for
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    Reconsideration of Sentence ¶2(B)-(H), (J)-(K). Appellant has also included
    a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief. Appellant’s Brief at 14-16.
    A substantial question exists where the appellant advances a colorable
    argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were inconsistent with a specific
    provision of the Sentencing Code or were contrary to the fundamental norms
    of the sentencing process. Commonwealth v. DiClaudio, 
    210 A.3d 1070
    ,
    1075 (Pa. Super. 2019); Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d 736
    , 759
    (Pa. Super. 2014).    Appellant in his first issue asserts that the trial court
    imposed a robbery sentence that was outside the sentencing guidelines and
    that the deviation from the guidelines was unreasonable because the trial
    court failed to take mitigating factors into account. This presents a substantial
    question.   42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3) (“The appellate court shall vacate the
    sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if …
    the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the
    sentence is unreasonable”); Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d at 759
    ; Commonwealth v.
    Cunningham, 
    805 A.2d 566
    , 575 (Pa. Super. 2002).
    This issue, however, fails on the merits. Our standard of review on this
    challenge to Appellant’s sentence is well-established:
    Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
    sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
    absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
    of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
    the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
    sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
    judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
    arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
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    DiClaudio, 
    210 A.3d at 1074-75
     (quoting Antidormi).
    The trial court’s imposition of a robbery sentence outside the sentencing
    guidelines was not an abuse of its discretion. While a trial court must consider
    the ranges set forth in the sentencing guidelines when sentencing a defendant,
    the guidelines are not mandatory and the court may deviate from the
    sentencing guidelines, provided that it contemporaneously states an adequate
    reason for imposing a sentence in excess of the guideline ranges. 42 Pa.C.S.
    § 9721(b); Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d at 760
    ; Cunningham, 
    805 A.2d at 575
    .
    Here, the trial court considered and correctly understood the standard and
    aggravated guideline minimum sentence ranges that applied to Appellant and
    stated at sentencing adequate reasons for imposing a sentence outside those
    ranges, the heinous nature of crime, beating the victim to the point that she
    was unrecognizable, and the fact that Appellant killed the victim.         N.T.
    Sentencing at 47-54; Robbery Sentencing Order at 2.
    Appellant’s claim that the trial court did not consider mitigating factors
    is inaccurate. The record shows that the trial court considered the evidence
    of mitigating factors that Appellant presented and the pre-sentence report,
    but found Appellant’s expert psychologist not fully credible and concluded that
    the mitigating evidence, which primarily concerned Appellant’s childhood and
    did not negate his involvement in beating the victim to death or include any
    expression of contrition or remorse by Appellant, was far outweighed by the
    aggravating factors. N.T. Sentencing at 46-47, 49-54; Trial Court Opinion at
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    2-5. Indeed, the trial court specifically considered Appellant’s rehabilitative
    potential in concluding that deviation from the sentencing guidelines was
    necessary. N.T. Sentencing at 49-50.
    Appellant also argues that his robbery sentence is unreasonable because
    it is harsher than his co-defendants’ sentences. This argument fails for two
    reasons.    First, this issue is not properly before us because it is based on
    assertions that are not supported by the certified record in this case. Appellant
    bases this argument on transcripts of his co-defendants’ sentencings in
    different criminal dockets.    Neither of these transcripts, which are dated
    January 19, 2022, over four months after Appellant was sentenced and over
    three months after this appeal was filed, appear in the certified record in this
    case.    Allegations of facts that are not in the certified record cannot be
    considered on appeal. Commonwealth v. Young, 
    317 A.2d 258
    , 264 (Pa.
    1974); Commonwealth v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    , 174 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2010);
    Commonwealth v. Preston, 
    904 A.2d 1
    , 6 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc).
    Second, even if we could consider this argument, it would fail.       As
    Appellant admits, his co-defendants had cooperated in providing evidence
    against Appellant and received negotiated plea deals. Appellant’s Brief at 22-
    23; N.T. Sentencing at 39. The fact that a co-defendant receives a lighter
    sentence as a result of such a negotiated plea does not constitute a basis for
    finding an otherwise reasonable sentence unreasonable. Commonwealth v.
    Ali, 
    197 A.3d 742
    , 764 (Pa. Super. 2018); Moury, 
    992 A.2d at 171, 174
    .
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    Appellant’s second issue, that the trial court abused its discretion in
    imposing consecutive sentences, does not raise a substantial question. A trial
    court has discretion to impose sentences consecutively to other sentences
    imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed in other cases,
    and a challenge to the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a
    substantial question.   Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 
    107 A.3d 127
    , 133 (Pa.
    Super. 2014); Moury, 
    992 A.2d at 171
    ; Commonwealth v. Pass, 
    914 A.2d 442
    , 446–47 (Pa. Super. 2006). The imposition of consecutive, rather than
    concurrent, sentences can raise a substantial question in only the most
    extreme circumstances, where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh
    considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.
    Radecki, 180 A.3d at 469-70; Moury, 
    992 A.2d at 171-72
    . Here, while the
    length of imprisonment imposed is great, it is not extreme in relation to the
    very violent and serious crimes that Appellant committed, a third-degree
    murder and a robbery in which he beat the victim to death.
    Because Appellant has not shown that the trial court abused its
    discretion in the sentence that it imposed for his robbery conviction and his
    challenge to the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for his crimes
    does not raise a substantial question that his sentence is not appropriate under
    the Sentencing Code, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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    J-S16038-22
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 09/22/2022
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